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-Abstract- 
The fifth enlargement of the EU to include Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) 
has led to the creation of new policy instruments, which will become a common feature in 
future enlargement rounds of the Community. Drawing on policy transfer literature and new 
forms of governance, this thesis explores the role of the EU and its administrative 
conditionality in shaping the public administration reforms in Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE). It analyses the introduction of the "twinning exercise" within the context of the 1997 
reforms of the enlargement strategy. This is followed by a discussion of the procedural 
changes which had to be introduced in order to facilitate the secondment of member states' 
civil servants to administrations in CEE. While emphasizing a new tendency in EU 
policyrnaking, the use of the semi-voluntary forms of coordination among its member states 
and the applicants, it is argued that the substantive policies of the enlargement process allow 
for the transfer of institutional models and implementation structures from current member 
states to the applicants. As a result, the EU's conditionality on administrative capacities at 
sectoral level has gained momentum from the engagement of member states' civil servants in 
the accession process, although resistance in many of the applicants' ministries has partially 
prevented full compliance with the acquis communautaire. The thesis regards the 
introduction of the twinning exercise as mainly driven by lesson-drawing. It argues that, in 
the long run, the policy outcome of twinning projects is convergence in form of hybridisation 
rather than compliance on the basis of 'full transfer'. 
PAG 
NUlVIBERING 
AS ORIGINAL 
Introduction 
Reforming the EU's pre-accession strategy 
The fifth enlargement of the European Union (EU) marks a decisive juncture in the 
history of Europe. Since the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 
1957 enlargement has remained a recurrent feature of European politics. The first phase 
of enlargement saw the inclusion of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom in 1973, 
followed by Greece in 1981 as well as Portugal and Spain in 1986. Finally, the accession 
process for Austria, Finland and Sweden occurred at the same time as the EU developed a 
common policy for the transition democracies in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). 
However, there has been more than one model of accession: the inclusion of the German 
Democratic Republic (GDR) into the EC through German unification was a more subtle 
and less negotiated form of enlargement. This chapter outlines the focus of research and 
some of the key theoretical considerations including the hypotheses which are tested 
through empirical research. It also briefly explains the epistemological and 
methodological foundations of the thesis, both of which had a considerable influence on 
the findings of this work. 
In 1997, the EU reinforced the pre-accession strategy by introducing a number of new 
measures which came into effect with the beginning of the enlargement negotiations in 
March 1998. The aim of this package of reforms was to accelerate the accession process 
which ran parallel with the negotiations in order to ensure that candidates would be able 
to fulfil the obligations of membership. Accordingly, the pre-accession strategy, which 
had originally been decided at the 1994 Essen European Council, was given a careful 
reassessment. All three pillars of the strategy, the Europe Agreements, the structured 
16 
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dialogue and Phare (the EU's aid programme for CEE applicant countries), became 
subject to significant changes. 
In mid- July 1997, the Commission published Volume 11 of Agenda 2000 (Reinforcing 
the pre-accession strategy), which set out an agenda for far-reaching changes in the EU's 
enlargement policy. A first set of reform measures, highlighted in this document, was 
designed to strengthen the links between the 1993 Copenhagen criteria and the conduct of 
the institutions under the pre-accession strategy (see Chpt. 6 on the APs' and NPAAs 2). 
The Copenhagen summit in 1993 defined these conditions in terms of economic and 
political criteria, as well as the ability to assume the obligations of membership. 
Subsequently, the Madrid European Council in 1995 explicitly highlighted the 
significance, not only of translating the acqUis 3 into national legislation, but also of 
ensuring its effective application and implementation through suitable administrative 
structures. 
A second set of reform measures were aimed at changing the Phare programme into a 
more accession-driven instrument. In light of the Madrid conclusions, particular emphasis 
was placed on its ability to create effective administrative and judicial structures which 
were able to facilitate the implementation of the acquis communautaire. This resulted in 
the introduction of two new elements within Phare: Firstly, an enhanced participation in 
Community programmes would enable applicants to take part in selected policy areas 
before accession. Secondly, the introduction of a twinning exercise would enable the 
long-term secondment of member states' practitioners to CEE institutions. These two 
measures became the backbone of the EU's reinforced pre-accession strategy with 
regards to institution-building. The twinning exercise, in particular, led to a departure 
from the practice of recruiting consultants to manage programmes for institution-building 
and instead favoured sending member states' civil servants. Although technical assistance 
from consultants has still been utilised after these reforms came into effect, twinning 
became the main instrument for influencing the administrative and judicial capacity 
building processes in candidate countries. As a result, consultants were strictly excluded 
from efforts to enhance administrative capacities, but became only involved when, for 
1 Accession Partnerships (APs). 
2 National Programmes for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAAs). 
3 Acquis = short for acquis communautaire, a French term which is widely used as a reference to 
the body of laws, policies and guidelines in the EU which have evolved over time. See also 
Glossary of terms, p. 256. A number of authors have addressed this expression in more concrete 
terms (Auddoud 2002; Lindahl 2003; Wiener 1998; Bellier 2004; Pelkmans 2002). 
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example, computer equipment needed to be installed to implement institution-building 
projects. 
A number of other changes were made to develop the candidates' capacity to absorb large 
financial transfers in relation to structural and agricultural policies. These measures were 
formerly embedded in Phare and therefore came under the responsibility of DG 
Enlargement. However, after the 1997 reform, DG Regional Policy was given 
responsibility for the allocations that matched the Cohesion Fund whereas agriculture and 
rural development programmes were placed under the supervision of DG Agriculture (see 
Chpt. 6 on ISPA 4 and SAPARD 5 ). The responsibility for managing the EU's economic 
and social cohesion programmes, however, remained with DG Enlargement, although the 
Commission originally also gave consideration to moving these programmes to DG 
Regional Policy's sphere of competence. The introduction of ISPA and SAPARD were 
largely supported by twinning projects which aimed to enable the candidates to make 
optimal use of these financial instruments. 
L. ____ 
Legend: Yellow Pre-May 1,2004 EU Members; Blue May 1,2004 Acceding Members; 
Lavender = Post-May 1,2004 Candidate Countries. 
Source: European Commission. Phare & TACIS Information Centre 
Figure 1: ELI enlargement map6 
4 Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (ISPA), Council Regulation 1267/99. 
5 Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural DeNelopment (SAPARD), Council 
Regulation 1268/99. 
6A map including the neighbouring countries of the enlarged European Union is included in 
Appendix 1. 
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I The focus of research 
This thesis evaluates policy formulation (internal governance), policy implementation 
(external governance), and considers possible policy outcomes in relation to a particular 
pre-accession instrument. It offers an in-depth analysis of the formulation and 
implementation of the twinning exercise, and outlines possible outcomes of twinning 
projects in the candidate countries. In short, it examines the introduction of the twinning 
exercise and its subsequent implementation. At the same time, the thesis tests alternative 
hypotheses and analyses the utility of the theories underpinning these statements. The 
rationale behind the alternative hypotheses approach is discussed in greater detail in 
Section 3. 
The concept of conditionality has often been examined from the applicants' point of 
view, i. e. from the receiving end of EU policies (Mattli and PlUmper 2002). This is even 
more prevalent in the current literature which tends to focus on the issue of general or 
horizontal and sectoral administrative capacities in CEECs (Tony Verheijen 1999; AJ. G. 
VerheiJen 2000; Meyer-Sahling 2001,2004; Lippert et al. 2001; Goetz and Wollmann 
2001). This increasing interest in the impact of the enlargement process on candidate 
countries has heightened the need for a clearer understanding of the accession 
instruments. Although considerable research has been devoted to analyzing the influence 
of various EU actors in CEE, rather less attention has been paid to the creation of new 
accession instruments which aim to achieve the objectives of the EU in this region. 7SO, 
while focusing on the formulation of the EU's policies regarding institution-building, this 
thesis aims to complement the existing literature on the subject of transforming CEE 
administrations with a view to accession. In this context, it shows the extent to which the 
EU's emerging administrative conditionality regime relied on creating opportunities for 
the applicant countries to learn from their future peers. Finally, the thesis seeks to explain 
the reforms in 1997, their implementation and the continuous reshaping of the twinning 
instrument up until 2002. However, this research also aims to facilitate theory-building on 
the issue of enlargement and the EU's policy in relation to applicant states. 
1.1 Hypotheses 
This research essentially poses main two questions: 
1. Internal governance. What factors can account for the introduction of the 
twinning exercise and which sources of information were critical for its 
formulation? 
7 Some of the contributions published on this particular subject date quite early in the process, 
before the instruments were actually implemented (Grabbe and Hughes 1998: 2; Baun 2000). 
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2. External governance. What type of accession instrument is the twinning exercise 
and how does it influence candidates to reform their institutions? 
This thesis sets out to evaluate different potential answers to these questions. These 
answers are developed in the form of alternative hypotheses. The section below 
introduces the hypotheses that have been confirmed on basis of the empirical evidence 
collected during the research process. Chapter 4 outlines the alternative hypotheses for 
each stage of the process. 
Policyformulation: Internal governance 
The first set of hypotheses is concerned with the introduction of the twinning exercise 
from 1997 to 1999. Several hypotheses are considered as a number of explanations 
appear to be plausible. However, on basis of empirical testing, this thesis asserts that the 
European Commission 8 due to its ability to draw lessonsfrom the experience of other aid 
donors has been crucial in creating the twinning exercise by determining its objectives, 
procedures and content. This is a unexpected finding since most research on emulation 
focuses on cross-national policy transfer rather than on transfer between donor 
organizations. However, it can be shown that the introduction of twinning would not have 
turned out this way if the Commission had not involved a consultant with a firm 
background in similar operations. Thus, the experience this consultant gained during the 
implementation of twinning projects for the World Bank and USAID were essential for 
formulating the implementation procedures of the twinning exercise. The thesis also 
found that the involvement of this consultant was important to when dealing with path 
dependencies in the Commission which existed in form of standard working procedures 
for the implementation of Phare. 
Policy implementation: External governance 
The second set of hypotheses addresses the implementation of the twinning exercise and 
its role as an instrument of the EU's enlargement strategy. After careful consideration of 
three plausible alternatives, the thesis stipulates that the EU aimed to offer the candidates 
opportunities for learning and the transfer of administrative procedures and therefore 
designed the twinning exercise as a newform ofgovernance that provides a flexible and 
participatory approach to implementation. The view of twinning as a new form of 
governance contrasts to the conclusions of many scholars of EU enlargement who have 
characterised accession instruments as the means of applying the EU's conditionality to a 
process that is determined by the asymmetric relationship between the Commission and 
8 From hereaftcr Commission. 
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candidate states (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004; Schimmelfennig 2004; 
Schimmelfennig et aL 2003a, 2003b; Grabbe 2001). This thesis, however, shows that 
accession instruments demonstrated considerable flexibility in how they operated so as to 
accommodate the preferences of candidate countries, thereby allowing for a more 
efficient implementation process. In addition, implementation was far less centralized 
than is often suggested in the literature. Thus, the conclusion here is that conditionality 
played an important role. However, the twinning exercise should not be viewed as an 
instrument of coercive policy transfer and therefore it does not support a direct strategy of 
reinforcement by reward. 
Domestic outcomes 
Some preliminary findings regarding the outcomes in candidate countries, elaborated 
finther in Chapter 3, lead to the conclusion that the long-term outcome of twinning 
projects was convergence of administrative structures, procedures and "Ways of doing 
things'. Individual projects may have also resulted in some form of sustained cooperation 
between the project partners, but this was not a necessary element of the process. 
These findings are, however, not rigorously tested against the empirical material as it 
would go beyond the scope of this thesis. The rationale behind the inclusion of this aspect 
is to draw a complete picture of the three stages of the decision-making process which are 
further outlined in Chapters 3 and 4. This approach enables a greater understanding of the 
various factors that were considered by decision-makers during the introduction of the 
implementation procedures for twinning projects. After all, policy formulation and 
implementation are not ends in themselves, but they rather serve to achieve particular 
policy outcomes. The thesis demonstrates that decision-makers within DGIA sought to 
avoid policy resistance by bureaucrats in the candidate countries and indeed aimed for the 
long-term convergence of administrative structures between the member states and the 
candidates. There was little false hope raised within the Commission that the candidates 
would be able to implement the entire acquis communautaire after accession. In contrastý 
policyrnakers sought to manoeuvre the candidates into better positions to reach this goal 
once they had become members of the Community. 
1.2 Dependent and Independent variables 
On basis of the above, the dependent variables can be identified as the introduction and 
implementation of the twinning exercise as a case study of how certain elements of the 
pre-accession strategy were reformed in 1997 and implemented thereafter. The 
independent variables are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3 and assessed in 
Chapters 6-9, but they can be stated here as lesson-drawing, policy transfer, deliberation, 
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evaluation and internal assessments as well as conditionality, social learning and 
enhanced cooperation. 
As a case study, the twinning of institutions is particularly interesting, since its 
implementation involves the Commission, the member states and the applicants; most 
other accession instruments do not include this kind of cooperation. In addition, the 
candidates' ability to implement the acquis communautaire and participate at the 
supranational level will largely determine the effectiveness at which the enlarged EU will 
function (Nicolaides 2003). In this respect, the accession process has the potential to 
indirectly reinforce the enlarged EU's capacity to act (cf Curtin and Van Ooik 2000; 
Philippart and Ho 2001). A closer understanding of the EU's enlargement policy is also 
important in view of the relations with current candidate countries and associates which 
might join the list of applicants in the future. 
2 Towards an analysis of public policy reform in the European Union 
This section addresses the issue of how the EU makes decisions over policies that affect 
applicant countries. The presentation of the theoretical underpinning of the thesis is 
divided into two sections. Firstly, emphasis is placed on concepts and assumptions 
deriving from the enlargement literature. Secondly, this section introduces different 
modes of governance in the EU, including lesson-drawing and policy transfer, which are 
employed as conceptual frameworks for the empirical analysis. The section also outlines 
possible responses by the applicant countries. An interesting and practical definition of 
governance derives from Scharpf's (1997: 195) actor-centred institutionalism which 
defines policy as 'the outcome of the interactions of resourceful and boundedly rational 
actors whose capabilities, preferences, and perceptions are largely but not completely, 
shaped by the institutionalized norms within which they interact'. This description is 
selected as the working definition of actors' behaviour in this thesis. 
2.1 Theoretical assumptions 
An important assumption within the academic literature concerning the EU's external 
policies is that it negotiates internally in order to determine its external policies. Friis 
(1996; 1998), for example, has highlighted that this constitutes a paradox, in the sense 
that a negotiation system negotiates. Consequently, all EU internal actors, including the 
institutions and the member states, can be defined as insiders which decide over the 
content of policies regarding outsiders (cf His 1996). This insider-outsider model helps 
focus our analysis of the EU's policy in respect to CEE, while it is also a fair depiction of 
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the EU's enlargement policy. As a direct result of assuming an EU-internal decision 
game, this research can thus concentrate on interviewing decision-makers within the EU 
rather than actors in applicant states. 
This distinction between insiders and outsiders is therefore a useful starting point for this 
research project. Insiders can decide among themselves what constitutes policy 
formation. As a result, they can also potentially determine the policy outputs as they have 
influence over the objectives, content and procedures of pre-accession instruments (see 
also Collinson 1999; His 1998). This process of formulating internally the policies 
towards outsiders is referred to as internal governance in this thesis. In the accession 
negotiations this theoretical position is matched by the arbitration of European Union 
Common Positions (EUCPs) between the member states, which are usually facilitated by 
a Commission proposal called Draft Common Position (DCP). These EUCPs become 
then the basis for the talks between the candidate countries and the Council Presidency, 
which is in charge of conducting the accession negotiations. Other instruments financed 
through the Phare programme include a number of steering mechanisms during 
programming of the projects. These allow the Commission and its delegations to exert 
considerable control over their content. The fact that the EU is a negotiation system 
within itself also allows the EU negotiators to portray their room of manoeuvre as limited 
by the consensus reached between the member states and the Commission (Friis and 
Murphy 1999; His 1996). 
As mentioned above, decision-makers were not obliged to take into account the positions 
of the candidate countries into account. However, they could have chosen to cooperate 
with candidates in order to achieve better outcomes. In fact, the EU's decision to open 
membership negotiations with the remaining CEECs in 1999 has largely been considered 
to have been more influenced by the Kosovo Crisis than by the applicants' preference for 
membership (Friis and Murphy 2000b: 767ff.; Phinnemore 2001: 102). Following the 
NATO bombing campaign of March-June 1999, the Union's performance within the 
framework of the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe (SEE) became 'a test of the 
EU's credibility' (Friis and Murphy 2000b: 769). This stance saw a higher priority over 
the applicants' interests and preferences. Thus, at the Helsinki summit in 1999, the 
European Council chose to open accession negotiations with the remaining CEE 
applicants,. the so-called 'Helsinki group', or 'laggards' (Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Romania and Slovakia). In other situations, the EU faces considerable problems in terms 
of resources and implementation capacity. It therefore relied, for example, on the 
cooperation of aid recipients to achieve optimal results. 
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In addition, Peterson and Bomberg (1999) have argued that there are different levels of 
EU decision-making: supersysternic, systemic and subsystemic levels. These ultimately 
include different actors in the decision-making process. There is no doubt that these 
levels of policy-making closely correspond to the reality of day-to-day policy-making, 
although, as with all classifications, they should not be regarded as strict dividing lines. 
The decisions that influenced the reform agenda of the pre-accession strategy in 1997, for 
example, are likely to be taken at a lower level of policy-making than the decisions 
concerning the membership of certain applicants in the EU. 
2.2 Modes of governance in the European Union 
Alongside these assumptions on internal governance games and levels of policy-making, 
it is important to stress that the EU had to make use of different modes of governance in 
order to successfully implement the accession process. In this sense, enlargement can be 
compared with the external policies of the EU, since the Commission cannot simply 
apply the Community method that has the sole aim of passing legislation in the Council 
of Ministers. 
The governance approach has emerged as a fairly common theme among writers 
analysing the EU's eastern enlargement (Friis and Murphy 2000a; Jacoby 2001b; Baun 
2000; Murphy 1996; Grabbe 2001). In particular, Nis and Murphy (1999: 212-13) argue 
that the governance school of European integration can overcome the theoretical gap in 
enlargement studies by providing the analytical tools necessary to analyse the interplay 
between EU policies towards the CEECs and the EU's internal development as a system 
of governance. The authors maintain hat governance provides a conceptual bridge 
between the domestic and the international. Firstly, it focuses on how the EU's system of 
governance affects its capacity to act towards outsiders. Secondly, the very concept of 
governance allows an analysis of how outsiders make an effort to influence decisions 
taken between EU insiders. This is further emphasized by their notion of governing 
beyond boundaries, in which the boundaries of integration are defined as the geopolitical, 
institutional/legal, transactional and cultural heritage of the EU (M. Smith 1996: 13-18; 
His and Murphy 1999: 216). 
As the accession process approached, the EU used the malleability of these boundaries in 
order to govern beyond its territory. This was, for example, achieved by lowering the 
transactional boundary in the form of a bilateral trade agreement between the EU and an 
applicant state. Interestingly, the EU's efforts under the pre-accession strategy could be 
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seen as a way of facilitating the transfer9 of already existing institutional/legal and 
cultural templates to the applicant states (Jacoby 2001b; His and Murphy 1999). This 
process of extending the EU's authority to the candidate countries is referred to as 
extemal govemance in this thesis. Since enlargement entails the incorporation of vast 
amount of legislation, up to 80.000 pages, the development of a consistent strategy 
became an essential task for policy-makers in the EU. The development of such a strategy 
would assist applicants in overcoming these obstacles and also provide clear incentives to 
learn from their future peers. 
2.3 Conditionality, policy transfer and new forms of governance 
A key argument developed in this research is that the EUs ability to govern beyond its 
boundaries has been facilitated by strategies of conditionality, policy transfer and new 
forms of governance. The use of political and economic conditionality within the 
framework of enlargement has meant for candidates, among other things, that they have 
to comply with regulations, resolutions and directives deriving from the acquis 
communautaire. This implies that membership is made conditional on the gradual 
incorporation of the terms enshrined in the geopolitical, institutional/legal, transactional 
and cultural heritage of the EU (M. Smith 1996: 13-18; Friis and Murphy 1999: 216). In 
addition, the introduction of administrative conditionality into the implementation of the 
EU's pre-accession instruments has pressured candidates into adopting particular 
administrative structures. 
The more recent literature on the EUs conditionality has focused solely on the impact of 
the accession criteria on applicant states, rather than analysing and evaluating the 
substantive policies involved in implementing the enlargement strategy (Grabbe 2001; 
Lippert et al. 200 1; Dimitrova 2002). However, it is suggested here that real meaning can 
only be given to terms such as 'conditionality' or 'compliance' through the analysis of 
substantive policies, such as the conduct of accession negotiations, Phare, ISPA, and 
SAPARD. This could also inform future policy regarding enlargement rounds with 
Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey, or with countries in the Western Balkans. This allows us 
to question whether the development of explicit conditionality terms with the 1997 reform 
has made any significant difference to the enlargement process and also former 
enlargement processes (Vachudova 2001: 5; Jacoby 200 1 b: 189; 2004: 198; Sasse 2004). 
9 The terms transfer, imitation, emulation, borrowing and mimesis are used interchangeably in this 
thesis for stylistic variety. A differentiation between policy transfer, convergence and diffusion 
studies is introduced in Chapter 2. 
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In their efforts to comply with the acquis communautaire, applicants needed to look at 
their Western European counterparts, therefore political elites in CEE have 'often sought 
to imitate Western organizational and institutional models' (Jacoby 2001b: 169). This led 
naturally to some degree of borrowing based on institutional models and templateslo, 
promoted by consultants, bureaucrats and scholars, who were all keen to uphold 
particular foreign models as solutions. In particular, Wade Jacoby has highlighted this 
dimension of CEE transformation processes in various publications (Jacoby 1999,2000, 
200 1 a, 200 1 b). 
However, as the process evolved over time, accession became a more urgent issue on the 
agenda. After concerns regarding the rule of law and democratic institutions were 
gradually met, the EU started to consider policy instruments which would enable the 
transfer of institutional models for the implementation of the acquis communautaire. 
Since the acquis only referred implicitly to which structures were needed to implement 
certain policies, administrative reform emerged as a particular sensitive area of 
transformation for the EU to touch on. This involved pushing sovereign states towards 
particular reform measures in their public administrations, entities which were often seen 
as a reflection of society (Waterman and Wood 1991; Mintzberg 1983; Mohr 1973). 
While formulating a policy on these necessary changes, the EU could not fall back on any 
general body of European law in the public administration sphere, since the subsidiarity 
principle acknowledges that member states are free to organise their public 
administrations as they please (OECD 1998: 13). 
In other policy areas, where the sovereignty of the member states has been a persistent 
feature, similar tensions have led to the creation of new forms of governance, such as the 
European Employment Strategy (EES) or the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) as a 
means of enabling the member states to draw on the experience of their peers (Regent 
2003; Tronti 1998; Trubek and Mosher 2001; de la Porte et aL 2001). At the 
implementation stage, both the OMC and the EES may result in lesson-drawing or cross- 
national policy transfer if member states are willing to make use of these new forms of 
governance. As a general rule, political elites are interested in drawing information and 
ideas from 'the actions of their counterparts in other jurisdictions' (Bennett 1997: 213) 
with the intention of fostering accountability and increasing efficiency. Several authors 
10 1 would agree with Wade Jacoby's definition of these terms. In his words, institutional models 
refer to organizational structures and the informal rules and laws propagated through structures. 
The term does not include uncodified norms, routines, and mentalities (Jacoby 2001b: footnote 1). 
The term institutional template refers to particular institutional models based on a real life 
example. 
Introduction: Reforming the EU's pre-accession strategy 27 
have documented how policy transfer has become a resource for national policy-makers 
who systematically make use of policy goals, policy contenL policy instruments, policy 
programmes, institutions, ideologies, ideas and attitudes, and negative lessons from other 
nations (Rose 1991: 5-6; 1993; Dolowitz and Marsh 1996; 2000: 12; Dolowitz 2000a; 
Bennett 1997). Furthermore, the emerging debate on the Europeanization of policy- 
making has also largely incorporated the notion of policy transfer, either implicitly or 
explicitly, as a way of giving emphasis to the fact that European integration encourages 
cross-national policy transfer and policy convergence (Knill 2005; Heichel et aL 2005; 
Radaelli 2003b; Bomberg and Peterson 2000; Knill 2001). 
In a number of these contributions, conditionality has already been identified as one of 
the key triggering factors for borrowing and transfer (Dolowitz 2000a: 1; Dolowitz and 
Marsh 2000: 9&13; Stone 2003: 11&18). At the same time, transfer can be facilitated by 
various factors, in particular the establishment of policy networks, epistemic 
communities, or other forums of resource and information exchange (Dolowitz and 
Marsh 2000; Radaelli 2000,1999b). Several elements of policy transfer identified in the 
literature are clearly evident in the enlargement process. Both policy instruments, such as 
the twinning exercise, and framework documents, such as the APs, could be seen as 
components of policy transfer as they were aimed at establishing similar institutional 
structures in the applicant states with those in the member states. 
As modes of governance, lesson-drawing and policy transfer enable decision-makers to 
utilize an alternative evidence-base to their usual resources of internal policy assessment 
and evaluation. In contrast to evidence-based policy making, policy transfer places 
emphasis on searching for alternative models of implementation, rather than improving 
existing programmes or engaging in designing new programmes with often unknown 
costs and consequences (cf Rose 2001: 1). This makes it a uniquely useful tool of 
prospective policy evaluation, especially where decision-makers have decided that a 
completely new model of implementation is necessary (Rose 1991; 1993: 32ff. ). National 
administrations are likely to compare their models of implementing and coordinating EU 
policies with those of other member states (Knill 1999). 
This dimension of EU membership has become an important element of the enlargement 
process. As the accession process continued, applicant countries had to consider more 
effective ways of implementing and coordinating EU policies. However, since 
administrations in CEE faced strong constraints in terms of budgetary provisions, it was 
only in response to the EU's pre-accession strategy, and in context of the accession 
negotiations, that real change in public administrations could be expected. The 
effectiveness of pre-accession instruments also relied upon the applicants' cooperation, 
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since the reinforced pre-accession strategy put particular emphasis on the decentralization 
of implementation. The following section describes the epistemological and 
methodological approaches adopted in this thesis. 
3 The triangulation of quantitative and qualitative research 
The research methodology rests firmly on the triangulation of observations from elite 
interviewing, document analysis and quantitative data analysis. The combination of these 
three approaches was applied within the framework of the case study. Thus for example, 
elite interviewing rounds were improved by analysing relevant documents beforehand. 
This enhanced the quality of discussions during interviewing and resulted in more 
concrete research outcomes. The quantitative data was particularly useful for answering 
questions in relation to the involvement of member states and applicant countries in the 
twinning exercise. However, the statistics on the participation of the countries in twinning 
programmes alone would not have led to an overall understanding of the implementation 
process. A number of interviewees pointed to the fact that some countries, for example, 
handed in "fake" proposals to circumvent in particular the Commission's eagerness to 
publish statistics on implementation, thereby exaggerating their involvement in official 
records (see Chpt. 7, p. 196-199). 
Comparative research designs can benefit from this type of triangulation, since it enables 
the research to capture multi-causality, while identifying the more important factors 
determining decisions in public policy-making (Mcneill 1985: 122-23). Researchers 
conducting an examination of a particular case study are often faced with difficult choices 
between alternative explanations on how decisions were taken (Allison and Zelikow 
1999). There is, therefore, a growing consensus in the social sciences that this 
phenomenon can be confronted by defining plausible rival hypotheses which are then 
tested against the empirical evidence (Campbell 1997; Campbell and Stanley 1971). 
These hypotheses should be based on the most promising theories in the field of study. 
The empirical test ensures that the research achieves clarity over the utility of the theories 
when attempting to address to answer the questions posed in the research project. 
As a result, the aim of social science research should not be to bend the empirical 
evidence to the needs of the authors' preferred theoretical perspective, but rather the 
research outcomes should be utilised to evaluate alternative explanations and to 
reconstruct reality in quasi-experimental fashion. This approach enables scholars to 
improve existing theoretical models on the basis of the observed phenomena and find 
causal relationships that are otherwise ignored (Popper 1989; Campbell 1994; Denzin 
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1978; Lakatos 1970). The case study method can become an important means during the 
research process. It can facilitate the triangulation of sources and methods because it 
minimizes the time constraints under which researchers operate (Yin 1994: 91f). This is 
the main strength of the case study method: it allows the research to collect data from a 
number of sources and therefore shed light on a question from different perspectives. Yin 
(1994: 92, emphasis added) remarks in this context that 'the use of multiple sources of 
evidence in case studies allows an investigator to address a broader range of historical, 
attitudinal, and behavioural issues and ... the development of converging lines of 
inquiry'. 
As mentioned above, this study has chosen elite interviewing, document analysis and 
quantitative analysis as methods of data collection. This strategy enriched the 
understanding of the process significantly as the lines of inquiry deriving from these 
methods complemented each other very effectively. Following Yin (1994: 94f. ), the 
research process started with the establishment of a separate data collection. This 
consisted of a chronology of events; statistics on the candidate countries; statistics on 
Phare and the twinning exercise; a compilation of documents; and elite interviews (see 
Appendix 1-3 and Annexes). The bibliography in particular includes a section that points 
to the more important documents and secondary sources used during the research process 
(see Bibliography, p. 169). These steps ensure that other researchers will find it easier to 
use the case study material in their own research or enable them to review the evidence 
directly without being limited to the material used in the empirical chapters. Such a 
strategy, as Yin (1994: 95) rightly points out, also increases the overall reliability of the 
entire case study. 
In addition, the thesis has benefited from the author's five months in-service training 
period in DG Enlargement, which facilitated access to further interviews and relevant 
documents. An ongoing reform of the twinning exercise concerning the introduction of a 
joint twinning manual between the EuropeAid Cooperation Office and DG Enlargement 
also permitted the author to attend meetings which discussed the implementation 
procedures of the programmes in detail. Further methodological considerations are 
presented in the subsequent chapter. 
4 Conclusion and outline of the thesis 
This chapter has introduced the aims and objectives of the thesis. It also outlined the 
research topic and the main theoretical debate that will be further examined in Chapters 3 
and 4. It identified the introduction and implementation of the twinning exercise as the 
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dependent variable and clarified that the independent variables will be identified by 
alternative hypotheses which the thesis tests against the empirical evidence collected 
during the research process. 
This thesis is divided into two parts: Part I explores the methodology, theories and 
concepts that may help to explain the EU's enlargement policy. It examines the EU's 
enlargement policy and discusses how it has been perceived in academic circles, and its 
likely impact in the CEE. Part 11 discusses the development of the EU's enlargement 
policy and its reform in 1997. It then addresses the EU's administrative and judicial 
capacity criterion, the introduction of the twinning exercise, its implementation, and the 
examination of concrete examples. This section also provides a brief evaluation of the 
twinning exercise. 
I 
Theory and methodology 
Introduction 
The analysis of the EU's policy towards the newly emerging democracies in CEE at first 
received the most attention in the debate concerning the enlargement process (Lippert and 
Schneider 1995b). However, the more recent interest in the impact of enlargement 
policies on candidate countries has heightened the need for a better understanding of the 
accession instruments. The renewed emphasis on the effects of enlargement has led to 
discussions which investigate the domestic outcomes of enlargement policies (Jacoby 
2004; Hughes et aL 2004b; Goetz and Wollmann 2001; Zubek 2001). The clear emphasis 
on the domestic effects of enlargement policies enables these studies to participate in a 
debate with scholars studying Europeanization, transition, and compliance. This results in 
interesting and challenging research agendas that have been confined to analyzing 
changes in the applicant countries. However, little information is available on the 
introduction and operation the accession instruments such as Phare, ISPA and SAPARD. 
Some scholars, however, concentrate their research on studying particular instruments 
with more concrete results (Papadimitriou and Phinnemore 2004; Tulmets 2005b). This 
thesis falls into the latter category. It aims to analyze the EU's enlargement policy with 
respect to the introduction and implementation of a particular instrument. It thereby 
complements the findings on the EU's influence on applicant countries by shedding light 
on the external pressures that are often manifest the form of concrete accession 
instruments. 
Helen Wallace (2000a) still referred to EU enlargement as a neglected subject. This has 
certainly changed. There are numerous special issues and edited collections on the subject 
stretching across a wide range of issues. The amount of comprehensive empirical studies 
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on enlargement-related issues is also considerable (see e. g. DIW 2001). However, in 
comparison to the large body of literature that is now available on the fifth enlargement, 
relatively little attention has been paid to the reforms of 1997 that led to a complete 
transformation of the EU's enlargement policies (see Baun 2000: 101-03; Tulmets 2003b; 
Steffens 2003; Grabbe 2001; Vachudova 2004: 125-38; Grabbe and Hughes 1998: 55- 
70). In theoretical terms, the prominence of studies on the effects of enlargement has 
largely turned the accession instruments into independent variables, thereby often 
neglecting their origins and character. This led, for example, to a widespread neglect of 
the fact that Phare, ISPA and SAPARD are not only pre-accession instruments, but also 
aid programmes. In the literature on enlargement, there is hardly any reference to what 
this means in terms of programme implementation and management. As a result, quite a 
large number of contributions are limited to statements on conditionality without further 
specifying the effects of the EU's accession instruments. 
In addition, contributions that actually have focused on the reforms of 1997 either come 
in the form of textbooks or do not develop any applicable theories (Grabbe 2001,2002; 
Baun 2000; Lippert 2000a; Grabbe and Hughes 1998). This part of the thesis responds to 
this gap in the literature by defining an accession instrument as a dependent variable. The 
focus therefore lies on explaining the introduction and implementation of twinning based 
on several plausible rival hypotheses. Such a research strategy poses a challenge as most 
of the enlargement literature remains largely atheoretical (cf His and Murphy 2000a: 
212; H. Wallace 2000b: 149-50; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2002: 500-01). In fact, 
Philippe Schmitter (1996: 14) once noted that 'all the discussion about widening vs. 
deepening is taking place in a theoretical vacuum'. It follows that next to concepts taken 
from enlargement studies, the theoretical chapters have to incorporate ideas from 
institutionalist integration and decision-making theory. 
These different strands of literature offer a number of insights into the workings of the 
EU as a decision-making institution. At the same time, the strategy of defining plausible 
rival hypotheses generates a number of models that could also be applied to different 
cases such as ISPA, SAPARD, and cross-border cooperation under Phare. This research 
strategy is closely connected to recent attempts to theorize Eastern enlargement and its 
impact on applicant countries (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005b, 2004,2002; 
Schwellnus 2005; Sissenich 2005; Grabbe 2005; Schimmelfennig et al, 2003a; 
Schimmelfennig 2004). It is also in line with growing trends in the social sciences to 
identify plausible rival hypotheses during research as further outlined in Chapter 2 
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(Etzioni 1968; Beauregard 1997; Campbell 1997; Dunn 1997; Campbell and Stanley 
1971). 
An additional consideration is that the Commission conducted the introduction of 
twinning at the instrumental level. Thus, the twinning exercise was introduced as an 
instrument under the Phare Regulation from 1989 (EC 1989) and the Regulation on 
coordinating aid to the applicant countries within the framework of the pre-accession 
strategy (EC 1999a). The Commission therefore did not have to steer a proposal through 
the Council of Ministers, but, instead, had to consult the Phare Management Committee 
and later the NCPs, the national contact points for the twinning exercise. As a result, the 
theory chapters have to reflect on this process with a discussion of comitology procedures 
and the particularities of these forums. This type of forum has been largely addressed in 
the literature and in particular the discussions between constructivist and rationalist 
scholars provide a good starting point that also links up with institutionalist theories 
(Pollack 2003b; Joerges and Vos 1999; Morten Egeberg et aL 2003). Nevertheless, it has 
to be noted that the Commission introduced meetings between the NCPs of the member 
states which do not formally come under the comitology procedure. However, the 
member states still had to agree with the arrangements and procedures made for twinning 
during sessions of the Phare Management Committee. The discussion of comitology is 
facilitated by a literature review of the new institutionalisms and other approaches to EU 
decision-making. 
The structure of this section of the thesis follows a simple rationale. Chapter 2 gives an 
insight into the research methodology. Chapter 3 provides a literature review of the 
relevant theoretical literature, whereas Chapter 4 outlines the plausible rival hypotheses 
that are tested in the analysis part of the thesis. The theoretical rationale of the thesis 
accounts for the fact that EU policies can be better explained when based on multi- 
causality rather than isolated theories (cf Moravcsik 1998). 
33 
2 
The triangulation of quantitative and qualitative 
research 
I Introduction 
This research sets out a three-tiered approach based on case studies, elite interviewing 
and document analysis. In addition, the research process has greatly benefited from the 
collection of quantitative data. It is innovative because it utilized the triangulation of 
research methods and sources of inquiry to solve problems of validity and reliability. This 
can be achieved, for example, by crosschecking statements of interviewees with official 
document records and other primary sources. In order to maximize the confirmation of 
research findings, the thesis sets out its hypotheses in Chapter I and a number of 
alternative working hypotheses are specified for each stage in the decision-making 
process in Chapter 4. This allows a comparison of alternative explanations for the same 
elements of the process. In addition, these alternative hypotheses are linked to rival 
theoretical approaches that attempt to explain the rationale of European policies. 
1.1 Epistemological considerations 
An enquiry into the public policy of the EU is faced with a number of difficult choices. 
This does not only concern the theoretical framework chosen to explain the case study, 
but also the methods applied during the research process. The identification of plausible 
rival hypotheses is one way to solve the theoretical dimension of these problems. 
However, such a strategy may also lead to a widening of the research process (Campbell 
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1994,1988; Campbell and Kenny 2002; Beauregard 1997; Dunn 1997). This can be 
briefly illustrated in relation to Chapter 4 which sets out four alternative modes of internal 
governance: lesson-drawing, evidence-based policy-making, intergovernmental 
bargaining and deliberative supranationalism. The research process has to establish which 
mode of governance has been utilised during this stage of the decision-making process in 
order to refute or verify the plausible rival hypotheses specified in Chapter 4. In practice, 
this leads to a need to widen the scope of the research over a number of factors, such as 
the nature of the involvement by the Commission and the member states. It should also 
incorporate a larger amount of documents and interviews in order to account for the 
possibility of different influences during the decision-making process. However, this 
appears to be a rather pessimistic view of the research process in light of this thesis. 
An alternative view of plausible rival hypotheses is that these usually suggest themselves 
to the researcher on the basis of his experience and after the initial steps of the research. 
In other words, initial findings suggest different explanations of the policy process. These 
are then to be outlined on the basis of the existing theoretical literature and tested more 
rigorously during further and more intensive empirical research. This method is also in 
line with the characteristics of EU decision-making, which naturally offers a number of 
explanations for any given case. The testing of plausible rival hypotheses is therefore not 
necessarily a time-consuming task and can be effectively incorporated in the research 
process. It lies in the researcher's discretion to decide which hypotheses can be classified 
plausible (Beauregard 1997; Peters 1997; Campbell 1997; Dunn 1997)". This method 
directs us to clarify what evidence confirms and rejects a proposition. It enables 
objectivity and reliability by advocating a research methodology that is open to different 
explanations. The testing of alternative hypotheses also leads to more precision, because 
authors are obliged to defend their conclusions in comparison to alternative explanations 
(cf Moravcsik 1998: 77M). Such a strategy also allows critiques which generate 
academic debates. This tendency can be clearly seen in discussions following the 
publication of Moravcsik's The Choicefor Europe. In order to facilitate easier access to 
debates, Chapter 4 also presents the competing hypothesis tested in this thesis in tables 
and figures (George and Bennett 2004: 21). 
"This approach seems also largely in line with a number of authors that have already used 
plausible rival hypotheses derived from rival theories. Andrew Moravcsik's (1998; 1999) work 
comes in particularly to mind, but others have utilized this principle as well (see for example 
Scharpf 1985). Moravcsik (1998: 77f, ) among others has highlighted that research should not 
simply support its claims with evidence, but should show that the evidence outweighs the evidence 
of competing explanations. 
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This type of research strategy has been developed largely by Donald T. Campbell and is 
in line with quasi-experimental research designs. Campbell devoted his career to extend 
the epistemology of the experimental method into non-laboratory social science and 
develop a method of program evaluation that would enable researchers to depict 
alternative futures (Campbell 1997: 37M). These efforts have found many advocates. The 
approach describes a vision in which the exploration of possibilities and a certain amount 
of trial-and-error becomes a cornerstone of society (Campbell 1997; Dunn and Ginsberg 
1997; Baum and Mckeley 1999; Beauregard 1997; Peters 1997). The resulting conception 
of the experimenting society is essentially depicted as an extension of Popper's 
epistemology and his open society (Popper 1989). It is an active society (Etzioni 1968) 
choosing exploratory innovation over inaction and avoiding self-deception. As a result, 
Campbell and his advocates of his approach describe an idealistic society in which 
honesty triumphs over lies and false self-representation. 
1.2 Research design 
A key question in public policy research is to what degree the policy process should be 
separated and analysed in segments. This research has answered this question very clearly 
by separating the process into three stages. Stage I questions the introduction of the 
twinning exercise; Stage 2 examines its character and performance as an instrument; and 
Stage 3 explores the outcomes it most likely produces in applicant countries. Separating 
the policy process into these distinct stages makes researching the whole process easier. 
However, a word of caution should be noted regarding such a separation. If taken too far, 
a separation of the policy process simply leads to the verification of all rival hypotheses. 
For example, if we examine the development of the policy process in relation to the 
introduction of twinning, then each of the elements mentioned in Chapter I may have 
indeed had a role to play. It was clear that evidence-based policy making was crucial for 
defining the problem with existing public administration programmes; lesson-drawing 
became important for agenda-setting and policy design. However, on the other hand, 
intergovernmental bargaining was essential for starting up the projects in early 
programming rounds. Instead of selecting the elements of a process that confirm the 
researcher's theoretical prepositions, one could use the empirical evidence to confirm or 
reject rival hypotheses. In view of this methodological consideration, this thesis has set 
out the questions to be answered by different approaches during the three stages 
mentioned above. 
The aim of this research is to confirm or reject the working hypotheses outlined in 
Chapter 4 for Stage I and 2 of the decision-making process. Stage 3 is only addressed on 
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the basis of preliminary results and not tested rigorously against the empirical evidence. It 
follows that the more dominant features of the respective decision-making stage should 
be regarded as the main mode of governance chosen by the actors involved in the process. 
Thus, while there may be elements of intergovernmental bargaining involved in the 
introduction of twinning, the empirical evidence of this thesis may reject the premise that 
this was the deciding factor during Stage 1. 
The next section explains the methods applied during the research process. It outlines 
triangulation as a method of substantiating research findings. A third section introduces 
the steps taken during the research process and the documents that were examined in 
detail. It concludes by detailing the role of the methodology as the foundation of the 
research process and questions to what extent the epistemological convictions of a 
researcher could affect his academic conduct. 
2 The research methodology 
The study of politics offers a wide spectrum of methods that can be applied during the 
research process. These methods provide alternative ways of gathering and disseminating 
information. The aim is to generate findings which enable research questions to be 
answered. This thesis employs essentially three methods: the case study method, elite 
interviewing, and document analysis. These methods are further underpinned by 
quantitative data which helps to depict the dynamics of implementation of the twinning 
exercise and the socio-economic circumstances of the applicant countries. 
The data generated and the findings drawn from the application of these methods are 
triangulated in order to ensure their reliability and validity. Denzin (1978: 291) has 
defined triangulation as 'the combination of methods in the examination of the 
phenomenon'. This makes it a uniquely useful tool to analyse a given incident and a 
source ofjustification for the utilization of a case study method. The triangulation applied 
in this study, however, does not just make use of different methods, but also utilizes 
12 different sources of inquiry . In this sense, the thesis employs a qualitative strategy of 
enquiry in which the researcher becomes what has been termed a bricoleur, a person that 
employs whatever method necessary to understand the phenomenon under observation. In 
other words, for a bricoleur, the 'choice of research practices depends upon the questions 
that are asked and the questions depend on their context' (C. Nelson et aL 1992: 2). 
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However, the objective of such a research strategy is not to capture reality, but to 'secure 
in-depth understanding of the phenomenon in question' (Denzin and Lincoln 1998: 4). 
This role implies also that research does not make a predestined choice of theory before 
coming to results, but instead operates 'between and within competing and overlapping 
perspectives' (Denzin and Lincoln 1998: 4). 
2.1 The case study method 
Case studies, in particular single case studies, are sometimes considered to lack precision, 
ob ectivity, and rigor. A number of scholars in political science have equated them with a 
lack of comparison and consolidation (King et al. 1994; Lieberson 1994; Moravcsik 
1998: 79; Anderson 1995). This makes it all the more surprising that case studies have 
been applied to almost all phenomena studied in political science. The case study method 
has been exceptionally popular among scholars since the early 1950s (see Allison and 
Zelikow 1999; Lijphart 1968; Dahl 1961; Pressman and Wildavsky 1973; Lowi 1964). 
The method is equally popular in European studies, with approximately 80% of articles 
published on the subject being based on case study research (see Franchino 2005)13 . This 
can in part be explained by its unique features that allow researchers to focus on a 
particular phenomenon. Schramm (1971: 16, emphasis added) for example, observed: 
The essence of a case study, the central tendency among all types of case study is that 
it tries to illuminate a decision or set of decisions: why they were taken, how they were 
implemented, and with what result. 14 
As a consequence, case studies meet many of the requirements that social science 
research demands from modem research methods. It therefore, can be less time-intensive 
than a survey and easier to set up than an experiment. In contrast to the survey method, 
the information collected relates to a decision or a set of decisions and not to the 
establishment of a dataset that often includes a large number of cases with little 
information on the individual case. For example, a survey method does not enable the 
researcher to ask questions about whom it was that was polled and why he might have 
answered in the way he did. Case studies, however, enable the researcher to incorporate 
this kind of contextual data and therefore can become a prime instrument in capturing 
complexity (Stake 1995; Gomm et at 2000; Feagin et at 1991; Agranoff and Radin 
1991). The incorporation of such data depends largely on the cases studied. Some authors 
12 The sources of inquiry also included documents from bilateral donors, international institutions 
and secondary literature. 
13 See Franchino (2005: 244) for the specification of the exact data set. 
14 These are exactly the steps taken in this thesis. 
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choose such large cases that surveys become their chosen tool of data collection. Indeed, 
surveys may have the advantage of having direct control of variables, but this comes with 
the cost of overlooking contextual variables that have not been incorporated into the 
research design. 
This raises the question of which sort of contextual data the author seeks to incorporate 
into the analysis of this thesis. Since the data collection in this study was mainly 
undertaken with elite interviews, document analysis and quantitative data, one of the first 
steps in the research process was to classify the data collected into categories; thereby 
ranking it by importance. This favoured interviewees that were directly involved in the 
1997 reform of Phare and the introduction of twinning. 15 It also led to a focus on archived 
documents which were accessed relatively late in the research process as a result of the 
author's second research visit to Brussels. Although other research techniques may 
perform similar categorizations, the consultation of various sources of inquiry is more 
likely to provide the foundation on which such a categorization can be built. In addition, 
case studies enable the researcher to provide the historical background of the decisions 
under observation, an element that an experiment or a survey can find difficult to 
incorporate. This is often the crucial step to a better understanding of why actors 
proceeded on a particular path (Feagin et aL 1991: 5-9; Yin 1994; Wieviorka 1992). 
The all-encompassing nature of case studies gives it clearer advantages over other 
methods of inquiry. It follows logically that the definition of case study research is a 
technical matter. According to Yin (1994: 13, emphasis added) it is a research method 
which looks into 'a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially 
when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident'. This 
research acknowledges that case studies should be anchored in theories and therefore 
highlights the benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide 
data collection and analysis. In addition, case study research is also closely associated 
with triangulation as a method of combining multiple sources to reach an answer to the 
research question (Arts and Verschuren 1999). As a result, case study research can be 
viewed as a theoretically underpinned research method which enables uncovering 
independent variables which were unknown to the researcher beforehand. It is principally 
a tool of understanding, rather than explanation. 
15 The bibliography provides information on which interviewees can be directly associated with 
the 1997 reform (identified by interviewee numbers to ensure anonymity). 
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A number of criticisms have been levelled at researchers that utilize the case study 
method. Yin (1994: 9ff. ) lists two significant criticisms that have been recurrent features 
in the academic debate. First, there have been concerns with the lack ofrigor enshrined in 
case study research. This criticism is based on the view that case studies are particularly 
vulnerable to the personal bias of the researcher. Of course, bias should be avoided at all 
costs, because if the researcher predetermines an outcome before consulting the evidence, 
there would be no need for fieldwork at all. Single case studies are particularly exposed to 
this kind of criticism as the researcher can easily be regarded as too involved in the object 
under consideration. However, there is reason to believe that bias can enter any type of 
research method whether it is an experiment (Rosenthal 1966); the design of 
questionnaires for surveys (Sudman and Bradburn 1982); or historical research 
(Gottschalk 1968). None of these methods are free from bias and neither is the 
quantitative method that has been regarded so highly by some scholars in political science 
(Przeworski and Teune 1970; King et aL 1994). The criticism that the case study method 
has attracted since its early application in the 1930s, equally applies to other methods. 
Dahl (1961: 26) claimed that the case study does not exchange relevance for rigor; rather 
it is the standing proof that relevance and rigor are not mutually exclusive goals. 
Secondly, further concern regarding case study research is that it presents no grounds for 
scientific generalization (King et aL 1994; Przeworski and Teune 1970). An influential 
critique, noted that the case study 'does not provide guidelines by which to abstract from 
reality the "critical" elements which would provide the material for comparisons on a 
large scale' (Blondel 1981: 67). At the heart of this controversy lies the question whether 
it is possible to generalize from a single case or even small number of cases. Gerring 
(2004: 346f. ) argues that this question is misleading, because the factors of a case study 
that are applicable to other cases are difficult to identify for someone conducting research 
on a particular country or decision. It follows that researchers have to consult a number of 
case studies to look for similarities and use these as a basis for generalization. However, 
even a single case study can certainly be generalized towards particular theoretical 
propositions (cf Yin 1993). As a result, the level of generalization is given by the theory 
outlined for the case. In this thesis, the testing of rival hypotheses is the only source of 
generalization that can be offered. However, in combination with other studies this may 
offer insights into the role of lesson-drawing and policy transfer in EU policy-making. 
After all, this is not the only study concerned with the role of policy transfer in the public 
policy-making process of the EU. This shows that case studies have more to offer if they 
test theoretical propositions. 
_ 
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To summarize, the case study method can clearly answer its critics. These are mostly 
members of the natural scientific tradition in social sciences that try to bring research 
closer to the methods used in subjects such as chemistry, biology and physics. An 
overwhelming difference of these fields to the social sciences is that the object of 
observation allows the isolation of particular independent variables by holding the 
remaining variables constant (see e. g. Graunch 2002). In social research this task of 
holding variables constant and formulating assumptions under which formal models 
operate becomes more difficult. Case studies clearly lie outside the spectrum of this type 
of research that was also recently advocated in the field of European studies with the 
emergence of the new specialist journal European Union Politics. It is unfortunate that 
many of those who condemn case studies actually advocate them if the primary method 
of data collection is quantitative data analysis. This understanding, in which quantitative 
data is the only source of objectivity, the holy grail of research design, considerably limits 
the scope of academic research on social issues tremendously. 
2.2 Elite interviewing 
The case study method describes the conduct of research, whereas the following 
considerations are concerned with data collection. Elite interviewing is an obvious 
approach to political research. In essence, if one seeks to explain decision-making, one 
has to engage with those who decide and determine policy. However, in reality this 
process becomes more complicated. There are problems of access to negotiators or key 
figures within the EU's negotiation game which have to be considered. Lee (1993: 63) 
proposes the sponsor method to overcome this problem. Thus, the researcher has to 
search for insiders who are willing to contact their peers to arrange interviews or to point 
to the right set of interviewees. This has been a very useful feature in this project. Four 
individuals in particular were able to point to the bureaucrats in Brussels who were 
involved in introducing the twinning exercise including the establishment of the twinning 
procedures. Three of these sponsors were based within in the Commission, one within 
DG Agriculture and two within the EuropeAid Cooperation Office. After the key 
decision-makers were interviewed the list of people involved in the introduction of 
twinning became very clear. It naturally included individuals from Commission staff, 
national bureaucrats, but also a consultant that had been heavily engaged in the process. 
Methodological problems associated with elite interviewing derive from the nature of the 
interview as method of inquiry and elites as particular types of interviewees. Elites are 
often highly active in an interview and can therefore hardly be steered through a preset 
table of questions (Arksey and Knight 1999: 122f.; Zuckerman 1972). Decision-makers 
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are used to take the lead and the interviewer's job of steering through the interview 
becomes extremely difficult. Lastly, the reliability problem appears to be a key problem. 
The 'Y11teredness" of interviews also raises important questions, as elites are used to 
communicating a positive message and tend to filter negative points out of the interview. 
However, leaving the tape recorder at home to address this problem increases problems of 
reliability, since only field-notes can be used to accurately reconstruct the interview. 
In addition, the researcher should approach elite interviewing differently compared with 
interviews with "normal" people. This refers in particular to the degree of standardization 
of the research questions. In elite interviews, the researcher ideally asks more open-ended 
questions that are based on the more general objective of the project. A structured 
interview that asks the same questions to every interviewee produces largely standardized 
data, whereas semi-structured interviews produce less standardized data. Elite interviews 
can provide an insiders' account of decisions, especially if the interviews are conducted 
with the actual decision-makers. The opportunity to gain information from such an 
interviewee could easily be lost by insisting on pre-formulated questions (Manheirn and 
Rich 1995: 162Q. Semi-structured interviewing is more flexible and dynamic, and more 
accommodating of the different directions an interview can take. It allows the researcher 
to ask the same major questions, but he can also alter their sequence and probe for more 
information (Fielding 1993: 136). 
Another important aspect of the research process is the sequencing of interviews. Some 
studies prefer to begin with pilot interviews that help to get to terms with the object under 
observation. These interviews can also be used to clarify the aims and objectives of the 
project and to pinpoint a case study that would be suitable to pursue (Fielding 1993: 137). 
In this case study, the initial research was also used to identify plausible rival hypotheses, 
thereby ensuring that the research design is not solely based on the theory but also on 
initial observations in the field. The first research trips to Brussels and Berlin also enabled 
the identification of interviewees for further interviewing. In addition, contact with other 
academics that worked on similar issues facilitated the exchange of interviewee lists. This 
is an effective method that should not be underestimated. The advantages of such an 
approach are obvious. Lists retrieved from other academics will only include people that 
have already agreed to be interviewed under similar circumstances. It is logical to assume 
that they would more likely agree to an interview than randomly selected interviewees. 
Finally a traineeship period in the European Commission also opened up the opportunity 
to arrange informal meetings over lunch with a number of key interviewees. It also 
enabled the author to complete interviews that could not be arranged until that time (see 
Annex 7 for a sample questionnaire). 
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2.3 Document analysis 
The analysis of documents is a widespread practice in the study of politics. However, 
archival research has been largely neglected, in particular in European studies. 16 Archival 
data is particularly useful for cross-checking interview data. This leads to improved 
validity through triangulation (cf Mcnabb 2002: 397). Archive records comprise a 
colourful mixture of information. The types of data that can be found in the archives of 
the Commission in particular include: 
- Official letters, 
- Responses to policy proposals by the member states and interest groups, 
- Minutes of meetings, 
- Drafts for all types of documents, 
- Concept papers, 
- Correspondence and personal notes of task managers, 
- Implementation documents. 
There is a wealth of information available in the Commission archives and certainly also 
in the archives of the delegations of the EU to an extent that it is crucial to identify the 
right archive and the right type of documents before conducting the research. This has 
been done here by focusing on retrieving information on the introduction of the twinning 
exercise. A longer research visit to Brussels and an internship also allowed attaining 
documents relating to the implementation of specific projects. The archives of the 
Commission are, by and large, accessible on request. However, task managers can refuse 
access if for instance personal or confidential information is at risk. This restriction of 
access has been largely overcome through sponsors within the institutions. 
Shapiro (2004: 227) notes that those concerned with particular political events are likely 
to use the 'case study method and archival research as the best means to evaluate the link 
between specific events'. To be sure, archival records help to establish timelines and 
connections between particular events or decisions. Minutes of meetings, for example, 
often refer back to former meetings or pinpoint agenda points for the next official 
appointment. However, archival research also requires a great deal of patience and skill; 
the material often has to be ordered, reorganized and restructured in order to enhance the 
case study. There is also a tendency for archives to keep records selectively rather than 
archiving the bulk of information. Webb et aL (2000: 54,84) refer to this phenomenon as 
selective deposit and selective survival. As a result, the researcher will tend to find only 
incomplete records in official archives. In such circumstances, researchers can only rely 
16 There are exceptions of course (Torreblanca 2001; Ross 1995; Grant 1994). 
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on a true method of triangulation, thereby validating the remaining information by other 
means. 
There are a number of reasons why document analysis, and in particular its sub-category 
of archival research, were central to answering the questions posed in this thesis. Firstly, 
regarding the introduction of twinning, elite interviews proved to be valuable, but many 
gaps remained after the initial research. The analysis of archival records that covered the 
introduction of the twinning exercise, and its early implementation, were helpful in 
closing these gaps and providing more information. This in return generated more 
specific questions for further interviews. 
Secondly, archival records were shown to be valuable also in relation to the 
implementation of twinning. The Progress Reports, APs, NPAAs and Financing 
Memoranda published by the Commission, on a annually or rather biannually basis, are 
equivalent to the Country Strategy Papers. These are used as a programming framework 
in the EU's development programmes for third countries 17 . This makes them important 
documents to consult in order to understand the Commission's objectives for the 
accession process before assessing the effectiveness of the instruments under observation. 
Such characteristics of the enlargement strategy seriously complicate an analysis of the 
process tremendously. This is because the research cannot simply consult a single 
document; rather, it has to filter information from various documents to identify the 
objectives of the actors involved. Chapter 6 discusses the relevance of these documents 
for the enlargement process. 18 Thirdly, archival research was also useful in providing 
information regarding the particular projects themselves. Although this had partly been 
established during interviews in Hungary and with Polish officials, the actual 
implementation documents offered more detailed information. 
Fourthly, an evaluation of the twinning exercise as an instrument would be incomplete 
without a consultation of the evaluation reports that have been produced by the 
Commission's contractors. Although these reports may not be considered as completely 
impartial, since they are produced under contract of the Commission, they are likely to 
include empirical evidence that a single researcher could never collect. The EMS 
consortium, which produced Phare evaluations from July 2001 to November 2003, has 
17 Country Strategy Papers ran be accessed on EuropeAid's Website: http: //europa. eu. int/comm/ 
europeaid/projects, rindex-en. htm. 
"Chapter 6 explains how the specification of objectives in twinning covenants and Phare 
logframes deals with this problems quite efficiently. Chapter 7 highlights the usefulness of the APs 
in overcoming this problem. 
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reviewed over 8,000 implementation documents and conducted some 6,650 interviews 
with stakeholders in the candidate countries (EMS 2004a: 6). The consultants from the 
OMAS consortium that were contracted before EMS arrived at similar numbers. It 
follows that these evaluation reports should be read carefully; in particular those 
concerning twinning and administrative capacity (OMAS 2001a, 2001b; EMS 2004b, 
2004a, 2003), but also those concerned with public administration reform in general 
(CEC 1999f, 1999c; OMAS 1998,2001c)19. However, as twinning has been seen not only 
as an innovative but evenly important instrument, the Commission has also asked a team 
of experts to analyse the instrument (C. Cooper and Johansen 2003; Birker et al. 2000) 
and reports by the European Court of Auditors became also a topic of discussion 
(European Court of Auditors 2003a, 2003b, 2004). 
Finally, the research consulted documents of the World Bank, USAID and other donor 
organizations in order to highlight the connection between the lending schemes of these 
organizations and the introduction of twinning into Phare. However, the author also tried 
to retrieve information on similar programmes by bilateral donors. This involved 
searching documents from development ministries of Germany, Britain and France as 
well as donor agencies such as GTZ20, SIDA 21, and Adetef22. 
Section 5 of the Bibliography presents a list of the documents that were taken into 
consideration during the research process. Chapter 6-7 are an indication of which 
documents were more important during the analysis of the case study. The main sources 
for document retrieval are listed below: 
Official documents 
Member states, 
European Commission, 
Parlimnent, 
Council of Ministers, 
European Court of Auditors, 
Evaluation Reports (published by the Commission, produced by independent 
consultancies under contract of the Commission) 
Wold Bank. 
19 CEC refers to Commission of the European Communities. 
20 GeseIlschaft fUr Technische Zusammenarbeit, a German development co-operation agency that 
largely works on contract by the Ministry of Development. 
21 Swedish International Development Co-operation Agency. 
22 Assistance au d6veloppement des dchanges en technologies dconomiques et financiers, a French 
development co-operation agency. 
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Some evidence could also be taken from newspapers. Research took on a three plus 
approach by examining mostly articles taken from the German, British and French 
newspapers and leaving the other twelve member states within one group. This led to an 
analysis of three main newspapers: Le Monde, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and 
Financial Times. Other Bulletins were taken into consideration, in particular where 
information on the transition processes or political developments within Eastern Europe 
were needed. These are the RFEL Research Report (Radio Free Europe), Transition and 
the Research Report on Europe. The awareness about such sources increases the ability of 
the researcher to put his case into context and thereby enhances reliability. An electronic 
CD-Rom search of the German weekly Der Spiegel, for example, revealed interesting 
allegations regarding the use of funds under early Phare programmes. 
Consultation of the following bulletins, newspapers and mailing lists. 
EnlargementfWatch, 
Europe, 
Financial Times (FT), 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), 
Le Monde, 
Der Spiegel, 
Research Report on Europe, 
RFE/L Research Report, 
Transition. 
The idea of consulting these sources of information was to keep up to date on a rapidly 
changing research subject. It was particularly useful during the earlier period of research, 
because it provided enough insights into the enlargement process to conduct interviews 
and discuss the topic with other academics. 
2.4 Quantitative data analysis 
The data collected in interviews and documents could also be complemented with a 
number of statistics on the twinning exercise, the Phare programme and the candidate 
countries' socioeconomic situation. Their contribution to the author's understanding of 
the topic was considerable, although most statistics and charts are simply annexed. The 
socioeconomic data, often presented in comparison to the EU-15 average, gives a clear 
idea about the dimensions of the EU's fifth enlargement. It also gives an understanding of 
the bilateral dynamics that influence the selection process of twinning projects can also 
largely be based on the available data. However, to be sure the author followed up on this 
aspect during the second interviewing round in which he confronted the interviewees with 
the statistics and charts. This led to a discussion of the factors which may underpin the 
candidates' decision for a particular partner (see Appendix 3, p. 378). 
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It should also be recognized that the candidates can only decide to cooperate with a 
country which has submitted a proposal for the respective project. This dimension of the 
selection process shows that member states pursue different strategies in winning 
twinning projects, a question that can only partially be answered on basis of the statistics 
(see Appendix 3, p. 378). The main aspect of the data on twinning projects is that it 
enabled a more concrete discussion of the start up and implementation problems of the 
programme. 
The thesis also makes an effort to illustrate the exposition with timelines and similar aids 
in order to facilitate a better understanding of this multifaceted subject. In combination 
with the data gained through interviewing and document analysis, this should provide a 
good empirical basis for this project. 
3 Triangulating and mixed-research methods 
Triangulation is a 'term borrowed from land surveying, and means simply that you get a 
better view of things by looking at them from more than one direction' (Mcneill 1985: 
123). The application of triangulation rests on the assumption that individuals' actions are 
a result of their interpretation of a situation. Thus, information deriving from interviews 
might contain a bias due to the structural limitations which influence the interviewee's 
understanding of the process. An eclectic approach such as triangulation, which makes 
use of several methods to explain social phenomena, tries to use a mixture of methods in 
order to compensate for the weakness of one method with the strength of another. This 
research strategy is depicted in Figure 2 below. 
Comparative research designs can benefit from this type of triangulation, since it enables 
the research to capture multi-causality, while identifying the more important factors 
determining decisions in public policy-making (Mcneill 1985: 122-23). While 
researching public policy in a particular case study, we are often faced with a difficult 
choice between alternative explanations on how decisions were taken (Allison and 
Zelikow 1999). There is, therefore, a growing consensus in the social sciences that this 
phenomenon can be confronted by defining plausible rival hypotheses which are then 
tested against the empirical evidence (Campbell 1997; Campbell and Stanley 1971). 
These hypotheses should be based on the most promising theories in the field of study. 
The empirical test ensures that the research achieves clarity over the utility of the theories 
to answer the questions posed in the research project. 
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As a result, the aim of social science research should not be to bend the empirical 
evidence to the needs of the authors' preferred theoretical perspective, but rather the 
research outcomes should be utilised to evaluate alternative explanations and to 
reconstruct reality in quasi-experimental fashion. This approach enables scholars to 
improve existing theoretical models on the basis of the observed phenomena and find 
causal relationships that otherwise get discarded (Popper 1989; Campbell 1994; Denzin 
1978; Lakatos 1970). The case study method can become an important means during the 
research process. it can facilitate the triangulation of sources and methods because it 
minimizes the time constraints under which researchers operate (Yin 1994: 9117. ). This is 
the main strength of the case study method; it allows the research to collect data from a 
number of sources and therefore shed light on a question from different perspectives. Yin 
(1994: 92, emphasis added) remarks in this context that 'the use of multiple sources of 
evidence in case studies allows an investigator to address a broader range of historical, 
attitudinal, and behavioural issues' and that this type of strategy can lead to 'the 
development of converging lines of inquiry'. 
Methods of data collection Research desiqn 
Elite Interviewing 
Document analysis 
Quantitative data 
Case study method 
ilL 
Source: Author's graph. 
Figure 2: The triangulation of research methods 
Another important consideration is the specification of dependent and independent 
variables. Implementation research is particularly sensitive to such problems. Such 
studies often confuse the ends (goals) with the relationship between the means and the 
ends (the question whether the chosen rneans are appropriate), and issues regarding the 
success during the adoption of the means (cf Hill and Hupe 2002: 145f. ). The issue here 
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is slightly different with regard to Chapter 7. In this part of the thesis, the question of how 
twinning has been introduced is addressed. In addition, the author simply wants to 
establish what type of instrument the twinning exercise is, i. e. whether it is in line with a 
strategy of governance by conditionality, persuasion and social learning, or whether we 
can rather define it as a new form of governance (Chapter 8). This question does not 
primarily ask about the appropriateness of the instrurnents, but rather wants to establish 
what type of policy the EU is pursuing with regard to institution-building. 
Barton and Laza sfeld (1955) outlined a research strategy in which qualitative methods 
would be employed for the generation of hypotheses and quantitative methods for the 
testing of hypotheses. Their reasoning was that qualitative methods are more suitable for 
exploring fields of research, whereas quantitative methods are an excellent tool to test 
statements. The authors saw quantitative methods as more appropriate for testing because 
of their accuracy and precision. There appears to be a logical leap in this argument; why 
use qualitative methods for hypotheses generation if it is not an accurate method? In 
recent years, the discussions surrounding quantitative and qualitative research have 
largely supported an integration of both types of inquiry. There is much discussion about 
mixed-methods approaches and triangulation (Erzberger and Prein 1997; Mcclintock and 
Greene 1985; Sale et aL 2002). The combination of quantitative and qualitative methods 
applied in this study does not fall into line with the strategy once outlined by Barton and 
Lazarsfeld. In contrast, the chosen research design acknowledges the role of different 
types of data during the research process, a view taken by many researchers these days. 
4 Conclusion 
This thesis is innovative in the application of its methodology because it uses a range of 
empirically informed inquiries into enlargement-related phenomena that are based on 
various theories. The chapter clarified that this is in line with the concept of an 
experimental society that tries to avoid self-deception (Campbell 1988,1997). Such an 
approach to scientific inquiry also tries to find answers during the research process, not 
before. 
As a consequence, this chapter has introduced the underlying methodology of the thesis. 
It described the research process as a triangular and interwoven approach, and highlighted 
the role case study analysis, elite interviewing, document analysis and quantitative data 
played in this project. First and foremost, however, it stressed the importance of mixed 
research strategies, in which the researcher becomes a bricoleur, a person that employs 
whatever method necessary to understand the phenomenon under observation. This 
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approach, as this chapter has shown, is in line with each of the chosen data collection 
methods, but also with the case study method which largely decided over the research 
design. The triangulation of research data deriving from these methods ensures the 
reliability and validity of the findings. In terms of objectivity and bias, the research has 
opted for an approach that undermines bias and ensures objectivity. 
3 
EU policy-making towards Central and Eastern 
Europe 
I Introduction 
Just as it has become well established in the comparative 
public policy literature that patterns of governance vary 
within states, so this view has taken hold in the analysis of 
EU governance. 
Simon J Bulmer 1998, p. 367. 
This chapter presents the theoretical underpinning of the models developed in Chapter 4. 
Two main streams of theory are needed to ana]Yse the empirical material in Part 11 of this 
thesis. Firstly, the thesis engages with internal governance. This has been defined as the 
process by which insiders formulate internally the policies towards outsiders. Secondly, 
the thesis is concerned with external governance, which has been defined as the process 
of extending the EU's authority to the candidate countries. As already highlighted in 
Chapter 1, the thesis applies Fritz Scharpf's (1997: 195) definition of governance which 
defines policy as 'the outcome of the interactions of resourceful and bounded rational 
actors whose capabilities, preferences, and perceptions are largely but not completely, 
shaped by the institutionalized nonns within which they interact'. 
Internal governance 
As the twinning exercise was introduced through NCP-Meetings, a subset of the Phare 
Management Committee, the introduction of twinning has mainly been driven by the 
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characteristics of the EU's system of committees, which oversees the Commission's 
delegated powers of implementation. Comitology procedures are mainly discussed among 
institutionalist scholars, which either view these institutions as control mechanisms or 
forumsfor deliberation (Pollack 2003a, 2003b; Joerges et al. 1997; Joerges and Neyer 
1997a). The sharp contrast in the interpretation of these committees is a reflection of a 
division within new institutionalist research. In this context, March and Olsen (1998: 949, 
emphasis added) once noted that 'on the one side are those who see action as driven by a 
logic ofanticipated consequences and prior preferences. On the other side, there are those 
who see action as driven by a logic of appropriateness and senses of identity'. This 
debate has clearly been carried over into the analysis of comitology. In order to delineate 
the contours of the discussion between various scholars and relation of this thesis to the 
current debate, this chapter starts with a general discussion of new institutionalisms and 
continues with a more specific discussion of comitology. 
Another crucial aspect of decision-making during the introduction of the twinning 
exercise was the fact that decision-makers sought information from different sources. 
Several factors restrict the Commission's access to information, in particular the lack of 
resources in terms of staff and implementation capacity. In order to conduct the reform of 
the pre-accession strategy, the Commission therefore gain access into various sources that 
were external to its own institutions. The research process revealed several factors that 
were important during the introduction of the twinning exercise: namely, internal 
assessments of Phare based on information from the Commission's Delegations in the 
applicant countries, evaluations of Phare, non-papers from the member states on models 
of twinning and lesson-drawing from other donor organizations. In order to assess which 
of these factors was more important, Chapter 3 develops plausible rival hypotheses for 
the internal governance stage of decision-making. These models are also subject to the 
distinction between a logic of anticipated consequences and a logic of appropriateness 
which March and Olsen (1996: 253-57; 1998: 949) introduced into the institutionalist 
debate. Section 3.2 and Section 3.3 illustrate this point through an analysis of lesson- 
drawing, policy transfer and institutional isomorphism. 
External governance 
In order to establish what type of instrument twinning is, and how it influenced the 
candidate countries, this chapter introduces the concept of external governance in more 
detail (Section 4.1). It also provides the theoretical basis for the models outlined in 
Chapter 3. In this context, conditionality is seen as the dominant concept in the 
enlargement literature when describing the accession process. The chapter also introduces 
the recent literature on new forms of governance as an alternative understanding of the 
__ 
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accession instruments. This leads to an overview of the discussion concerning the EU's 
leverage in CEE affairs that is closely linked to the concept of explicit conditionality. 
Again, all these concepts are closely related to the two different logics mentioned above. 
Conditionality is largely seen as an instrument that enforces a logic of anticipated 
consequences, whereas new forms of governance are depicted as instruments that enable 
both logics. 
2 Comparative politics approaches to the study of the EU 
There is a consensus between most scholars which suggests that the EU is neither an 
international organization nor a federal state (W. Wallace 1999). The grand debate 
between neofunctionalist and intergovernmentalist mainly addressed the question of 
where the EU can be placed on this continuum, and which criteria could be used to assess 
it as a polity (Lindberg 1963; Hoffmann 1966; Moravcsik 1993). However, scholars 
moved on to stress that EU governance may vary across policy areas as well as over a 
number of different levels of policy-making (P. C. Schmitter 1996: 11 ff ; Marks et aL 
1996; Peterson and Bomberg 1999). 
2.1 Theorizing EU decision-making 
The governance school has claimed a firm place on the list of approaches explaining 
European integration (Jachtenfuchs 2001; Kohler-Koch and Eising 1999; Marks et aL 
1996). This research agenda is largely in line with the institutionalist understanding of the 
EU (see Bulmer 1994; Christiansen 1997). In contrast to classical integration theories, 
such as intergovemmentalism and neofunctionalism, the governance approach to the EU 
'takes the existing multi-level institutional system as a given starting point for analysing 
the modes and process patterns of European policy-making' (Schimmelfennig and 
Wagner 2004: 657). 
This focus allows us to conduct research into the policies of the EU and their impact on 
the member states and the candidate countries. It moves away from the narrow focus of 
defining the nature of the beast towards analyzing the processes that shape the policies of 
the EU (cf. Risse-Kappen 1996). There are several notions of governance that have 
entered the debate: these include societal governance (Kooiman 2000,1993 c; Yee 2004), 
govemance as networks (Rhodes 1997; Dowding 1995; Marsh and Smith 2000; 136rzel 
1998), and good govemance (Leftwhich 1994; Grindle 2004; Zanger 2000). All these 
conceptions share an assumption that can be illustrated with a quote by Fritz Scharpf 
(1978: 347) who argued, as early as in the 1970s, that 
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it is unlikely, if not impossible, that public policy of any significance could result from 
the choice process of any single unified actor: policy formulation and policy 
implementation are inevitably the result of interactions among a plurality of separate 
actors with separate interests, goals and strategies. 
In other words, actors are usually engaged in various forms of cooperation. In addition, 
Kooiman (1993a: 258; 1993c: 2) makes a distinction between social-political forms of 
'governing' and 'governance'. Governing refers to constellations in which actors do not 
act separately but cooperate with each other. It is more an effort to steer the system rather 
than an attempt to run it. Governance is defined by 'the patterns that emerge from 
governing activities of social, political and administrative actors' (Dunsire 1993: 2). This 
leads us to acknowledge the fact that policyinakers will engage with various counterparts 
in order to achieve the best possible results. 
2.2 The new institutionalism 
Throughout the history of European integration, the member states of the EC/EU have 
pooled specific areas of policy authority by introducing collective institutions or by 
expanding the responsibilities of existing institutions. Studies on the impact of 
supranational institutions were, until the late 1960s, conducted within the research 
framework of neofunctionalism (Haas 1968; Lindberg 1963) and stimulated criticism 
from intergovernmentalist accounts of decision-making in the EC (Haas 1964a, 1964b; 
Hoffmann 1964,1966). However, over the last decades a considerable number of 
approaches, deriving mostly from comparative political studies and partly from 
International Relations (IR), have contributed new insights into institutional change, 
inter-institutional relationships and policy evolution. 
The new institutionalisms, namely historical institutionalism (HI), rational choice 
institutionalism (RCI), and sociological institutionalism (SI), focus on the impact of 
supranational and national institutions on decision-making (Hall and Taylor 1996). 
Institutional approaches towards European integration normally focus on two major 
research questions. Firstly, they try to explain how institutions originate and change. 
Secondly, they seek to explain the relationship between institutions and the individual 
behaviour of the decision-makers (Hall and Taylor 1996; Bulmer 1994). The latter focus 
facilitates a view of organizations as structural constraints on individual actors. The 
principal-agent framework in particular as applied within RCI and HI emphasizes the 
importance of inter-institutional relationships. In general, governance is seen to create 
social-political subsystems in which a particular or relatively stable set of actors and 
institutions interact (Mayntz 1993: 16ff.; Kooirnan 1993b, 1993a). 
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Historical institutionalism (HI) points to the possible gaps that may emerge between the 
member states' intentions and developments at the EU level. The presence of high issue 
density in EU politics further enhances the likelihood of such unintended consequences. 
As a result, it may be difficult for governments to reign in their agents at the 
supranational level in order to ensure control over the policy process. This is because EU 
institutions consist of procedures, routines, people and other resources (Pierson 1996). 
Accordingly, relatively autonomous EU institutions could arise, and the institutional 
arrangements of the EU themselves could constrain governments in return, thereby 
replacing rationality with bounded rationality (Bulmer 1994; Simon 1997a, 1997b; 
Thelen and Steinmo 1992; Krasner 1988). Such considerations point to the path 
dependencies that are potentially enshrined in institutions. These may derive from their 
original formulation or critical junctures such as the decision to introduce a Single 
European Market which set the path for further decisions (Pierson 2000,1996; Bulmer 
and Burch 200 1). 
The concept of bounded rationality has its origin in the writings of Herbert A. Simon 
(1957; 1997a: 89-117)23 who argued that substantive rationality ultimately leads to 
unintended consequences, because no given individual or organization can control the 
incomplete and fragmented nature of knowledge, nor can decision-makers fully deal with 
complexity. As a result, decision-makers create coping strategies that eventually develop 
into habits and routines 24 . In an institutional context, these tendencies can be reinforced 
by the organizational envirorunent and short issue-attention cycles can strengthen a given 
cause of action. 
Institutionalists in political science have usually restricted themselves to focusing on 
formal and legal aspects of institutions, but they have at last succumbed to the temptation 
of considering bounded rationality (see March and Olsen 1989,1984; Thelen and 
Steinmo 1992; Hall and Taylor 1996; Weingast 1996). Rational choice institutionalism 
(RCI) resembles many of the features voiced by these classical perspectives on 
institutions; with both relying heavily on formal structures and procedures. RCI considers 
the behavioural consequences that logically derive from formal rules such as cooperation, 
co-decision and comitology procedures (M. D. Aspinwall and G. Schneider 2000: 2-5). 
When using a principal-agent framework, in which the Commission is the agent for the 
23 The original of this contribution was published in 1947. This citation refers to the 4th Edition of 
the book (published in 1997). 
24 HI research often refers to habits and routines as standard working procedures (Bulmer and 
Burch 2001; Pierson 2004,1996; March and Olsen 1989; Thelen and Steinmo 1992). 
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member states (the collective principal), scholars question how much control the principal 
can exercise over its agent or whether agency shirking is a possibility under the formal 
rules established between the institutions. The principal-agent model and the theory of 
delegation have been widely used in the study of the EU (cf Kassim and Menon 2003). 
Although RCI shares the application of this model with liberal intergovernmentalism, it 
looks for opportunity structures which allow EU institutions to introduce their own 
preferences into the decision-making process. A number of concepts have been deployed 
to outline such situations with regard to the influence of the Commission, the Parliament 
and the Court of Justice (see e. g. Tsebelis 1994; Garrett 1995; Pollack 1997). 
The value of this approach is that RCI does not a priori rule out the relevance or 
irrelevance of institutions, but instead seeks to analyze the relationship between the 
member states as a collective principal and, for example, the Commission. Such an agent 
can, based on asymmetric information, engage in opportunistic behaviour. This is often 
referred to as agency shirking. This opportunistic behaviour can be increased by slippage, 
when 'the structure of delegation itself provides perverse incentives for the agent to 
behave in ways inimical to the preferences of the principals' (Pollack 1997: 108). Since 
asymmetric information plays a crucial role in the relationship between principal and 
agents (i. e. in that agents usually know more about themselves than others), principals 
usually employ oversight mechanisms in order to monitor agency behaviour (Mohr 1973; 
Moe 1984; Doleys 2000; Pollack 1997,1996). Two questions then become the focus of 
analysis with regard to the European Commission: 1. Are the member states able to rein 
in the Commission? 2. How do the Commission's preferences differ from those of the 
member states? In this context, Pollack (1997: 110) affirms that 
... agency independence may often be more apparent than real. More specifically, because principals often opt to use unobtrusive forms of political oversight ..., and because agents may rationally anticipate the reactions of principals to certain types of 
behaviour, agency behaviour that at first glance seems autonomous may in fact be 
subtly influenced by the preferences of principals... 
However, member states find it hard to exercise control over their agents, since sanctions 
can in many cases only be applied if a qualified majority or even unanimity can be 
achieved in the Council (Pollack 1997: 113ff. ). In addition, it can be argued that the 
Commission has been purposely constructed to embody the Community interest, whereas 
the Council voices the member states' interest, and the Parliament represents the citizens' 
interest. 
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The Commission has been given the unique advantage within this institutional triangle 
(the Council, the Commission and the Parliament), because it possesses the sole right of 
initiative 23. As a result, it dominates the formal agenda-setting process and can direct 
agreements towards a more integrative direction than the principals would normally 
alloW. 26 Pollack (1997: 124) asserts that the Commission has formal power, where it has 
the right of initiative and where 'it is easier to adopt than to amend a Commission 
proposal, ... differences in member state preferences can be effectively exploited, and ... 
member states are dissatisfied with the status quo and impatient to adopt a new policy'. 
Although the Commission does not possess the sole right of initiative with regard to the 
external relations of the EU, similar dynamics unfold where the Commission enjoys 
delegated powers as it does for the implementation of Phare. This is largely a result of the 
fact that the Commission's conduct in the EU's management committees is subject to a 
qualified majority vote, just as one of its proposals would be in the Council of Ministers. 
The formal agenda-setting power is complemented by informal agenda-setting, which 
enhances the scope of the Commission's influence through the construction of focal 
points. In line with Garrett and Weingast (1993), Pollack argues that in the absence of a 
unique equilibrium, institutions can provide policy proposals that serve as focal points 
around which member state bargaining can converge. Alternatively, informal agenda- 
setting can also derive from the Commission's entrepreneurship. Kingdon (1995: 180-81) 
names three categories that qualify an actor as policy entrepreneur: 
1. the person must be taken seriously, as an expert or a leader; 
2. the person is known for his political connections or negotiating skill; 
3. successful policy entrepreneurs must be persistent. 
An actor with these qualities can create change only if a policy window opens. Pollack 
(1997: 126-27) rightly points out that these characteristics are not unique to the 
Commission, but that member states may as well possess them as liberal 
25 This applies only in Pillar I (the European Communities), but not in Pillars 11 (CFSP) and III 
QHA). An excellent explanation of the pillar structure of the EU can be found in The Penguin 
Companion to European Union (Bainbridge 2003: 418). Although, regarding enlargement policies, 
the right for initiative therefore does not solely remain with the Commission, it has still played a 
crucial role in the accession process - for instance, when it came to the agreements on Draft 
Common Positions (DCPs) for the negotiations. In this context, the member states have usually 
proven unable to agree without a proposal by the Commission. The Commission is also the leading 
actor in the formulation of substantive policies, since it implements the EU's pre-accession 
strategy and holds delegated powers for this purpose that are only subject to control by the Phare 
Management Committee as well as the Committee put into place for ISPA and SAPARD. 
26 See also Pollack's numerous contributions on these issues, in particular (Pollack 1998,1996, 
2004). 
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intergovernmentalism has clearly shown (Moravcsik 1993,1995). However, he insists 
that the Commission indeed 'embodies all three characteristics of expertise, brokering 
skills, and institutional persistence and has the additional advantage of the formal right of 
initiative and well-developed policy networks' (Pollack 1997: 126). To summarize, the 
Commission is not the only actor that can engage in informal agenda-setting, but it is well 
positioned to do so; and is indeed often expected to act as a policy entrepreneur in order 
to foster cooperation. 
2.3 Two logics of decision-making: Appropriateness and anticipated 
consequences 
At the heart of the differences between institutionalists, lies the role of institutions. RCI 
sees institutions as 'thin' entities; in that they act as a constraint on the behaviour of self- 
interested actors, which have to channel initiatives through them. In this perspective, 
institutions act as intervening variables. Furthermore, institutions may act as a strategic 
context that 'provides incentives or information, thus influencing the strategies that 
agents employ to attain given ends' (Checkel 1999: 546). HI portrays institutions as 
'thicker' organizations, but only in a long-term historical perspective. Institutions that 
have been long standing can have a wider effect on actors since strategies may be locked 
into and institutionalized in them. HI therefore asserts that in long-term perspective 
institutions potentially become independent variables, which produce increasing returns 
in terms of path dependencies and unintended consequences Qupifle et al. 2003; Hall and 
Taylor 1996; Thelen and Steinmo 1992; Pierson 2000). 
As much as RCI defines institutions as thin in terms of impact, sociological 
institutionalism (SI) characterizes them as thick; institutions become independent 
variables, which help to explain the behaviour of individual actors. One has to 
acknowledge the powerful message deriving from this concept. As Checkel (1999: 547) 
highlights, S1 assumes that 'institutions constitute actors and their interests'. It follows 
that the preferences and interests voiced by particular actors can be explained by the 
institutions through which they interact. In integration studies, this leaves us with the 
question of whether national decision-makers are more influenced by their home 
institution, or by the institutional setting in Brussels, in which they frequently work 
together. 
To the same extent to which liberal intergovernmentalism is based on rational choice 
theory, social constructivism (SC) is based on SI and partly on HI. It is largely 
constructed upon sociologists' findings on social interaction, in which the behaviour Of 
individuals is connected to processes of learning and socialization. Checkel (1999: 547), 
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one of the main contributors to SC research on Europe, maintains that these processes 
lead individuals to base their decisions on a logic of appropriateness (informal meetings 
between Ministers; European-level policy networks centred on the Commission). As a 
result, the focus of social constructivist scholarship on European politics lies with the 
analysis of identity formation. The main concern of SC is the 'content of actor 
identities/preferences and the modes of social interaction ... where something else aside 
from strategic exchange is taking place' (Checkel 1999: 548). This contrasts with RCI 
scholarship, which describes institutional interactions as driven by the logic of anticipated 
consequences. 
Integration theory Behavioural assumptions and concepts 
Liberal intergovernmentalism rationality; logic of anticipated consequences; economic 
(p. 53) interests; material interests; relative power; the need for credible 
commitments; institutions are facilitators of agreements 
Neofunctionalism. (p. 59) bounded rationality; functional, political and cultivated 
spillover, engrenage; internalization; externalization 
Historical institutionalism (P. bounded rationality; institutions become independent variables 
54) in long-term perspective; issue density; unintended 
consequences 
Rational choice institutionalism rationality, logic ofanticipated consequences; institutions are 
(P. 5) intervening variables; delegation and authority; oversight 
mechanisms; institutions act as agents; agency shirking, 
slippage 
Sociological institutionalism logic of appropriateness, bounded rationalit)r, learning and 
(p. 58) socialization; institutions are independent variables 
Social constructivism (p. 58) logic ofoppropriateness, social construction; institutions 
embed and reinforce norms and rules; persuasion and social 
learning 
Table 1: Integration theory, behavloural assumptions and concepts 
3 EU governance and comitology 
The interpretations of institutions outlined above, have also influenced the analysis of the 
EU's comitology system. As a result, the impressions drawn of the committees, which 
supervise the Commission's delegated powers during the implementation of common 
policies, depict the two logics of delegation that are implied by RCI and SI accounts of 
institutions. This discussion is outlined in the following section. The subsequent sections 
outline the concepts of lesson-drawing, policy transfer and institutional isomorphism, 
which enable a better understanding of the policy process and the Commission's potential 
sources of information. 
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3.1 Governing by committees: Implementing the EU's external governance 
In legal terms comitology could be understood as a set of 'procedures by which the 
Commission makes decisions about the implementation of European Union legislation in 
collaboration with committees of national experts' (Dogan 1997: 3 1). The Commission's 
conduct with regard to the execution of common policies has been stringently regulated 
by Council Decision 1999/468/EC within the comitology system. 27 The Council has the 
right to install a committee that is composed of national experts, and to which the 
Commission must report the actions it wishes to take under the delegated power . 
28 EU 
law distinguishes two types of committees, the advisory committee and the oversight 
committee. The latter type is divided into management and regulatory committees. The 
main difference between advisory and oversight committees is that the latter can overrule 
the Commission's decision and refer it back to the Council. The powers of regulatory 
committees extend further than those of management committees (Pollack 2003b: 115M). 
RCI theorists label these forums oversight mechanisms (Pollack 2003b: 88,114; cf. 
Tallberg 2002: 29ff. ), but Sl scholars render them forums of deliberation in which 
decision-making is driven by consensus-seeking and the roles of national representatives 
and Commission officials tend to become blurred (Trondal 2002; Joerges and Neyer 
1997a). Whereas the latter view stresses the function of these committees to seek optimal 
solutions, RCI scholars insist on their role as instruments of control for the member states 
(Majone 2001: 115; Pollack 2003b). The differences in the interpretation of EU 
committee governance are perceived as a fundamental clash between the main alternative 
theoretical explanations. Trondal (2001: 8, emphasis in original), for example, notes that 
the new institutionalisms 'fundamentally disagree on how easily supranational role 
conceptions are evoked by EU committee participants'. Added to this, Morten Egeberg 
(1999: 456-57) points out that the comitology system provokes statements among leading 
scholars that often lack an empirical foundation. RCI scholars assume a logic of 
anticipated consequences, whereas Sl scholars depict a logic of appropriateness. 
27 The European Institution of Public Administration has published an annotated bibliography and 
a State of the Art Report on comitology (EIPA 2000). This is a good starting point for the 
discussion outlined here, but see also the debate between various scholars (Trondal 2002; Zahra 
200 1; Morten Egeberg el al. 2003). 
28 Art. 9 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 3906/89 of 18 December 1989 sets up a Phare 
Management Committee based on majority voting (Art. 205, ex 148) of the Treaty establishing the 
European Community. This committee is charged with overseeing the activities of the 
Commission under the Phare programme. ArL 9 of Council Regulation (EQ No 1266/1999 of 21 
June 1999 foresees the same institutional arrangement. 
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This controversy is rooted in the behavioural assumptions discussed above (see Table 1, 
p. 59). SI scholars assume that institutions are independent variables, because actors 
approach decisions without fixed preferences. The deliberation of alternatives in the 
institutional environment of the EU's committees therefore constitutes opportunities for 
them to change or discover their preferences on the basis of socialization, learning, or 
persuasion. As a result, authors such as Joerges and Neyer (1997b: 618) observe a higher 
probability of informal agenda-setting within EU committees. In their view, 'the main 
problem of rationalistic approaches is that they underrate the importance of discourse in 
facilitating social integration'. Sociological perspectives consider rationalist accounts of 
comitology as distorted by the lack of conceptual space for the normative dimension of 
reality. As a result, Joerges and Neyer (1997b: 618) conclude that such approaches 'fall 
victim to the analytical trap of equating rational behaviour with strategic behaviour'. This 
sort of argument in relation to comitology has also been made by SC scholars (Checkel 
2001a: 37; Gerstenberg and Sabel 2002: 330-31). 
RCI scholars answer these critics by arguing that the Commission rationally anticipates 
the reaction of the committees and therefore avoids confrontation. Thus, referrals of the 
Commission's proposals are unlikely (Pollack 2003a: 67; 2003b). This assertion 
corresponds with studies of Congressional committees or subcommittees in the US 
Congress that are often quoted as an example of similar oversight mechanisms. 
McCubbins et aL (1987a; 1989) have used this context to argue that administrative 
procedures can create policy outcomes in accordance with the preferences of the 
principals. However, even more importantly, they argue that this even holds true if the 
principals themselves are not sure of their preferred policy. The principals can ensure this 
situation firstly by requiring the agent to make information available as soon as policies 
are formulated, so that the informational asymmetry between the agent and the principals 
can be overcome. Secondly, administrative procedures can outline which constituents of 
the principal should be heard first before drafting decisions. As a result, the consultation 
of interests groups or other administrations before drafting a decision would become 
standard practise for agents (Mccubbins et aL 1987b: 272f. ). 
Overall, RCI scholars have introduced an altogether different view of committee systems. 
McCubbins and Schwartz (1987), for example, argued that three types of oversight 
mechanisms can be differentiated: the police-patrol oversight, the fire-alarm oversight 
and institutional checks. As the expressions suggest, a police-patrol system involves a 
more regular checking of the agent's actions, whereas a fire-alarin system relies on third 
parties to appeal in court or directly to the principal. The regular monitoring of agencies 
can be performed on basis of public hearings, field observations, and examination of 
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agency documents and reports. These resources are readily available to the member states 
in the EU's committee system. Thus, poIice-patrol oversights can be performed by the 
member states if they wish to monitor the Commission in this way. To some extent, the 
member states can also rely on third parties to ring the bell in case the Commission goes 
beyond its remits. Such a large variety of actors is subject to EU policies and organized 
interests are so present in Brussels that fire-alarm oversights become a viable alternative 
to police-patrols. The EUs committee system, however, provides forums for both types 
of controls as member states may choose to monitor the Commission's behaviour with 
different levels of scrutiny. 
Finafly, McCubbins and Schwartz (19 87) also mention a variation of fire-alarm oversight 
mechanisms. The authors point to the fact that third parties include not necessarily only 
organized interests, citizens and firms, but can also exist outside these actors in the form 
of institutional checks. In other words, the principal can draw up an institutional design in 
which one institution irregularly checks the actions of the implementation agency. In case 
of the EU, this type of oversight mechanism is in place within the individual DGs in the 
form of Internal Audit and Evaluation units. In addition, the Court of Auditors assesses 
the relevance and effectiveness of the Commission's implementation regimes on a regular 
basis. These institutionalized checks by both evaluation exercises across the different 
policy areas and the Court of Auditor's monitoring function are an important part of the 
EU's SEM 2000 (Sound and Efficient Financial Management) programme which was 
installed to ensure the proper allocation of finances to political objectives (see Chapter 4, 
p. 80). The Commission is also restricted through a system of administrative and judicial 
review by the European Court of Justice as well as by the European Ombudsman (Pollack 
2003b: 379ff.; Tallberg 2002). 
Some rationalist scholars regard these oversight mechanisms as effective enough for the 
member states to control the policy implementation of the Commission. Steunenberg et 
al. (1996) for example argue that the introduction of comitology procedures has led to a 
strengthening of the member states position with regards to the implementation of EU 
measures. In their view, the Council has acquired substantial gatekeeping power on a 
number of initiatives. The RCI literature on other institutions such as the European Court 
of Justice, the Court of Auditors and the European Parliament makes similar arguments 
(Garrett 1995; Garrett and Tsebelis 1996; Franchino 2000). Pollack has presented the 
most wide-ranging analysis of oversight mechanisms in the EU, in particular concerning 
the Commission's conduct under the existing institutional procedures. He comes to the 
conclusion that 
the Commission, the Cour4 and the Parliament are all constrained by the limited 
powers delegated to them and by the administrative and oversight mechanisms 
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established by member governments to limit their discretion, and the influence of each 
actor over policy outcomes varies across issue areas primarily as a function of these 
various control mechanisms (Pollack 2003b: 390). 
In addition, Majone (1996: 73) argued that 'even in the case of the regulatory and 
management committee the Commission is not only in the chair, but has a strong 
presumption in its favour'. He supports his claim with evidence taken from a study that 
found that the Council hardly ever follows up on the complex technical matters under 
consideration in comitology committees (lep 1989). Furthermore, Majone (1996: 73-75) 
describes the reluctance of the Council to involve itself in costly policy control and its 
inability to compete with the Commission's expertise. 
The debate on the characteristics of EU committees is of considerable importance for the 
analysis of the preceding chapters in this thesis. The introduction of twinning and its 
implementation procedures were entirely managed in cooperation with the NCPs of the 
member states, which is essentially a subset of the Phare Management Committee. 
Consequently, the thesis has to reflect on the nature of such forums. In addition, the 
questions deriving from the exchanges between RCI and Sl scholars on comitology are 
relevant in the sense that they pinpoint the main dividing lines between the prominent 
theories of European integration. 
This discussion is both pertinent to the internal governance and the external governance 
stages of decision-making. Chapter 3 further outlines how this discussion relates to the 
alternative modes of governance introduced therein. The Commission's implementation 
powers with regard to Phare, ISPA and SAPARD are subject to approval by comitology 
committees, which are assembled on basis of the relevant Council Regulations. Phare and 
ISPA foresee the installation of management committees, which decide by QMV whether 
a proposal should be referred to the Council or noe9 (EC 1989: Article 9; 1999a: Article 
9; Council 1999b). The Council Regulation on SAPARD, however, only foresees the 
involvement of a monitoring committee that advises the Commission during 
implementation (Council 1999a). The Commission also decides in conjunction with these 
committees which type of instruments it uses during the implementation of the pre- 
accession strategy in the candidate countries. 
29 According to Art. 205(2) of the Treaty establishing the European Community, the member states 
votes shall be weighted as follows when the Council decides on the basis of qualified majority: 
Belgium 5, Denmark 3, Germany 10, Greece 5, Spain 8, France 10, Ireland 3, Italy 10, 
Luxembourg 2, Netherlands 5, Austria 4, Portugal 5, Finland 3, Sweden 4, United Kingdom 10. A 
qualified majority is reached with 62 votes if the Council decides on the basis of a Commission 
Proposal. Otherwise the 62 votes also have to derive from 10 different member states. 
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The following section introduces the core concepts of lesson-drawing and policy transfer 
in the context of introducing of policies and instruments. These concepts are also 
discussed below in the section on external governance, but with a particular emphasis on 
policy implementation and policy outcomes. The main objective is to introduce various 
types of policy transfer. This enables a discussion of the information the Commission 
used during the introduction of twinning, while it also sheds light on the implementation 
of the accession instruments. 
3.2 Lesson drawing, policy transfer and Institutional Isomorphism as methods of 
policy formulation and implementation 
The academic debate on policy transfer and lesson-drawing has increased rapidly since 
the late 1980s. This section introduces the significance of policy transfer and lesson- 
drawing for policy formulation, whereas the importance of these concepts with regards to 
policy implementation and policy outcomes is discussed in Sections 4.3. In addition, 
Section 4.2 explains how policy transfer relates to conditionality, a term widely used in 
the enlargement and external relations literature. An effort has been made here to link 
these approaches to the new institutionalisms. This is not a unique step because other 
authors have already pointed out that a combination of policy transfer and new 
institutionalist approaches could benefit research significantly (Jacoby 2004: 201T., 179ff.; 
Stone 2004: 547f. ). Indeed, the link between policy transfer and S1 is more established in 
the literature. However, the concept of lesson-drawing carries some clear connotations of 
rational policy-making and this constitutes a good starting point to combine it with RCI 
accounts of decision-making. The theoretical implications of such theoretical synthesis 
has been discussed widely in the literature (Moravcsik 2003; Kratochwil 2003; Hellmann 
2003a, 2003b; Harvey and Cobb 2003; Lapid 2003; Mcadarn et al. 1997; Lichbach 1997). 
While this chapter focuses on introducing these concepts, Chapter 4 establishes the 
connection to the new institutionalisms. 
Diffusion and convergence 
The origins of policy transfer and lesson-drawing approaches lie in the study of policy 
convergence (Bennett 1988,1991) and the diffusion of policies across the federal states 
of the US (Gray 1973; Walker 1969; Collier and Messick 1975). The literature on 
diffusion identified examples of policies progressively spreading across American States. 
Following Jack L. Walker's significant 1969 article, a large number of authors have 
endeavoured to explain the sequencing of decisions in relation to diffusion. These studies 
focused mostly on the origins of policies and their subsequent introduction in a different 
state; only occasionally, they incorporated notions on the performance of policies (cf. 
Jacoby 2001a: 265). Diffusion studies have been particularly useful in explaining the 
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process and conditions for transfer, but had little to say about the innovation that often 
goes along with it and showed little concern about the content of new policies (cf. Stone 
2004: 547). In addition, they mostly focused on the adoption of policies in the US and 
only occasionally focused on the borrowing of models between countries or 
organizations. 
In contrast, policy convergence has been described as 'the tendency of societies to grow 
more alike, to develop similarities in structures, processes, and performances' (Kerr 1983: 
3). The main difference compared with diffusion studies is that convergence approaches 
seek to explain policy outcomes rather than policy processes. As a result, authors 
interested in policy convergence engage in discussions of causal factors that may produce 
similarities across different countries. These studies exhibit a tendency to connect 
research findings to broader concepts such as Europeanization and globalization, which 
are both seen as inducing factors for convergence (see Bennett 1991; Drezner 2001; 
Heichel et al. 2005 for definitions and reviews). In the introduction of a recent special 
issue of Journal of European Public Policy, Knill (2005: 765f. ) describes the concept of 
policy convergence as an adjacent but somewhat different approach to policy transfer, 
diffusion and isomorphism. He emphasizes that convergence is concerned with the effects 
of policy transfer, but is not necessarily an outcome of transfer. It can instead also occur 
by chance between two countries that adopt similar solutions. 
Lesson drawing 
The differentiation of lesson-drawing and policy transfer has not been clearly defined in 
the academic debate. However, we will see that there are actually some clear dividing 
lines between both approaches. As a concept, lesson-drawing has been developed in a 
seminal article by Richard Rose (1991) and several subsequent publications (Rose 1993, 
2000,2005). It refers to a natural process of leaming by experience from others and 
across time. It therefore goes beyond mere self-evaluation, but extends to the drawing of 
lessons from similar programmes in other jurisdictions. It 'cuts across territorial 
boundaries but remains within the boundaries of a given policy community' (Rose 1993: 
7). As a result, lesson-drawing is facilitated by the fact that the functional concerns of 
different countries or constituencies are subject to decreasing variations. An increasing 
number of policies adopted in one place are often relevant in another. The exchange of 
information across nations is largely increased by modem computer technologies. In 
addition to this account of lesson-drawing, one might add that such processes are not 
limited to government bodies but can also occur in the private sector or between 
organizations. 
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The most pronounced distinction between lesson-drawing and other accounts of learning 
across different territories is that Rose emphasizes the rational component as much as the 
normative dimension of introducing a foreign model. As he puts it, 'the process of lesson- 
drawing starts with scanning programmes in effect elsewhere, and ends with the 
prospective evaluation of what would happen if a programme already in effect elsewhere 
were transferred here in future' (Rose 1991: 3, emphasis added). Lesson-drawing, 
however, is as much a normative activity as it is a practical one, because 'a prescription 
that a program in effect elsewhere should be applied here is a statement about what ought 
to be done' (Rose 1993: 11). Mossberger and Wolman (2003: 428,30ff ) note that lesson- 
drawing as a form of prospective policy evaluation involves as much an element of 
assessment of foreign models before their application as it considers the awareness about 
alternatives an important component in the process. Awareness, or as Rose (1991) puts it 
information search, is often given by the large amount of networks across nations or 
epistemic communities in which bureaucrats are involved (Rhodes 1997; Marsh and 
Smith 2000; Haas 1992; Verdun 1999). Of considerable importance in this context is the 
scope, adequacy and accuracy of the information available (see Mossberger and Wolman 
2003: 430; Wolman 1992). An added consideration is that lesson-drawing is a response to 
dissatisfaction with the status quo (Rose 1991: 10-12). An assessment of a prospective 
model on the basis of the similarity of problems and goals, its performance and the 
differences in settings is therefore a crucial element of lesson-drawing. Thus, the 
applicability and transferability of the programme is a prime concern for policy-makers 
that seek to learn lessons from abroad (Rose 1991: 22-27). 
The model of lesson-drawing outlined here and further defined in Chapter 3 is a 
rationalist account of policymaking which derives from Rose (1991; 1993) and implies 
that learning processes are characterized by "simple learning" rather than "complex 
learning" as described by sociological variants of this process. "Simple leaming" leads to 
a change in means but not in ends, whereas "complex learning" results in the revision of 
underlying goals (cf. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005c; Deutsch 1963; Levy 1994). 
This latter version of learning has also been coined institutional isomorphism by ST 
scholars who wanted to stress the fact that 'organizations compete not just for resources 
and customers, but for political power and institutional legitimacy' (Dimaggio and Powell 
1991: 66). Such a process can become part of deliberative supranationalism as discussed 
above, because institutions are adopted when the discourse among policyrnakers views 
them as appropriate or legitimate solutions. Radaelli (2000: 27) notes that in EU decision- 
making 
copying organizational structures is not a process driven by efficiency considerations, 
but a way of securing legitimacy in political life. Legitimacy explains why 
__ 
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organizations seek to be isomorphic in their structure and activity pattern with specific 
patterns present in their environment. 
In contrast to these sociological variants, Rose (1991: 3) describes lesson-drawing as a 
contested political process without the assurance that 'a lesson drawn will be both 
desirable and practical'. Such a form of lesson-drawing uses the information gained from 
alternative institutional models to formulate policies or design institutions. Similar to 
other forms of policy transfer, lesson-drawing can take place at different degrees (Rose 
1991: 21-22; see also Dolowitz and Marsh 2000: 13): 
1. copying is the direct and complete transfer of institutional models or policies, 
2. emulation refers to adoption of a programme with adjustments to different 
circumstances, 
3. hybridization combines elements of programmes from two different places, 
4. synthesis is the combination of familiar elements from programmes in effect in 
three or more different places, 
5. inspiration means that another programme inspired policy change but did not 
affect the final outcomes. 
This puts a myth about policy transfer or lesson-drawing as a method of policy-making to 
rest; namely that it refers to the full transfer of institutional models, policies or 
programmes. Another term that is often used in the transfer literature is imitation (Jacoby 
2000; Westney 1987). This is essentially a synonym for emulation. 
In addition, lesson-drawing differs from other forms of rational policy-making, because it 
often leads to a clear break with current programme patterns in favour of solutions that 
are based on foreign examples. Therefore, the information drawn from foreign lessons 
differs largely from evaluation results because it leads to the establishment of a new 
model: one that is based on both foreign programmes, and innovation. In contrast, 
evidence-based policy-making provides the information necessary to patch up existing 
programmes or to increase the efficiency of implementation (Sanderson 2002; Palumbo et 
aL 198 1; Lippincott and Stoker 1992). Lesson-drawing, however, is a strategic instrument 
for policy-makers in an institutional environment. It can be applied to increase the 
relevance of a contribution or in fact to gain an advantage over other participants of the 
policy process. In this respect, evidence-based policy-making leans more towards the 
assertions made by HI scholars, whereas lesson-drawing falls into line with RCI 
scholarship. 
Policy transfer 
Dolowitz and Marsh(2000: 3,13) (2000: 3,13) describe lesson-drawing as a sub-type or a 
voluntary fonn of policy transfer. The frarnework of analysis put forward by these 
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authors outlines an interesting distinction between different types of policy transfer. As 
Figure 3 shows, it portrays lesson-drawing and coercive transfer as ideal types at two 
ends of a continuum that is defined by different degrees of intention and coercion (see 
also Dolowitz 2000b; Dolowitz and Marsh 1996). 
As a result, policy transfer is understood as a process by which 'knowledge about how 
politics, administrative requirements, institutions and ideas in one political setting (past or 
present) is used in the development policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and 
ideas in another political setting' (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000: 5, emphasis added). The 
authors also introduce the idea of obligatedpolicy transfer, which is a response to treaty 
obligations either in the EU or in other international organizations. This can be played out 
in a voluntary form that involves the desire for international acceptance or a more 
coercive form of policy transfer that includes conditionality terms defined by these 
institutions. Lesson-drawing lies at the voluntary end of the continuum in its perfect 
rational form and under bounded rationality it implies a higher degree of coercion. The 
authors also point out that obligated transfer in the EU is to an extent also negotiated 
because the member states participate in the negotiation of policies (Dolowitz and Marsh 
2000: 15). This view of obligated transfer corresponds to the idea of 'convergence 
through harmonization' (Bennett 1991: 225). 
Obligated transfer (transfer as a result of treaty obligations, etc. ) 
Lesson-drawing Coercive transfer 
(perfect rationality) (direct imposition) 
Lesson-drawing .. -. -y but driven by Conditionality 
(bounded rationality) perceived necessity (such as 
the desire for international 
acceptance) 
Source. Dolowitz and Marsh 2000, p. 13 
Figure 3: From lesson-drawing to coercive transfer 
Accordingly, policy transfer in the EU, as much as in other organizations and institutions 
'is not an all-or-nothing process' (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000: 13). Accounts of policy 
transfer in the EU have been incorporated into studies of Europeanization (Jordan 2003; 
Knill 1999; Bulmer and Radaelli 2004; Bomberg and Peterson 2000), but also studies of 
regulatory policy-making across Europe (Majone 1991). As a result, a rich fabric of 
policy transfer and lesson-drawing, ranging across all forms of transfer discussed so far, 
has been utilised in EU research. Radaelli (2000: 29) notes that observations of instances 
in which the EU is coerced into certain policy options are unlikely since it operates on a 
non-hierarchical type of policyrnaking. In some circumstances, however, the economic 
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weight of some member states like Germany may play a role via economic mechanisms. 
Another example of policy transfer at the EU level is the gradual diffusion of 
environmental policy instruments. Jordan et al. (2003: 555) observe the 'recent increase 
in the adoption of new and innovative instruments' in EU and the member states' 
enviromnental policies. 
3.3 Agents of transfer 
This also leads us to question whether the EU as a system of governance draws lessons 
frequently and who gets involved in transfer. In his analysis, Richard Rose has already 
pointed out that leaming through lessons is facilitated by transnational epistemic 
communities (Haas 1992). Since then the list of possible agents of transfer has grown 
steadily; Dolowitz and Marsh (2000: 5) included various bodies and agents such as: 
elected officials, civil servants, institutions, consultants, think tanks and even ideologies 
and attitudes. It is certainly crucial to identify factors or persons that enable the transfer of 
policies or institutions when researching such phenomena. However, it is questionable 
whether the sheer expansion of this list of potential agents would be helpful to 
researchers. 
Diane Stone has introduced the idea of the tr-msnationalization of policy into this debate 
(Stone 1999,2004). While framing her version of policy transfer around the notion of 
learning, Stone argues that the involvement of global networks in policyrnaking has led to 
an increase in transfer between countries and organizations. Policy leaming is an essential 
element of success, it 'may result in more coherent transfer of ideas, policies and 
practices whereas mere copying may well be ad hoc and piecemeal' (Stone 2004: 548). 
The author stresses that the transfer literature has overly focused on the transfer between 
nation-states rather then considering a wider trend such as the vertical transfer of policies 
between international organizations and states. As examples, Stone includes the OECD 
and the UN as clearing houses for political ideas and forums for common policy 
development are mentioned. 
A more concrete example would be the establishment of UNAIDS as an epistemic 
community surrounding the multilateral response to this pandernic (Stone 2004: 553). A 
case in point from employment policy would be the agreement on an OECD Jobs 
Strategy, in which the member states of the organization agreed on suitable active labour 
market policies (OECD 1994b, 1994a). Similar accounts of vertical transfer emerge from 
recent studies of Europeanization (B6rzel 2001; Bulmer and Burch 2001; Hughes et aL 
2004b). 'Me following section discusses the EU's external governance, which becomes an 
important concept for the analysis of the implementation of the twinning exercise. This 
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also includes also a discussion of conditionality as integral part of coercive policy 
transfer, and new forms of governance which have become alternatives to traditional 
methods of influencing policyrnaking. 
4 External governance in the European Union 
The EU's enlargement strategy has primarily been described as a policy of conditionality 
(Grabbe 2002,2001; K. E. Smith 2003). However, as Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 
(2004: 662) convincingly argue 'the mere use of conditionality by the EU does not 
necessarily tell us much about the underlying mode of governance and the conditions 
under which EU rules are transferred to the CEECs'. The authors continue to argue that 
there is a need to make a distinction between the use of conditionality as a political 
strategy and its causal impact on domestic politics. In this context, some authors have 
also questioned to what extent the explicit conditionality that the reinforced pre-accession 
strategy introduced increased the leverage of the EU over domestic politics in CEE 
(Vachudova 2001: 5; 2004; Jacoby 2001b: 189; 2004: 198). As this thesis will show in 
the following chapters, the enhanced pre-accession strategy indeed did not just lead to the 
application of conditionality, but also incorporated new forms of governance that enabled 
cooperation on a more voluntary basis. This type of external governance has been rarely 
assessed in the academic literature. In fact, it has only received attention in areas of 
internal governance such as employment policies, tax harmonization and reform of 
pensions (Regent 2003; Velluti 2004; Borrds and Jacobsson). 
This section introduces the concept of external governance as defined by governance 
beyond boundaries, and different modes of governance such as governance by 
conditionality and new forms of governance. The 'governance approach' has found little 
recourse in the study of the EU's external relations. As already mentioned in Chapter 1, 
enlargement has been one of the testing grounds for the application of the concepts 
deriving from this line of research to the external relations of the EU (Friis and Murphy 
1999; Grabbe 2001). These areas of activity have frequently been described as the 
domain of intergovernmental bargaining characterized by the EU's three-pillar structure. 
This system allocates equal powers of initiative to the member states and the 
Commission, and charges the Council Presidency with the task of heading enlargement 
negotiations in the external relations domain. According to a number of authors, this 
leaves the Commission in both enlargement-related issues and external relations in a 
weaker position than in other areas of activity. As a result, this view of the involved 
actors leads to the conclusion that the member states are able to protect their interests 
through transitional periods, issue linkages and overlapping games (Torreblanca 1998; 
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Moravcsik and Vachudova 2003). However, as we will be seen from the analysis of the 
modes of governance the EU utilizes in implementing its external policies, this does not 
accurately reflect the reality of the enlargement process. 
4.1 External governance and the boundaries of integration 
In this thesis, a narrower definition of external governance than that outlined in the 
literature is applied. Most authors include the internal governance stage in their definition 
of external governance, but it is excluded here for analytical reasons (cf. Lavenex 2004; 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005c). This highlights the fact that the theme of 
external governance is closely connected with the question as to what type of strategies 
the EU uses to influence third countries. It is therefore also in line with studies that focus 
on the implementation of external policies (Santiso 2002; Holden 2003) and accession 
instruments (Papadimitriou and Phinnemore 2004); thereby seeking to identify the 
underlying modes of governance that accompany the EUs accession conditionality. 
Michael Smith (1996: 5, emphasis in original) suggests that 'after spending most of its 
life practising the politics of exclusion, the EU has moved towards a politics of inclusion 
to reflect the changing demands of European order'. This calls into question traditional 
interpretations of the EU as a civilian power (Duch8ne 1973) and the CFSP (Hill 1993). 
The politics of exclusion was based on the geopolitical, institutional/Iegal, transactional, 
and cultural boundary of integration; the politics of inclusion derives from the blurring of 
these boundaries. External governance is concerned with the 'external dimension of 
internal politics' (Lavenex 2004: 682), thereby focussing on the dynamics unfolding 
when the EU moves towards partial inclusion of third countries in existing agreements. 
The extension of the EU's governance beyond its boundaries has been an important 
device in exerting influence over developments in its direct neighbourhood and beyond. 
The geopolitical boundary resembles the political dividing line between insiders and 
outsiders of integration. A prime example of such a division was the Cold War. 
Geopolitics defined the relationship between East and West, where only very limited 
cooperation was possible between the two sides and membership of the CEECs was 
unthinkable. The institutional4egal boundary refers to the supranational institutions and 
their procedures as well as to the EU's role as a community of law and civic statehood 
(M. Smith 1996: 15-17). 
As several authors have later argued, institutional and legal parameters of integration 
could also be seen as seen as separate boundaries, because the institutional setup of the 
EU is subject to constant interpretation by the institutions themselves. The legal 
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boundary, however, is defined by the 'hard law' deriving from the Treaties, secondary 
legislation and case-by-case rulings of the European Court of Justice. It is also present in 
the 'soft law' that exists because of political agreements and declarations. The core 
elements of the acquis communautaire are not subject to transitional periods in 
enlargement negotiations. These components of the EU's governance system are essential 
to its capacity to govem and cannot therefore be called into question (Lavenex 2004). The 
transactional boundary refers to the regulation of the internal market for goods, services, 
capital and persons. As the EU has signed up to many trade agreements, this boundary 
has seen significant movement towards the partial inclusion of outsiders over last few 
decades. In comparison to the other concepts put forward by Smith (1996: 15-17), the 
cultural boundary is more illusive and less defined. It refers to the EU's status as a 
Community of political values, a status that in return also signals a boundary between 
insiders and outsiders. 
It was recently seen how important cultural and political values can be in political 
discourse when the opening of accession negotiations with Turkey was discussed in the 
General Affairs Council. The EU has promoted political values such as support for 
democracy, respect for the rule of law and human rights. It also tends to 'somewhat 
tentative references to common culture and heritage of its peoples' (Friis and Murphy 
1999: 217). 
These boundaries translate into accession criteria during membership negotiations. In 
terms of political and cultural values, the EU has, for example, insisted on the abolition of 
the death penalty and placed minority protection on the list of conditions for membership. 
The opening of the Berlin Wall has led to significant changes regarding the geopolitical 
division that characterised Europe before 1989. This led not only to the inclusion of ten 
countries from the former Warsaw Pact in enlargement negotiations, but also to the 
introduction of the EU's Wider Europe initiative or European Neighbourhood Strategy 
(M. Smith 2000; Emerson 2004; CEC 2004i). In parallel with this new initiative which 
aims to 'develop a zone of prosperity and a friendly neighbourhood' (CEC 20031: 4) with 
countries deriving from the former Soviet Union and the Mediterranean, the EU seeks to 
bring countries in the Western Balkans closer to membership through the Stabilisation 
and Association Process (SAP). The SAPs are similar to the Europe Agreements in 
respect to the economic opening that goes along with them. However, in political terms 
these agreements also seek to overcome the ethnic conflicts that have dwelled in the 
Western Balkans for some time. This process has already led to the opening of accession 
negotiations with Croatia (CEC 2003k, 2004e). 
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As mentioned in Chapter 1, His and Murphy (1999: 217) propose that the enlargement 
of the EU with CEE constitutes an extreme case of governance beyond boundaries and 
that this type of cooperation leads to internalization effects 'where external developments 
and external actors become part of the EU bargaining process'. Such internalization 
occurs when issue linkages between external policies and internal developments have a 
significant effect on matters such as institutional reform or financing (see also M. Smith 
1994: 463). Internalization can be costly for the member states, which over time have 
made significant investments of political, institutional and economic nature. As a result, 
His and Murphy (1999: 225) conclude that 'increased emphasis was placed on the 
readiness of applicants to implement the Union acquis upon accession - this would also 
(at least in the short term) limit numbers and minimize internalization costs'. 
In his critique of foreign policy, Ekkehart Krippendorff (1997) posed the question 'Is 
foreign policy foreign policy ? 130 . This question is an expression of the mechanisms 
underpinning the external relations of the EU. As the EU approaches third countries, its 
external policies are often a reflection of the acquis communautaire. The Union aims to 
protect the investment of the member states as well as its political and economic 
achievements. As a result, enlargement negotiations are most likely to entail an element 
of self-preservation in the form of conditions and numerous strategies that are designed to 
achieve results in the candidate countries. In this respect, a politics of inclusion is yet 
another strategy of the EU to influence its neighbours. In a more recent contribution, 
Michael Smith (2000: 808, emphasis in original) describes external relations as a 
6coexistence of "three worlds" in the European arena ... those of boundaries, layers and 
networks'. In a world of boundaries, Smith argues, 'negotiation is likely to be about 
inclusions and exclusions', whereas in a multi-layered world negotiations are more likely 
to be about managing the balance and linkage between layers and coalition-building. 
Finally, the author regards a networked world as one where the focus of negotiation lies 
with the identification and treatment of common problems. Consequently, networking is 
more about problem solving than bargaining or linkage problems. While the analogy of 
boundaries can help to reflect on a great deal of EU's activity in candidate countries, the 
notion of networks and active network building by the Commission is particularly suited 
to this thesis. 
30 My translation; the original reads 'Ist Aussenpolitik Aussenpolitik? '. 
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4.2 The conditional nature of enlargement processes 
The incentives deriving from the EU's conditionality have become a common theme in 
the enlargement literature. Grabbe (2002: 249), however, has rightly emphasized the 
ambiguity of the EU's conditions for CEE applicants. The accession criteria are defined 
in terms of political, economic and administrative terms, but 'are very general and not 
amenable to quantitative assessment'. The use of conditionality is not limited to the 
enlargement process. It has been employed widely by Western donors and organizations 
in order to provide incentives for reform. The theme of conditionality has also been 
closely linked to obligated and coercive policy transfer (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000: 9; 
Stone 2004: 554). 
In the context of EU enlargement, the obligations deriving from membership may lead to 
obligated policy transfer. Since the EU's administrative conditionality as formulated at 
the Madrid European Council in 1995 explicitly highlighted the significance of ensuring 
the effective application and implementation of the acquis, it also implicitly demanded a 
degree of convergence on issues of administrative reform. The connection between 
coercive policy transfer and the EU's conditionality is equally strong. Lal (2001: 253-56; 
cited in Stone 2004: 554) has identified five features of conditionality pertinent to our 
understanding of coercive policy transfer: 
1. Inducement: getting governments to enact policies they would otherwise not have 
initiated; 
2. Selectivity., aid given only to those countries already exhibiting a "good" policy 
environment; 
3. Paternalism: donors attempt to get aid spent on the goods and services they 
favour; 
4. Restraint. ý seeking protection against policy reversal that may occur with a new 
government. It differs from inducement in that there is no policy disagreement 
between the recipient and the donor country; 
5. Signalling: aid is used as a device to signal "good" policy behaviour by the 
recipient. 
Inducement has been present in the enlargement process on basis of the APs, which 
identify the priorities and objectives for the financial instruments. Although implemented 
under the label of partnership, these documents clearly focused governments on particular 
areas of reform. The Commission is also able to extent its grip on areas of reform through 
the programming of pre-accession aid that is based on the AN and NPAAs. This may 
lead to priorities that are more specific during the implementation of the accession 
instruments. The selectivity of aid to the applicant countries has also been an important 
element of coercion in the accession process. The EC/EU has suspended aid to the 
CEECs on numerous occasions; for example, to Slovakia in May 2001. This was because 
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of irregularities concerning disbursement. Paternalism and signalling have also been used 
to ensure compliance by the candidates with the acquis. In addition, the Commission has 
used its Regular Reports to monitor the CEECs' progress towards accession and the 
publication of the White Paper on regulatory alignment also helped to clarify its 
intentions (CEC 1995c). A large number of programming documents, starting with the 
Financing Memorandum for each candidate down to the individual project fiches and 
twinning covenants have allowed the Commission to refine its accession criteria in detail. 
As Grabbe (2001: 1019-24) points out these activities introduce elements of gate-keeping, 
benchmarking and monitoring. Moreover, they allow for the provision of legislative and 
institutional templates, and advice. Hence, the EU can influence candidates with varying 
degrees of conditionality. In this context, Schimmelfermig and Sedelmeier (2005c: 3) 
advocate the external incentives model which serves as a word of caution in relation to 
the fact that most analysts 'take it very much as a given that the EU has, or at least could 
have, a pervasive influence on the domestic politics of the CEECs'. The authors define 
this model as a rationalist bargaining model that is both actor-centred and based on a 
logic of anticipated consequences. It derives from studies of international financing 
institutions (Haggard and Webb 1994: 25-27; Kahler 1992: 92-123) and asserts that 'the 
EU sets the adoption of its rules as conditions that the CEECs have to fulfil in order to 
receive rewards from the EU' (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005c: 10). The authors 
distinguish between two kinds of rewards that are offered to the candidate countries: 
assistance and institutional ties. 
This type of strategy differs from a strategy of pure coercion because the EU does not 
intervene when conditions are not met, but simply withholds the reward. It is a strategy of 
reactive reinforcement or reinforcement by reward (Schimmelfennig 2000: 125-27; 
Schimmelfennig et aL 2003a: 496-97). It follows that the failure of applicants to comply 
with the EU's conditions would lead to the temporary suspension of financial assistance 
or association agreements. Another reaction could be the cancellation of a particular 
project. As the EU's accession criteria run across political, economic and administrative 
issues, the rewards put forward as an incentive can relate directly to these elements of 
domestic reform. 
It has been argued, however, that conditionality undermines local ownership and should 
therefore be replaced or accompanied by alternative strategieS3 1. Dearden (2005: 12), for 
31 This is a fairly common argument in the literature on conditionaflty (see Kahler 1992; J. Nelson 
1996; Killick et al. 1998; Williamson 1983c; Ethier 2003; Kelley 2004). 
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example, stipulates for EU development policy that 'without the involvement of recipient 
governments, ownership of aid will be lost and delivery impaired'. In addition, several 
authors have emphasised the problems deriving from excessively controlled external aid 
programmes. In particular, this effect has increased considerably since the creation of the 
EuropeAid Cooperation Office in 2001. Santiso (2002: 402), for example, notes that the 
reforms of the EU aid regime 
have created a risk-averse bureaucracy driven by the tortuous procedures of financial 
accountability. ... EC aid policies applicable to any given sector or geographical 
region consist of a thicket of regulations, resolutions, declarations and 
communications which often lack an overarching purpose and strategic objectives. 
These considerations call into question whether incentives based on rewards were enough 
to induce governments in CEE to reform their administrations. The question is whether 
the candidates can perceive the Phare programme or individual project as a reward if their 
influence on its implementation and objectives is limited. As already highlighted in 
Chapter 1, the EU could not depend on any general body of European law in the public 
administration sphere and therefore it was more difficult to pinpoint the administrative 
criteria for accession than the remaining accession criteria (OECD 1998: 13; see also 
Dimitrova 2002; Nicolaides 2003). This in return leads to the issue regarding on what 
basis the EU allocates, or withholds rewards, in the area of administrative reform or 
whether indeed programmes are cancelled if they are not on target. 
4.3 New forms of governance 
The OMC has removed most of the elements of coercion mentioned above from the 
implementation of policies, instead its aim is to 'share experience and to encourage the 
spread of best practice' (H. Wallace 2000c: 33). In a sense, this method of policy-making 
is the mirror image of the Community method. It does not focus on policy formulation, 
but is concerned with policy outcomes and concentrates on the implementation of 
policies. As a method of policy coordination, it 'avoids strict regulatory requirements and 
allows experiments that are adapted to local circumstances' (Eberlein and Kerwer 2004: 
123). Thus, coordination under this new form of governance can foster the improvement 
of policies on basis of mutual learning processes and peer pressure. Since it does not 
impose any regulations on the member states that sign up to it, the OMC can be used 
when 'harmonization is unworkable but mutual recognition and the resulting regulatory 
competition may be too risky' (Trubek and Mosher 2001: 2 1). 
There have been many criticisms levelled at the relevance of the OMC to policy-making 
and its effectiveness as a method (Eberlein and Kerwer 2004: 123-24; Hodson and Maher 
2001: 16-17). However, it has become an important alternative to the Community 
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method, because it allows for more diversity among the member states while seeking 
convergence on particular issues. As a result, member states are able to select elements of 
the systems used by various peers and implement these at home. The list of policy areas 
where the open method of coordination is implemented is expanding; it includes 
macroeconomic coordination (Hodson 2004), employment (de la Porte et aL 2001), the 
environment (Lenschow 2002), taxation (Radaelli 2003a), innovation (Kaiser and Prange 
2004) and immigration (Caviedes 2004). 
The OMC is seen as a solution for accelerating decisions in areas where EU decision- 
making has resulted in gridlock. Hdritier (2003: 105) points out that this is largely due to 
the fact that integration has reached 'a stage where the core activities of the member 
states are directly addressed'. In these areas of activity, traditional methods of decision- 
making do not yield success and the application of a more inclusive method that 
incorporates actors, which participate in implementation, is attractive. Mosher (2000: 6) 
has outlined four essential elements of the OMC: 
1. fixed guidelines set for the Union, with short-, medium-, and long-term goals; 
2. quantitative and qualitative indicators and benchmarks; 
3. European guidelines translated into national and regional policies and targets; and 
4. periodic monitoring, evaluation and peer review, organized as a mutual learning 
process. 
It has been argued elsewhere that the twinning exercise in combination with other 
elements of the enlargement strategy such as the APs and NPAAs resembles some of the 
essential features of the OMC (Steffens 2003; Tulmets 2005b). Twinning as a method of 
aid delivery upholds a decentralized mode of implementation (Askvik 1999; Jones and 
Blunt 1999). This characteristic leads to the incorporation of actors in the process of 
formulating programme objectives, which later bear the costs of implementation. The 
preceding chapters will show that the programming of twinning leaves substantial room 
for common goal definition and therefore undermines resistance from the outset. It 
incorporates both elements of a top-down and a bottom-up perspective to implementation 
(Pressman and Wildavsky 1973; Sabatier and Mazinanian 1979,1981; Mayntz 1983; 
Majone and Wildavsky 1978; Ham and Hill 1984; Sabatier 1986; Peters 1993). 
In relation to enlargement, the identification of best practices allows for the recognition of 
suitable and efficient models of implementation on behalf of the candidates. In respect of 
administrative and judicial capacities, this becomes particularly interesting since there are 
no predefined 'European' templates concerning the administrative arrangements for the 
implementation of particular directives. The exchange of best practices and the 
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formulation of benchmarks as minimum requirements for projects replace the top-down 
approach of incentives by rewards and at the same time serve the purpose of promoting 
convergence. The introduction of soft laws into the accession process is therefore an 
attractive alternative to more coercive forms of policy transfer. New forms of governance 
enable actors to draw lessons from their peers; they create opportunities for transfer of 
'best practices'. At the same time, it does not enforce cooperation through peer pressure 
and therefore does entail a different form of coercion. This dimension of policy reform is 
needed in candidate countries, but also across the whole of Europe as shown by the 
adoption of the OMC in various policy areas. 
5 Conclusion 
This chapter analysed a number of integration theories deriving from the new 
institutionalisms. Section 2 highlighted the behavioural assumptions that underpin 
approaches such as RCI, HI and SI, whereas Section 3 focused on comitology procedures 
in the EU and their relevance for policy implementation. 
In light of Simon's (1997a) argument that an analysis of organizations should find a 
middle ground between those approaches which assume rational behaviour, and those 
which presume actors fall victim to their environment, a synthesis between these different 
institutional isms would be an important step in theorizing EU decision-making. This 
chapter concludes that an analysis of the life cycle of an instrument such as twinning can 
only be attempted with the help of various concepts and on the basis of multi-causality. 
The discussion on comitology undertaken in Section 3 of this chapter, however, shows 
how difficult a synthesis may be, because academic discussions on institutional arenas 
such as the EU committee system are often conducted in "camps". The same holds true 
for approaches to lesson-drawing and policy transfer. In particular, the transfer literature 
including studies on diffusion and convergence addresses different issues, namely policy 
formulation, policy implementation and policy outcomes. It is in light of these different 
elements of the policy cycle that discussions on transfer often fail to communicate 
effectively with each other. In order to enhance our discussions, it is necessary to separate 
out these elements more clearly, even though there is considerable overlap of such 
processes in reality. 
Such tendencies have also found recourse in the debate surrounding the EU's external 
relations. It is clear, however, that an enlargement of this magnitude would have been 
hard to achieve on basis of a single underlying mode of governance such as coercive 
policy transfer based on the EU's accession conditionality. On the contrary, it is more 
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likely that the EU has covered a wider spectrum during the accession process. Chapter 4 
engages with this aspect of external governance in more detail and outlines plausible 
alternatives in relation to the twinning exercise as an accession instrument. The 
preliminary conclusion on this aspect of the decision-making process is, however, that the 
EU has utilized a number of strategies to achieve results in the candidate countries. 
Finally, studies of enlargement should bear in mind that institutional reforms are 
inevitably subject to domestic debates and therefore subject to the influence of domestic 
circumstances. 
4 
Governing by conditions, transfer and new forms 
ofgovernance 
The essence of a case study, the central tendency among all 
types of case study is that it tries to illuminate a decision or 
set of decisions: why they were taken, how they were 
implemented, and with what result. 
Schramm 1971, p. 16, emphasis added 
1 Introduction 
The establishment of the twinning exercise remains one of the most substantial changes 
introduced in 1997. This institution-building instrument was created to facilitate the long- 
term secondment of civil servants from the member states to the applicant countries. The 
aim of this thesis is to provide a clear picture of how this particular reform of Phare was 
conducted from 1996 to 1998 and how the twinning exercise influenced candidates to 
reform their institutions. In order to understand the different elements this decision- 
making process entailed, this chapter elaborates the three stages which substantive 
enlargement polices normally assume: 1. Internal governance; 2. External governance; 3. 
Domestic outcomes. It identifies plausible rival hypotheses for Stage I and 2 that are 
closely connected to theoretical models. In contrast, for Stage 3 possible outcomes of the 
EU's policies are introduced. 
The rationale behind this is that the decision-making process can make use of several 
alternative modes of governance. This has been highlighted by a number of authors in 
recent years (Hix 1994,1998; Bulmer 1994; H. Wallace 2000a; Jachtenfuchs 2001, 
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1995). To the same extent, the EU can choose to use different types of strategies to 
influence CEE governance and outcomes vary substantially across sectors and countries 
(Grabbe 2001; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004; Jacoby 2001b). Thus, policy 
formulation, policy implementation and policy outcomes may vary across different areas 
of policyrnaking (see Figure 4). These considerations suggest that studies on EU 
enlargement policies have to answer three basic questions outlined below: 
EU decision-making model 
Stage 1: Internal governance. How does the EU decide policies regarding 
applicant countries? 
Stage 2: External governance. Which instruments or type of policies does 
the EU introduce to generate change in applicant countries? 
Candidate countries 
- Stage 3: Domestic outcomes. How do the applicants respond to these 
policies, and what impact do the EU's policies have on domestic reform? 
The first part of the chapter focuses on the reform of the pre-accession strategy and the 
introduction of twinning. Stage I examines the dynamics between actors within the EU 
when it decides enlargement policies. Stage 2 pays particular attention to the fact that the 
EU created twinning as an instrument to generate policy transfer between existing and 
future member states. It seeks to explain how actors focused on the effectiveness of the 
twinning exercise in transferring institutional models to the candidate countries when 
formulating implementation procedures for the programme. Stage 3 analyses the likely 
effects in CEECs and their response to the EU's enlargement strategy and in particular 
the instruments it uses to achieve its aims. 
EU decision-making model 
1) Policy Input 2) Policy outpuijt 
Insiders 
Effediveness of 
externalpolicies 
Candidate countries 
-ome, 'Irnpic, f- 
'_; 
jouic 
,, _., _-,, 
and, response 
Outsiders 
Figure 4: Policy Input, policy output and the Impact on candidate countries 
The connections between the new institutionalisms and theories of the policy process 
such as lesson-drawing, policy transfer and evidence-based policy-making are crucial to 
the understanding of the alternative models developed in this chapter. In general, these 
different theories can be distinguished by the behavioural assumptions that underpin their 
concepts. This chapter clarifies each model and explores how these theories relate to each 
other. This enables an informed discussion of the enlargement process which is in line 
with the central theoretical tendencies in the literature. 
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Model' Modes of governance and outcomes .. 
I. Internal governance (p. 83ff) lesson-drawing, evidence-based policy-making, 
intergovernmental bargaining, deliberative supranationalism 
2. External governance (p. 92ff) governance by conditionality, new forms of governance, 
persuasion and policy learning 
[3. Domestic outcomes (p. 99ff) convergence, resistance 
Table 2: Models of decision-making, modes of governance, strategies and responses 
Theories of regional integration initially neglected the meso-level of policy-making. 
Theoretical frameworks frequently fell short of explaining how the 'grand bargains' of 
the EU are translated into more pragmatic and manageable programmes. In practical 
terms, agreement on a political goal such as the enlargement of the EU towards CEE 
cannot be achieved without the entrepreneurship of actors who have the skill to develop 
and implement suitable instruments for their purposes. Neither neofunctionalism nor 
intergovemmentalism (including its latest strand of 'liberal intergovernmentalism') 
provided the toolkit to explain 'how the EU works on a day-to-day basis as a system of 
government' (Peterson 1995a: 70). This observation has been supported largely by a 
broad move to utilize the new institutionalisms within the study of regional integration in 
order to shed more light on these sectoral or 'meso-level' policies (Bulmer 1994,1998; 
M. Aspinwall and G. Schneider 2000; Pollack 1996,1997; Peterson and Bomberg 1999). 
Similarly, the literature on the EU's enlargement policy has divided the subject into two 
different levels of policy-making, a 'macro or polity dimension' and a 'substantive or 
policy dimension' (Jacoby 1999: 504; Sedelmeier 2002). However, recent accounts of the 
EU's conditionality have focused solely on the impact of the accession criteria on 
applicant states rather than analysing and evaluating the substantive policies involved in 
implementing the enlargement strategy (Grabbe 2001; Lippert et al. 2001; Dimitrova 
2002). In order to understand terms such as 'conditionality' or 'compliance' the analysis 
of substantive policies; and the conduct of accession negotiations, Phare, ISPA, and 
SAPARD, needs to be considered as one of the key issues of enlargement processes. " 
These considerations are equally relevant for ongoing enlargement rounds with Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Romania and Turkey, or future negotiations with countries in the Western 
Balkans. 
32 These types, of policies have also been introduced by other organizations. NATO for example 
used the Partnership for Peace programme to support the necessary changes in CEE regarding the 
military capacity of the candidate countries. 
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2 Internal governance 
There are a large number of theories available on Stage I of the decision-making process. 
Integration theories traditionally explained the introduction of common policies on basis 
of the Community method or intergovernmental bargaining. The Community method was 
defined as a distinctive mode of governance in which the Commission takes a strong role 
in formulating, brokering and implementing common policies. The brokering of the 
agreement is underpinned by an empowering role of the Council of Ministers, which acts 
on basis of strategic bargaining and package deals. The implementation of common 
policies is supported by the locking-in of relevant interest groups and the engagement of 
national agencies (H. Wallace 2000c: 28ff. ). At the same time, intergovernmental 
bargaining was seen at the opposite end of the integration spectrum. This method 
described national governments as the main actors in the decision-making process with 
the Commission only remaining as a facilitator of agreements between them. It is 
characterized by the active involvement of the Council in formulating, brokering and 
implementing policies (H. Wallace 2000c: 33ff. ). 
The internal governance stage in our case has utilized one of four different modes of 
governance which are seen as plausible alternatives for the introduction of the twinning 
exercise (see Table 3). Evidence-based policy-making and lesson-drawing are both 
depicted as a variation of the Community method, whereas intergovernmental bargaining 
refers to both the classical method of EU decision-making as well as the more modem 
version referred to as liberal intergovernmentalism (see Chapter 3). In addition, 
deliberative supranationalism is an alternative that stresses the possibility of real 
deliberation based on social leaming and persuasion. The specification of different modes 
of governance below results in four plausible rival hypotheses which seek to explain how 
the Commission conducted the reform of the twinning exercise in 1997 and the 
subsequent implementation of the programme. 
The Community method of decision-making is largely centred on the idea of the 
Commission as policy entrepreneur (Pollack 1998: 51f.; Kingdon 1995: 180; Cram 
1993). This term has already been discussed in section 2.2 of Chapter 3. It assumes that 
the Commission takes an active role in agenda-setting and can make use of its informal 
agenda-setting powers if a number of requirements are met. In view of the discussions 
surrounding the Commission's role in the policy process, we can assume that it uses a 
number of different strategies in order to consistently extend these powers. This is largely 
connected to the role of expertise in the policy process. Radaelli (I 999b: 757f ) notes that 
different forms of expertise correspond with different modes of the politics of expertise. 
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Therefore, the use of expertise results in different modes of governance depending on 
which sources the Commission can access during the policy-making process. 
The Commission as the sole initiator of legislation can, for example, make use of 
epistemic communities (Zito 2001; Haas 1992; Verdun 1999), policy networks (Bdrzel 
1998; Peterson 1994), or advocacy coalitions (Radaelli 1999a; Sabatier 1998). The 
application of these theories enables us to elaborate on how the Commission can exercise 
authority through the Community method. The frequent contact between the Commission 
and the academic community enables the use of epistemic communities as a form of 
technocratic policy-making. The involvement of policy networks allows the Commission 
to gain access to a power base and share the member states' authority on certain issues. In 
a similar way, advocacy coalitions enable the Commission to identify collaborators in the 
Council before decisions are reached. 
Internal governance 
Modes of governance Concepts applied 
Evidence-based policy-making logic of anticipated consequences, * bounded rationality, 
(P. 85) benchmarking; evaluation 
Lesson-drawing (p. 88) logic of anticipated consequences, rationafity,, prospective 
policy evaluation; transfer of institutional structures and policies 
Intergovernmental bargaining logic of anticipated consequences, intergovernmental 
(P. 9 0) bargaining; relative power of the member states; policy transfer 
(most likely by the German model) 
Deliberative supranationalism logic of appropriateness; persuasion; social leaming; 
(p. 92) deliberation of alternatives; transfer of norms; institutional 
isomorphism 
Table 3: The internal governance of the EU 
The approaches to the policy process outlined below are generally similar, but they also 
differ in some aspects. This chapter argues that evidence-based policy-making and 
lesson-drawing (or policy transfer) have become important alternatives to the examples 
mentioned above. In the context of this thesis, they can be distinguished and defined by 
the sources they make use of during policy-making: Lesson-drawing implies the 
borrowing of ideas from outside the Commission's resources, either from a third country 
or from another institution, whereas evidence-based policy-making draws on internal and 
external resources of the Commission. In addition, the different views on comitology 
described in Section 3.1 of Chapter 3 indicate considerable disagreement about the role of 
the Commission in the EU's system of committees. As the twinning exercise was 
introduced at this level of policy-making, this raises interesting questions concerning the 
relevance of this case in connection to the wider debate. In this context, theories of the 
policy process can help to identify the behavioural patterns that underpin the discussion 
between the different institutionalisms. The following sections introduce four different 
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modes of governance that are seen as plausible alternatives for the introduction of 
twinning: evidence-based policy-making, lesson-drawing, intergovernmental bargaining, 
and deliberative supranationalism (see Table 3 above). 
2.1 Alternative Explanation 1: Evidence-based policy making 
The use of evidence during decision-making is a common and well-established practice in 
nation states and the EU alike. However, in recent years the introduction of evidence- 
based policy-making led to formal procedures which have become extended beyond a 
simple collection of relevant information. The utilization of evidence has taken place 
alongside three dimensions: the instrumental (decision support and problem solving 
function), conceptual (educative function), and symbolic (political function) dimension 
(see Leviton and Hughes 1981: 525-27). The question of how evaluation studies could 
become more relevant to policy-making has been a central point of discussion between 
the members of a quickly developing profession (see e. g. Palumbo 1987; Patton 1997; 
Palumbo et al. 1981; Rist 1995). In this sense, evaluation can become instrumental in 
enhancing the accuracy of policy formulation by collecting information on 
implementation and assessing policy design. However, the use of evaluations can also 
become helpful for the choice of instruments, the fine-tuning of programmes and their 
termination (Howlett 1991; Bemelmans-Videc 1990; Nioche 1992). 
The potential enshrined in structured and regular information on programme 
implementation were clearly noticed within the EU. As a result, the Financial Regulation 
demands that institutions shall undertake both ex ante and expost evaluations applied to 
'all programmes and activities which entail significant spending' (EC 2002: Article 27, 
§4). In the execution of these obligations, the Commission has now even gone further as 
part of the Action Plan for Reform established by Commissioner Neil Kinnock. Er ante 
and ex post control of financial expenditure is matched by a monitoring system which 
also facilitates interim or mid-term evaluation across the different policies. In addition to 
the Evaluation Units within the individual DGs, a network of evaluators has been 
established which regularly identifies best practices in respect to evaluation methods 
(CEC 2000f, 2000g). The evaluation of programmes is conducted by a number of 
institutions. These include 'in-house' evaluations, private consulting firms, think tanks, 
and academic researchers (cf. J. A. Smith 2000). However, the most pertinent change has 
been the introduction of external evaluations by for-profit consulting firms. The Phare 
programme benefited from a number of these studies that informed ex ante evaluation of 
forthcoming implementation rounds, but also considered policy goals and objectives as 
well as the means of implementation. 
Chapter 4: Governing by conditions, transfer and new forms of qovernance 86 
The Commission's management capacities were questioned by a number of scholars in 
the 1990s. This time was considered the main period of change with regard to the 
evaluation capacities of the Commission itself and the powers given to the European 
Court of Auditors (Laffan 1997; Metcalfe 1992; Christiansen 1997). Firstly, each DG 
possessed 'in-house' capacities for internal reviews of policies. These resources were 
often present in the form of coordination units, assistants to the Director General and 
Cabinet members of the Commissioner. Consequently, a number of internal reviews were 
regularly produced to examine the effectiveness of the policies and instruments utilized in 
implementation (see e. g. CEC 1997h; 2000i for reviews of Phare). In addition, the 
Commission's Delegations to the applicant countries had to report regularly to Brussels 
not only on the sectors addressed by the Phare programme, but also on the instruments 
themselves. Finally, the Phare Regulation (EC 3906/89) requested the publishing of an 
annual report on the programme. These types of internal assessments can result in 
unexpected returns for programme implementers. 
Furthermore, the Santer Commission emphasized the need for reform of internal 
practices. This resulted in the introduction of the SEM 2000 (Sound and Efficient 
Financial Management) which initiated the changes to the Financial Regulation 
highlighted above. The programme started in 1995, but in practical terms only became 
operational in 1997. Since it envisaged the strengthening of evaluation in Commission 
programmes and policy, most contractors began their work in early 1997 parallel to the 
reforms of the pre-accession strategy. The OMAS consortium, the contractor that 
evaluated the Phare programme from 1997 to 2000, started its operations in January 1997. 
Later, the SEM 2000 reforms were re-examined by the Prodi Commission and now have 
been designed to evaluate the performance of the Commission's top personnel (Kassim. 
2004; Cini 2001; The Evaluation Partnership 1999). It is, of course, questionable how 
effective such management reforms are, but it can at least we be concluded that there was 
much more information available to the Commission than it would have had without 
these changes. Although external contractors only started their work in 1997, a variety of 
evaluation activities had already been present before that year. 
In addition, these changes were in line with Project Cycle Management (PCM), the 
implementation regime under which aid programmes has been implemented since 1992. 
This provided a project cycle in which the identification of needs was followed up with 
project formulation; implementation, evaluation and audit33 . Thus, Commission services 
33 See Figure 8 on page 172 for an overview of the programming cycle. 
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were required to evaluate projects as well as programmes and policies on a regular basis 
(Eggers 2002). In practice, this takes the form of evaluation sheets by task managers in 
the Delegations of the Commission. The approach is largely based on the logical 
framework matrix, an instrument developed by USAID in the late 1960s. 
The basic idea of this approach is to depict the needs, objectives, means and specific 
requirements of a project in a matrix. It has been adopted across a number of aid agencies 
including GTZ34 and SIDA35. The so-called logframe became an important tool for 
monitoring and evaluation of Phare programmes that otherwise would be hard to assess. 
This is because their objectives are influenced by a number of programming documents 
(see Annex 15 on the logframe matrix, CEC 2004a; Particip 2002). A word of caution 
should also be attached to these considerations. The mere installation of such an approach 
to implementation does not necessarily lead to an evaluation culture in which mistakes 
are easily admitted and corrected, but rather it merely provides an opportunity to develop 
such a pattern of behaviour during implementation. 
This leads to the conclusion that overall DGIA was in a good position to use evaluations 
and internal assessments to introduce an alternative instrument for institution-building. 
The capacities for internal policy assessments in particular were quite pronounced due to 
the variety of reports available from the delegations and the work of the evaluation unit 
(CEC 1997h). This could have enabled the initial introduction of twinning in 1997-98. 
Later, after the first implementation rounds, results from evaluation studies could have 
been used for procedural fine-tuning in order to enable a smoother operation of the 
instrument and ensure effectiveness (OMAS 200] a; Birker et al. 2000; CEC 2000i). The 
role of the evaluation units within first DGIA then DG Enlargement should not be 
underestimated. These parts of the Commission may not only act as satellites of DG 
Budget in order to ensure Sound Financial Management, but could also become important 
partners for the hierarchy in case changes to instruments become necessary. 
In the context of this thesis, evidence-based policy-making is understood to be a rational 
form of policy-making. Since the role of the Commission in the 1997 reforms is a 
particular concern for this research, it also links up with the review of the RCI literature 
undertaken in Section 2.4 on the new institutionalisms and Section 3.1 on the EU's 
committee governance of Chapter 3. It has already been mentioned that evaluation 
exercises and the reports by European Court of Auditors provide a form of institutional 
34 Gesellschaft far Technische Zusammenarbeit a German bilateral cooperation agency. 
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checks for member state governments. Considering the internal governance stage, 
however, the criticisms from these sources can also be used by the Commission to assess 
the performance of policy instruments. In addition, it is important to note that it also has 
an obvious link to the HI research agenda outlined in Chapter 3. HI predicts path 
dependencies and limits on the range of possible options for future decisions based on 
prior decisions. Thus, standard working procedures that have been in place may influence 
the creation of twinning procedures. Consequently, even when a new instrument is 
introduced, actors may face increasing returns from prior decisons (Pierson 2000). In the 
enlargement case, this concerns the financial arrangements made for the pre-accession 
funds, but also the EU's aid implementation regime that was largely driven by inter- 
institutional politics between EuropeAid and DG Enlargement. In addition, as evaluation 
identifies the defects of policy design, it provides prime information for fine-tuning, 
thereby working out a solution within known parameters rather then breaking with the 
past. Based on the above, the following working hypothesis can be put forward: 
HIa: The Commission, due to its resources ofpolicy assessment and evaluation, has been 
crucial in creating the twinning exercise by determining its objectives, procedures and 
content. 
This working hypothesis can be confirmed if the research process shows that the 
introduction of the twinning exercise, and in particular its implementation procedures, 
was based on either positive or negative lessons learned from Phare evaluations and the 
Commission's internal assessments. Such confirmations would be expected to be shown 
in the form of references by interviewees to internal assessments, delegation reports and 
evaluations. It would also be expected that the Commission was the first actor in 1997 to 
voice the idea for a twinning exercise and that interviewees acknowledge this. 
2.2 Alternative Explanation 2: Lesson-drawing 
There are a number of reasons why policy-makers would prefer lesson-drawing to other 
styles of policy-making. Seeking knowledge from 'across time and/or across space' (Rose 
1991: 5-6) often is easier than the innovation of completely new instruments. At the same 
time, lessons provide an alternative to reforms based solely on the evaluation of the 
programmes in question. This underlines the view that policy-makers are 'seeking 
knowledge instrumentally' (Rose 1991: 5) rather than finding an entirely unique solution 
to their problems. The concept of lesson-drawing therefore refers to a natural process of 
learning by experience. 
35 Swedish International Development Co-opcraflon Agency. 
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In many cases, what may appear theoretically possible will not succeed practically due to 
the functional pressures deriving from the complexity of the implementation process and 
the variety of actors that engage with it. Rose (1991: 5) stresses that 'in policymaking 
circles experience has a unique status as justification of effectiveness'. In this context, it 
should be noted that the European Commission has often acted as a clearing house of 
ideas and this has inevitably enhanced its legitimacy as an actor in the policymaking 
process. The Commission's position, in particular at the meso-level of policymaking, is 
frequently perceived as policy-relevant rather than purely interest-based. As a form of 
prospective policy evaluation, as discussed in Chapter 3, lesson-drawing offers an 
interesting alternative by allowing the Commission to extend its knowledge by lessons 
drawn elsewhere. 
Lesson-drawing is understood to be a rational form of policy-making with normative 
elements; an instrument of prospective policy evaluation that allows policy-makers to 
rationalize on the basis of known examples. It is therefore seen as closely connected to 
the framework that RCI scholars draw up for the Commission as an agent of the member 
states. In other words, the Commission uses lesson-drawing in order to enhance its 
authority during the introduction of new instruments. It employs this device rationally, on 
the one hand, to gain an advantage in the policy process. In our case, this entails the need 
to overcome resistance in the Phare Management Committee. On the other hand, it is also 
keen to gain more information on "new methods" of which it has no prior experience 
without engaging the member states. This in return has the advantage that it can face the 
member states without being accused of supporting, for example, a "German" or a 
"British" model of implementation. At the same time, the Commission cannot ignore 
developments in other aid agencies if it wants to operate its programmes with efficient 
delivery methods. 
Hlb: The Commission, due to its ability to draw lessonsfrom the experience of other aid 
donors, has been crucial in creating the twinning exercise by determining its objectives, 
procedures and content 
This working hypothesis can be confirmed if the research process demonstrates that the 
introduction of the twinning exercise was based on either positive or negative lessons 
learned from similar programmes of another/other DAC donor/S36 . The research findings 
should establish the link between the examples, which the Commission chose during the 
introduction of implementation procedures, and the arrangements made for the twinning 
36 DAC refers to Developmad Assiistance Committee, a group ofthe roughly 22 richest members ofthe OEM 
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exercise. In addition, under such a constellation, the Commission would also be the first 
actor in 1997 to voice the idea for a twinning exercise. 
2.3 Alternative Explanation 3: Intergovernmental bargaining 
Prior to the introduction of twinning, only one government had extensive experience with 
similar operations in CEE. In 1993, the German government introduced a bilateral 
cooperation programme called TRANSFORM. This was a direct result of bilateral 
exchanges between German administrations and Eastern European partner institutions. In 
order to coordinate these commitments, the government gave the responsibility for the 
programme to the Ministry of the Economy (because of economic advice)37 . the Foreign 
Ministry (because of its foreign policy relevance)38 and Department for International 
Cooperation (because of its experience in development cooperation)39. These three 
ministries installed a joint steering committee to implement the programme. 
TRANSFORM was mainly introduced for the delivery of advice on economic and 
political transition. The programme originally intended to support the introduction of 
social market economies in Eastern Europe, but gradually shifted also towards 
encouraging measures relating to the accession of CEE candidate countries into the EU. 
The budget for this initiative remained El 10 million in 2000, only E35.8 million lower 
than the overall twinning budget for the same year. 
The intergovernmental interpretation of bargaining activities in European integration has 
primarily regained strength on the basis of Andrew Moravcsik's work on the SEA 40 and 
EMU (Moravcsik 1993,1995,1998). Since the publication of the Choice for Europe, 
liberal intergovernmentalism has emphasized elements of power politics such as the 
relative bargaining power of important governments and incentives to enhance the 
credibility of commitments. The latter concept is not only an important explanation for 
the delegation of authority (see also Pollack 2003b; Majone 2001), but also offers an 
insight into the tendency among governments to address particular issues at the European 
level as opposed to the domestic level. The introduction of an EU twinning programme 
mobilised a much larger number of experts from Western Europe to cooperate with their 
counterparts in CEE than the TRANSFORM programme alone. It is therefore logical that 
a government, which had already spearheaded this type of bilateral cooperation with the 
37 BMWi, Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft. 
38 AA, Auswärtiges Amt 
39 BMZ, Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung. 
40 SEA, Single European Act. 
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candidate countries, would be enthusiastic to introduce a similar European mechanism for 
administrative cooperation. In addition, the lack of finances in Germany around the time 
might have led decision-makers to look for different budgets to utilize. 
In addition, the bargaining power of a member state is indeed an important resource, but 
this case study shows that it also comes in different disguises. Since Germany had the 
most evident experience with administrative cooperation, it had an obvious advantage 
during the introduction of twinning. The knowledge accumulated among the ministries 
over a period of 5 years was not only specific to the candidate countries (and beyond), but 
also of technical significance. It related to the internal coordination of such activities. 
This made the German government an important partner in initiating and sustaining 
operations. It adds plausibility to the understanding of the process as a policy transfer by 
the German government to the European level. This is because the government could 
have aimed to sustain its efforts in CEE on an EU budget line. Subsequent to the 
introduction of twinning, the German government also significantly reduced the financial 
basis for TRANSFORM. This was not only a result of budgetary problems, but also a 
direct result of the EU twinning programme (BMZ 2000: 5). All these observations may 
lead us to question whether the German government was the main architect of twinning. 
In this context, intergovernmental bargaining is seen as a rational form of decision- 
making in which the transfer of implementation procedures becomes the main objective 
for a particular member state. Such a transfer would not only have allowed the German 
government to meet its budgetary demands by shifting its bilateral policy to the EU level, 
but also to minimize its adaptation costs to the twinning procedures. In addition, an 
intergovernmentalist account of this reform would assume that the Commission was 
willing to cooperate with Berlin during the introduction of twinning, because of the 
relative power of the German government. At the same time, the Commission could have 
accepted the authority Germany had on the issue on basis of the TRANSFORM 
programme and therefore it would have chosen to lean towards the same model of 
implementation. 
HIc. The German government based on the transfer of implementation procedures from 
its bilateral aid programme TRANSFORM has been crucial in creating the twinning 
exercise by brokering a deal in the Phare Management Committee concerning its 
objectives, procedures and content. 
This working hypothesis can be confirmed if the research process convincingly illustrates 
that the German government had not only the idea to introduce the twinning exercise, but 
also was instrumental in introducing its implementation procedures. The research process 
could uncover such a mode of governance by references of interviewees to the 
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involvement of the German government in introducing twinning, but also through 
archival records in form of exchanges between the Ministry of Finance and the 
Commission. In addition, it should not be expected that interviewees openly affirm their 
involvement in introducing twinning, because the Berlin government could have 
informed the Commission behind the scenes. However, in case TRANSFORM was 
openly introduced as a model for twinning then this should also become evident in the 
minutes of the NCP meetings. 
2.4 Alternative Explanation 4: Deliberative supranationalism 
The concept of deliberative supranationslism is closely linked to Sl and SC research on 
European integration. The assumptions underpinning these approaches to European 
integration have already been introduced in Chapter 3. In the context of the case study 
under consideration here, it is important to stress that Sl and SC scholars describe the 
negotiation of implementation procedures in EU committees as a process driven by 
consensus and problem-oriented deliberation (Joerges et al. 1997; Joerges and Neyer 
1997b; Checkel 1999). Tbus, these scholars describe comitology committees as forums 
for communicative interaction in which actors not only form their preferences, but also 
are socialized by common norms and ideas. Even though these committees mostly discuss 
technical issues of implementation, Sl scholars assume that the common search for best 
solutions leads to the socialization of actors and persuasion becomes an important 
mechanism for taking decisions. 
Consequently, deliberative supranationslism as outlined by Joerges et al. (1997b; 1997) 
describe decision-making as a process that can be explained by a logic of appropriateness 
as opposed to a logic of anticipated consequences. As far as the decision-making involves 
the introduction of an institutional model that is in place elsewhere, SI scholars explain 
this by a phenomenon called institutional isomorphism, in which institutions are adopted 
because the discourse among policyrnakers views them as appropriate or legitimate 
solutions to the problems under consideration (Dimaggio and Powell 1991: 64-67; 
Radaelli 2000: 27-38). In case this examination of committees is accurate, principals do 
not simply calculate the consequences of their actions 'but rather turn to widely 
recognized and legitimate templates which may or may not be suited to the context and 
the requirements of individual issue areas' (Pollack 2003b: 58). 
Deliberative supranationalism is an interpretative form of policy-making in which 
decision-makers are open to reasoning and argumentation. It therefore links up with the 
Sl and SC fi-ameworks of analysis as discussed in Chapter 3 of this thesis. The key 
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assumption for this approach is that interest and preferences are not predetermined, but 
rather remain fluid during the decision-making process. Should the introduction of 
twinning have followed this model then the deliberation of the implementation 
procedures had to be mostly consensual. The Commission and the member states were 
therefore driven by the aim to find the best possible solution: instead of insisting on their 
preferred policy design or an altogether different delivery method. The following working 
hypothesis can be suggested based on these considerations: 
HId. A deliberative style of negotiation between Commission and members states 
officials has been crucial in creating the twinning exercise by determining its objectives, 
procedures and content. 
This working hypothesis can be confirmed if the research process shows that the 
introduction of the twinning exercise, and in particular its implementation procedures, 
was based on a deliberative style of negotiation between the Commission and the member 
states. Such patterns of behaviour can be traced in elite interviews, but also in archival 
records of the Commission. The records should show that a consensus-driven style of 
negotiation was the basis for the reforms concerning the implementation procedures 
undertaken between mid of 1996 and 2002. In addition, the roles of national 
representatives and Commission officials in such a negotiation style would be blurred by 
the desire to reach consensus and the best possible solutions. 
The following section outlines the models that explain the implementation of the 
twinning exercise. These theoretically informed models develop plausible rival 
hypotheses which can be tested against the empirical evidence. This part of the chapter is 
in particular concerned with the question of what type of instrument constituted and how 
it sought to influence the candidate countries in relation to the reform of their public 
administrations. The thesis connects this question with the concept of external 
governance that has been discussed in Chapter 3. 
3 External governance 
The external governance of the EU leads to a more open 'unbundling of territoriality' 
(Ruggie 1993: 172-74). As Smith (1996: 23) points out, this process calls the entire logic 
of a politics of exclusion into question, because it willingly risks 'the internalization of 
disturbance' rather than opting for its containment. The governance patterns deriving 
from external policies produce various linkages between the internal and the external 
world of EU politics. In order to protect the investments member states have made over 
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the course of European integration the EU formulates policies that are able to minimize 
the risks of internationalization (Friis and Murphy 1999: 225; M. Smith 2000: 811). The 
boundaries of integration are extended to include candidate countries or blurred because 
of trade agreements. Accordingly, the formulation of strategies created to manage these 
processes of inclusion becomes a prime task for policyrnakers. Moreover, the 
establishment of networks helps to solve problems on both sides of the border. 
In order to manage these processes the EU has introduced the enhanced pre-accession 
strategy. As a result, 'enlargement governance aiming to ensure that the Union acquis is 
fully adopted influences the candidates' choices on a daily basis' (Dimitrova 2002: 174). 
The enhanced pre-accession strategy ran alongside the accession negotiations in order to 
improve the applicants' administrative and judicial capacities, and to ensure necessary 
investments. This section aims to explain these strategies of the EU's external 
governance. The EU's enlargement policy is principally described as a policy of 
conditionality (see Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004: 662). However, given the fact 
that the EU has a number of instruments at hand to influence developments in the 
applicant countries, we have to consider how governance varies across sectors and in 
particular, whether different instruments have diverse effects on candidates. This 
approach is somewhat in line with the notion of mechanisms of Europeanization (Grabbe 
2001). Studies on the impact of EU policies on CEE applicants should distinguish 
between these strategies enshrined in the enlargement process. There is no doubt that the 
EU's overall policy towards these countries has been driven by its accession 
conditionality. However, in order to understand the underlying mechanisms and the 
circumstances under which institutions and policies are transferred, it is necessary to 
examine individual instruments. 
This section outlines three alternative modes of governance, which the EU can utilize in 
order to govern beyond its boundaries: governance by conditionality; persuasion and 
social learning as well as new forms of governance (see Table 4). 
External governance 
Modes of governance Concepts applied 
Governance by conditionality logic of consequences; reinforcement by reward; rationalist 
(p. 95) bargaining; coercive policy transfer; external incentives 
Persuasion and social leaming logic of appropriateness; persuasion; social learning; 
(p. 9 7) deliberation of alternatives; transfer of norms and rules; 
institutional isomorphism 
New forms of governance logic of consequences and appropdateness; agents of 
(P. 99) transfer, voluntary policy transfer; top-down and bottom-up 
implementation; obligated policy transfer; benchmarking; 
identification of best practices; peer pressure 
Table 4: The external governance of the EU 
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3.1 Alternative Explanation 1: Governance by conditionality 
In the context of this thesis, governance by conditionality is defined by the external 
incentives model as previously outlined in Chapter 3. The EU has clearly incorporated 
conditionality as a solid pillar in its enlargement strategy. However, in relation to the 
accession process, the question arises whether pre-accession financial instruments can 
simply be viewed as rewards for compliance or they go beyond coercion and incorporate 
elements of flexible implementation (Borrds and Jacobsson 2004; Haahr 2004) or a policy 
dialogue (Checkel 2000: 5). In relation to public administration reform, conditionality 
may be applied where the Commission's screening process has discovered inadequate or 
insufficient administrative capacities. 
In this context, the Europeanization literature introduced the "goodness of fit" concept 
that aims to assess to what extent states are in line with EU requirements or preferences 
(see for example Green Cowles et aL 2001: 6-11; 136rzel and Risse 2003; and for an 
excellent review Mastenbroek 2005). This helps to identify the status quo that is based on 
a "domestic equilibrium", and reflects the distribution of preferences and bargaining 
power in domestic society as well as the influence of international actors. 
Schimmelfermig and Sedelmeier (2005b: 11) argue that EU conditionality 'upsets the 
domestic equilibrium by introducing additional incentives for compliance with EU rules 
in the game'. 
This process can take on two different forms: 1. Intergovernmental bargaining, 2. 
Differential empowerment of domestic actors. The intergovernmental bargaining route 
targets governments directly. As a result, the candidate countries consider the benefits 
and costs that derive from the adoption of EU rules. The costs derive merely from the 
technical and institutional changes necessary to implement EU rules, but also from 
economic consequences of those rules. The benefits may derive from discarding the rules 
in favour of measures preferred by other international actors (see also Moravcsik and 
Vachudova 2003; Vachudova 2001). The differential empowerment of domestic actors 
counts on the fact that domestic actors may have independent incentives to promote the 
adoption of EU rules. Such incentives can relate to the empowerment of domestic actors 
in the national administration or to benefits deriving from EU rules in terms of problem 
solving. It is important, however, to stress that these domestic actors were not able to 
force an agreement in favour of their preferred rules. The introduction of conditionality 
into the domestic equilibrium however 'strengthens their bargaining power vis-A-vis their 
opponents in society and government - to the extent that these opponents share the goal 
of EU membership and expect to benefit from the EU's rewards' (Schimmelfennig and 
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Sedelmeier 2005c: 12; see also B6rzel and Risse 2003: 63-64; Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002: 
268-71). 
According to the external incentives model, the success of the EU's conditionality largely 
relies on the determinacy of conditions, the size and speed of rewards, the credibility of 
conditionality as well as domestic veto players and adoption costs (Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier 2005c: 12-17; Schimmelfennig et aL 2003a: 497M). The model suggests that 
'the determinacy of the conditions set by the EU and the determinacy of the rules from 
which they are derived enhances the likelihood of rule adoption by the candidate 
countries' (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005c: 12). Some authors therefore point to 
the density of EU rules as an important factor determining the impact of the EU in CEE 
(Jacoby and Cernoch 2002: 320; Jacoby 2004: 34ff. ). As noted previously in Chapter 3, 
Heather Grabbe (2001: 1025; 2002: 249) describes the lack of clarity and the ambiguity 
of the accession criteria as the main factors for an increasing amount in the EU's power in 
accession negotiations. However, it is also considered a reason for diffused influence on 
the candidates' institutional and policy choices. 
The size and speed of rewards is also an important factor in actors' perceptions of EU 
conditionality. In the international context, the IMF, for example, pays out its stand-by 
agreements in instalments. In case a government postpones the required reforms, it also 
risks a delay of the next instalment. Thus, incentives are sequenced and are always 
transparent for domestic actors when they deal with the IMF, whereas in EU enlargement 
the largest trump card is membership, a reward that stands at the end of the accession 
process (Dimitrova, and Pridharn 2004; Feldstein 1998; K. E. Smith 2003). However, the 
accession negotiations and the withholding of grant aid allow for further sequencing of 
conditions. 
According to Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005c: 13-16) the credibility of 
conditionality is a third factor influencing the likelihood of rule adoption in CEECs. 
Enlargement conditionality is only credible if the EU is able to withhold rewards in case 
of non-compliance and to grant rewards quickly when the candidates comply. The authors 
see the credibility of conditionality enhanced if the agency employing it is capable of 
following up its promises, can bear the "sunk costs" of rewards and applies conditions 
consistently. In addition, credible conditions may be undermined by cross-conditionality, 
i. e. conditions by other internal organizations that run against the EU's criteria (Kahler 
1992: 104,11; Killick 1996: 224). The issue of "sunk costs" is particularly relevant to 
membership negotiations as the EU faces comparatively high costs due to the institutional 
and budgetary changes that are necessary to incorporate the CEECs. Added to this, the 
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EU is also confronted with the problem of asymmetric information that reduces the 
effectiveness of conditionality. As Kahler (1992: 114) notes, 'the dependence of 
cooperation on repetition and self-enforcement is rendered more difficult when the 
behaviour (reputation) on which compliance is judged is obscured by "noise" and 
difficult or impossible to monitor'. The fourth factor listed above, namely veto players 
and adoption costs in the candidate countries, is discussed in section 4 below. 
Thus, the success of conditionality as a coercive form of policy transfer based on 
reinforcement by rewards relies on a number of factors that may vary across the 
individual sectors covered by accession negotiations. This is also related to the question 
whether the explicit conditionality terms introduced in 1997 through elements such as the 
Regular Reports, the AN and the NPAAs could be sufficiently reinforced by the 
accession instruments (Vachudova 2001: 5; 2004; Jacoby 2001b: 189; 2004: 198; 
Schimmelfennig et aL 2003a: 496-98; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004: 663). On 
basis of the above, the following hypothesis can be put forward: 
H2a: Twinningprojects are rewards attached to conditions that have to be met in order 
to receivefurther assistance. 
This hypothesis can be confirmed if the research demonstrates that the Commission has 
reinforced the implementation of twinning projects with clear conditions. As shown by 
the considerations above, the findings should demonstrate that conditions were 
determinant and credible, and that the size and speed of rewards was sufficient to 
constitute an incentive for candidates to reform their administrations. Research should 
also show that rewards in form of twinning projects were withheld, either during 
programming or through the cancellation of projects in order to enforce compliance. 
3.2 Alternative Explanation 2: Persuasion and social learning 
Persuasion and social learning as strategies of the Commission to influence candidate 
countries' reforms have only recently been introduced into the enlargement debate 
(Checkel 2000; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005c; Schimmelfennig 2004). 
However, the social learning model originates from debates on the ownership of reforms; 
it has become an important explanation for the actions of International Financial 
Institutions (IFIs) and can be applied to enlargement even without substantial adjustments 
(see Kahler 1992: 123-3 1; Checkel 2000). It is based on core tenets of social 
constructivism and therefore assumes a logic of appropriateness as well as the existence 
of a collective identity, common values and social norms (Checkel 2001b: 4; see also 
Schimmelfennig 2003b: 86-90). As a result, the social learning model stipulates that 'a 
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goverment adopts EU rules if it is persuaded of the appropriateness of EU rules' 
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005c: 18). 
In their elaboration of the social learning model, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005c: 
18-20) identify factors that impinge upon the persuasive power of the EU: legitimacy, 
identity, and resonance. The legitimacy of rules implies that rule adoption depends on 
'the clarity with which the rules communicate, the integrity of the process by which they 
were made and are applied, their venerable pedigree and conceptual coherence. In shortý 
it is the legitimacy of the rules which conduces to their being respected' (Franck 1990: 
38, cf. 49; cited as Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005c: 18). It follows that rules have 
to be applied consistently and double standards should be avoided at all costs. The clarity 
of rule definition is also important for the EU's influence on the compliance of 
candidates. Rules that are defined ambiguously are therefore less likely to be adopted by 
the candidates' institutions. 
The authors continue to argue that the perception of imposing EU rules can be mitigated 
if the EU engages in a deliberative process and considers special circumstances. The 
same effect can be achieved when demands are linked to international standards 
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005c: 19; Checkel 2001b: 563). Thus, concerning the 
pre-accession financial instruments, the EU's aim should be to 'increase the perception of 
"ownership" of EU rules in the target states' (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005c: 
19). However, as the authors point out the EU cannot make any exceptions regarding the 
adoption of the acquis communautaire; on the contrary, candidates have to accept the 
entire acquis. The granting of transitional arrangements in the accession negotiations may 
give the impression that the EU considers special circumstances, but they 'can in no way 
involve amendments to Community rules' (Avery 1995: 5). As a result, the EU has to 
deal with a profound dilemma if it still considers a strategy of persuasion and social 
learning as an alternative. The question is whether such a strategy can be successfully 
implemented under the umbrella of the accession negotiations. In addition, the legitimacy 
of rules and norms can be challenged by other international actors that also enjoy the 
confidence of the candidate countries. 
In addition, identity is a factor in the sense that it makes the persuasion of candidates 
easier; given that these states view 'the community of states represented by the EU as a 
valid "aspiration group" whose collective identity, values, and norms they share, whose 
recognition they seek, and to which they want to belong' (Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier 2005c: 19). This factor highlights the fact that after all the main ob ective for 
the candidates is membership, not only on rational grounds, but also because they seek 
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recognition by the international community. Finally, domestic circumstances can make 
persuasion possible, for example, if there are no pre-established rules and the EU's 
solution to a given problem is widely accepted. Such circumstances are referred to as 
resonance in the constructivist literature (Johnston 2001; Checkel 2001b). In addition, 
studies on social learning have emphasised that domestic actors may be more willing to 
learn if they cooperate with groups that share similar professional backgrounds. In this 
way, they are insulated from political pressures and the density of interaction is high 
(Checkel 2001 a: 26). 
The transfer of institutional models to CEE can therefore also be based on institutional 
isomorphism, in particular when a certain solution is viewed as appropriate or legitimate. 
This form of transfer presupposes a policy dialogue in which actors use the EU as a 
knowledge bank for solutions and engage in constant informal exchanges (Checkel 2000). 
As a result, in EU enlargement 'bureaucratization and other forms of homogenization 
emerge ... out of the structuration ... of organizational fields' (Dimaggio and Powell 
1991). The term structuration reflects the tendency of organizations to 'lessen the extent 
of diversity within the field' (Dimaggio and Powell 1991). This appears to be a 
consequence of an organization seeking legitimacy and its relevance to given problems. 
Coercive forms of isomorphism may involve other organizations trying to persuade an 
institution to join the trend across an organizational field or legal commitments. Several 
elements in the accession process may be regarded as strategies of persuasion and 
learning. In particular, the implementation phase of the twinning exercise appears to be in 
line with these theoretical considerations. The following hypothesis can therefore be 
formulated: 
H2b: Twinning projects are vehicles to persuade candidates' administrations into 
reforms alongside established rules and norms on basis of learning. 
The social learning model can be confirmed if the research findings show that the 
Commission mainly used member states' officials to persuade candidates to introduce 
particular institutional models, rules and norms. Interviewees would highlight that 
twinning is mainly an instrument of persuasion and norm transfer; and that documents 
would come to similar results. 
3.3 Alternative Explanation 3: New forms of governance 
The OMC has become a popular form of policy coordination. It largely focuses on the 
implementation of policies and the quality of policy outcomes. It is based on monitoring, 
benchmarking and evaluation. These were precisely the characteristics that made the 
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OMC attractive to policyrnakers in 1997. In order to address the issue of administrative 
capacities, policyrnakers were looking for an instrument that would not only allow the 
candidates to learn from their future peers, but also enable an assessment of possible 
partners for such a learning process. The elements of benchmarking and assessment 
unique to the OMC enable the identification of 'best practices'. An important factor for 
the choice of instrument was that the definition of administrative structures scould not be 
clarified, neither legally nor by the Commission. In fact, the only attempt by the 
Commission resolved in a working document that was distributed among the candidates 
in 2001. The Commission unmistakably clarified that the document serves merely 
information purposes, but 'should not in any way be construed as committing the 
European Commission' (CEC 2001 e: 6). 
The Commission may be able to assess whether a country possesses adequate 
administrative structures to implement various chapters of the acquis. However, it cannot 
force the candidates to adopt particular models. The adoption of methods that are 'more 
accepting of diversity and encourage semi-voluntary forms of coordination' (Trubek and 
Mosher 2001: 1) between the member states and the candidates therefore presented a 
viable alternative. The utilization of the OMC was also obvious, since political elites in 
CEE 'have often sought to imitate Western organizational and institutional models' 
(Jacoby 2001b: 169). The connection to the theoretical frameworks of lesson-drawing and 
coercive policy transfer is quite clear. As a method of policy coordination, the OMC lies 
between these ideal types since it combines peer pressure with opportunity structures that 
allow the candidates to introduce elements of West European administrations in their own 
institutions. Such instruments appear to be the ideal vehicle for obligated policy transfer 
in the context of administrative and judicial capacities. In the accession process, pre- 
accession instruments can help the candidate countries to initiate obligated policy 
transfer. Therefore, instruments such as the twinning exercise, but also ISPA, SAPARD 
and other Phare programmes can act as mechanisms for domestic change. 
Accordingly, the success of the OMC in the enlargement process largely relies on the 
relevance of the guidelines set, the quality of coordination and on whether 'best practices' 
are identifiable and transferable. The relevance of the guidelines in the accession process 
is largely a result of the Commission's screening of national laws and administrations. 
This systematic assessment of the candidate countries' administrative capacity takes place 
in the context of the accession negotiations, but it entails a clear view of the main 
administrative structures required to implement the various chapters of the acquis. The 
quality of coordination relies on the actors' willingness to cooperate or, as Caviedes 
(2004: 298) puts it, 'hinges upon the ingenuity of countries to use the OMC as a tool for 
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- 
setting themselves challenging goals, secure in the knowledge that failure to meet these 
goals will not be penalized'. The identification of 'best practices' can be a difficult task, 
in particular if actors aim to link the necessary assessment to concrete and measurable 
benchmarks. Nevertheless, across the large variety of policy sectors that the EU's acquis 
communautaire covers, there are identifiable best practices in place (see for example de la 
Rosa 2005; de la Porte 2002; Kaiser and Prange 2004). Finally, the transferability of 'best 
practices' to a candidate state is another matter. Not every institutional model identified 
as a 'best practice' may yield the same results in a different political environment. It may 
also be challenged by factors unique to the candidate country. 
Wade Jacoby (2001b: 178M) has argued that transfer can stimulate innovation by 
providing templates or thresholds, and creating opportunities for borrowing or 
adjustments. Following the author's definition, templates and thresholds assume both a 
functional character, but these mechanisms can be distinguished by their degree of 
voluntarism. The templates serve to sketch an institutional structure in explicit terms. 
However, the provision of such outlines does not result into detailed advice on how to 
install every detail of the institution elsewhere. The predominantly 'voluntary use of 
templates insulates the international organizations from charges of imperialism' (Jacoby 
2001b: 179). Thresholds, on the other hand, are less voluntary in nature and are usually 
applied later in the transition process as opposed to templates that served as formulas for 
early transformations in CEE. Jacoby (2001b: 179) defines thresholds as 'qualitative and 
subjective judgements about minimum standards that new formal structures must meet to 
qualify a CEE nation for membership in an international organization'. Thus, while not 
pressuring candidates into adopting particular models, the EU may pressure the 
governments of the candidate countries to address certain issues. Such interventions are 
often coupled to suggestions how to reform institutions to enable implementation of the 
acquis. In contrast, adjustments are defined as small correctives to some larger 
institutional scheme. The main difference lies in the fact that they do not challenge the 
appropriateness of the underlying institutional foundations. 
Nevertheless, there are also important differences between the way the twinning exercise 
operates and the implementation of the OMC. These are explained in detail towards the 
end of this thesis. As a result, we cannot speak of a clear adoption of the OMC; but 
should rather point to the fact that the twinning exercise utilizes several key features of 
this method, in particular monitoring and benchmarking (see also Tulmets 2005b). The 
identification of 'best practices', for example, was largely replaced by the identification 
of suitable twins. To summarize, we may argue that twinning incorporated both top-down 
and bottom-up perspectives to implementation (Pressman and Wildavsky 1973; Sabatier 
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and Mazmanian 1979,1981; Mayntz 1983; Majone and Wildavsky 1978; Ham and Hill 
1984; Sabatier 1986; Peters 1993). This type of implementation sets a clear framework 
for the respective projects, but it also leaves significant scope for project leaders to 
manoeuvre on the ground. It also differs from a strategy of persuasion and social learning 
which implicitly attempts to win over the hearts of civil servants in the candidate 
countries. It settles neither for a rational approach based on coercion nor for an 
interpretive approach based on persuasion, but rather it seeks to combine the better of two 
worlds. The following working hypothesis can be formulated based on these 
considerations: 
H2c. The twinning exercise seeks to provide candidates with opportunities for learning 
and transfer of administrative procedures. It is therefore designed as a new form of 
govemance with aflexible andparticipatory approach to implementation. 
The research should show that essential elements of the OMC such as benchmarking, 
monitoring, common guidelines and the identification of 'best practices' are enshrined in 
the procedures of the twinning exercise. In addition, it should indicate that the twinning 
exercise provides the candidate countries opportunities to transfer administrative 
procedures and offers significant opportunities for learning. Ideally, interview partners 
should also admit that twinning is based on structured cooperation and therefore 
candidate countries participate in the defining of policy goals (Hdritier 2003: 106; 
Arrowsmith et aL 2004: 319). Finally, the guidelines set should be relevant to the 
accession process; the quality of coordination under twinning projects should be 
sufficient and 'best practices' should be identifiable and transferable. 
In the following section, this chapter addresses the question of possible outcomes. This 
question is closely related to the reaction of civil servants in the candidate countries to the 
twinning exercise in general and the projects in particular. The response to twinning was 
not decidedly positive in the candidate countries and this leads us to ask whether the 
projects received enough support to be implemented efficiently. These considerations 
allow a better understanding of the motives that directed policyrnakers during the 
introduction of the twinning exercise. 
4 The transfer of institutional models to CEE applicants 
The impact of EU policies in the candidate countries has received considerable attention 
(see for example Vachudova, 2004; Jacoby 2004). Scholars working on this aspect of 
enlargement have largely drawn on concepts deriving from Europeanization and 
compliance studies (Knill 2001; Olsen 2002; Radaelli 2003b; Ladrech 1994). The focus 
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of this section is narrower. It concentrates on situations where an emulation of Western 
practices is attempted in candidate countries. This covers all twinning projects, as they are 
all attempts to develop administrative structures in CEE that are adequate to implement 
the acquis at sectoral level. The question that is asked here is how the applicants respond 
to reform endeavours based on emulation and whether twinning as an instrument can 
achieve results. 
The nature of the candidates themselves has been a crucial factor in transforming this 
enlargement into an unprecedented event. The EU has never before embarked on an 
enlargement with a region that has been subject to a completely different set of doctrines 
for such an extended period. The CEE candidates were formerly Soviet bloc states and 
therefore considered a threat during the Cold War by EU decision-makers and member 
states officials alike. A number of scholars working on the transition processes in CEE 
have therefore pointed out the stickiness of institutions and the historical legacies 
embedded in public administrations and other institutions in these countries (Crawford 
and Lijphart 1995; Elster et al. 1998; Nunberg 1999; Lippert and Umbach 2004; Jabes 
1997). Since the collapse of Communist regimes in the early 1990s, the region has also 
been overwhelmed by economic problems. A decade after the fall of the Berlin wall, the 
immensely different economic and social circumstances under which the CEECs aimed to 
accede into the EU in comparison to former applicants, remained a source of concern for 
policy-makers across Europe. The candidate countries represented 45% of the EU 
population and 7% of its GDP in the year 2000. GDP per capita varied between 24% of 
the EU average in Bulgaria and 82% in Cyprus (Eurostat 200 1: 1). 
In addition, tight budgets have created enormous problems for the candidate countries to 
meet the third Copenhagen criterion and therefore EU decision-makers began to question 
their ability to 'take on the obligations of membership' (EC 1993). In this context, 
Papadimitriou and Phinnemore (2004: 620) observe that 'gross inefficiency and a severe 
lack of expertise have been some of the most damaging legacies of the old socialist order 
for their civil services'. In addition, the authors cite endemic levels of corruption and 
excessive politicization as the key factors that undermine the credibility and effectiveness 
of public administrations in the candidate countries. Consequently, CEE applicants were 
heavily involved in the internal reforms of their politico-administrative systems (A. J. G. 
Verheijen 2000; Jabes 1997). This leads us to question to what extent the candidates were 
prepared to create administrative structures for the implementation of the acquis and 
whether CEE elites were willing to cooperate with EU actors on this dimension of reform. 
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4.1 Domestic obstacles to Institutional transfers 
The EU's insistence on an administrative accession criterion is partly based on its 
experience with the former enlargements. Greece in particular was allowed formal 
membership before the country completed systematic institutional reforms; and therefore 
the administrative structures for the implementation of EU directives run into problems 
across a number of areas (Jacoby 2001b: 176-77). Subsequent steps towards integration, 
including the agreement on a Single European Market and EMU, made it even more 
difficult for countries to join the club. Because of the experiences with Greece and the 
binding character of common market regulations, the EU has taken a clear decision to 
oblige CEE candidates to create institutional capacities prior to entry (Inotai 2004: 365). 
The EU's administrative conditionality emerged with the decisions taken at the Madrid 
European Council in 1995 and quickly brought a number of changes that were 
unexpected in CEE. Firstly, the requirement was incorporated in the accession 
negotiations and therefore candidates had to present their administrations' ability in the 
respective negotiation chapters. Most candidates did not approve of the repercussions 
these changes in the EU's enlargement method brought with it. The classical method of 
enlargement was based on an incremental incorporation of the acquis communautaire and 
therefore gave more leeway to candidates that were struggling to adapt (Preston 1997: 
176). 
Secondly, this criterion has led to the creation of new instruments such as TAIEX and 
twinning that were viewed with suspicions in CEE. The technical assistance office within 
DGIA supported the Commission's screening process and the accession negotiations. It 
involved short-term peer reviews of member state officials who reported to Brussels on 
the implementation structures in the candidate countries, and twinnings involved even 
longer stays of peers from Western Europe in CEECs. Poland and the Czech Republic in 
particular were ambivalent about these instruments and warned for 'spies from Brussels' 
(Interviews 2,30 and 41, CEC and MS officials). These changes also signalled a 
significant delay in the timeframe for accession, an element of the enlargement process 
that was particularly controversial in CEE since high-level politicians from Western 
Europe had promised accession by the year 2000 on several occasions. Intellectually, the 
notion that CEE candidates actually took on and were able to implement the acquis fully 
is, given the constraints, absurd. To be sure, none of the eight countries that entered the 
Union in 2004 was fully able to apply the acquis. Enlargement is always a gradual 
process that can only be completed after sustained periods of consolidation that follow the 
accession of new members. 
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In practice, the outcomes of policy transfer are a function of the activities developed by 
the EU and its member states as well as 'the institutional relationship with the CEE 
countries and the latter's domestic situation' (Lavenex 2002: 705). The policy design of 
the instruments applied to the process of accession is an important element of the success 
of the overall project. However, the candidate countries' domestic situation will decide 
the actual outcome of reform processes, especially in the institutional realm where the 
density of rules is generally low (Jacoby and Cernoch 2002: 320; Jacoby 2004: 34ff. ). 
Indigenous factors that influence the success of accession instruments are the density of 
domestic veto players, adoption costs and the existing political equilibrium. 
There are different ways to overcome these obstacles during the implementation of 
accession instruments. The external incentives model as outlined above would postulate 
that the adoption of institutional reforms becomes likely if the incentives offered by the 
EU outweigh the costs of adopting a directive, or introduction of EU incentives into the 
domestic equilibrium leads to the differential empowerment of domestic actors that 
favour "EU" solutions. The social leaming model in contrast would count on the 
persuasion of domestic actors in order to let them fall in line with EU rules, whereas a 
new form of governance incorporates both elements of coercion and persuasion in order 
to achieve its objectives. In addition, the Commission has used extensive monitoring 
devices such as questionnaires, screening, harmonigrams and progress reports to enable 
change in the candidates' institutions (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005c: 15-16; 
Jacoby 2004: 44-46). 
In view of these pressures from the EU, the candidate countries are likely to develop 
coping strategies in order to respond to challenges from external actors. As the ownership 
debate in development studies has stressed, the implementation of aid programmes relies 
on the participation of domestic actors (see e. g. Killick 1996: 218-19). There is hardly 
any disagreement among students of aid policies that donor-driven initiatives develop 
problems during implementation. However, the consequences from this insight have 
hardly taken hold of policy formulation in donor organizations. As Burnell (1998: 790) 
has noted 
ownership has emerged as a major shibboleth from development cooperation 
experience during the last decade ... but ... our understanding of what ownership 
means, of precisely who or what should be the owners, and how best to operationalise 
the goal in practise are relatively underdeveloped and are contested. 
The issue of ownership is more straightforward during the implementation of accession 
instruments than in development cooperation. The Commission had to trust the candidate 
countries and the programme implementers to involve as much as possible domestic veto 
players defined as 'actors whose agreement is necessary for a change in the status quo' 
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(Tsebelis 2002: 37). This can be a difficult situation for project leaders and their opposites 
in the candidates' institutions alike, even if the Delegations of the Commission are 
available as an additional support. The implementation of projects involves in most cases 
a number of cross-sectoral issues and therefore touches on the responsibilities of various 
ministries. As a result, implementation is confronted with horizontal coordination issues 
as much as it is with sectoral capacities. 
4.2 Institutional reform, transfer, Innovation and domestic outcomes 
The partial transfer of institutional models also deserves a more extensive examination in 
terms of the policy outcomes it is able to produce. A closer look into the problems of 
policy transfer reveals that policy resistance can be generated by concerns regarding 
whether the suggested models will fit local circumstances. Beissinger (1988: 463), for 
example, points out that Soviet efforts to imitate American management practices failed 
whenever they were tightly linked to market logics, so that 'many of these imported 
methods ... amounted to nothing less than a foreign limb grafted onto a somewhat 
gangrenous body'. Similarly, Muniak (1985) provides examples where American actors 
borrowed policy designs from Great Britain, but the differences between unitary and 
federal systems caused grave disruption. Thus, convergence in institutional arrangements 
between the candidates and the member states may not necessarily result in a better 
implementation of the acquis, in particular where domestic veto players have not been 
incorporated in policy design or when necessary adaptations have not been introduced. 
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Source: Author's diagram based on Rose (1993), Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) and Jacoby (2004). 
Figure 5: Mode of domestic reforms, modes of transfer and different degrees of 
convergence 
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Jacoby (2001 a, p. 267) illustrates that 'innovation through transfer is likely to differ from 
indigenous innovation'. Thus, he stresses that it constitutes a distinct subcategory of 
institution building and change. As a result, emulation typically questions the legitimacy 
of existing actors, also due to the radical changes that are implied by the imitation of 
foreign models. The extensive involvement of foreign experts and consultants during the 
early years of transition, have nurtured an instinctive resistance against foreign advice in 
Eastern Europe (see Wedel 2001). Nevertheless, the process of transferring models from 
Western European states or elsewhere to Eastern Europe has often stimulated 'indigenous 
innovation simply by unblocking domestic stalemates' (Jacoby 200 1 a: 269). 
As demonstrated in Figure 5, emulation is not the only form of administrative reform that 
takes place in CEE. On the contrary, countries in Eastern Europe are renowned for 
institutional engineering and candidates may therefore opt to build their own systems 
instead of borrowing institutional templates from abroad. B6r6cz (2000: 50) claimed that 
'Central European societies can be justly 'accused' of many things, [but] a lack of 
institutional creativity is hardly among them'. To put it another way, indigenous actors 
may opt for different models and where they opt for transfer; this may be accompanied by 
significant innovation (Jacoby 2000; Westney 1987). Thus, the transfer of institutional 
models from the member states is likely to result in some sort of emulation, hybridization 
or synthesis of familiar institutions (Rose 1991: 21-22; see also Dolowitz and Marsh 
2000: 13). This is not only a domestically driven but also a necessary process, since 
research has shown that pure transfers do not yield results. The adaptation to local 
circumstances remains one of the main tasks of programme implementers. A strategy of 
pure indigenous reform most likely represents a form of policy resistance (Bache and 
Taylor 2003), but the transfer of institutional models to CEE can result in different 
degrees of convergence. The EU clearly favours higher degrees of convergence, but 
candidates may opt for a level that achieves compliance with EU directives and 
minimizes adaptation costs. 
4.3 Alternative hypotheses: two basic policy outcomes 
The implementation of accession instruments in CEE, in particular those that involve 
processes of cross-national transfer, can result in different outcomes: convergence and 
resistance. These categories are explained briefly here given the constraints of this study. 
However, this discussion also provides a better understanding of the other stages of 
decision-making. It should be kept in mind that the EU aimed at improving policy 
outcomes during the design of the twinning exercise rather than just considering policy 
formulation and implementation. 
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Chapter I has already noted that the long-term outcome of twinning exercises is 
convergence. This section further outlines the alternative hypotheses regarding the 
outcomes of twinning projects. 
Domestic outcomes 
Outcomes Mechanisms and factors 
Convergence (p. 108) policy transfer; social learning; persuasion; indigenous refonns, 
domestic veto players; low adaptation costs 
Resistance (p. 109) indigenous reforms, negotiation of transitional periods, domestic veto 
players; policy advocates; lack of resources (no real reforms); high 
adaptation costs; exemptions and opt outs 
Table 5: Domestic outcomes In CEE 
Alternative 1: Convergence 
The compliance with EU rules in terms of the implementation of common policies can be 
achieved in various ways. Next to the transfer of institutional models discussed above, 
necessary reforms can be generated by lesson-drawing on the candidates' side 
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005c; Jacoby 1999), or social learning and persuasion. 
An indigenous reform strategy is unlikely to result in compliance since the 
implementation of EU rules involves expertise that was not present in the candidate 
countries before the cultural revolutions in 1989-1991. Thus, candidates had to engage in 
some sort of consultation process with the Commission, consultants or other sources of 
advice. However, compliance is much more likely if a candidate country is willing to 
draw lessons from the member states. In this case, the result will most likely be some sort 
of emulation, hybrid, synthesis or "inspired transfer". Thus, the following hypothesis is 
put forward: 
H3a: The long-term outcome ofthe twinningprojects is the convergence of 
administrative structures, procedures and 'ways ofdoing things'. 
Ile testing of this hypothesis goes beyond the empirical remit of this thesis. However, it 
has to be stressed that short-term studies of twinning projects are likely to result in 
preliminary findings. This is because the candidates may opt at a later stage to adopt the 
institutional changes proposed by the twinning partners: for example, if the 
implementation under the indigenous model results in infringement procedures. In order 
to come to conclusive results, it would also be necessary to conduct a comparative 
research project, which examines at least at two countries. Some candidate countries have 
been more open to the twinning process than others. It is therefore likely that we can 
observe variation between such countries. In addition, variation may also be expected 
between different policy sectors based on the density of EU rules (Jacoby and Cernoch 
2002; Jacoby 2005). 
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Alternative 2: Resistance 
As mentioned above, resistance against transfers may derive from domestic veto players 
that have an embedded interest in existing institutions or indigenous reform. It can also 
result from the fear that the proposed model is unsuitable in the domestic context. Finally, 
resistance is part of a wider instinct that CEE actors have developed against foreign 
advice. This is often rooted in general distrust or suspicion against foreign advisers that 
come to -tutoe' about necessary changes (cf Jacoby 200 1 b; Wedel 200 1). 
In case resistance is more dominant than cooperation efforts by Western actors to unblock 
domestic stalemates, then this would most likely show in the negotiation of transitional 
periods, exemptions or opt outs. While the latter are the exception to the rule that the 
acquis is not negotiable, the negotiation of transitional periods is a normal process in 
enlargement negotiation. However, the EU has made it very clear that negotiation periods 
are to be much shorter for this enlargement than for former enlargement due to the market 
distortions that come with them. Resistance is also more likely if the adaptation costs are 
unusually high. 
H3b: The long-term outcome of twinningprojects is resistance to transfer attempts by the 
partner count? y and the Commission. 
To reiterate, in order to test the hypothesis more fieldwork would need to be done in 
particular in candidates' ministries' in order to measure the level of doubt that is present 
towards foreign models and examine general attitudes towards the twinning process. A 
word of caution has to be added here. Bureaucrats in candidate countries are usually 
outspoken with their criticism. However, this does not suggest that the same people do 
not fall into line with a project or guideline if the hierarchy demands it of them. This is 
why the project leaders in both the candidate country and the member state play such an 
important role in twinning (see Chapter 7,8 and 9). In addition, as Bache and Taylor 
(2003: 283) point out, policy resistance remains a relatively under-theorised subject. This 
is particularly the case concerning the transition processes in CEE. Although, a number of 
authors have pointed out that there are dynamics of collision and collusion (Wedel 200 1), 
or tutor and pupil relationships unfolding in the region (Jacoby 2001b), little knowledge 
is available on the effect of these constellations on institutional change. A more 
comprehensive conceptualization of this process in the light of transition processes in 
Eastern Europe would therefore provide a better theoretical basis to analyse such 
dynamics. 
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5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, the task of outlining plausible rival hypotheses for the three stages of 
decision-making that were introduced in Chapter I was conducted. While this approach is 
arduous, it yields interesting results. It accounts for the multi-causal character of the fifth 
enlargement and helps identifying theoretical models that may be applied to accession 
instruments. 
The rationale behind this research strategy was outlined in Chapter 2. This thesis suggests 
that the separation of the enlargement process into the three stages outlined in this chapter 
corresponds well with the themes of policy formulation, policy implementation and 
policy outcomes that have been extensively applied in studies of public policy. It is 
important, however, to stress that these stages of the policy process overlap significantly 
in practice. This results from the time pressures policymakers face during enlargement 
processes. The timeframe of the fifth enlargement has been one of the most contentious 
issues between the candidates and the EU. In 1997, at the eve of the Luxembourg Council 
decision-makers had little time to sit back and reflect on possible designs for a twinning 
exercise. Thus, as we will see from the discussion in Chapter 7, the introduction of 
implementation procedures for the twinning exercise was attempted parallel to its 
implementation. As a result, Stage I and 2 were largely played out parallel apart from 3 
months period in early 1997, whereas the third stage covers the whole implementation 
period. 
There are also obvious feedbacks between these stages. Thus, for example, in case the 
twinning exercise would have been unsuccessful, this would have empowered actors 
within the EU that were against its introduction in the first place. In addition, failures 
from implementation can also lead to a revision of the applied twinning concept. In due 
course, the Commission in conjunction with the Phare Management Committee may opt 
for a different strategy or considerable fine-tuning of the procedures. Thus, these three 
facets of enlargement policies can tell us a lot about the dynamics unfolding within the 
EU, the strategies chosen to influence candidate countries and the outcomes of respective 
projects. 
5.1 The three faces of enlargement policies 
The distinction between internal governance, external governance and domestic outcomes 
accounts for the fact that the setting of policies is followed up by the shaping of 
implementation procedures, which ultimately reflect on the instruments' universal 
direction. In order to have lasting effects on candidate countries, actors within the EU not 
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only have to agree among themselves but also need to develop a strategy that can be 
upheld during implementation. 
Internal governance 
Stage I focuses on the participatory and bargaining aspects of this process. It questions in 
particular who gets involved and why these actors gain access in the decision-making 
process. In reality, decision-making in and between institutions is never perfectly rational, 
and processes are becoming increasingly dynamic, complex and diverse (Simon 1997a; 
Kickert 1993). 
As the overview of plausible rival hypotheses in Table 6 shows, this thesis suggests that 
the EU-internal policy-making process regarding the accession isntruments can be 
explained with approaches such as lesson-drawing, evidence-based policy-making, 
intergovernmental bargaining, and deliberative supranationalism. The latter concepts are 
understood as particular transformations of the Community method, which help the 
Commission to increase its influence in the decision-making process. 
Evidence-based Hla: The Commission, due to its resources of policy assessment and 
policy-making evaluation, has been crucial in creating the twinning exercise by 
determining its objectives, procedures and content. 
Lesson-drawing Hlb: The CoMmission, 'due to its ability I to draw lessons from the 
experience of other aid donors, has been crucial in creating the twinning 
exercise by determining its objectives, procedures and content.. 
Intergovernmental H1c: The German government based on the transfer of implementation 
bargaining procedures from its bilateral aid programme TRANSFORM has been 
crucial in creating the twinning exercise by brokering a deal in the Phare 
Management Committee concerning its objectives, procedures and 
content. 
Deliberative Hld:,, A, deliberative -sty! e-'of negotiation between' Commission and 
supranationalism members' states, officials' has been crucial 'in, "creating'the, twinning 
exercise by determining its objectives, procedures and content. -_ 
Table 6: Internal governance - Overview of alternative working hypotheses 
External governance 
Phase 2 draws attention to EU strategies concerning necessary reforms in candidate 
countries. The EU aimed to include a number of elements in the pre-accession strategy 
that would enable the preparation of the candidates for membership. These elements 
include conditionality, policy transfer, social learning, and new forms of governance. This 
chapter described the stark contrast between strategies based on stringent conditions 
attached to incentives such as institutional ties and grant aid, and the interpretative 
approach of socialising and persuading candidates into continuing particular paths of 
reforms. In contrast to the external incentives model and the social learning model, the 
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application of the OMC in the enlargement process has the obvious advantage of 
combining elements from both of extremes. 
The implementation of new forms of governance in the enlargement process has only 
received rudimentary attention. In this respect, the thesis can provide further evidence to 
an ongoing debate on the coordination of policies. However, the depiction of the OMC as 
a retreat of the Commission from the Community method of decision-making in the 
literature is somewhat misleading (Writier 2003; Wincott 2003), since new forms of 
governance enable the EU executive to sail in new waters. Such instruments also allow 
for the necessary flexibility during implementation. In addition, the setting of common 
guidelines and timetables, a cornerstone of the OMC, resembles elements of the 
Community method. The Commission has indeed less direct influence, but it can make 
use of different mechanisms such as shaming and naming. The interventions of the 
Commission in case a country accedes the 3% ceiling for budget deficits under Growth 
and Stability Pact for example have led to grave disturbances for national governments. 
In the same way, the Commission can use accession instruments to take the moral high 
ground concerning institutional structures. In other words, as Jacoby (200 1 b) points out 
Western models can act as thresholds, templates or adjustments for domestic reforms. 
Governance by 
conditionality 
H2a: Twinning projects are rewards attached to conditions that have to 
be met in order to receive further assistance. 
Persuasion and social H2b: ' ., Twinning ý, projects "' are -` vehicleit' to, persuade I candidates' 
learning administrations into reforms alongside' established rules and norms on 
basis of learning. `. " 
New forms of H2c: The twinning exercise seeks to provide candidates with 
governance opportunities for learning and transfer of administrative procedures. It is 
therefore designed as a new form of governance with a flexible and 
participatory approach to implementation. 
Table 7: External governance - Overview of alternative working hypotheses 
Domestic outcomes 
Phase 3 describes possible outcomes of pre-accession assistance in CEE: convergence 
and resistance. A number of studies have shown that, in order to achieve maximum 
impact with aid policies, one must create a sense of ownership in the beneficiary 
countries. In addition, in order to run a twinning scheme successfully, pre-accession 
advisers sent into beneficiary countries always rely on the host institution to provide 
necessary access to information. An aid scheme that aims at reforming public 
administrations in CEE potentially faces obstacles from domestic policy agendas and veto 
players alike. As a result, Phase 2 and 3 are closely related and interact with each other at 
all times. While the Commission seeks to control the content and activities of the projects 
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through policy steering, it has to acknowledge that it needs to win indigenous support in 
order to achieve a maximum impact. 
Convergence H3a: The long-term outcome of twinning projects is the convergence of 
administrative structures, procedures and 'ways of doing things'. 
Resistance H3b , The long-term' outcome of twinning projects is resistance' to 
, transfer attempts by the partner country and the Commission.. 
Table 8: Domestic outcomes - Overview of alternative working hypotheses 
The transfer of institutional models to CEE administrations is likely to become enmeshed 
in indigenous reform. This introduces innovative elements into the process. In this way, 
the twinning exercise may lead to different degrees of convergence between the member 
states and the candidate countries. In case cooperation between the twinning partners 
breaks down or the candidates prefer other ways of reforming their institutions, resistance 
to policy transfer becomes the outcome of the project. 
5.2 The synthesis of theories and the explanation of the policy process 
The discussions of the various models developed for internal governance, external 
governance and policy outcomes has highlighted that each of these theories has to offer 
something towards an explanation of the dynamics at work. However, the problem that 
each of these theoretical models faces is that they cannot explain all the significant 
elements of the process. Indeed, they are unable to effectively and convincingly account 
for even one of the stages of the stages of decision-making outlined in this chapter. 
Moreover, theories of the policy process are also often detached from the current debates 
in the discipline. 
It has been suggested here that these shortcomings can be overcome by connecting the 
concepts of lesson-drawing, policy transfer and evidence-based policy-making to the 
institutionalist literature. The connection between RCI and lesson-drawing is easily made. 
The lesson-drawing approach has already been described as a rational approach. The 
Commission's use of lesson-drawing can therefore logically be explained by RCI. 
Similarly, evidence-based policy-making is a rational approach in nature and can be 
adapted in the same way. However, policy transfer is defined in such wide terms that a 
connection to the new institutionalisms becomes more difficult. The modes of external 
governance outlined above connect easily with the themes of new institutionalism. 
Governance by conditionality assumes a logic of consequences, whereas the persuasion 
and learning model presumes a logic of appropriateness. New forms of governance 
combine elements from both logics to achieve results. 
if 
Analysis 
Introduction 
The analytical sections of this thesis in Chapters 4 to 7 serves two purposes: (i) They 
chart the background of the 1997 reform of Phare and the pre-accession strategy; (ii) 
They provide empirical evidence to test the theoretical models outlined in Chapter 4. The 
focus throughout the four chapters concentrates on the policy design of the enlargement 
strategy in general and the twinning exercise in particular. It is important to stress that 
both the EU's conditionality and its accession instruments have evolved over the past 30 
years. Whereas the Phare programme reform in 1997 may be depicted as a more radical 
break with the past, the formulation of explicit conditionality through the introduction of 
the Progress Reports, the APs, and other elements of the enlargement strategy in 1997 
was clearly in line with efforts to clarify the Copenhagen criteriaý' that occurred earlier in 
the enlargement process. In addition, the Phare programme not only carried a number of 
well-established programme types into the post-1997 implementation phase, but also 
experienced signiflcant problems with the switch from demand-driven to accession- 
driven programming (see Chapter 6). In fact, new instruments and programmes such as 
twinning, ISPA and SAPARD had a much clearer mandate in this respect and became the 
cornerstones of the reinforcedpre-accession strategy. 
Chapter 5 traces the evolution of conditionality terms in the EU's relations with CEECs; 
starting from 1989 until 1996. It questions to what extent conditionality was part of the 
EU's association policy, the original pre-accession strategy from 1994, and the Phare 
programme, which has been implemented parallel to all other policy instruments since 
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1989. This discussion forms the basis for an assessment of the explicit conditionality that 
was later enshrined in the reinforced pre-accession strategy. The chapter also examines 
the emergence of administrative conditionality in the EU's relations with CEECs in order 
to assess to what extent this aspect had already been covered before 1997. In order to 
conduct such an analysis, the activities of the EU in the area of public administration 
reform have to be assessed in detail. The chapter provides this by an informed discussion 
of the White Paper on Preparation of the Associated CEECs, SIGMA, TAIEX and those 
Phare programmes that targeted administrative reform. This discussion is complemented 
by an explanation of the main events that led to the evolution of the EU's conditionality 
in the early 1990s. Another important aspect highlighted in this chapter is the way in 
which the Commission developed frequent contacts with other aid donors as a result of its 
coordination function under the G-24 aid initiative. 
Chapter 6 elaborates the discussion on the evolution of conditionality, and questions to 
what extent the 1997 reforms made a difference to the substance and enforceability of the 
accession criteria. In other words, this chapter examines the issue of explicit 
conditionality, while asking whether the changes introduced to the pre-accession strategy 
made a qualitative difference, and whether it had an effect on the implementation of the 
financial instruments Phare, ISPA and SAPARD. In this sense, the analysis part of the 
thesis also evaluates Vachudova's (2001; 2004) argument that the early transition period 
was characterized by passive leverage of the EU, whereas the emergence of explicit 
conditionality led to active leverage from 1997 onwards. Chapter 6 also outlines the most 
important steps taken during the 1997 reform and introduces the main actors in this 
reform process. In addition, it explains the reform of the Phare programming cycle, in 
particular the decentralized approach to implementation. In this way, it lays down the 
basis for an informed assessment of the introduction and implementation of twinning. 
In order to assess the dynamics which unfolded between the Commission and the member 
states during the creation of policy instruments, Chapter 7 examines the introduction of 
the twinning exercise, in particular its implementation procedures. It reveals which actors 
were more decisive in pressing for certain policy designs and identifies the factors that 
were crucial for their persistence (internal governance). The chapter demonstrates that 
lesson-drawing was the main mode of internal governance utilized by the Commission 
during the introduction of the twinning exercise and its procedures. It evaluates the extent 
41 'Me term explicit conditionality was first used by Milada Anna Vachudova (2001: 5), but has 
later also been utilized by Wade Jacoby (2001b: 189), 1-161scher and Stephan (2004: 329), Sasse 
(2004) and others. 
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to which the other modes of governance played a role during the formulation of the 
implementation procedures. 
Chapter 8 considers what type of instrument the twinning exercise constitutes based on 
the existing implementation procedures. This is facilitated by an analysis of the bidding 
process for twinning projects and other dynamics unfolding during implementation 
(external governance). It shows that twinning projects possess similar features to new 
forms of governance, which have become important alternatives in the harmonization of 
policies in areas such as employment, pensions and the environment. 
The chapter concludes that explicit conditionality played a significant role during the 
programming of the twinning exercise. However, twinning projects are not in line with a 
strategy of reinforcement by rewards. In fact, hardly any projects have been cancelled and 
the Commission's influence on projects is limited once the covenant has been approved. 
Analytically, new forms of governance are also better suited to explain the elements of 
benchmarking and peer pressure. Such factors are clearly present during the 
implementation of twinning projects. Chapter 8 also sheds light on the potential of 
twinning projects, regarding their role as a vehicle for transfer of institutional models 
from the member states to the candidate countries. The chapter also highlights how an 
evaluation of the twinning exercise has become a necessary condition for the 
implementation of the instrument in other aid programmes, such as CARDS42, MEDA 43 
and TACIS44. 
To summarize, the analytical sections of the thesis introduce the background of the 1997 
reform and examine the formulation, implementation and outcomes of the twinning 
exercise. This enables the assessment of the theoretical models outlined in Chapter 4. 
Chapters 7-8 form the core part of the thesis on the formulation, implementation and 
evaluation of the twinning exercise; a direct result of the empirical research undertaken 
during the last few years. These chapters are closely linked to the theoretical 
considerations outlined in Part I of the thesis. The discussion in all chapters focuses on 
the policy design of the twinning instrument. 
42 Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation, Council Regulation 
2666/2000. CARDS finances aid programmes in the Western Balkans. 
43 MEDA is the financial and technical assistance programme which finances measures to 
accompany the reform of economic and social structures in the framework of the Euro- 
Mediterranean partnership, Council Regulation 1488/96. 
44 Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States. TACIS supports all the 
countries in Eastern Europe which are part of the Commonwealth of Independent States. This 
includes states like the Ukraine which aspire to EU membership as well. 
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5 
Financial assistance, association and conditionality, 
1989-1996 
I Introduction 
This chapter charts the historical background for the case study examined in Chapters 
5-7. The introduction of the twinning exercise became part of the reform of the pre- 
accession strategy and the Phare programme in 1997. In order to provide the basis for an 
understanding of this process, this chapter examines the developments of the early 
transition period from 1989 to 1996. It explores the G-24 aid initiative, the introduction of 
Phare in 1989 and the establishment of the pre-accession strategy in 1994. The issue of 
the EU's accession criteria is addressed in order to trace the evolution of conditionality in 
the enlargement process. The chapter places particular emphasis on the introduction of 
the administrative accession criteria and its occurrence in the implementation of the pre- 
accession instruments until 1996. It stresses that the EU's conditionality regime was 
subject to significant evolution from the early 1990s to the late accession period. In 
addition, former enlargement processes are seen as the most important source of the 
accession criteria. 
The collapse of Communism in 1989 
1989 saw events that led to the collapse of communism and German unification, led 
Western European governments into further integrating their foreign policies towards the 
newly emerging regimes in CEE. Once it became clear that the artificial division of 
Europe had been overcome through peaceful revolutions in Eastern Europe, governments 
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decided to channel their efforts to stabilize the region through EC institutions. Activities 
of the EC in CEE were not completely new; a trade and cooperation agreement had 
already been signed with Hungary in September 1988 and negotiations on a similar 
agreement with Poland were well on the way. However, it has to be stressed though, that 
relations between Eastern and Western Europe were predefined by the geopolitical 
constellations of the Cold War for most of the 1980s. It is therefore questionable whether 
such agreements would have been possible at any earlier point in time. Some efforts to 
overcome this strict division were for example made by Germany under Willy Brandt's 
Ostpolifik and France's anti-bloc foreign policy in the 1970s. The scale of the challenges 
regarding relations with Eastern Europe that emerged in the early 1990s could hardly 
have been matched by any other event at the time. Not only were the transition and 
transformation processes completely new to the international community, but they also 
entailed a significant rethinking of the existing world order and relations between states 
within Europe. 
2 The evolution of conclitionality in the EU's relations with CEECs 
In response to these challenges, the EC formulated policies which regulated the flow of 
trade between CEECs and the Community. This largely resulted from the reluctance of 
several member states to consider an accession of the newly emerging democracies into 
the Community. The unwillingness of countries such as France, Italy and the Netherlands 
to engage in an enlargement process with CEE therefore led to the formulation of the 
EC's association policy 45. This policy fell short of a number of expectations that were 
emerging in CEE. It was characterized by economic protectionism, which was largely out 
of tune with the rhetoric of Western leaders on the issue of opening trade to the EC's 
neighbouring countries (cf. Papadimitriou 2003: 108). It was also an effort to sidetrack 
membership aspirations in CEE and build a Europe of concentric circles in which 
Western European member states clearly had the upper hand over their Eastern 
neighbours. This was the result of the fact that not every EU member state would benefit 
from the accession of CEECs. As a result, some member states had became particularly 
obstructive to the process of opening trade. In the early 1990s, Portugal prevented further 
liberalization of trade with CEE in textiles, France rejected concessions on beef, and 
45 The EU's association policy has been analyzed by a number of scholars (see for example 
Lippert and Schneider 1995b). Elaborations on the member states' preferences towards Eastern 
enlargement are available in various publications (Schimmelfennig 2003b: 178) and monitoring 
reports (lep 1998). 
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Spain vetoed an agreement on steel trade. Such strategies continued during the early 
1990s (Schimmelfennig 2001: 54-63). 
The negotiations on the Europe Agreements, the EU's association agreements, paralleled 
an international aid effort initiated by the G-7 to overcome the burden of restoration and 
restructuring in the CEECs. The Arche Summit of the G-7, which was held in Paris on 14 
and 15 July 1989, assigned the Commission the task of coordinating the aid of these 
states to Poland and Hungary. The project, referred to as Phare 46, triggered the 
establishment of an aid initiative for CEE and parts of the Western Balkans. However, 
later the term Phare was used for an aid programme of the EC, which had been proposed 
by the Commission in theAction planfor coordinated aid to Poland and Hungary (CEC 
1989a). The Commission requested an allocation of ECU 200 million from the 
Community budget in order to carry out the measures envisaged in 1990. This was to be 
supplemented by a member states' contribution of ECU 100 million from their national 
budgets and ECU 300 million from the other group members. The financial proposal was 
accepted by the member states and effectively led to the establishment of the Phare 
programme in December 1989 (Council Regulation No. 3906/89), which constituted the 
Community's contribution to the overall G-24 budget of ECU 600 million for 1990. The 
Action Plan and its financial outlay were also well-received by the European Parliament, 
which insisted however on an increase of the Community's financial effort in 1990 to 
ECU 300 million (Ehlermarm 1989: 25). 
This programme became one of the cornerstones of the EU's strategy towards CEE 
(Ehlermann 1989; K. E. Smith 1999; Lippert 2000c). The wider aid initiative, however, 
was finally delivered by a group of 24 OECD member states, the so-called Group of 24 
(see Glossary of terms, p. 256 and Figure 6, p. 121), which signed up to the agreement 
and recognized the central role the G-7 had given to the European Commission as a 
coordinator of the initiative. The coordination function placed the Commission at the 
centre of the G-24 initiative and made the EC/EU one of the main contributors to the 
scheme. 
46 The acronym Phare stands for Toland Hungary Assistance for Reconstruction of Economies" 
and is also the French word for "lighthouse" , which became a widely used symbol 
for the aid 
policy programme's operation within official speeches and documents of the Community. The 
Phare programme is based on the very loosely formulated Council Regulation (EEC) No 3906/89 
of 18 December 1989 on economic aid to certain countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which 
allowed the Commission a considerable amount of leverage in implementing Phare in the early 
1990S. 
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2.1 An international aid initiative: G-24 aid and political conditionality 
Aid and trade policies were the two pillars upon which the EC/EU's relations with 
Eastern Europe would rest (Tovias and Laird 1991; Kramer 1993). The EC/EU's share in 
the G-24 aid initiative amounted to 11.26 per cent of total assistance and 29.05 per cent of 
grant aid during the 1990-1996 period. The Commission not only spearheaded an 
initiative that became the largest source of financial support in CEE, but also contributed 
the main share of grant aid (see Figure I and Appendix 2, p. 363). The member states also 
contributed a large amount of bilateral aid to transition processes in Eastern Europe. 
Moreover, Germany even exceeded the amount of Community aid for the region with a 
contribution of 17.77 per cent assistance in total of which 14.42 were grant assistance. 
France supported the initiative with a percentage of 6.69 in total and 8.10 in grant aid. UK 
involvement in the initiative, however, was disappointing; its contribution fell well 
behind the efforts of Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden. This was an 
indication that geographic proximity played an important part in the member states' 
willingness to engage. 
As a significant donor and substantial source of direct investment, the United States also 
emerged as an important partner for Eastern European countries. The EC/EU, however, 
including its member states took the lion's share with 53.76 per cent of total and 66 per 
cent of grant assistance. However, neither G-24 aid nor the Phare programme and the 
Europe Agreements came without conditions, but instead incorporated a number of 
criteria. The US government and its Western European counterparts alike clearly paid 
tribute to the fact that the fall of the Iron Curtain meant the breakdown of the geopolitical 
boundaries that had existed for too long. In Europe and the U. S. policy-makers were 
equally keen to seize the opportunity and sustain the changes that had occurred across the 
whole of CEE. However, in spite of the security concerns that were attached to the issue 
of successful transition processes in CEE the transatlantic community did not act 
completely selflessly. The majority of projects were delivered by Western European and 
American companies, thereby ensuring that a great deal of the committed money would 
benefit home-grown businesses (Wedel 200 1; Carothers 1996). 
The Action Plan for coordinated aid published by the Commission in September 1989 
still lacked an explicit reference to the conditions that would be attached to G-24 aid 
(CEC 1989a). In February 1990, however, a revised version of this action plan became 
part of a Commission Communication, which included the proposal to extend the 
initiative to five more countries (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic 
Republic, 
Chapter 5: Financial assistance, association and conditionality, 1989-1996 121 
Austrii 
Belgiur 
Denmarl 
Finlanc 
Franc( 
Gerrraný 
Greecc 
Irelanc 
RaN 
Luxen'bourC 
Netherlands 
Portuga 
Spair 
Sw eder 
UK 
Total EU Wnber States 
RJ Programnes 
EIB 
ECSC 
Total EU (incl. member states) 
Iceland 
Norw ay 
Switzerland 
Secretariat 
Australia 
Canada 
Japan 
New Zealand 
Turkey 
us 
EBRID 
Word Bank 
IW 
IFis 
Dala Source: G-24 Scoreboard, CEC. 
Figure 6: G-24 Assistance, % of total assistance (1990-1996). 
0% lo% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100 
Chapter 5: Financial assistance, assodation and conditionality, 1989-1996 122 
Romania and Yugoslaviaý7. The document identified the necessary conditions as the rule 
of law, respect for human rights, the establishment of multiparty systems, the holding of 
free elections in 1990 and economic liberalization. The General Affairs Council on 5 
February approved the report of the Commission and stated: 'this co-ordinated assistance 
should be provided on the basis of commitments from the countries concerned to political 
and economic reform. In addition, the programme of assistance should be adapted to each 
country's own situation, specific requirements and absorption capacity' (EC 1990). The 
Group of 24 embraced this proposal in June 1990 and outlined the criteria that recipients 
would have to follow in order to receive aid. In a separate statement, the Group explicitly 
stressed the conditional character of the plan: 'the only countries ... which could benefit 
would be those which have satisfied the prescribed political (free elections, multi-party 
systems, priority of law) and economic (progress towards a liberal economy) conditions' 
(Group of 24 1990: 1). The Commission played an important role in the definition of 
these criteria. It used the weekly meetings between Commission and national officials in 
the informal advisers group to reach an agreement on the specific formulation and 
received support from the Council prior to the meeting in June (K. E. Smith 1999: 68). 
The Commission was now preparing to perform one of the most significant tasks that it 
had been asked to fulfil regarding the area of external relations (see K. E. Smith 1999: 66; 
Ehlermann 1989: 23; Pelkinans and Murphy 1991: 129; Ross 1995: 263-64; Grant 1994: 
165-66). The Commission machinery quickly produced several measures designed to 
ensure the effective coordination of aid between the Community, bilateral donors and 
IFIs. It stressed that countries should enter into agreements with the IMF in order to 
stabilize their economies. In addition, the Commission identified five key areas that were 
crucial for the early aid effort in these countries: 
" improved access to Western markets, 
" food supply, 
" training, 
" environment, 
" investment, and 
" economic restructuring. 
The agreements between the Council and the Commission that followed these 
developments also involved the opening of Community programmes in the area of 
education, which would allow CEE students to attend Western European universities 
(K. E. Smith 1999; CEC 1989c, 1989d). 
47 For a description of the extension of the Phare programme to other CEECs and the Western 
Balkans see Harsay, Smith (1999: 69-72) or the ChronoloSy ofevents in Appendix 1. 
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The coordination of aid did, however, become a daunting assignment, simply because 
none of the other aid agencies 'wanted to be coordinated' (Intw 17, CEC official, II 
September 2003). The Commission started to transfer officials from DG Development 
into DG External Relations. These officials often met their former counterparts from the 
World Bank, who had also moved on to work on the transition processes in post- 
communist countries. Starting with around 25 individuals in 1990, the Commission 
expanded the group of people working with Phare to over 250 people in 1995 (including 
its delegations in CEE)48. G-24 aid was mainly a political initiative (Intw 17 and 18, CEC 
officials, 11 September 2002). The Commission set up regular coordination meetings 
which allowed for a great deal of exposure to other agencies' working methods. These 
meetings were organized alongside the sectors that were covered by the initiative. 
However, as one interviewee indicated, 'there was a complete underestimation of the 
complexity and the timing it would take to support these countries' (Intw 17, CEC official, 
11. September 2002). Nevertheless, the G-24 initiative had set an important precedent 
with regard to the political conditions it attached to the aid it delivered (cf Weber 1995). 
The Europe Agreements signed between 1991 and 1996 also contained a number of 
conditions which closely reflected the Commission's previous stand on the issue (cf K. E. 
Smith 1999; Phinnemore 1999a; K. E. Smith 2003, see Annex 1). These bilateral 
agreements became an important element in the EC/EU's relation with its CEE 
neighbours. In addition to the regular coordination meetings for the G-24 initiative, the 
association committee meetings with the partner countries were an important source of 
information for decision-makers . 
49 The Commission had to utilize as many forums as 
possible in order to gain some influence on developments in the region. As one would 
expect, there was little understanding about suitable methods that would enable the 
transition from planned to market economies, and from communist to democratic 
government. In addition, all donors faced significant problems in gaining knowledge on 
the CEECs and the region in general. 
48 These are rough figures that have been confirmed by a number of key interviewees that worked 
with Phare since 1989. The bibliography has a section that identifies the more important interviews 
for this thesis. 
49 There were eight sectoral subcommittees setup under Europe Agreements which allowed the 
Commission and the member states to monitor developments across these sectors. 
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Country Europe Agreement 
signed 
Europe Agreement 
came into force 
Official application 
for EU Membership 
Bulgaria March 1993 February 1995 December 1995 
Czech Republic October 1993 February 1995 January 1996 
Estonia June 1995 February 1998 November 1995 
Hungary December 1991 February 1994 Afarch 1994 
LatN ia June 1995 February 1998 October 1995 
Lithuania June 1995 February 1998 December 199.5 
Poland December 1991 February 1994 April 1994 
Romania February 1993 February 1995 June 1995 
Slovakia October 1993 February 1995 June 1995 
Slovenia June 1996 February 1999 June 1996 
Source. - CEC, DG Enlargement, Available: http: //eui-opa. eu. int/coinni/enlat-ý, cment/ 
va. slem: up ag. htin -ý 20021. [Accessed: 11. Januai. 
Table 9: Europe Agreements and official membership applications 
2.2 The demand-driven approach of Phare, 1989-1996 
Similar to other donors, the Commission was overwhelmed by the sudden challenge of 
post-communist transition and therefore advocated a demand-driven approach within the 
Phare programme. This meant that 'the partner countries were themselves the driving 
force in shaping the programmes' (CEC 1999i: 7). The development of the Phare 
programme remained relatively flexible. In 1990, a substantial amount of assistance was 
spent on food aid and other areas of emergency aid, including pesticides to boost 
agricultural production. The programme, which was intended to 'support the process of 
social and economic reform under way in Hungary and Poland' (EC 1989: 1), was also 
extended to countries in the Western Balkans such as Croatia and Albania, after they met 
the political conditionality as defined above. 
The initiative quickly moved on to fund efforts in restructuring the econorny (see 
Appendix 2). Phare mainly used teams of consultants as a delivery mechanism. This 
delivery oJ' 'know-how' by consultants becarne widely contested in the reform of the 
programme in 1997. The Phare programme was also the largest source for this type of 
support in the associated countries, while the World Bank and other agencies focused 
largely on infrastructure and environment projects. The other significant source of advice 
was the German TRANSFORM programme, which organised twinning projects between 
German ministries and eight of the CEECs as well as Russia, the Ukraine and Belarus 
(BMWi 1994; BMZ 2000). Whereas Germany covered most of the region under the 
umbrella of TRANSFORM, the EU introduced TACIS in 199 1, a separate programme for 
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the newly independent countries of the former Soviet Union (Delcour 2001; Tulmets 
2003a). 
Between 1990 and 1996, the Commission developed a number of different programme 
types under Phare in order to facilitate the delivery of aid to the associates: national 
programmes, regional and horizontal programmes, cross-border cooperation, and nuclear 
safety. National programmes were directed at particular associates, while aiming to 
reform their economy and institutions. Regional and horizontal programmes addressed 
either a set of countries (regional programmes) or all associates (horizontal programmes) 
in order to achieve economies of scale. The cross-border cooperation initiative was 
largely seen among interviewees as a trade-off from German unification, since a group of 
German MEPs proposed it in order to retain some of the Phare funds for the New 
Under. 50 The initiative was introduced on 4 July 1994 (EC 1994a). It finances joint 
projects between bordering regions in a candidate country and a member state. In its later 
form it resembled the implementation of INTERREG programmes under the structural 
funds, which enable the same type of projects between member states. Finally, nuclear 
safety received noteworthy attention, particularly in the early phase of transition. The 
importance attached to this issue was also a result of the 1986 Chernobyl disaster, which 
had long lasting effects on policymakers' thinking. The Phare programme also 
reimbursed costs incurred in other areas of the budget through the participation of CEECs 
in Community programmes. " 
The SIGMA programme is an excellent example of a Phare horizontal programme. In 
May 1992, the Commission agreed with the OECD PUMA service to establish a 
programme on general or horizontal public administration for CEECs. SIGMA was 
installed within the OECD's headquarters in Paris. The aim of this joint initiative was to 
help countries modernise their public management systems with regard to public 
administration reform, management and control of financial resources; and the fight 
against fraud and corruption. Since then, it has largely operated as an academic exercise, 
which has drafted reports on the basis of study visits to a number of associated countries, 
but has also provided technical assistance in the form of training events. The programme, 
for example, seeks to enhance civil service legislation, human resource development 
strategies and management of human resources. It also considers the legal framework of 
" Intw2 and 3, German officials, 13 March 2002. Intw26, European Parliament official, 
23 September 2002. 
51 There is plenty of information on the early implementation period of the Phare programme 
available in form of Annual Reports and other documents (CEC 1989b, 1989d, 1990,1992b, 1993, 
1995b, 1996,19981). An overview of these documents is presented in the bibliography, p. 256. 
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administration an important pillar of administrative reform. The management and control 
of financial resources is to be achieved by the institutionalization of budgetary decision- 
making, budget execution and treasury systems. This is also supported by internal audit 
and control standards that are respectively enforced by the State Audit Institutions (SAls) 
and external audit systems (see Annex 14). The programme was extended in 1994 and 
subsequently also won the approval of the Commission which believed that it is 
'important to keep this service alive in order to have several instruments to influence 
public administration reform in CEE available' (Intw3O, CEC official, 04 March 2003). 
However, the involvement of Commission officials in several central areas of cooperation 
and the persistent calls for membership in CEE made member states who opposed an 
enlargement with the associates suspicious. 
2.3 The EBRD, the EIB and the International aid effort 
The French government was keen to deal with these issues outside the EC's institutional 
arena. In October 1989, the French President Mitten-and suggested creating a new 
institution, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) to direct 
multilateral aid and investment capital towards Eastern Europe. He entrusted the project 
to his special adviser Jacques Attali. As France was holding the Council Presidency at the 
time, it was in a 'prime position to propel the idea forward' (K. E. Smith 1999: 80). 52 The 
French government was acting on the basis of a careful strategy to 'frame CEE as a third 
"concentric circle" of the European integration process, which made sense to France as a 
way of diluting German influence, keeping the United States at arm's length, and giving 
Paris a privileged position in extending east the EC's central rationale' (Weber 1994: 13). 
Attali's proposal included plans to restrict membership of the EBRD to European states, 
thereby excluding the United States, Canada and Japan from its portfolio and stretching 
its role far beyond the normal parameters of a regional development bank. It also 
threatened the Commission's new role as aid coordinator among Western Donors. The 
French proposal was quickly watered down within the Council and the remaining 
agreement was fully in accordance with the efforts made in late December 1989. The 
EBRD's aims were now to 'foster the transition towards open market-oriented economies 
and to promote private and entrepreneurial initiative in the Central and Eastern European 
countries committed to and applying the principles of multiparty democracy, pluralism, 
and market economies. ' 53 It thereby also followed the precedent set by the G-24 aid 
52 See also Agence Europe No. 5418,26 January 199 1. 
53 EBRD Articles of Agreement, Article 1. 
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initiative and applied the same set of conditions to its programmes. The US, Canada and 
Japan are also members of this regional development bank that focuses on promoting 
private investment in the region (Weber 1994: 6-11; K. E. Smith 1999: 80-82; Menkveld 
1991: 20-26). 
Date -, Event, ' I' '- ,, "I I" ,"- '- 
-, - 
Autumn 1989 "Peaceful" revolutions in Eastern Europe lead to the break up of the 
Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact 
14-15 July 1989 Arche Summit of the G-7 
8-9 December 1989 Strasbourg European Council 
II June 1992 Commission publishes "Europe and the Challenge of Enlargement 
26-27 June 1992 Lisbon European Council 
02 December 1992 Commission publishes "Towards a closer association with the Countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe" 
21-22 June 1993 Copenhagen European Council 
13 July 1994 Commission publishes "The Europe Agreements and Beyond: A Strategy 
to prepare Countries of Central and Eastern Europe for Accession" 
10- 11 Nov 1994 Essen European Council 
03 May 1995 Publication of the White Paper on Preparation of the Associated CEECs 
for Integration into the Internal Market of the Union 
15-16 December 1995 Madrid European Council 
01 January 1996 Introduction of TAIEX 
Source: Author's compilation. 
Table 10: The development of the EU's relations with CEE 
The Community also provided loans paid out by the European Investment Bank (EIB) in 
the areas of energy, telecommunications, transport and the environment, and in cases 
where the recipient countries did not have access to IMF loans. It also provided macro- 
financial assistance in order to assist the covering balance of payments deficits. The 
Community saw this as a crucial step for the building of a base from which the countries 
could build up their reforms and thus urged other donors to join these initiatives. The 
February 1990 Ecofin Council agreed the first loan, 870 million ECU. This was designed 
to close Hungary's expanding balance of payment deficit and subsequently this type of 
assistance continued to be paid out regularly (see Appendix 2, p. 363). In this context, 
Smith (1999: 79) mentions that a loan to Bulgaria was stalled in October 1992, because of 
delays in the envisaged reforms, and disbursement of assistance was also stopped to 
Albania and Romania in 1994 and 1995. The loan to Romania was only reactivated in 
March 1997 when the new government adopted a reform programme. EIB loans played 
an important role in reinstating the transport links between the associates and the 
Community. In the early transition period, the activities of the EIB were also decisive in 
improving work conditions in coal mines and modernising the CEECs 
telecommunications network. 
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As a result, the G-24 aid initiative not only set a precedent with regards to the conditions 
applied in relations with CEE, but also incorporated the efforts of multilateral 
organizations, bilateral aid agencies, the ElB and the EBRD. The activities of the donor 
Community were firmly linked to the progress of reforms to democracy and market 
economies. This was an added incentive for CEECs to receive the rubberstamp of 
membership as a clear indication that their reforms had been successful. 
3 The establishment of EU membership conclitionality 
In this section, other factors contributing to the evolution of membership criteria for the 
CEECs are introduced with a discussion of prior enlargement processes. The criteria for 
membership were enshrined in Treaty Articles, statements by the European Council, and 
legal agreements between the EU and candidates. Article 237 of the Rome Treaty 
declared that 'any European state may apply to become a member of the Community'. 
The first enlargement of the European Communities was a contentious issue, in particular 
since Britain's membership application had been stalled several times. Yet, the accession 
of Britain, Ireland and Denmark was subject to limited membership criteria in comparison 
to the preceding enlargement rounds. The transition of Greece, Portugal, and Spain from 
authoritarian rule to democracy in the mid- I 970s clearly called for a revision of the EU's 
approach to enlargement (K. E. Smith 2003: 109). 
3.1 The emergence of accession criteria: Greece and the Southern Enlargement 
The April 1978 Copenhagen European Council proclaimed that 'respect for and 
maintenance of representative democracy and human rights in each Member State are 
essential elements of membership in the European Communities' (CEC 1978a: Art. 6). 
As a result, the accession of Greece, Portugal and Spain are often referred to as the 
Community's first contribution to democracy promotion (Dimitrova and Pridharn 2004: 
95). The enlargement to Greece finally took place in 1981. However, as Smith (2003: 
110) points out, the Commission's opinion on these candidates did not emphasise the 
establishment of democracy, but rather pointed to the importance of economic and 
administrative capacities. 54 All three applicants were less developed economically than 
other member states. This in return caused reservations in the Commission about 'their 
capacity to function within the Community' (K. E. Smith 2003: 110). Accordingly, the 
Commission's Opinion on Greece declared in 1976 that the country was not ready for 
54 See also the Commission's Opinions on Greece, Portugal and Spain (CEC 1976: Art. 9; 1978b: 
ArL 7; 1978c: Art. 9). 
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membership on economic grounds and proposed to consider the opening of negotiations 
at a later point in time. The Commission emphasized that there should be a period of 
preparation which would enable Greece to enter the EU after considerable adaptation in 
its institutions (Intw9, British official, 15 April 2002). The Council, however, took a 
different stand on the issue and preferred to support the transition process in Greece by 
the opening full membership negotiations. However, one of the greatest myths on the 
enlargement process is that the Commission Opinion gave a negative evaluation 
regarding Greek membership (Intw58, CEC official, 24 November 2003). On the 
contrary, it simply highlighted the fact that the country needed more time to prepare 
before entering the Community. 
Year of entry Member state/s 
1973 Deninark, Ireland and the United Kingdom (first enlargenteni) 
1981 Greece 
................... .-......... ........ - 
1986 Portugal and Spain (Southern enlargement) 
.......... ................... . ... ..................... .............. 
1990 East Germany (as a result ofGerman unification) 
1995 Austria, Finland and Sweden (EFTA Enlargemenl) 
2004 Czech Republic, Estonia. I lungary, Latvia, Lithuania. Poland, Slovakia. Slovenia as Nvell as 
Cyprus and Malta (Eastern Enlargetnew) 
Source: Own compilation. 
Table 11: Former enlargements of the EU and the incorporation of East Germany 
The special circurnstances under which these countries airned to enter the EC were also 
taken into consideration when the Council in October 1975 decided to allocate ECU 150 
million of EIB loans to Portugal. In addition, the payment of debt on these loans was 
subsidized by 33% with ECU 30 million frorn the EC budget. This decision consolidated 
into a more cohesive initiative, which supported the transformation of the Portuguese 
economy. It was the first instance of the Community paying pre-accession aid to help a 
country developing the conditions necessary for membership. The total sum paid out to 
Portugal amounted to ECU 875 million from 1975 to 1984. Although the aid packages 
were mainly designed to transform Portugal's economy and came largely in form of 
loans, this was an important step taken by the Community towards establishing a pre- 
accession aid system (Dauderst5dt 1986). Later, the agreement on EMU led to the 
introduction of the Cohesion Fund. This was originally designed as a temporary measure 
to support the economic transition processes in Southern Europe and enable this region to 
take part in monetary union. Institutional stickiness, however, led to a continuation of the 
fund until today. 
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3.2 EFTA enlargement: Austria, Finland and Sweden 
The end of the Cold War resulted in a large number of applicants for membership. Since 
the relatively early incorporation of East Germany into the EC, the Community had 
problems explaining why other states would not be eligible (K. E. Smith 1999: 83-85). 
However, applications were not only expected from CEE states, but also from the 
member states of EFTA. Austria, Sweden, Finland, Switzerland and Norway" all applied 
for membership between July 1991 and November 1992. The EC reacted by installing the 
European Economic Area (EEA) with all of these countries apart from Switzerland56 . The 
EC now began to face the 'widening vs. deepening' dilemma that could stall the 
integration process for some time if it would not come up with more concrete 
membership criteria. The specification and enforcement of specified conditions would 
enable the Community to function after enlargement given that the necessary institutional 
reforms were pursued parallel to the accession process with new members 
(Schimmelfennig 2003c: 176). In fact, the EC had already reached agreement on the 
Maastricht Treaty that would lead to significant deepening in political and economic 
terms. 
In 1992, the Commission, in response to a request by the member states, therefore issued 
a report to the European Council in Lisbon in which it stated that 'a state which applies 
for membership must ... satisfy the three basic conditions of European identity, 
democratic status, and respect of human rights' (CEC 1992a: 11). The document defined 
European identity as a combination of geographical, historical and cultural elements 
which sets the limits of Europe. The setting of stricter membership conditions is a partial 
answer to the dilemma that enlargement poses to the institutional setup of the Community 
and its policies. EU membership conditionality cannot be the only means to guarantee the 
member states' long-term investment in European institutions, but was meant to become 
the vehicle for reform in CEE. The situation was less problematic with regards to other 
applicants such as Austria, Sweden, and Finland since these countries had already shown 
a high degree of democracy and economic development (Preston 1997; Granell 1995; 
Pentland 2000). 
In order to protect the Community institutions and its policies, the Commission also 
addressed the ability of the candidates to take on the acquis communautaire and to take 
55 Although Norway completed accession negotiations in 1994, a referendum rejected EU 
membership for a second time. 
, ý6 The membership application of Switzerland was 'frozen' after a referendum in which citizens 
decided that the country should not take part in the European Economic Area. 
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part in the internal market. It therefore specified further criteria by clarifying that 
applicants had to accept the Community system and be able to implement it: 
As the Community's legal, economic, and political framework has developed, the 
obligations of membership have become progressively more difficult to fulfil. The 
obligations presuppose a functioning and competitive market economy, and an 
adequate legal and administrative framework in the public and private sectors. An 
applicant without these characteristics could not be effectively integrated; in fact, 
membership would disrupt the working of the Community (CEC 1992a: 11, emphasis 
added). 
The reference to adequate legal and administrative frameworks can be interpreted as the 
first instance in which the Commission implied that candidates have to meet 
administrative criteria in order to enter the EC. This position is repeated several times in 
the report, for example, where it stresses that some applicants 'are relatively well-placed 
to take on the obligations of membership, while others are manifestly not in a position to 
adopt them in the near future' (CEC 1992a: 13). As a result, the Commission supported 
the applications of the EFTA members that had already agreed to establish the EEA and 
therefore were in the process of adopting a large part of the Community's acquis. It was 
clear from the report, however, that the Commission took a more moderate view of CEE 
applicants. This was largely a result of the completion of the single market and EMU. In 
Lisbon, the Council agreed with the assessment and stated that 'the EEA-agreement has 
paved the way for opening enlargement negotiations with a view to an early conclusion 
with EFTA countries seeking membership of the European Union' (EC 1992: 1). 
As Smith (2003: 112) notes, the Commission also placed particular emphasis on the 
adoption of the entire acquis. This is partly a result of the fact that the Maastricht Treaty 
negotiations had shown how difficult it was to accommodate former applicant countries' 
preferences after accession. Denmark and the United Kingdom negotiated an opt-out of 
the third stage of EMU, and Denmark also received an opt-out from the common defence 
policy. In addition, the United Kingdom did not sign the Social Charter. As a result of 
these developments, the Commission clarified that members would have to subscribe in 
principle and in practice to the CFSP (CEC 1992a: 13), a demand that was difficult to 
meet by the neutral EFTA countries. Although this was not an encouragement for these 
countries to join the EC, it did not prevent them from starting accession negotiations after 
the ratification of the Treaty on European Union (Bieler 2000; Granell 1995; Cameron 
1995). The Commission was eager to guard the EU from harmful effects of enlargement: 
The impact of future enlargement on the capacity of the community to take decisions 
merits the most careful reflection and evaluation. Non-members apply to join because 
the Community is attractive; the Community is attractive because it is seen to be 
effective; to proceed to enlargement in a way which reduces its effectiveness would be 
an effor (CEC 1992a: 14). 
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The Commission further stressed that 'widening must not be at the expense of deepening. 
Enlargement must not be a dilution of the Community's achievements' (CEC 1992a: 10). 
Owing to the recognition this report received in the European Council, the parameters for 
the EU's fourth enlargement were set. However, the issue of membership was not 
addressed with regards to the CEECs. Both the Council and the Commission pointed to 
the negotiations on the Europe Agreements which were still seen as an alternative to 
enlargement. 
3.3 Eastern enlargement and the consolidation of the accession criteria 
The will for a revision of this policy became clear when, 18 months later, the 1993 
European Council in Copenhagen established further criteria for accession. The summit 
attached a number of conditions to its decision that 'the associated countries in Central 
and Eastern Europe that so desire shall become members of the European Union' (EC 
1993: 5). It outlined the following accession criteria: 
Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions 
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection 
of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to 
cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. Membership 
presupposes the candidate's ability to take on the obligations of membership including 
adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union. 
The Copenhagen criteria not only put forward a new rationale for policy-making in 
respect of associated countries, but also broadened the scope of the EU's leverage by 
incorporating references to democratic values and norms (Lippert 2000a: 128-30). As a 
result, the membership criteria acted as a further incentive for democratisation. In that 
sense, they ensured a link between accession and the transition to democratic and market- 
oriented institutions. However, the clear membership perspective, which was introduced 
with the decisions taken at the Copenhagen summit, was weakened by the broad 
formulation of the criteria. It became clear that this would give the stakeholders in the 
process the opportunity for interpretation (Lippert 2000b). Nevertheless, the EU started to 
act as the main externalfocalpoint for the transition processes in CEE (Elster et al. 1998: 
188). 
The Copenhagen Summit also agreed to a number of proposals which the Commission 
had worked out with the member states for several months before the meeting. As a 
result, quite a number of changes were introduced to the EU's relations with CEE. This 
involved the introduction of a structured relationship with the institutions of the EU, 
improved market access, the introduction of an infrastructure facility within Phare and the 
furthering of economic integration (EC 1993: Annex 11). The structured relationship 
referred to a multilateral dialogue between the CEECs and the Community on matters of 
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common interest. Such a political dialogue had already been introduced as a structure of 
consultation under the Europe Agreements, but only on a bilateral basis between the 
respective countries and the EC. The structured relationship, however, involved the 
organization of meetings between the Council and all associates in CEE. It was designed 
as an instrument that could steer through the murky waters of association and pre- 
accession. 
As the boundaries of integration began to blur in the early 1990s, classical forms of 
cooperation such as association had to be accompanied by measures that would take into 
account the ambiguity of the situation. The structured dialogue helped 'maintaining 
boundaries while simultaneously offering closer cooperation' (Lippert and Becker 1998a: 
343). It gave the associates the opportunity to familiarize themselves with the obligations 
of membership without actually having to implement any EU legislation. At the same 
time, it was also seen as a vehicle to coordinate initiatives across all three pillars of the 
acquis (the Community, JHA and CFSP) (Lippert and Becker 1998a; Regelsberger 1995). 
Improved market access was implemented by bringing forward the deadlines for the 
lifting of import restrictions on products originating in the associate countries. The 
member states also agreed that up to 15% of Phare funds could be used to finance 
infrastructure projects. This was highly controversial among member states. France, the 
United Kingdom and Ireland feared that this proposal would 'fundamentally alter the 
character of the Phare programme' (Intwl 8, CEC official, II September 2002). In the 
background, member state negotiators were lobbied by their consultancy businesses who 
would lose significant funds if infrastructure projects would be financed instead of know- 
how transfer (cf K. E. Smith 1999: 75-77). Nevertheless, an agreement was reached that 
enabled Phare managers to offer infrastructure support under a strict set of conditions. 37 
Finally, the furthering of integration with the CEECs involved increased approximation 
of laws in the associate countries. This was to ensure that the associated countries adhere 
to the provisions on banning restrictive practices, abuse of dominant positions and public 
aid which all distort conditions of competition. The Europe Agreements had already 
foreseen that the approximation of laws in this area is of importance, but the Community 
placed particular emphasis on the implementation of these measures in view of future 
accession and proposed the training of CEE officials in EC legislation by member state 
and Commission officials. As a result, the Council announced that 'a task force of 
57 Such funds should only be paid out as components of projects jointly financed by the EIB and/or 
IFIs and beneficiary countries. There should be no private funds available to finance these projects 
and they should comply with the Community interest. The Commission was also asked to ensure 
that there would be no undue concentration in a particular country (EC 1993: Annex 11, iii). 
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representatives of the member states and the Commission will be set up to coordinate and 
direct the work' (EC 1993: Annex 11, iv). Niemann (1998: 438-39) argues that these 
changes are a result of the Commission's entrepreneurship. 
The success of the Commission's proposals was linked to the fact that it was known 
beforehand that an agreement on membership of CEECs would come to the table during 
the Copenhagen Summit. Commission officials anticipated that the decision to offer such 
a perspective to the associates would open a window of opportunity. This enabled the 
Commission to act as apolicy entrepreneur (Kingdon 1995: 180-81; Pollack 1997: 126- 
27) and carefully engineer its plans for infrastructure support under Phare. The physical 
links with CEE were seen as crucial not only for accession, but also for the development 
of closer trading relationships with the rest of Europe. However, the Commission could 
only win support for its proposal by arranging with the Danish Presidency that the issue 
would be put on the agenda for the last day of the of the Summit. Niemann (1998: 438- 
39) stresses that 'the Council framework would have allowed too much controversial 
discussion'. Thus, the direct approach of getting the issue approved by the European 
Council was more realistic and it proved successful in the end. 
The following years demonstrated that the EU's conditionality was largely subject to the 
institutions' conduct under the policies designed for enlargement. In other words, 
conditions were not only written on paper, but were subject to daily interpretation by 
Commission Headquarters in Brussels, the Delegations of the Commission in the 
applicant countries, association committees and later also on the negotiation table 
(Niemann 1998; Lippert 2000b: 21 ff. ). 
4 Administrative conditionality: EU enlargement and public 
administrations 
In the wake of the 1993 Copenhagen summit, however, there was great concern about the 
fact that the least wealthy applicants in the history of the EU would face more difficulties 
than former applicants when entering a much more integrated Community. This stressed 
the clear need to develop a strategy which would ensure the preparation of the associates 
for membership. Accordingly, the internal policy debate and negotiations throughout 
1994 focused on the establishment of a new strategy for enlargement. These discussions 
resulted in the creation of the pre-accession strategy (see Lippert 2000a: 144)58, the nite 
" Babara Lippert provides a good overview of the development and content of the pre-accession 
strategy. 
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Paper on the Preparation of the Associated Countries of CEE for the internal market 
(CEC 1995c), a revised structured dialogue and the extension of the infrastructure facility 
within Phare (see Annex 4). 
4.1 The creation of the pre-accession strategy 
The introduction of the pre-accession strategy was advocated by the Commission in view 
of the changes that needed to be introduced in order to prepare for an enlargement with 
CEE. The German EU presidency was sympathetic to the Commission's proposals and 
became instrumental in brokering the deal at the Essen European Council in 1994 (see 
Niemann 1998: 436). This deal followed up the changes already introduced at 
Copenhagen in 1993. The Commission and the member states were aware that more 
substantial revisions of existing instruments and new methods of cooperation were 
needed in order to prepare the associates for membership. The development of a pre- 
accession strategy clearly accounted for the particularity of the Eastern enlargement. The 
objective was to combine the transformation in government, administration, economy and 
society with integration into the EU (cf Lippert 2000a: 108). 
In order to move ahead with development of the pre-accession strategy, the Commission 
and the Council Presidency coordinated intensively in summer 1994. The Commission 
published a Communication in mid July, in which it outlined the overall approach of the 
Essen strategy for accession (CEC 1994a, see Annex 3). The document described the 
developments under the Europe Agreements and the structured relationship with the 
CEECs. After their ratification in the European Parliament, the Europe Agreements with 
Poland and Hungary had gone into force in February 1994 (see Table 9, p. 124). 
Following this event, both countries announced that they would apply for EU 
membership soon. The agreements established Association Councils between government 
officials and parliamentarians from the CEE and the member states in order to oversee 
implementation. Hungary made clear during the first of these meetings on 7 March 1994 
that it would submit an application, which followed on I April 1994. Seven days later, 
Poland submitted its applications. All remaining applications from the CEECs were 
received between 1995 and 1996. 
The Commission followed up its Communication on the Europe Agreements and beyond 
at the end of June 1994 (CEC 1994b). The new communication contained five concrete 
proposals to accelerate the relations with CEE. However, several initiatives stood out in 
comparison to the preceding period. First of all, the Commission supported an initiative 
by the European Parliament to introduce a programme for intra-regional cooperation 
financed under Phare. This had already been agreed on 4 July 1994 and became known as 
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the cross-border cooperation programme (Commission Regulation No. 1628/94). It 
finances joint projects between bordering regions in a candidate country and a member 
state. Secondly, the Commission argued that the 15 per cent limit for infrastructure 
spending that had been introduced in Copenhagen had to be dropped completely. Finally, 
it advocated a move towards multi-annual planning (MAP) during the programming of 
Phare in order to enhance the predictability of the programme and give incentives for 
investment (CEC 1994b: 16-17). The latter decision had the potential to positively impact 
on the programme's compatibility with the structural funds if followed up appropriately 
during implementation. 
The Commission also directly addressed the associates by asking them to create the legal 
and institutional environment for economic development and integration. It pointed to the 
necessary approximation of laws in particular with regards to the Internal Market and the 
implementation of competition policy. The Commission stressed that 
In order to pave the way for accession and for participation in the Internal Market each 
country needs to draw up a programme of priorities and a time-table for ensuring 
approximation of legislation, technical harmonisation and development of common 
European standards and certification procedures (CEC 1994b: 5). 
In other words, the Commission sought to clarify that the Europe Agreements included 
clear commitments for the associates and that the implementation of these obligations 
were a pre-condition for membership negotiations. Interestingly, it also pointed to the role 
member states could play in facilitating these developments by 'making resources and 
experience available, where appropriate and feasible' (CEC 1994b: 5). This latter remark 
was a reference to the TAIEX programme which had been developed in parallel to the 
elaboration of the pre-accession strategy. In its final form, the programme enabled the 
secondment of member state officials for up to 2 weeks. 
The Council Presidency received these Communications favourably and started a six 
months consultation period with the Council. These discussions culminated in a report to 
the Essen European Council in December 1994 (EC 1994b, see Annex 4). This document 
generally fell in line with the Commission's proposals, but extended the amount allocated 
to infrastructure to merely 25% of the total Phare budget. One official made clear that 
'some member states still held that you should not use grant money to finance 
investments' (IntwI8, CEC official, 11 September 2005). Although the Council was 
aware that infrastructure spending would become more important, in particular to ensure 
the ability to co-finance ElB loans, it regarded this extension as sufficient since a number 
of member states signalled reservations about lifting the limit on infrastructure spending 
altogether. This helped to overcome the CEECs problems with the co-financing of ElB 
loans which were only allowed to cover up to 75 per cent of total project costs (Niemann 
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1998: 435436). The Council further stressed that Phare would be redirected to 'help 
associated countries to absorb the acquis communautaire' (EC 1994b: Annex IV). The 
Council agreed to the focus on the approximation of laws and as a result, the Essen 
European Council asked the Commission to prepare a White Paper on the Internal Market 
outlining the measures which the associated countries would need to adopt. 
In this context, Milller Graff (1997: 34-36) convincingly argues that association 
agreements do not necessarily include a membership perspective. The Europe 
Agreements were originally not seen as pre-accession instruments. On the contrary, these 
accords were 'originally devised as an alternative to membership' (Maller-Graff 1997: 
35) and only became part of the pre-accession strategy after the European Council in 
Copenhagen and the Essen introduced a substantial reorientation in the EU's strategy. 
The Commission began to draw up the "ite Paper on the Preparation ofthe Associated 
Countries of CEEfor the internal market of the Union (CEC 1995c). The document was 
published in 1995 and outlined 'a detailed programme of law approximation' (Gaudissart 
and Sinnaeve 1997: 43). This emphasis on the gradual approximation of laws in CEE 
ultimately aimed at the membership of the countries of that region in the EU. The 
programme described in the White Paper addressed each sector of the Internal Market and 
identified key measures that would have to be taken during the duration of the accession 
period. However, as Gaudissart and Sinnaeve (1997: 45) stress, by definition it 'has a 
non-binding character'. Accordingly, it was necessary to follow up its implementation 
with properly adapted Phare programmes and continued monitoring under the 
institutional arrangements for the Europe Agreements. 
The elements of the pre-accession strategy were now clear; it included the Europe 
Agreements, the structured dialogue, the White Paper, and the Phare programme. The 
latter also received a substantially increased budget at Essen. The member states agreed 
to allocate a sum of 16 1,114 million for the year 1995. The commitment rate for Phare rose 
steadily during the early 1990s. However, the problem was that the amount of allocated 
contracts did not match these commitments (see Table 12). The demand-driven approach 
of Phare led to the allocation of projects in a vast number of issue areas. The programme 
was administered by project management units (PMUs) which were responsible for the 
implementation of individual projects. PMUs were usually attached to or located in the 
ministries of the candidates. However, as Bailey and de Propris (2004: 79-81) show, the 
programme's implementation procedures were overly centralized and too much driven by 
the associates' needs. As a result, the Phare programme became fragmented into many 
small programmes. This not only hampered control of allocated funds, but also made it 
difficult to apply a strategic approach towards the programming of Phare projects. The 
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Commission faced increased criticism from the inernber states and Parliament. It gained a 
reputation for not having the procedures and in particular the PMUs in the candidate 
countries under control. In addition, the programmes were driven by foreign consultants 
which often had their own agenda. One of the CEC officials interviewed admitted, 'we 
had millions of Euros lying around on bank accounts in Eastern Europe without knowing 
the status of the money' (Intwl 8, CEC official, II September 2004). 
1990 475.3 1997 1207.8 
1991 769.7 1998 1135.1 
1992 979.6 1999 1153.9 
1993 966.1 1999 1481.7 
1994 946.1 2000 1651.5 
1995 1114.0 
Total 11880.7 
The situation with regard to implementation may be summarised as follows: 
Total commitments 1990-2000 
Total value of contracts 
signed 1990-2000 
E 11,880.7 million 
E 8,902.8 million (thus 74.9 per cent of all 
commitments have been contracted) 
Total payments under 
signed contracts 1990-2000 
E 7,647.25 million (thus 64.4 per cent of all 
committed funds have been paid and 85.9 
per cent of all contracted funds have been 
paid) 
Source: CEC 200 1, p. 24. 
Table 12: Phare Programme Commitments, 1990-2000 (in million EUR) 
Such managerial issues were of little help, because tile change of tide in the EU's 
relations with CEE dernanded a substantial restructuring in the rnedium-terrn. Yet, the 
Phare programme suffered frorn 'enormous complications and time-consuming activities 
by project managers' (Bothorel 1999: 6). These problerns were exaggerated by the fact 
that the DG IA in Brussels failed to incorporate its Delegations in the candidate countries 
adequately into programming and implementation. Commission Headquarters wanted to 
'retain control, but became overloaded by too many projects and delays built Lip between 
funds being committed and paid out' (Bailey and Propris 2004: 80). As a result, the 
contracting rates for Hungary in 1997 were as low as 10 per cent, whereas the overall 
contracting rate for the period 1990-98 arnounted to E5,589 million out of a total of' 
E8,891 million in commitments (CEC 1999h: 85). Although this figure is partly a result 
of the apparent lack of absorption capacity in the applicant countries, it is also clearly a 
result of the cumbersome and inadequate Phare procedures in this period. Geurts (1999: 
26) argues in this context that Phare had developed into 'a very complex network of 
institutions, rules and procedures where duplication of work, dilution of sense of 
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"ownership" on projects, administrative inertia and bottlenecks could not always be 
avoided'. 
4.2 The obligations of membership 
The management issues described above became more urgent when the applicant 
countries began to feel the burden of joining into such a complex and highly integrated 
system of market regulation. There were significant problems in taking on the obligations 
of membership outlined in the White Paper. As Grabbe and Hughes (1998: 35) indicate, 
4civil servants in all countries have experienced major problems with taking on the 
administrative burdens imposed by the White Paper. There was no room for discussion 
as the EU saw the Internal Market legislation as the core of the acquis that needed to be 
transposed into national law without any exceptions. The governments of CEE were 
simply expected to apply the obligations outlined in the document. 
The discussion in the applicant countries, however, still focused on how to approximate 
legislation and how to prioritize between sectors in order to meet the demands spelled out 
by the Commission. These difficulties were hardly surprising, since applicants at this 
level of development were bound to face specific problems when taking on a far more 
complex body of legislation than previous applicants did (Grabbe and Hughes 1998: 35). 
The legislation stipulated in the White Paper derived solely from agreements on the 
Internal Market. It included provisions on the production and marketing of goods, 
conditions under which services can be offered, and the removal of barriers of trade. 
Similar problems were expected in the context of EMU and JHA, both areas of 
integration which were developing rapidly parallel to the accession process. 
The clear desire of the CEECs to become members resulted in a response by the 
December 1995 European Council in Madrid. The summit concluded that the Essen 
strategy 'will have to be intensified in order to create the conditions for the gradual, 
harmonious integration of those states, particularly through the development of the 
market economy, the adjustment of their administrative structures and the creation of a 
stable economic and monetary environment' (EC 1995: l3emphasis added). This was the 
first instance in which the Community emphasised the need for suitable administrative 
structures. It became the Commission's task to incorporate these changes in emphasis in 
its pre-accession strategy. As a direct response to the Council Conclusions, the 
Commission completed the preparations for the introduction of the TAIEX59 office, 
59 Technical Assistance Infonnation Exchange Office. Following the proposal of the White paper 
"Preparation of the Associated Countries of Central and Eastern Europe for Integration into the 
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which would provide technical assistance regarding the approximation of law and was 
financed as a horizontal programme under the Phare regulation. 
The Madrid European Council also requested the Opinions on the candidates, one of the 
formal steps between the submissions of a membership application and accession (see 
Burghardt and Cameron 1997: 9, Table , p. )60 . Alongside the Opinions, the Council 
requested an evaluation of the effects of the enlargement on Community policies. 
Furthermore, it asked for the preparation of a composite paper, which would complement 
the Opinions by providing an overall approach, and the submission of a future financial 
framework. The Commission started working on these proposals, which were later 
merged into the Agenda 2000 initiative. In the same year, the Union also concluded 
successfully its so-called EFIA enlargement with Austria, Finland and Sweden. 
4.3 Targeting the lack of administrative capacity 
The drafting of the Opinions and Agenda 2000 opened a window of opportunity for the 
Commission to reform its existing enlargement method (Preston 1997). The Commission 
itself was dissatisfied with the performance of Phare and other elements of the pre- 
accession strategy. The programme was not effective regarding a number of issues. It 
became clear for example that the pure approximation of laws would not guarantee the 
implementation of Community legislation in the often highly understaffed 
administrations in CEE. The TAIEX office had developed into an adequate structure for 
the support of applicants during the drafting of legislation. However, it did not deliver the 
expertise that was necessary to enable the implementation of directives. 
There was also evidence suggesting that the implementation of the Phare programme had 
already demonstrated that the administrative capacities of the applicants would not be 
sufficient to participate in the implementation of regional policy or other sources of 
financial transfers (Intwl7, CEC official, 11 September 2002). A clear lack of well- 
trained technical managers for aid management also led Hungary to contract only ECU 55 
million out of its ECU 92 million allocation in 1995. Even later in the process, deficits in 
the Polish administration still led to the rejection of applications for Phare grants worth 
ECU 34 million from its 1998 aid budget, because of inadequate project preparation. The 
Commission regarded the necessity of reinforcing the applicants' absorption capacity in 
Internal Market of the Union", the "Technical Assistance Infomation Exchange Office'(TAIEX), 
was set up in January 1996 to provide the Associated Countries of Central and Eastern Europe 
with technical assistance on approximation of legislation. 
60 See Appendix 1, Table 24, p. 354 for a list of the formal steps to enlargement. 
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order to prepare for the implementation of structural funding, cohesion policy, 
agricultural and other financial transfers as a crucial prerequisite for accession. This 'lack 
of absorption capacity' is still a main area of concern among Commission officials 
(Intw28,32,17 and 18, CEC officials), mainly because the amount of financial transfers 
will rise significantly after accession. These objections were also fuelled by experiences 
from former enlargement processes (Nicolaides 2003). After the accession of Austria, the 
country took three years before taking up its full share of structural funding and former 
applicants like Greece and Portugal developed even more substantial problems (Intwl3, 
CEC official, 09 September 2003). 
The Commission highlighted that 'legislative and public administration reform ... has 
become especially important in the light of the Essen strategy which stresses preparing 
countries to adopt the European Community's internal market'(CEC 1995b: 9). In 1994, a 
pilot programme for the approximation of laws was launched in the Czech Republic. The 
programme led to advice on drafting legislation and regulations and provided training, 
hardware, software, books and documentation. A consortium of three law firms and two 
training institutions assisted in undertaking these tasks. Similar programmes were 
developed in the remaining applicant countries. 
In 1995, the Phare programme continued its work on infrastructure projects, cross-border 
cooperation and know-how transfer. The increased ceiling in infrastructure spending 
allowed the allocation of Phare funds in key areas such as transport, the environment, 
energy, telecommunications and private sector development. This led to a number of 
infrastructure improvements in CEE, projects included the installation of roads and 
railways between Warsaw and Berlin, the elimination of border-crossing bottlenecks, and 
the development of traffic management systems (CEC 1996: 7). The cross-border 
cooperation scheme also started to gain momentum. Since Austrian accession, the 
Commission could add Slovakia as well as new border regions in the Czech Republic and 
Slovenia to its list of recipients. In 1995, a total of ECU 169 million was spent on cross- 
border cooperation in sectors such as transport, environment and economic development. 
However, the Commission also introduced a Small Project Fund Facility to support "soft" 
actions in tourism, human resources and culture. 1995 also marked the year in which 
reconstruction of the former Yugoslavia began. The Commission therefore started to 
support Albania under the aegis of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe and the 
Phare programme. In 1996, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina were added to the list of Phare recipients, which now supported 13 
countries. 
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In 1995, the Commission also restructured its internal management within DGIA which 
was originally organized alongside the sectors that Phare supported. However, from June 
1995 a focus on individual countries was introduced. Thus, national programmes under 
Phare administrated by country units within DGIA. In this way, the Commission (1996: 
10) hoped to 'focus on all aspects of each country's pre-accession needs at the same time 
as improving the performance of the Programme by enabling a faster co-ordinated 
response to country issues, and operational synergy between the Delegations in the 
partner countries and staff in Brussels'. In order to monitor programmes that were paid 
out to several countries at a time, the Commission also supplemented this structure with a 
number of sectoral and coordination units. In 1996, these changes were complemented by 
the introduction of a financial directorate within DGIA. This new structure comprised 
units for audit, evaluation, human resources, information, and financial management 
(CEC 19981: 20-21). This novel structure proved more workable and was maintained 
when the Prodi Commission came into office in 1999. 
In terms of the know-how transfer provided for the reform of public administrations in 
CEE, the Commission continued to develop programmes for law approximation. This 
emphasis started to get off the ground on basis of the work provided by the TAIEX office. 
In addition, the issue of administrative capacity was targeted with all three programme 
types: national, horizontal and regional programmes. In 1996, the Phare programme 
therefore supported a diverse mix of changes in public administrations. This included the 
upgrading of the administrative and ministerial structures in charge of steering the 
European integration process, facilitating adaptation to EC standards and norins through 
upgrading labs and services in charge of accreditation and certification, and rendering 
public procurement practices more stringent and compatible. The main instruments for 
these changes were the SIGMA programme (ECU 5 million) and TAIEX (ECU 6 
million). Multi-country programmes for JHA and anti-drugs initiatives were facilitated by 
intensive consultation with member states and applicants. The approximation of 
environmental legislation was partly slowed down by the fact that the mandate of TAIEX 
was limited and the Commission decided in 1996 that a horizontal programme on the 
enviromnent should fill this gap (CEC 19981: 6-18). 
As a result, the sector allocations to public administration reform increased by more than 
fourfold in 1996 compared to 1995. The sector public administration, EU integration and 
legislation accounted for 12.9 per cent of the Phare programme in 1996 more than all 
other sectors except for infrastructure support which for understandable reasons 
consumed higher sums of money (34.7 per cent). However, these initiatives lacked an 
overall approach not only to implementation, but also in terms of focus. A variety of 
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programmes were now targeting public administration reform and it became difficult 
even for the Commission itself to maintain an overview what the individual programmes 
intended to achieve. In addition, the strong reliance of Phare on consultants had proven 
inefficient. Several interviewees indicated that the Commission was aware that a large 
number of programmes which provided know-how transfer simply ended up with reports 
being archived in the candidates' filing cabinets (Intw 18,24,28, CEC officials, 2002). 
The transition to a market economy alone, however, clearly required the 'elimination of a 
range of existing institutions and practices in these countries, and the introduction of new 
agencies, with new goals, staffed with people having different attitudes and behaviour' 
(Rice 1991: 1). The transformation of public administrations in post-communist countries 
had been one of the prime concerns of all international donors alike, although it remained 
unclear how to create these necessary changes. The target of membership increased this 
problematic situation because attitudes and behavioural patterns of national bureaucrats 
would be carried into EU fora and decision-making. The Commission therefore went 
through 'all sorts of gymnastics exercises to get member states officials involved' 
(IntwI5, CEC official, 10 September 2002). In Poland, the secondment of a retired 
member state official led to a twinning project in the energy sector even before the 
twinning exercise was introduced in 1997. However, this programme was not as 
developed as most of the twinning programmes that were implemented after 1998. Yet, it 
showed that the Commission was aware of this delivery method. 
The early 1990s was a period of discovery, trial-and-error and constant search for suitable 
solutions. In light of the peaceful revolutions of 1989, the Community found it difficult to 
respond to the constant hints of CEECs at membership in the club. The 1993 Copenhagen 
European Council, however, changed the scenario completely. In the wake of the 
announcement by the member states that 'the associated countries in Central and Eastern 
Europe that so desire shall become members of the European Union' (EC 1993: 5), the 
Community had to come up with a revised mix of policies which could enable the 
accession of the CEECs. The response by the Commission was supported by the German 
EU Presidency and extended changes that had already partly been introduced in the 
Copenhagen package. As Marc Maresceau (2003: 9-10) notes: 'In the current EU 
enlargement scenario preýaccession policies indeed play a much more predominant role 
than in previous enlargements of the European Community'. 
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5 Conclusion 
This chapter traced the evolution of the EU's membership conditionality. It showed that 
the basic conditionality of adhering to democratic principles, human rights and a 
transition to market economies was not only incorporated in the early instruments that 
established relations with CEE, but also in the accession criteria for former applicant 
countries. All initiatives launched in the early 1990s shared this basic set of rules. The 
EU's membership conditionality took on a very similar form to policies for former 
applicants with the remarkable difference that the importance given to administrative 
structures was a new element. However, the Copenhagen criteria do not discriminate 
against the CEECs as one author believes (Inotai 1998: 159), because the Community in 
essence reacted to the particularity of the situation and also carried a number of 
conditions forward from former enlargement processes. In other words, the policies were 
adapted to the functional pressures of an enlargement with post-communist countries. 
The expansion towards CEE was a much more challenging task than EFFA enlargement. 
The socioeconomic circumstances of these applicants were marked by over 40 years of 
Communism, in which economic activities were centrally planned and politics dominated 
by one-party rule. This point can be illustrated for example by the statistical fact that the 
eight CEE candidates that joined the EU in May 2004 together had roughly the same 
GDP as the Netherlands. Such circumstances were likely to hinder a smooth integration 
into the EU. A number of investments are necessary before accession, but without the 
necessary budgetary means applicants were in a difficult situation. The pre-accession 
strategy became the EU's answer to these challenges (Maresceau 2003; Lippert 2000a; 
Sedelmeier and Wallace 2000). A number of elements of the pre-accession strategy 
coexisted until the reforms in 1997: the Europe Agreements, the Phare programme, the 
structured dialogue and the White Paper on the Associated Countries. Since the Phare 
programme was initially developed as part of the G-24 aid initiative it continued to be 
implemented under a very similar set of conditions after the decisions taken in 
Copenhagen. In addition, this early exposure to the role as coordinator of the aid initiative 
for Eastern Europe enabled the Commission to discuss suitable delivery methods and 
working procedures with other donors. 
The demand-driven approach of Phare meant that the programme supported transition and 
accession-oriented projects in most of the years between 1990-1996. The first activity 
under Phare and other aid programmes was the stabilisation of the CEECs' economy 
through the transformation stage and through import programmes to overcome shortages 
in vital products. The projects were closely linked to the countries' ability to develop an 
entrepreneurial class who would be able to run businesses. The second stage was to 
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establish the necessary structures for a market economy. This aimed in particular at 
replacing instructions with regulations that would enable the market to function freely. 
The third stage addressed the consolidation of reforms installing efficient public 
administrations and the mechanics of government. The fourth stage provided substantial 
support for the preparation for accession (CEC 1995b: 8). However, the implementation 
of these stages became a difficult task in particular because the phenomenon of transition 
was still very new to decision-makers in the Community. 
The EU's administrative conditionality was also largely a result of incremental changes. 
As the analysis demonstrated, the incorporation of similar criteria had already been 
introduced with the Commission's Opinions on Greece, Portugal and Spain. It was 
always in the Commission's interest to ensure that candidates are prepared to take on the 
obligations of membership. The main difference of the Eastern enlargement was that the 
Community actively supported not only the transposition of legislation into national law, 
but also the installation of administrative structures that would enable implementation. It 
also stressed on several occasions that it expected the member states' help for preparing 
the candidates for accession, in particular when it came to the implementation of TAIEX. 
In the past the Commission's approach to enlargement has often been criticised for its 
lack of strategy and the incremental changes it involved (Grabbe and Hughes 1998: 120; 
Preston 1997: 176). The question, however, is whether the Commission could make use 
of the 1997 reform to inject a more strategic vision into its reinforced pre-accession 
strategy and enable changes on basis of the pre-accession instruments. This question is 
examined further in Chapter 6 which deals with the introduction of explicit conditionality 
into the EU's approach to enlargement. 
6 
Agenda 2000 and the reform of Phare in 1997 
I Introduction 
This chapter analyses the reform of the prc-acccssion strategy. It questions to what extent 
the 1997 reforms made a difference to the substance and enforceability of the accession 
criteria. In the context of this thesis, such an analysis is important with respect to the 
programming framework under which twinning projects were implemented since 1998. 
The discussion of this aspect of the reform is informed by an insight into the internal and 
external governance stages of decision-making. The chapter analyses the changes of 1997 
in three steps. Firstly, it explores the reform of the prc-accession strategy. Secondly, it 
examines the changes introduced to the Phare programme. Thirdly, it examines how these 
changes were implemented from 1998-2002. The chapter's overarching theme is 
associated with the question of the extent to which the introduction of explicit 
conditionality terms made a significant difference to the accession process. In addition, 
the concluding section of this chapter also provides a comprehensive assessment of the 
models outlined in Chapter 4 and explores the extent to which they can explain the reform 
of the pre-accession strategy. 
Internal governance 
In July 1997, the reinforcement of the pre-accession strategy became an essential part of 
the Commission's Agenda 2000 package. The 1995 Madrid European Council had 
requested the Opinions on the candidates, one of the formal steps between the 
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submissions of a membership application and accession (see Table 23, p. 353). These 
documents were to be complemented with a composite paper that would provide an 
overall approach to the enlargement process; the future financial framework; and impact 
studies on the effects of enlargement on the institutions, regional policy and agricultural 
policies. 
The Commission used this opportunity to initiate a substantial reform of the enlargement 
strategy and reinvented its accession criteria. While drawing together the information 
needed to issue these documents, it also gathered facts on the implementation of the pre- 
accession strategy. The changes that Phare had undergone in the years prior to 1996 were 
well-known to the Commission services (see Chapter 5). However, it was rather unclear 
what direction should be taken regarding its reform. This was further complicated by the 
fact that the financial framework would only be decided in 1999. Thus, the Commission 
could only suggest increased enlargement-related spending from the year 2000 onwards. 
An additional challenge derived from the reorganisation of the Commission's external 
services which resulted in the introduction of the Common Service for External Relations 
(SCR) and later the EuropeAid Cooperation Office 61 (see Neill Nugent and Saurugger 
2002; CEC 2001a: 14-16; 1999g: 25). This process, which was conducted around the 
same time, led to internal problems, since the central idea of the reorganisation was to 
introduce harmonized procedures across all external aid programmes. The officials 
involved in reforming the Phare programme therefore had to defend their plans internally, 
and in particular towards Commission staff involved in the creation of DG Aidco. 
This chapter examines the internal dynamics of decision-making which became important 
during the reform of the pre-accession strategy. It questions to what extent the changes 
were based on the Commission's proposals or whether the member states had an impact 
on the decisions taken in 1997. This puts the internal governance hypotheses that were 
formulated in Chapter 4 to their first test, even though these relate to the twinning 
exercise in particular. It provides the basis for the analysis of the introduction of twinning 
which was an important element of these reforms. 
External governance 
The changes to the external governance regime of the EU deriving from the 1997 reforms 
are of even greater relevance to this thesis. This is largely a result of the fact that the 
programming framework originating from the AN and the NPAAs is crucial for our 
61 Also refeffed to as EuropeAid or Aidco. 
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understanding of twinning. This aspect is particularly important in relation to the external 
governance hypotheses stated in Chapter 4, because it questions which level of coercion 
the reinforced pre-accession strategy entails. In order to assess whether the explicit 
conditionality terms introduced in 1997 allowed for an active leverage of the EU in CEE 
(Vachudova 2001,2004), an in-depth analysis of the reinforcement mechanisms (i. e. 
those built into the programming exercise) is necessary. The chapter addresses this 
question by examining the relevant elements of the enlargement strategy and the Phare 
programme. 62 This analysis is extended to the administrative capacity criterion in Section 
4. Here, we address the question of whether the explicit conditionality terms and the 
instruments introduced in 1997 increased the EU's leverage on the candidates' 
administrative reforms. 
2 The establishment of explicit conditionality 
In 1993, the decision to offer membership to the associates marked a 'quantum leap in the 
EU's relations with Central and Eastern Europe' (Interview 16, CEC official, II 
September 2003). Although the Copenhagen Summit had specified the criteria for 
accession in broader terms, decision-makers needed to create substantive policies in order 
to prepare the applicants for enlargement. In 1994, the EU introduced the first revisions 
of its existing association policy by introducing the pre-accession strategy (Lippert and 
Schneider 1995b; Niemann 1998, see Chapter 5). At the same time, policy-makers drew 
on previous enlargement rounds. However, fundamental changes to the EU's policy 
towards applicant countries were only introduced by 1997 with the launch of the 
reinforced pre-accession strategy in Agenda 2000 (CEC 1997b; Baun 2000: 77-114; 
Grabbe and Hughes 1998: 55-70; Steffens 2003; Vachudova 2004: 125-38). These 
reforms not only marked the start of the accession proceSS63 , but also introduced new 
instruments to govern through enlargement (Friis and Murphy 1999; Grabbe 2001). 
62 This analysis is complemented by Appendix 2 which presents data on the Phare programme and 
other sources of assistance. In addition, Annexes 5,8-11 reproduce key documents relating to 
these reforms. 
63 The process before the beginning of the accession negotiations (until 1997) is usually referred to 
as pre-accession process, whereas after the beginning of the negotiations most scholars refer to the 
taccession process'. 
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2.1 The objectives of the 1997 reform 
The preparation of the Opinions supplemented the reform of the pre-accession strategy, 
since they 'were largely technical assessments of the capacity of each applicant to 
become an EU member' (Baun 2000: 78). This emphasis on the ability of the candidates 
to meet the obligations of membership is a recurrent theme in the enlargement process. It 
is an important element of the accession criteria as it demands from the candidates the 
need to meet this condition in relation to their political, economic and administrative 
systems (Vachudova 2004: 113-17; K. E. Smith 2003; Dimitrova 2002). The officials who 
started working on the reform of the enlargement strategy from the beginning of 1996 
therefore sought to strengthen the link between these criteria and the instruments 
employed during the accession process. 
The aim was to streamline the elements of the pre-accession strategy and refocus them 
onto accession. As one official clarified, 'the underlying desire was to address the issue of 
accession and to introduce new procedures such as twinning in order to rely less on 
consultants' (Intwl 8, CEC Official, II September 2002). As a result, the Commission 
throughout 1996 to 1997 remained committed to four basic themes of reform: 
clarifying the accession criteria; 
strengthening the link between the accession criteria and the pre-accession 
instruments; 
(iii) streamlining and refocusing all instruments onto accession; 
(iv) ensuring the effectiveness of all accession instruments. 
Accordingly, Sipke Brouwer, Director of Directorate B- Relations with Central 
European countries in DGIA (see Figure 7), worked with a number of officials on a 
proposal regarding the Phare programme and the structured dialogue. However, when the 
plan was presented to Deputy Director General Frangois Lamoureux, he rejected it as 'not 
ambitious enough' (IntwI8, CEC Official, II September 2002, Brussels). Subsequently, 
the internal process within DGIA became driven by the hierarchical nature of the 
institution. The Deputy Director General removed Sipke Brouwer from his position and 
replaced him with Catherine Day, who had been Director of Directorate D- Relations 
64 with other European countries. She was close to the issues at stake, because of her 
responsibility for the Western Balkans which were recipients of the Phare programme. In 
64 Ibis changes were confirmed in various interviews with CEC officials (IntwI7, IntwI8 and 
Intw32, CEC officials; September 2002 and March 2003). They can also be confirmed on basis of 
the relevant interinstitutional directories of the European Union (European Union 1998: 193; 1997: 
181). 
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addition, she was also responsible for relations with the applicant countries Turkey, Malta 
and Cyprus. Her new duties enabled her to draw information from a number of sources 
and extend her knowledge in this way. 
A group of ten officials started to work closely on the reform proposals. In the run-up to 
the 1997 Luxembourg European Council, these officials prepared a document labelled 
Reinforcing the pre-accession strateSy, which was later presented as Volume 11 of 
Agenda 2000. In order to draw together the necessary information, these officials 
gathered material from the Delegations of the Commission in the applicant countries; 
internal assessments produced by the task managers working with Phare; and documents 
on the association process. Catherine Day also requested a comprehensive interim 
evaluation of the Phare programme from the evaluation unit in DG IA. The intention was 
to base the reforms on as much evidence as possible. Since the member states had 
requested the Opinions on the applicant countries, a great deal of detailed information 
also became available. 
Frangois Lamoureux and Catherine Day came to an agreement with the Directors and 
Heads of Units of DGIA that the best way to address the issue of accession would be a 
more open approach regarding the issue of conditionality (Intw6O and 75, CEC officials, 
November 2003). The aim was to clarify the conditionality terms enshrined in the pre- 
accession strategy. This would enable the Commission to confront the applicants if they 
did not meet the conditions. The screening process which started parallel to the reforms 
would provide arnple opportunity to investigate such circumstances. This was not 
completely new to former enlargement processes. However, it was decided that this 
principle should be implemented across all accession instruments. Before this approach 
was only taken in the accession negotiations (Intwl 8 and 60, CEC officials). 
In addition, the particularities of the proposals would be worked out internally. Firstly, 
the Commissioner and his cabinet were also to be informed and involved in the process 
on a regular basis. Secondly, the reform would require extensive inter-service 
consultation with the remaining DGs. Finally, the member states would only be involved 
where necessary and preferably after the proposals had been worked out internally within 
DGIA. Several interviewees who were involved in these reforms stressed the heavy 
involvement of the hierarchy. As one official noted, 'there was a very intense work 
programme to try to get this moving. It needed the direct input of the hierarchy because 
we did not have time to come up with a proposal and go back ... there was an element of 
that, but it was much more immediate and hands-on in order to find solutions quickly. 
There was no time to go through our normal procedures' (Intw32, CEC official, 10 March 
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2003). This sequence of events is in line with the RCI approach to decision-making 
outlined in Chapter 3 and 4. It suggests that the Commission prepared a detailed proposal 
internally and then informed the member states. 
2.2 Specifying the accession criteria 
A number of changes regarding the pre-accession strategy and its instruments were 
undertaken. This included the preparation of the Opinions on the basis of clearly defined 
indicators for each of the accession criteria; the introduction of the AN and NPAAs; the 
reform of the Phare programme; the abolishment of the structural dialogue and the 
refocusing of the Europe Agreements onto accession. These reform steps are discussed 
with respect to the dynamics unfolding during their introduction and implementation. The 
following sections address the steps taken during 1996-1998 within the scope of the 
theoretical considerations outlined in Chapter 3 and 4. Thus, the implementation of these 
instruments is discussed in light of the discussion surrounding the different types of 
external governance outlined above. The introduction of the new instruments is 
illuminated in light of the theoretical models outlined for the internal governance stage of 
decision-making. 
The Avis and the Regular Reports 
At the beginning of 1996, the reform group within DG IA embraced the idea to regularly 
publish reports on the progress of the candidates. This suggestion was incorporated into 
Agenda 2000 where the Commission stated that it 'will report periodically to the Council 
on the progress achieved by the applicant countries in the programme for adopting the 
acquis' (CEC 1997b: 5). Instead of introducing internal documents to report to the 
Council, it suggested publishing public documents which would enable a kind of 'beauty 
contest between the candidates' (Intw 15, CEC official, 16 September 2002). 
This suggestion was also inspired by discussions with academics which pointed to 
international organizations such as the IMF or the World Bank. It was clear to the 
Commission that in comparison to these institutions its own approach to conditionality 
was rather ambiguous. Whereas the Bretton Woods institutions included clear references 
to concrete conditions in their agreements with beneficiaries, the Commission's aid 
programmes to the candidates were rather vague on this issue. One official stated, 'we 
were aware that our approach to conditionality had to be revised significantly if we 
wanted to pave the way to accession and have a similar impact than the IMF or the World 
Bank' (Intw32, CEC official, 10 March 2003). There was therefore a clear element of 
lesson-drawing in these reform proposals. 
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The Commission used Volume I in Agenda 2000 - the composite paper - to further 
specify the criteria for accession. The document stated in detail which indicators had been 
used during the preparation of the Avis". It also gave a clear idea which information had 
been used when drawing up the Opinions on the candidates. This included answers to a 
questionnaire circulated among the applicants; bilateral meetings; European Parliament 
reports and resolutions as well as the work of various international organisations, non- 
governmental organisations and other bodies. The Commission further clarified that the 
political criteria for accession were, on the one hand, assessed on the basis of the 
existence of formal institutions guaranteeing democracy and the rule of law. On the other 
hand, they also included an assessment of 'how various rights and freedoms, such as the 
freedom of expression, are exercised, through, for example, the role of political parties, 
non-governmental organisations and the media' (CEC 1997a: 50). 
TheAvis also introduced an extensive catalogue of indicators for both economic criteria, 
the existence of a functioning market economy and the capacity to withstand competitive 
pressure and market forces within the Union (CEC 1997a: 53-56). The Commission 
stated that none of the applicants ftilly met the economic criteria at the time of the 
publication of Agenda 2000, but that five of them could be considered a functioning 
market economy (the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia). The 
second criterion was in view of the composite paper not met by any of the applicants, but 
could be achieved in the medium-term in Hungary and Poland, the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia and Slovenia. The latter three countries, however, would have to strengthen their 
efforts and avoid policy reversals. The report also acknowledged that substantial external 
support, both from the Phare programme and IFIs, would be needed to support applicants' 
domestic policy efforts. 
In addition, the ability of the applicants to meet the obligations of membership was 
assessed in three parts. Firstly, the report focused on the obligations undertaken by the 
commitment to political, economic and monetary union. While it expressed optimism 
regarding the candidates' potential effect on CFSP, it also stressed that none of them 
would be able to take part in EMU upon accession. The Commission therefore 
cmphasised that they would need to make further progress in structural reforms in order 
to achieve macroeconomic stability in the long run. As concrete steps, the report 
recommended central bank independence, coordination of economic policies, and 
adherence to the relevant provisions of the Stability and Growth Pact. 
65 Equivalent to the Opinions. 
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Secondly, the Commission analysed the record of the candidates in adopting the acquis. It 
reemphasized the fact that it would be considerably more difficult for the applicants to 
comply with the whole body of the acquis since 'new obligations have arisen regarding 
the Single Market, CFSP, EMU, and justice and home affairs' and because the 'European 
Council has ruled out any idea of a partial adoption of the acquis' (CEC 1997a: 57-58). 
The report referred directly to the Europe Agreements and the White Paper on the Single 
Market as a means to assess the applicant countries' record in implementing existing 
commitments. The list of the acquis that should be adopted by the applicants before 
accession was therefore separated into three parts: 
a) the obligations set out in the Europe Agreement, particularly those relating to the 
right of establishment, national treatment, free circulation of goods, intellectual 
property and public procurement; 
b) the progress in transposition and effective implementation of the measures set out 
in the White Paper, particularly key Single Market directives in areas such as 
taxation, public procurement and banking; 
c) the progressive transposition and implementation of the other parts of the acquis 
(CEC 1997a: 58-59). 
Thirdly, the report addressed the administrative and judicial capacity to apply the acquis 
communautaire. It clarified that adequate administrative structures are of crucial 
importance for the implementation and enforcement of the acquis, but also for the 
efficient use of financial support in particular from the Structural Funds. On this point 
however, the report had to remain rather vague, because it was practically impossible for 
the Commission to actually name the institutions needed to implement the acquis. In 
addition, each of the Opinions provided a short assessment for all candidates on basis of 
these three categories, thereby indicating the needs of each of these countries. In this 
context, the Commission (I 997a: 6 1) emphasised that '3 0% of Phare's resources could be 
used to finance exchanges and the long-term detachment of experts from the member 
states to the applicant countries in the framework of twinning programmes'. 
The 1997 Luxembourg European Council received the Opinions and the Commission's 
recommendations favourably and went along with the suggestion to open negotiations 
with Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Estonia, and Slovenia 66 . As a result, 
the accession process was officially launched in March 1998. This decision was not 
greeted favoumbly by all member states. A number of countries, Italy, Denmark, and 
66 Malta had temporarily withdrawn its application beforehand after the election of a new 
government. 
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Sweden as well as several MEN in the UK wanted to avoid the 'destabilizing effects of 
excluding some of them' (K. E. Smith 2003: 126). However, the issue had been discussed 
for a period of five months in the Council (EC 1997b: 3). This allowed for enough time to 
reassure the member states that were opposed to a division of the applicants into two 
groups. In addition, the Commission could ease the tension by proposing to introduce a 
catch-up facility into Phare which would enable the remaining four CEE applicants 
(Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria and Romania) to draw level with the frontrunners. The 
European Council also agreed with the proposal to introduce periodical reports. These 
were later referred to as Regular Reports. 
The clarification of the accession criteria in Agenda 2000 was the most comprehensive 
list of indicators ever published in the context of enlargement. It offered a clear indication 
for the applicants of what the Commission expected to see in order to give a positive 
recommendation of their membership application. In terms of the internal governance that 
took place during the reform of the pre-accession strategy, it is important to stress that the 
Commission was pressing for these changes and the member states were largely willing 
to approve them. At the same time, the reform was inspired by the direct comparison to 
other aid agencies' experiences with the use of conditionality in the early 1990s as well as 
former enlargement processes. It was clear to the officials working on the reform that the 
candidates would only be able to comply with the conditions if they could be clearly 
explained beforehand. 
The approach taken within theAvis and the Regular Reports is in line with the findings of 
the external incentive model which is outlined in Chapters 2 and 3 (see Schimmelfennig 
et al. 2003a; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004,2005c). The clarity of conditions 
enhances their credibility and increases the likeliness of compliance by the beneficiary. 
At the same time, the clarification of accession criteria partially answers the concerns 
voiced by Grabbe (2002: 249) regarding the ambiguity of the accession criteria. However, 
the largest deficit remained the failure to define the conditions regarding the 
administrative capacity of the candidates to implement the acquis. Although, the 
Commission mentioned administrative structures explicitly, it did not specify in great 
detail their exact meaning. This is because members of the EU remain sovereign states 
and can therefore enjoy considerable freedom during the implementation of Community 
legislation. 
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The accession negotiations 
The opening of the accession negotiations, however, created new possibilities for the EU 
to influence the developments in candidate countries on a wide range of issues. As one 
official noted, 'you only had real leverage with the accession negotiations, you don't buy 
yourself influence in the candidate countries with peanuts' (Intwl 8, CEC official, II 
September 2002). This statement in combination with similar remarks by numerous 
interviewees is an indication of the fact that the accession negotiations are considered the 
real bargaining chip in the enlargement process. However, in reality the negotiations are 
also restricted by the nature of the acquis. In other words, accession negotiations are a 
particularly useful instrument where the acquis communautaire is specific or, as some 
authors have interpreted it, the density of EU rules becomes an important factor (Jacoby 
and Cernoch 2002: 320; Jacoby 2004: 34-36). As a result, the negotiation teams can 
coerce candidates into complying with specific rules. However, they have little room for 
manoeuvre when the acquis is ambiguous. In such cases, EU diplomats have often chosen 
to close a negotiation chapter provisionally and then to oblige a candidate to initiate a 
twinning project in order to create the necessary administrative structures in that policy 
area. 
This was, for example, the case in Hungary where during the negotiations on Chapter 13: 
Employment and Social Policy concern was voiced about the provisions made for the 
autonomous social dialogue between trade unions and employer organisations. The 
Commission had clarified in its Regular Report that 'the government should make 
additional efforts to ensure that real dialogue is taking place' (CEC 2000a: 19). Since 
most other issues in the negotiation chapter were addressed by the reforms in Hungary, 
the Commission official present on the day suggested to the Council Presidency to 
resolve the problem with a twinning programme. This was then proposed to the 
Hungarian chief negotiator during a coffee break and the chapter could be closed 
provisionally (Intw34 and 35, CEC officials, 14 March 2003). As a result, twinning 
project HUOI-SO-01: Social Dialogue was initiated in order to address the issue of 
organising sectoral committees between the social partners. This was an immense task to 
achieve, since the Hungarian trade unions were fragmented into over 80 organisations 
(Intw53, PAA, 27 June 2003). This connection between the programming of twinning 
projects and the negotiations was not an unusual case. Indeed, the Commission's DGs 
started to employ the twinning exercise in this manner immediately after its establishment 
as an accession instrument under the Phare Regulation No 3906/89. The programme was 
generally used to complement other instruments based on its unique feature of long-term 
cooperation (see Chapter 8). 
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In addition, the Commission began to describe enlargement as a merit-based process, in 
which 'an applicant's place in the membership queue has corresponded to the progress it 
has made toward fulfilling the EU's requirements' (Vachudova 2004: 112). In order to 
remain consistent on this aspect of the process, it employed its instruments to signal 
shortcomings and progress. In this context, the Avis, the Regular Reports and the 
accession negotiations introduced useful elements of gate-keeping, benchmarking and 
monitoring into the accession process (Grabbe 2001: 1029-24). The opening of accession 
negotiations and therefore the granting of candidate status to only six of the applicants 
was a prime example of the gate-keeping role such decisions could play. The Regular 
Reports clearly introduced elements of benchmarking and monitoring into the process. 
They provided the basis for often controversial decisions such as the opening of accession 
negotiations and the granting of membership for a particular applicant state. In this way, 
the accession instruments become elements of the EU's external governance which could 
serve to redefine the boundaries of integration (Friis and Murphy 1999,2000a; M. Smith 
1996,2000; Lavenex 2004). 
2.3 Establishing a programming framework 
The first theme of the reform, the clarification of the accession criteria, had already been 
met in Agenda 2000. The Regular Reports were a useful instrument for the accession 
process, but as one official noted, 'the relationship between the reports and our financial 
assistance was quite abstract' (Intw24, CEC official, 19 September 2002). Accordingly, 
the Commission created a programming framework that would draw the financial 
instruments closer to the Regular Reports and the accession criteria. 
The APs and NPAAs 
This programming framework consisted of the APS67 and the NPAAS68. The Commission 
considered the APs 'a key feature of the reinforced pre-accession strategy' (CEC 1997b: 
9). These documents would provide a single framework for the mobifisation of all 
assistance to the applicants in CEE. In Agenda 2000, the Commission (1997b: 9) clarified 
that the AN involved the following: 
- precise commitments on the part of the applicant country, relating in particular to 
democracy, macro-economic stabilisation, nuclear safety and a national 
programme for adopting the Community acquis within a precise timetable, 
focusing on the priority areas identified in each opinion; 
67 Accession Partnerships. 
68 National Programmes for the Adoption of the, 4cquis. 
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- mobilisation of all the resources available to the Community for preparing the 
applicant countries for accession. 
The Commission proposed to draft these documents on the basis of the Opinions and later 
the Regular Reports, which would highlight the deficiencies in adopting the Community 
acquis. The APs were related closely to the issue of adequate administrative structures. 
Their introduction was the first step for the Commission to make more definitive 
arrangements for its administrative conditionality and investment priorities alike. The 
provision of financial assistance was explicitly made 'conditional on achieving these 
objectives and on progress made' (CEC 1997b: 9). In addition, each of the APs carried a 
conditionality clause that further specified that Community assistance is conditional on 
respect by the applicant country to its commitments under the Europe Agreements, 
further steps towards satisfying the Copenhagen criteria and in particular progress in 
meeting the specific priorities of the Accession Partnership (see Annex 08-11, clause 6 in 
each of the APs). 
The candidates were also asked to respond to the AN with a detailed programme for the 
adoption of the Community acquis which would be prepared by each applicant country in 
partnership with the Commission. The NPAAs as mentioned above would indicate 
precise timetables, focusing on the priority areas identified in each opinion and outlining 
all budgetary allocations from the Commission, the national budget and international 
organizations. In reality, these programmes consisted of up to 500 pages when they 
arrived in Brussels. They became an interesting exercise for the applicants and helped 
them to identify the budgetary implications of foreign assistance (Intw25, Hungarian 
official, 23 September 2002). Since 1998, each of the projects financed by the 
Commission had to make a reference to at least one objective outlined in the relevant AP 
and NPAA. This enabled the Commission to exercise significant influence on the types of 
projects financed by the Community budget. It increased the EU' s leverage on the policy 
areas covered during the implementation of the reinforced pre-accession strategy (see 
also Vachudova 2001: 5; 2004; Jacoby 2001 b: 189; 2004: 198). 
These documents, the APs and NPAAs, were a direct result of the discussions between 
Catherine Day and the group of officials working on the proposals. In general the member 
states received favourably the concept of the APs, but insisted on adopting them by 
unanimity in the Council. 69 This ran counter to the Commission's plans which was in 
favour of adopting them by Commission Decision. The European Council in Luxembourg 
69 Ibis was then formally decided in Council Regulation 622/98 of 20 March 1998 (EC 1998). 
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firther stressed that 'when an element essential to the continuation of pre-accession 
assistance is missing in an applicant State, the Council will take appropriate measures' 
(EC 1997a: 3). In practice, only minor differences are entered into the proposals of the 
Commission. These documents are also distributed to the candidates before their approval 
by the Council in order to accelerate implementation. As a result, most scholars treat 
them as Commission documents (Vachudova 2004: 129-30; Grabbe 2001: 1026). Their 
introduction was largely driven by the functional concerns deriving from the 
implementation of Phare in the 1990s. The adoption by the Council added legitimacy to 
the programming of pre-accession assistance (Intw5 and 13, German and CEC official, 
2002). 
In addition, the Commission understood that it would have to communicate these changes 
to the applicants. The new programming framework for the Community's assistance was 
in stark contrast to the demand-driven approach under which Phare had been previously 
implemented. Thus, in meetings with the candidates, Commission officials started to refer 
to the AN as needs assessment, thereby stressing that the assistance was responding to 
the candidates' needs before membership (see e. g. CEC 1997f, 1998i). The conditionality 
clause has hardly been exercised and as a general rule, the disbursement of all aid was 
suspended rather than individual projects. This was for example the case in 2001, when 
'the EU suspended its aid to Slovakia because of irregularities in its disbursement within 
the country' (Nicolaides 2003: 43). It was symptomatic that the EU would suspend aid 
because of its concerns regarding the financial management of an applicant country. This 
was the main cause for the suspension of funds in the applicant countries. As a result, the 
EU's financial assistance was perceived as a means to introduce the necessary reforms 
rather than as a reward for compliance with EU rules. 
The APs and NPAAs had a considerable impact on the explicitness of the EU's 
conditionality. At the same time, however, these documents were also designed as a 
programming framework for the pre-accession funds. In reality, the priorities were 
worked out between the Commission and the candidates, the Council only became more 
involved in areas that were monitored by the association sub-committees. The 
Commission (1998b: 1) also stressed in relation to the AN that 'whilst these are not an 
agreement between the two parties because they are based on the Copenhagen criteria and 
Community acquis, the Commission has aimed to build a broad consensus on the 
priorities'. In practice, it largely depended on the Commission's Delegations to what 
extent the partner countries would be involved in the formulation of priorities. 
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The process of formulating the APs is very similar to the definition of common guidelines 
that takes place in policy areas when the OMC is employed as a method of enhanced 
cooperation (Mosher 2000: 6; Mosher and Trubek 2003: 65-67). The main difference in 
the enlargement process is, however, that the EU enjoys an asymmetric relationship with 
the candidate countries. The insider-outsider dichotomy whereby these documents are 
formulated limits the candidates' influence during the process. However, a basic 
requirement for enhanced cooperation, the definition of short-term and medium-terin 
goals, is met with the priorities set in the APs. 
In addition, Grabbe and Hughes (1998: 65) refer to these new programming arrangements 
as financial conditionality while emphasizing that 'is not obvious why failure to meet 
objectives should mean a withdrawal of funds'. However, this problem did not persist, 
since the AN and the NPAAs developed into useful instruments for the programming of 
Phare, ISPA and SAPARD rather than a reinforcement mechanism. The approach of the 
Commission was more in line with the logic of obligated policy transfer based on 
enhanced cooperation rather than coercive policy transfer (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000: 9; 
Stone 2004: 554; Haahr 2004: 6; Wincott 2003: 539). The candidates were still able to 
choose which model of implementation they would employ across the different policy 
fields of the acquis. However, the APs obligated them to concentrate on certain areas of 
the acquis communautaire and encouraged them to learn from the member states. 
The Europe Agreements and the structured dialogue 
The next step in the reforms of 1997 was to address already existing elements of the pre- 
accession strategy and refocus them onto accession. The Europe Agreements were 
discussed quite early in the process. The idea that emerged was to use these agreements to 
'monitor the candidates' progress in getting closer to EU regulations' (Intw28, CEC 
official, 24 September 2002). Since the agreements lead to integration in a large number 
of fields as diverse as trade, competition, approximation of laws, and standardization, 
their employment as monitoring devices promised to become a useful device for both the 
Commission and the member states. This also prevented conflicts regarding the approval 
of the APs, since member states are present during the sub-committee meetings and thus 
decide on what gets reported to the Joint Association Meeting with a particular candidate. 
As a result, the priorities deriving from the monitoring conducted by the association sub- 
committees did offer little in the way of constructive discussion during the approval of 
the respective AN (Intw77, CEC official, 26 February 2004). 
77he Commission also found that the structured dialogue no longer appeared appropriate, 
since the opening of the accession negotiations, the Europe Agreements and the AN 
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enabled enough contact between the candidates and the Union (CEC 1997a: 72). 
However, in order to preserve at least one multilateral forum for broader discussions, the 
European Conference was introduced. This forum would meet once a year at the level of 
Heads of State and the President of the Commission. It was mainly an effort to coordinate 
issues relating to the CFSP and JHA. The first of these conferences was hosted by the 
British government in March 1998. Turkey did not participate in the conference because 
it objected to not having been granted candidate status by the Luxembourg European 
Council in December 1997. 
Date Event, 
31 March 1996 Opening of the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) in Turin. 
June 1997 Evaluation Unit/DGIA publishes Interim Evaluation Report 
15 July 1997 Commission issues its comprehensive Communication Agenda 2000 
including theAvis on the applicant countries 
12-13 December 1997 Luxembourg European Council decides to open negotiations with 
Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Estonia, and Slovenia 
24-25 March 1999 Berlin European Council agrees financial framework for 2000-2006 
10 June 1999 G8 summit in Cologne agrees on "Stability Pact for South Eastern 
Europe'. 
10- 11 December 1999 Helsinki European Council decides to open accession negotiations with 
the remaining applicant countries. Turkey is granted the "official 
candidate status" but is asked to resolve certain problems before 
accession negotiations can start. 
15 February 2000 Opening of the accession negotiations with Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Bulgaria, Romania, and Malta. 
27 October 2000 Phare 2000 Review: Strengthening Preparationsfor Membership - 
Communicationfrom Mr Verheugen is published 
07-11 December 2000 European Council Nice, France. The Heads of State and Government 
of the 15 member states conclude the Intergovernmental Conference on 
institutional reform. The member states adopt the road map proposed 
by the Commission. 
Source: Author's compilation. 
Table 13: Timeline on the reform of the pre-accession strategy and related events 
3 Reforming the Phare programme 
The introduction of the APs and the NPAAs were considered an important measure 
towards a more structured programming of the financial instruments. However, in order 
to ensure the effectiveness of pre-accession aid, the Commission also decided to initiate a 
number of changes to the implementation structures of the Phare programme. The 
officials involved in the reform of Phare benefited largely from the interim evaluation that 
Catherine Day had requested from the Evaluation Unit within DGIA (see Figure 7, p. 
_ 
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15 1). This provided the necessary information to identify the problems enshrined in the 
operational management and the overall development of the programme. 
3.1 Evaluating the effectiveness of Phare 
The interim evaluation was published in June 1997. Its findings had an immense impact 
on the reform of Phare. This has also been acknowledged by several interviewees 
(IntwI7,18,28,32 and 60, CEC officials) and in the 1997 Phare Annual Report (CEC 
1999g: 12-14). The main message emerging from the interim evaluation was the 
following: 
the Phare Programme has been appreciable; it has adapted in response to the perceived 
needs of the partner countries and the requirements of the EU institutions; the 
requirements of accession have dictated further adaptation of the Programme; 
however, there is an overemphasis on administration at the expense of performance 
which needs to be addressed (CEC 1997h: 7-8) 
This concern regarding the administrative burden which was incorporated in early Phare 
programmes corresponds to the ownership debate outlined in Chapter 3. It also reflects 
criticisms voiced by scholars working on the EU's development assistance (Dearden 
2005: 12; Santiso 2002: 402; Holden 2003: 349-50). The operational management 
governing Phare at this point had developed into a tight net of checks and controls by task 
managers in Brussels, literally every action during the implementation of the programme 
required a signature of an official in the Commission's Headquarters or Delegations. 
The programme was driven by obligations to certain means rather than results (Intw6O, 
Claude Cornuau, 20 March 2003). Consequently, the task managers focused on signing 
against the allocation of means rather than checking results. There was therefore a 
tendency to disburse aid quickly if the budgetary controls were met in order to respond to 
the problem of low rates of allocated funds. Commission officials often referred to this 
phenomenon as "disbursement bias". thereby stressing the sole focus of task managers to 
satisfy statistics instead of ensuring the performance of the programme (Intw28 and 72, 
CEC officials). 
Although the evaluators listed a number of strengths, their assessment was alarming. 
Firstly, there was a serious problem with the high backlog of budgetary commitments that 
led to questions concerning the effects of the programme on the candidates' absorption 
capacity. Second, the lack of focus and management problems deriving from the PMUs 
marginalised the candidate countries' view of the programme. In the eyes of the 
evaluators this problem was amplified by the 'lack of commitment devices in Phare 
programmes themselves, through financial, political and other forms of conditionality' 
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(CEC 1997h: 64). Third, the programme had created too many small projects. The 
demand-driven nature of the programme was considered 'both a strength and a weakness; 
it may have enhanced ownership by the partners but it has also led to fragmentation of 
effort and dispersion of resources with adverse effects on programme performance' (CEC 
1997h: 13). The evaluators concluded that this led to a Shoppin&USt approach which 
created a scattering of Phare resources over a variety of topics. 
Fourth, the administration of the programme was overly complex, mainly because of the 
five layers of programming documentation required by the Commission. In this context, 
the report stressed that 'political and budgetary spending pressures have favoured a strong 
emphasis on financial and procedural control in Phare rather than substantive design and 
performance' (CEC 1997h: 64). Fifth, the Commission's supervision and control system 
was unclear. There was a high potential of the duplication of controls between 
Commission HQ in Brussels and its Delegations. The report also explicitly emphasised 
that 'the impact of technical assistance on local attitudes and culture was greatest where it 
was offered on a long-term basis and especially in twinning arrangements' (CEC 1997h: 
64, emphasis added). 
3.2 The accession-driven focus within Phare 
The findings of the Evaluation Unit were an important foundation for the reform group 
within DG IA. They provided adequate input which could adequately define the problems 
that had to be addressed during the reform of Phare. It was concluded that the 
programming of Phare had to be streamlined in order to ensure the substance and 
performance of the programme. In addition, it became clear that the size and the type of 
projects financed under Phare was the cause of many problems. The operational 
management of the programme also had to be reconsidered. 
The findings of the evaluators enabled the officials to defend their proposals internally as 
far as they were based on the evidence provided in the report. They started to draft a 
Communication on the New Phare Orientations programme for Pre-Accession 
Assistance. The document underlined the need to abolish the demand-driven nature of the 
programme, because it led to the fragmentation of the programme in the candidate 
countries. In this contextý one Commission official stressed: 'Lamoureux felt that we had 
to communicate a clear break with the past in order to achieve a more substantial reform. 
I was asked on several occasions by people from other units why we would come into the 
open with such controversial information' (Interview 17, CEC official, II September 
2003). 
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Since the reform of Phare coincided with the reorganisation of the Commission's external 
services, there was ample opportunity for the officials to test the validity of their findings. 
In 1997, the Commission prepared to introduce the SCR which was to be replaced with 
the EuropeAid Cooperation Office (AIDCO). This change was based on a number of 
ideas which lie outside the scope of this thesis. It is important, however, to recognize that 
one of the main concepts of this reform was to harmonize the implementation procedures 
of all external aid programmes. This entailed plans to devolve project management to the 
Commission Delegations. However, EuropeAid was designed as a single department 
which would be in charge of the entire project cycle from identification to evaluation 
(CEC 2001a: 13-18; Neill Nugent and Saurugger 2002). The officials involved in 
reforming Phare had to coordinate their efforts with the arrangements made for the SCR. 
There was much heated debate over the smallest of procedures and issues regarding 
bureaucratic responsibility for the respective initiatives. This process was already 
challenging regarding the whole arrangement for the programming of Phare. However, it 
became an even more complex issue during the introduction of procedures for the 
twinning exercise (see Chapter 7). 
Phare programme priorities 
The Commission published its revised Guidelinesfor Phare Programme Implementation 
in Candidate Countries, 1998-9. This document outlined in detail the plans made for the 
implementation of Phare during this period. It stressed that the Phare programme would 
be transformed into an accession-driven programme. As a result, it would focus on a 
'limited number of priorities in line with the Copenhagen criteria' (CEC 1998d: 3)70. This 
was to be achieved by the setting of priorities in the AN and the NPAAs. The guidelines 
clarified that these documents would be only employed during the programming of 
national envelopes and cross-border programmes only. Multi-beneficiary programmes 
would be reduced in number in order to rationalize their use. In addition, changes to the 
operational management of Phare should improve the speed, efficiency, effectiveness and 
transparency of its activities (see Table 14, p. 168). 
The guidelines also emphasised that the accession-driven focus would be based on two 
main priorities within Phare: institution-building (30yo) and investment (70YQ. 
Institution-building was defined as 'helping the candidate countries to develop the 
structures, human resources and management skills needed to put in place economic, 
70 The original version of the Guidelines were published before Agenda 2000 was issued. 
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social and regulatory systems equal to the task required for approximation of laws and 
implementation of the acquis communautaire'(CEC 1998d: 5). In its original proposal, 
the group of officials working with Sipke Brouwer had given less emphasis to institution- 
building. Their purpose in operational terms was to adapt the tendering procedures of 
Phare to the respective areas of the acquis. Thus, projects in economic and social 
cohesion were to be implemented with similar procedures to the Structural Funds. As one 
of the official involved in the reforms stated, 'we were looking at the possibility of 
implementing Phare in the same way as the instruments of the European Union' (Intw32, 
CEC official, 10 March 2003). 
This element was retained in the proposals put forward in Agenda 2000, partly with the 
introduction of two new instruments, ISPA 71 and SAPARD72 (see below), and on the 
other hand with a move towards the Structural Funds within Phare. However, the 
introduction of a separate financial portfolio for institution-building gave more 
importance to this cross-sectoral issue and the creation of new instruments such as the 
twinning exercise. It was decided that an indicative allocation of 30 percent of Phare 
funds would be appropriate for institution-building given the fact that investment support 
usually involved higher costs. In order to facilitate the introduction and implementation of 
the twinning exercise, the Commission asked the member states to appoint a NCP73 for 
coordination on institution-building (see Chapter 7). A forum of NCPs would then also 
discuss issues relating to all the measures taken in regard to institution-building. 
Investment support was defined as 'progress in addressing sectoral, regional and 
structural imbalances in the economies of the candidate countries' (CEC 1998d: 5). The 
Commission in particular emphasised the need for further investment in areas such as 
competition, environment, energy, transport safety, social and labour legislation, 
veterinary and phytosanitary norms, legislation for industrial products, consumer 
protection, control of production processes and fair trading, and JHA (CEC 1998d: 9). In 
order to achieve maximum impact, it also initiated a Memorandum of Understanding with 
the EBRD and the World Bank in these investment areas. This was because Phare, as a 
grant programme, had only limited resources for investment. The guidelines designated 
70 percent of the Phare budget for investment-related projects. 
71 Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession. 
72 Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development. 
73 National Contact Point. 
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The creation of ISPA and SAPARD 
In Agenda 2000, the Commission also suggested the introduction of an instrument for 
agricultural support. It proposed that the aid paid out through this programme would 
amount to ECU 500 million per year. The programme, later referred to as SAPARD, 
matches the procedure of the European Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF). It 
therefore had a strong institution-building element, since it led to the creation of fully 
decentralised implementation systems in the candidate countries. The SAPARD agencies 
which were all subject to a strict accreditation process resemble the paying agencies in 
the member states. The Commission ensured the proper accreditation of these institutions 
in the candidate countries and subsequently only got involved on the basis of ex-post 
controls (CEC 2001c: 15-18; 1997b: 6-8). However, there were significant delays in 
getting these structures on the ground and implementation could not take place before 
accreditation by the Commission. 
Another instrument was proposed for structural assistance at regional level. This 
instrument would match the Cohesion Fund and familiarize applicant countries with the 
objectives and procedures of the Structural Funds. The Commission proposed to allocate 
ECU I billion per year to the ISPA initiative in order to 'bring the applicant countries' 
infrastructures up to Community standards' (CEC 1997b: 7). This assistance scheme 
would allocate funds in the areas of transport and environment. In order to implement 
ISPA, the candidates had to provide the same documentation as the member states for the 
implementation of the Cohesion Fund. This included the National Development Plan and 
national ISPA Strategies for Environment and Transport (CEC 200 1 c: 12). 
ISPA and SAPARD would both be programmed through the AN and NPAAs. However, 
the creation of these instruments depended on an agreement regarding the financial 
framework for the period 2000-2006. In spring of 1999, the Berlin European Council 
agreed to allocate 63.120 million annually to the three pre-accession instruments: E1.560 
to Phare, C520 million to SAPARD, and 61.040 million to ISPA. Following this decision, 
the Council agreed relatively quickly on the three Council Regulations relating to ISPA, 
SAPARD and Coordinating Aid to the Applicant Countries in the Framework of the Pre- 
Accession Strategy (EC 1999a, 1999b, 1999c). There were some objections between the 
member states that implementation would be obstructed by overlaps between the three 
instruments. However, as one official noted, 'we were surprised how well these 
programmes were coordinated and how little conflict occurs during implementation' 
(Intw5, German official, 14 March 2002). The objections against infrastructure support 
had in time been eradicated by the perceived need of the candidate countries to develop 
suitable structures for the implementation of the Structural Funds. 
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As a result, three pre-accession instruments were implemented from 2000 onwards. 
However, the most significant decision was that ISPA would be implemented by DG 
Regional Policy and SAPARD by DG Agriculture. The Commission felt that it was more 
suitable to involve more of its departments in order to lift the administrative burden for 
DGIA. Further pre-accession funds were introduced to provide support for Cyprus and 
Malta, first under MEDA74 and from 2000 onwards under a separate Council Regulation 
(EC) No 55512000 for pre-accession assistance. This aid scheme later also included 
Turkey 75. 
In addition, the Commission decided to create a new instrument for non-candidate 
countries in the Western Balkans which still benefited from Phare funding. This new 
instrument, CARDS76 , has been managed by the Europe Aid Cooperation Office and has 
disbursed grant aid to Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia and FYROM since the year 2000. This meant that Phare focused solely on 
institution-building and investment support in the candidate countries from 2001 
onwards. The programme was dealing with three components: institution-building, 
investment, and economic and social cohesion. In addition, there were discussions in 
DGIA to move the third of these components under the heading of ISPA to DG Regional 
Policy as well. However, this plan was dropped, because Director General Landaburu of 
this service decided that this would not be appropriate (Intwl7, CEC official, 11 
September 2002). 
In order to enable the smooth transition from Phare to ISPA and SAPARD, the 
Commission decided in 1998 to introduce the necessary administrative structures in the 
candidate countries. It supported the establishment of development strategies and 
priorities at regional level; administrative cooperation on the modernization of the 
administrative and budgetary procedures which would be used subsequently under the 
Structural Funds joint-financing arrangements, and the joint financing of projects in the 
transnational cooperation sphere (CEC 1997b: 7). The main instrument for these support 
schemes was the twinning exercise. In addition, the Commission introduced the Special 
74 MEDA is financial and technical assistance programme which finances measures to accompany 
the reform of economic and social structures in the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean 
partriership. 
75 Council Regulation (EC) No 2500/2001 of 17 December 2001 Concerning Pre-Accession 
Financial Assistance for Turkey (EC 2001,2000b). 
76 Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation. 
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Preparatory Programme and the Large Scale Infrastructure Facility which resembled 
SAPARD and ISPA between 1997 and 2000. 
1997 reforms 1999 guidelines Proposed for 2001 and bejond', ý' 
Programming based solely on Investment support Multi-annual commitments from 
APs and NPAAs reoriented to take account 2002 
of ISPA and SAPARD. 
Institution-building a key Coordination mechanism Twinning extended to cover 
priority (minimum 30% of the for coordination of shorter periods 
programme) pre-accession instruments 
established. Framework for Deconcentration extended and 
Twinning introduced economic and social roles within Delegations 
cohesion support redefined to allow more time to 
Supervision of implementation established, based on be spent on substantive project 
deconcentrated to Delegations National Development Plan supervision 
and investment actions in 
MuIti-annual programmes priority regions. 
reduced 
Movement from ex-ante to ex- 
Minimum project size and post control from 2002 under 
criterion of maturity defined conditions 
established 
Principle ofjoint responsibility 
for monitoring established. 
Role and composition of Joint 
Monitoring Committees 
def med. 
Principle of further 
decentralisation established 
CFCU and National Fund 
established 
Project Management Units 
phased out 
Source., Adapted from CEC 2000c, p. 28. 
Table 14: Developments In Phare, 1997-2000 
Agreement on opening of accession negotiations 
In the same year, the first APs were published and the Commission proposed to open 
negotiations with the remaining CEECs in its Composite Paper. The Helsinki Council 
agreed with this proposal in December 1999 and therefore accession negotiations began 
with Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria and Romania in February 2000 (CEC 1999a: 29-32; EC 
1999d: 2). This decision was largely influenced by war in the Kosovo, which stressed the 
vital importance of 'security and stability on the European continent' (EC 1999d: 2). The 
accession negotiations started to follow the so-called regatta approach, in which each 
. 
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candidate country would enter the EU based on its progress towards the Copenhagen 
criteria. 
This contrasts with the group model which was adopted by the EU until the Helsinki 
Summit. In this model, the negotiations with a group of candidates are preferred to the 
option of talks with all of them (Friis and Murphy 1999: 225). In his analysis, 
Schimmelfennig (2003b: 108) concludes that 'economic criteria and the implementation 
of the acquis are of secondary importance in the decision to open accession negotiations'. 
The validity of this conclusion is widely recognised across the discipline. The main issue 
for the opening of accession negotiations remains the political criteria. 
3.3 Operational changes Introduced In 1997 
In order to respond to problems occurring during the implementation of the Phare, DG IA 
also introduced several procedural changes to the Phare, programme (see Table 14). These 
were largely based on the findings of the Evaluation Unit regarding the performance of 
the programme during implementation. However, several interviewees also highlighted 
the importance of quarterly reports from the Delegations and other implementation 
documents (Intwl8,28, and 32, CEC officials). 
Financing Memorandum 
The first of these procedural changes came with the introduction of the Financing 
Memorandum (FAV. The FMs were designed to assist programming by specifying annual 
financing decisions with a partner country in a single document, thereby outlining both 
the projects to be implemented and commitments by the candidates to be undertaken in 
relation to the projects (see Figure 8). It included a conditionality clause which specified 
that the Commission could decide to cancel all or part of the programme in case the 
agreed commitments were not met by the respective candidate country (see e. g. CEC 
1998c: 12). 
These annuallY published documents facilitated an assessment of the programmes to be 
implemented in each of the candidate countries. However, the FMs also enabled the 
Commission to exercise control over the implementation of the Phare programme. 
Although the conditionality clause in the APs gave the member states the power to 
suspend financial assistance on basis of Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 622/98, the FMs 
facilitated the Commission to withdraw funding from particular projects or to reallocate 
assistance to other envelopes such as multi-country programmes. The introduction of the 
FMs therefore compensated the Commission for the member states' decision to approve 
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the APs within the Council and retain control over the possible suspension of assistance. 
However, in practice the enforcement of the commitments specified in the FMs was 
complicated by their ambiguity. It also ran counter to the spirit of Phare in making use of 
these enforcement mechanisms frequently. A Commission official noted, 'conditionality 
became part of every document we published after 1997, but in reality we wanted to 
enable a collective effort by the candidates and everyone involved in implementation' 
(Intw39, CEC official, 18 March 2003). 
Decentrallsation and Deconcentration of implementation 
The next steps considered were the improvement of the implementation structures in the 
Commission and the candidates countries alike. In line with the decisions taken in the 
context of the introduction of the SCR, the Commission introduced a Decentralised 
Implementation System (DIS). Since the decentralisation of implementation had been a 
feature within Phare since the early 1990s, the real innovation of the DIS was that the 
control mechanisms were deconcentrated to the Delegations of the Commission in the 
candidate countries. This change was also introduced in response to 'the observations 
made by the European Court of Auditors and the European Parliament calling for 
increasing role of the Delegations in particular with a view to reducing duplication of 
controls and decision making processes' (CEC 1998a: 14). It responded to a concern that 
was voiced in relation to all external aid programmes of the EU. 
In order to increase the transparency of operations and avoid the dispersion of funds the 
DIS was complemented with new implementation structures in the candidate countries. 
The PMUs were phased out from 1998 onwards and instead the Commission asked the 
candidates to establish a National Fund (NF) which would administer the financial 
support allocated. The idea was that the establishment of the NF under the responsibility 
of a National Authorising Officer (NAO) would 'reduce the parallel structures in the 
financial management and enhance the co-ordination of funds in the country concerned' 
(CEC 1998a: 15). The candidates were asked to limit the number of implementing 
agencies that would work under the authority of the NAO and to establish Central 
Finance and Contracting Units (CFCUs) where there was no implementing agency to 
administer the funds of a programme component. The latter was often the case in 
institution-building which tends to be multi-sectoral in nature. 
Maturity and size of projects 
The Phare Guidelines also included a maturity condition for investment projects that 
ensured projects only received funding when they were 'ready for contracting and once 
. 
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all the necessary technical studies have been completed' (CEC 1998a: 9-13). In addition, 
projects also required a minimum size of E2-3 million in order to gain financial support. 
This condition was later waived for cross-border, civil society, transnational and 
institution-building projects in the Phare Guidelines for the 2000-2006 period. However, 
projects of up to C300.000 million would have to be implemented under the Small Project 
Fund Facility and all other projects required a case by case assessment under the 
arrangements made for cross-border cooperation (CEC 1999b: 14). 
Joint responsibility for monitoring 
These changes were further complemented by the introduction of joint responsibility for 
monitoring. This was to be achieved on the basis of a Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC) 
between the European Commission and the respective partner country, which would meet 
regularly in the candidate countries. In order to facilitate monitoring the Financing 
Memorandums were expected to incorporate 'verifiable and measurable indicators of 
achievements with regard to financial and physical inputs, activities, outputs and objects 
and the timescale of implementation' (CEC 1999b: 15). 
The programming cycle 
As a result, the Phare programming cycle was both based on PCM and the 
implementation structures introduced with the 1997 reforms (see Figure 8). The 
programming of Phare was based on the Regular Reports, APs and NPAAS77. In order to 
submit the first working document the candidates prepared project fiches that responded 
to the priorities stipulated in the Al's and NPAAs. 
The Commission then decided which of the fiches should be financed under the Phare 
Regulation (EEC) No 3906/89 and forwarded a financing proposal to the Phare 
Management Committee. This included the supporting projects fiches and the respective 
project scheme for horizontal programmes such as SIGMA and TAIEX The programmes 
that got approved during the Phare Management Committee were subsequently granted a 
budgetary commitment by Commission Decision. This was followed up by the drafting 
and signing of the FMs with each of the candidate countries. The implementation of the 
projects started with the tendering of contracts after an agreement had been reached on 
the FMs in the candidate countries. This process was complemented with monitoring, 
evaluation and audit activities of the Commission and the candidates themselves. 
77 Component 3 of the Phare programme, economic and social cohesion, also requires a National 
Development Plan. 
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Enhancement of Implementation procedures 
The Commission also continued to adapt the procedures of the Phare programme. In 
1999, it announced that economic and social cohesion would become the main priority of 
the investment envelope. The purpose was to align the Phare programme as far as 
possible with the Structural Funds. As a result, the candidate countries were asked to 
annex a National Development Plan (NDP) to their NPAAs. This was to develop into the 
type of NDPs required for all Objective I regions inside the EU. The Commission asked 
the candidates to include a comprehensive analysis of their development gaps and to 
identify their concrete needs in terms of economic and social development. The NDP 
should also Provide an overall perspective for government and Community co-financing 
in this area (CEC 1999d: 9). 
In 2000, on the initiative of Commissioner Verheugen, DG Enlargement 78 launched a 
comprehensive assessment of its 1997 reforms, the Phare 2000 Review. The document 
made a number of recommendations on how to accelerate the process of implementing 
the reforms deriving from Agenda 2000. The main changes deriving from this initiative 
were the following: 
1. Introduction of multi-annual indicative programming for the period 2002- 
2006; 
2. Indication of requirements for the introduction of an Extended Decentralised 
Implementation System (EDIS); 
3. Establishment of "twinning light". 
The introduction of multi-annual indicative programming was considered an important 
step for the candidate countries. This was presented as the move towards the Structural 
Funds. In effect, it had a significant impact on the programming of the economic and 
social cohesion component within Phare. The Commission stressed that at least 20 
percent of the institution-building and investment components would be allocated on an 
annual basis. This was because the needs in these area should be clearly identified on the 
basis of the Regular Reports and negotiations each year (CEC 2000i: 17). 
In addition, the Phare 2000 Review reintroduced the requirements for EDIS. This system 
was considered a major overhaul of the way Phare would be implemented. Although 
Council Regulation 1266/99 on the coordination of pre-accession assistance already 
78 DG Enlargement followed DGIA after the resignation of the Santer Commission on 16 March 
1999. The Prodi Commission took up office on 25 March 1999 with GUnther Verheugen as 
Commissioner for DG Enlargement. Eneko Landaburu, the former Director-General in DG 
Regional Policy, was appointed Director General around the same time. 
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provided for this implementation system, the document was instrumental in re- 
establishing the process. The concept behind the EDIS was fully in line with the spirit of 
accession. It would provide the candidates with the opportunity to manage Phare 
programmes on their own without ex-ante control by the Commission in Brussels and its 
Delegations. It was also a very necessary step as the Delegations of the Commission were 
phased out during the later stages of the accession process. There is a set of conditions for 
the change from the DIS to the EDIS system which is specified in the review (CEC 
2000i: 18-19). This change proved to be extremely difficult. In spring 2004, the phasing 
out of the Delegations was in progress, but EDIS had not been approved for a single 
associate country. The introduction of twinning light is discussed in Chapter 7. 
Road map for the accession negotiations 
The Phare 2000 Review and in particular the appointment of GUrither Verheugen also 
intensified the strategic dimension of the pre-accession strategy. In 2000, the Composite 
Paper unexpectedly carried the heading Enlargement Strategy Paper and in the 
subsequent year it was named Making a Success of Enlargement (CEC 2000e, 2001g). 
This was not just an exaggerated claim by the Commissioner, it was more an expression 
of the approach taken by DG Enlargement. As the accession of the candidates drew 
closer, the Commission was determined to prevent further delays. It stressed that 'we 
must not delude ourselves that the EU has endless time to complete its enlargement 
project. There is a window of opportunity open now and it needs to be seized' (CEC 
2000e: 5). It also urged the member states to make progress on the necessary institutional 
reforms of the EU at the Nice Summit in December 2000. It stressed that the success of 
the lGC in Nice was a crucial condition for enlargement. 
The issue of an indicative timetable had been attempted by the Commission at the 1999 
Helsinki European Council. However, it got voted down on the issue by the member 
states and there was therefore no commitment on the timefirame for enlargement. In 2000, 
the Commission used its Enlargement StrateýD, Paper to relaunch the idea in a different 
format. It proposed to introduce a road map which would introduce a sequenced approach 
to the accession negotiations with the identification of the priorities for the next 18 
months. The member states agreed to this approach at the Nice European Council. The 
Presidency Conclusions stressed that 'the road map for the next 18 months will ease the 
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way for further negotiations, bearing in mind that those countries which are the best 
prepared will continue to be able to progress more quickly' (EC 2000d: 1). 79 
Subsequently, in the 2000 Feira European Council, the member states stressed that 'in 
addition to finding solutions to negotiating issues, progress in the negotiations depends on 
incorporation by candidate States of the acquis in their national legislation and especially 
on their capacity to effectively implement it' (EC 2000c: 3). At the same time, the 
Commission used its Enlargement Strategy Papers to reiterate the importance of 
institution-building. It stated, for example, that 'in the present phase of the accession 
process, however, it is necessary to focus as much on the candidates' capacity to 
implement and enforce the acquis as on its transposition into law' (CEC 200 1 e: 5). 
4 Strengthening the EU's administrative conditionality 
The reforms of 1997 gave the Commission a new repertoire of instruments to govern in 
the accession process. This increased the EU's leverage on the candidates' 
administrations. The Regular Reports, Al's and NPAAs were used to identify problems 
regarding administrative and judicial capacity, set priorities for financial instruments and 
benchmark progress between the candidates. However, the accession-driven focus within 
Phare was difficult to implement. The programme required a period of time to adapt to 
the reforms made in 1997. This issue was also acknowledged by the Commission in the 
Phare 2000 Review where it stressed that 'there should be a period of relative stability to 
consolidate the past reforms and to ensure their full benefit is obtained' (CEC 2000i: 6). It 
took the Commission 18 months to complete these changes; in particular the twinning 
exercise was a complicated mechanism to get on track. 
4.1 Regular Reports and administrative conclitionality 
In 1997, the Opinions of the European Commission drew particular attention to the issue 
of administrative capacity. These documents devoted a special section to a review of the 
applicants' public administrations (134. Administrative Capacity to Apply the Acquis). 
The issue was also mentioned at several other sections of the Opinions, for example, in 
the section on political criteria where the functioning of institutions and of the executive 
is discussed in detail. This is because the relationship between the executive and the 
79 Shortly after this decision, in spring 2001, the Commission published its brochure "Enlargement 
of the European Union - An historic opportunity". This highlighted the benefits of enlargement for 
both the Community and the member states. It also outlined the achievements of the accession 
process (CEC 200 1 b). 
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legislative is of particular concern in the context of the political criteria. The issue also 
mentioned in a special section on the obligations of membership which details financial 
management and control mechanisms. 
In his assessment, Fournier (1998: 112) notes that the Opinions 'do not provide a specific 
model for the organisation and functioning of public administrations'. However, the 
Commission does take several definite positions on certain aspects. The horizontal 
organisation of public administrations is not addressed with the exception of the 
Commission's emphasis on the need for interministerial coordination of European affairs 
and in particular the creation of a single body responsible for this task. There are several 
recommendations the Commission makes with regard to civil service reforin. It stresses 
that countries should pass an act dealing specifically with public administration reform 
and the importance of training on EU legislation. It also emphasises the importance of 
bringing public sector pay in line with that in the private sector (cf Fournier 1998: 113). 
The sectoral dimension of public administration is addressed in the individual sections on 
the acquis. In addition, the Commission outlined a number of necessary institutions under 
the heading of "Key areasfor the implementation of the acquis ". The first of these is the 
judicial system which is described in fairly general terms relating to the internal market 
and Community policies. Following these observations, the Commission discussed in 
more detail the institutions it considered essential for implementation in particular 
sectors. Jacques Fournier (1998: 114), who assessed the Opinions with respect to the 
administrative capacity criteria, lists the following institutions in this context: 
- the bodies responsible for ensuring the free circulation of goods (regulations, 
standardisation and certification) and services (in particular, banking, insurance 
and security transactions); 
- the bodies responsible for monitoring competition; 
- regulatory bodies for telecommunications; 
- the departments dealing with indirect taxes; 
- the bodies responsible for veterinary and plant health inspection and those that 
implement the CAP; 
- the transport authorities; 
- the departments responsible for health and safety at work and social affairs; 
- the bodies responsible for the environment; 
- consumer protection bodies; 
- the administrations responsible for home affairs and justice, to the extent that 
they are in charge of the enforcement of immigration laws, border control and 
international police and judicial co-operation; 
- customs; 
- financial control, in particular to ensure the fight against fraud and the monitoring 
of the use of Community funds. 
_ 
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This list of important institutions increased over time, notably by the publication of a 
informal working document published by the Commission in 2002 which was marked 
"For information purposes only". There was a clear ambiguity involved in the 
Commission's approach to applying the administrative criteria. On the one hand the 
Opinions mentioned explicit institutions necessary for the implementation for the acquis. 
On the other hand the Commission later emphasised that its working document on the 
issue of administrative structures 'should not in any way be construed as committing the 
European Commission' (CEC 2001 f. 6). 
The assessment of the candidates' public administrations, provided in the Opinions, also 
makes interesting reading. In line with its approach of addressing the problems directly, 
the Commission identified several shortcomings at central, regional and local government 
level. The Opinions stressed, for example, that the lack of a regional government level 
would affect the implementation of EU regional policies and that decentralized authorities 
need financial autonomy. It mentioned that local government in Bulgaria, the Czech 
Republic, Poland and Romania were financially dependent on their respective central 
governments. The Opinions also highlighted the need to plan administrative reforms 
centrally and to combine them with substantial efforts in the modemisation of the civil 
service (Fournier 1998: 113-18). The overall assessment of the administrative capacity of 
the candidates led the Commission to conclude that Slovenia, Poland and Slovakia are 
more likely to have the capacity to apply the Community acquis in the medium term. It 
further concluded that "significant and sustained" (Czech Republic), "major" (Estonia), 
"major and sustained" (Bulgaria and Romania) efforts were needed by the remaining 
countries. 
The 1998 and 1999 Regular Reports were modelled on the type of assessment made by 
the Opinions. In 2000, the DG Enlargement took a slightly different approach. it 
addressed the issue with a comprehensive analysis of the individual negotiation chapters. 
In subsequent years, the reports followed this model. In its overall assessment of Poland's 
administrative capacity in 2000, for example, the Commission (2000b: 84-85) stated the 
following: 
In contrast to the 1999 regular report, there has been progress in adopting legislation 
in key areas of the internal market acquis, standards and certification and state aid. In 
both cases the necessary framework legislation has been adopted. The emphasis must 
now turn to the secondary legislation necessary to implement the acquis in these areas 
and the accompanying administrative capacity. 
In this way, the Commission made use of its regular reports to assess the administrative 
preparedness of the candidates' to implement the acquis. It used the individual chapters 
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of the negotiations as benchmarks of the candidate countries progress towards accession 
and indicated where the institutional boundary of integration still had to be overcome 
(Grabbe 2001: 1016; His and Murphy 1999: 214). The candidates in return paid 
considerable attention to the actual wording of these documents, since was an indication 
of their place in the accession queue. 
4.2 Programming of the financial instruments 
In combination with the remaining commitment devices (FMs, project fiches, logframes), 
the AN and NPAAs developed into important programming mechanisms for the 
implementation of the financial instruments. The priorities of the AN were often directly 
translated into project fiches, in particular where twinning was chosen as an instrument. 
Although the NPAAs in particular were a tedious task for the candidate countries, they 
helped them to focus on the budgetary needs deriving from foreign assistance. This 
enabled most countries to approach the issue of co-financing in a more structured manner 
and therefore had a significant impact on programme implementation. 
In order to facilitate institution-building, the candidates were also asked to present an 
institution-building plan as part of their NPAA. The Commission (1998a: 6) listed the 
components of this plan as follows: 
- an inventory of regulatory, policy-making, organisational, training and equipment 
needs; 
-a sequence of primary and secondary legislative actions; 
-a financial and budgetary plan for these actions; 
-a programme description with projects and indicative financial allocations; 
-a clear indication of timescales and milestones to be achieved. 
The existence of a single plan on institution-building helped to focus implementation on 
the actual needs of each candidate. However, the number of documents included in 
programming, the AP, the NPAA, the FM and the individual project fiches led to delays 
in several candidate countries. The problem that remained in Phare was that once a 
programme was agreed there was too little flexibility to change envisaged activities 
without approval of the Commission. In addition, projects still lacked adequate needs 
analysis and design (cf EMS 2004a: 5). 
In 2000, the Regular Reports also included a global assessment on the candidates, 
progress towards the priorities of the Al's and the NPAAs (headings DI and D2). This 
added further legitimacy to these documents and corresponded to the approach taken after 
the publication of the Phare 2000 Review. This approach was carried into subsequent 
Regular Reports. 
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4.3 The implementation of the Phare programme 
The first tension during the implementation of the New Phare Orientations emerged from 
the fact that the institution-building component was not factored into the allocation of 
Phare. The distribution of Phare into national and multi-country budget lines had always 
been a controversial matter. However, following the reforms of 1997, it was expected in 
most of the candidate countries that the Commission would consider their problerns in 
implementing the acquis. This was because smaller candidates had to carry the same 
burden regarding the administrative and judicial capacity to implement Community 
legislation, although their budgets for public administration were much lower than in 
other candidate countries. 
Bulgaria 
Czech Republic 
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Figure 9: National programme commitments by country, in million EUR and % in 2000 
The formula determining the allocation of Phare assistance was based on two factors: the 
population of each applicant and to a lesser extent on its GDP. Poland and Romania 
therefore had the largest national envelope at their disposal. The Baltic States and 
Slovenia were at the other end of the scale. Figure 9 shows the allocation for tile year 
2000, in which Poland was allocated 36 percent and Romania 25 percent of the funds. 
'O 
In the same year, the Baltic States and Slovenia received an allocation between 2 to 3 
percent of the total of the national programme commitments. As a consequence, these 
countries could implement a drastically lower number of projects. This also had an 
80 Cf statistics on the candidates' population and GDP (Appendix 1, p. 339) 
50 100 150 200 250 300 
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immense impact on the number of twinning projects implemented in 2000. Out of a total 
of 143 projects, Poland implemented 44, Romania 25, Slovenia 5, Latvia 6, Lithuania 8, 
and Estonia 8 (see Appendix 3 for more figures). Although the candidates are expected to 
implement the acquis also at regional and local level, this distribution appears to make 
little sense. 
In addition, it has to be stressed that the majority of projects were based at central 
government offices across all countries. In fact, only in Romania and Poland did the 
budget allow to launch special programmes for the strengthening of regional 
administrations in preparation for the implementation of the Structural Funds (see Annex 
12 and 13). The other area of the acquis which received considerable support away from 
the capitals of CEE was JHA. This was because twinning projects were utflised for the 
training of border control staff and the development of border management. It has to be 
mentioned though that the majority of projects located in central government offices also 
included regional activities in their implementation such as training of regional officials 
in applying Community legislation. Nevertheless, the difference of 38 projects in 2000 
between Latvia and Poland is unjustified in light of the needs of this candidate to improve 
public administration. 
In 2001, the Commission reacted to this inconsistency between the priorities of Phare and 
the national allocations of the candidate countries. Its Enlargement Strategy Paper, 
Making a success of enlargement, announced that Action Plans for Administrative and 
Judicial Capacity would allow for additional spending across the 10 negotiating countries 
in 2002 (CEC 2001g: 22-25). This initiative was to allocate up to C250 million from the 
total Phare commitments to additional institution-building efforts in 2002 (CEC 2002a: 
24). This sum was to be allocated equally over the 10 negotiating countries. It enabled the 
smaller candidate countries to implement up to 50 percent more twinning projects than in 
2000 or 2001. The total number of projects also peaked at 173 in 2002. In this way, the 
Commission has often addressed particular problems. There was always an element of 
muddling through involved in the implementation of Phare, and this remained to be the 
case after the reforms taken in 1997. 
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Figure 10: Commitments by programme type, in EUR million and in % of total, in 2000 
The Commission also opted to combine institution-building and investment support in 
Special Preparatory Programmes (SPPs) for econornic and social cohesion. In 2001, 
Project Fiche HU0105-01 pulled together three twinning components with the aim to 
strengthen institutional structures in order to achieve, upon accession, sound and efficient 
management of EU Structural and Cohesion Funds in Hungary. The components prepared 
the Managing Authorities for of Structural Funds, the ISPA/Cohesion Fund Agencies and 
strengthened audit, payment and financial control functions. At the same time, Hungary 
received funds through Phare and ISPA that gave these institutions the opportunity to 
play through the procedures of the Structural Funds. This initiative followed the Phare 
2000 Review. It was also introducedjust ayearafter ISPA becarne operational. 
The share between national and other types of programmes developed into a 50-50 split, 
where roughly 50 percent of the budget was spent on national envelopes and the 
remaining resources on CBC, Community programmes, nuclear safety and horizontal 
programmes (see Figure 10). Since 1999, the horizontal envelope also financed short- 
term missions of member state officials to the candidate countries under TAIEX. This 
was for the purpose of conducting peer reviews which would evaluate the level of 
preparation of their counterparts in the negotiating countries (see CEC 1997d). The 
general administrative capacity of the candidates' institutions was still addressed by the 
SIGMA programme (see CEC 1997e). In 2001, the OECD-SIGMA unit presented its 
baseline criteria for a well-functioning public management system covering both EU 
funds and national resources (Allen and Torrimasi 2001: 29-3 1). However, the document 
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had only advisory status and was therefore of no further consequence to the candidate 
countries. 
5 Conclusion 
This chapter questioned to what extent the 1997 reforms made a difference to the 
substance and enforceability of the accession criteria. Its objective was to shed light on 
the introduction and implementation of these reforms. The internal and external 
governance employed by the institutions were addressed by way of examining the actual 
decision-making. In order to evaluate the relevance of the theoretical models outlined in 
Chapter 4, this section summarizes the findings on each of the steps taken during the 
1997 reforms. It reflects on the importance of the individual models based on the findings 
presented in the thesis. Finally, it examines the importance of these changes to the EU's 
ability to apply its administrative conditionality. 
5.1 Internal governance: Reforming the pre-accession strategy 
The reforms of 1997 incorporated a number of elements that were crucial for the 
development of the enlargement process. A recurrent theme during this reform process 
was the need to specify the accession criteria and connect it with the pre-accession 
strategy. This objective was largely inspired by the experience collected during the early 
1990s. It was mainly based on internal assessments of DGIA, notably the Phare Interim 
Evaluation which was published at the time. The message deriving from this evidence 
was that the accession criteria were too broadly defined to enforce it in the candidate 
countries. In this context, the Commission was also inspired by the work of other donor 
organizations, in particular the World Bank and the IMF. However, the introduction of 
the logframe matrix approach into the programming of Phare also points to close links 
with USAID and bilateral donors. 
Thus, the clarification of the accession criteria can be explained by the evidence-based 
policy-making and lesson-drawing models outlined in Chapter 4. The evidence deriving 
from the implementation of Phare was an incentive for the Commission to search for 
existing solutions to the problems it encountered with its conditionality regime. In line 
with the clarification of the accession criteria, it proceeded to draw lessons from the 
implementation of the programme and introduced the APs and NPAAs. In addition, it 
conceived the idea of annual FMs, when the proposal to adopt the APs by Commission 
decision was declined by the Council. This was based on the insight that the ability to 
suspend funding was a viable option, if considered necessary. However, in reality little 
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recourse was taken to this approach. The introduction of the APs and NPAAs was largely 
based on the findings of the Phare Interim Evaluation which pointed out that 'the lack of 
commitment devices in Phare programines themselves, through financial, political and 
other forms of conditionality, weakened the partners' commitment to good programme 
performance' (CEC 1997h: 59). The new programming framework deriving from the 
APs, NPAAs and FMs was designed to respond to this criticism and at the same time 
would ensure an accession-driven focus within Phare. 
The remaining operational changes were largely a result of the Evaluation Unit's 
findings. Some changes were also driven by functional concerns. The creation of ISPA 
and SAPARD, for example, responded to the fact that the Commission had to handle 
much larger amounts of money during the 2000-2006 period than ever before in the Phare 
programme. In order to facilitate this process, the prograrnmes were managed by DG 
Regional Policy and DG Agriculture. This would also ensure a closer match between 
these instruments and Community policies. The minimum size of projects and criterion 
for maturity was based on the findings of the interim evaluation. It established after all 
that the prograrnme was dispersed over too many small projects. The introduction of 
these criteria for the approval of projects targeted specifically this problem. This leads to 
the conclusion that evidence-based policy-making had a significant impact oil the 
introduction of the reinforced pre-accession strategy. This conclusion is supported by the 
fact that the Council and the Phare Management Committee largely agreed with the 
proposals presented in Agenda 2000, the Communication on the New Phare Orientations 
and the 1997 Phare Guidelines. 
Element of the 1997 reform Mode of governance 
Programming I. Clarification of the accession lesson-dra%% ing. evidence-based policy- 
framework criteria. Regular Reports tnaking 
2. Introduction of Al's and NPAAs lesson-draxving, evidence-based policy- 
making, functional concerns 
Reform of Phare I. Access ion-dri ven focus within Phare evidence-based policy-inaking 
2. Introduction of progranuning 
documents evidence-based pol ic) -making 
3. Mininium prqject size and criterion 
of maturity evidence-based policy-making 
4. Introduction of DIS and EDIS 
5. Creation of new instrunients evidence-based policy-making 
(twinning, ISPA and SAPARD) evidence-based policy-making, functional 
6. Introduction of National Funds and concerns 
CFCUs/Phasing out ofPMUs evidence-based policy-making 
Source: Author's own compilation. 
Table 15: Internal governance - elements of the 1997 reform and modes of governance 
The Commission acted as an agent of the member states. It worked on the proposals that 
were directly requested by the European Council. At the same time, it enjoyed a great 
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deal of freedom in carrying out these tasks. As Vachudova (2004: 117) points out, 'the 
Council delegated all of these tasks to the Commission because they were complex, 
technical, and labor intensive'. Thus, the weight of the recommendations issued by the 
Commission increased significantly by the nature of the enlargement process. The 
member states followed each of the Commission's recommendations regarding the 
opening of membership negotiations or membership. However, the Commission also had 
to incorporate the member states' preferences in these tasks in order to have its proposals 
adopted in the Council. The Commission 'took a careful sounding of member states 
preferences at each step' (Vachudova 2004: 120). However, one characteristic of the 
enlargement process is that preferences tend to differ across the various issues. 
Torreblanca (1998; 2001) refers to this phenomenon as 'overlapping games', thereby 
stressing that a member state may side with the Commission on one issue, but oppose it 
on another. 
5.2 External governance: The instruments of the EU's enlargement strategy 
The reform of the pre-accession strategy in 1997 was a critical step towards a more 
structured approach to the programming of Phare funds. The link between the accession 
criteria and the financial instruments has particularly been strengthened with respect to 
the relevance of the programme to the objectives of the enlargement process. In other 
words, the introduction of the AN and NPAAs in combination with the clarification of 
the accession criteria allowed the Commission to address the lack of administrative 
capacities. However, the effects of the explicit conditionality terms incorporated in the 
AN and also the FMs may be overestimated. This is because in practice the institutions 
avoided using the accession instruments as a means of coercive policy transfer (Dolowitz 
and Marsh 2000: 9; Stone 2004: 554). The analysis demonstrated that few projects were 
suspended due to a lack commitment by the applicants in applying the acquis. As a result, 
one of the main requirements of the external incentives model, the credibility of threats to 
withhold rewards is not given in the context of Phare (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 
2005c: 17). 
The EU's conditionality in the enlargement process is therefore restricted to selectivity 
(Lal 2001: 253-56; cited in Stone 2004: 554). In conclusion, we may say that the type of 
external governance emerging from the EU's reinforced pre-accession strategy was 
characterised by obligatedpolicy transfer based on enhanced cooperation (Dolowitz and 
Marsh 2000: 9; Stone 2004: 554). The AN and NPAAs were the means to define short- 
term and medium term objectives or common guidelines for the implementation of the 
Phare, ISPA and SAPARD. The remaining programming documents sustained the 
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cooperation from the pre-accession strategy. However, the accession negotiations enabled 
the Commission to also use more coercive means of re-establishing the candidates' 
reforms. As one German official stressed that Phare programme took 't-nore a pragmatic 
orientation rather than a politically heated approach' (Intw5, German official, 14 March 
2002). In interviews, it was generally described as an instrurnent that worked on basis of 
cooperation rather than coercion. In addition, national officials stressed that there was 
little room for the member states to influence Phare prograiriming since they could only 
vote on complete programmes (Intw6,8 and 29, German, British and French official). 
Thus, objections against particular parts of a project are eradicated by the relevance of the 
whole project. 
Accession instrument Mode of governance 
Programming 1. AN is. Regular reports governance by conditionality 
framework 
I Application ofAPs and NPAAs new forins of governance, 
governance by conditionality 
3. Accession negotiations governance by conditionality 
Reform of Phare I. Programming of financial new fornis ot'governance, 
instruments (I'Ms. NDPs) governance by conditionality 
2. Implementation of financial governance by conditionality, 
instruments ne" forms of governance 
3. Implementation of DIS and FIDIS neNN forms ot'goNernance 
4. National Funds and 
CFCUs/Pliasing out of PMUs II/a 
Source: Author's o%ý n compi lation. 
Table 16: External governance -instruments after 1997 and modes of governance 
The administrative conditionality deriving from the reinforced pre-accession strategy is 
ambiguous. The Avis and the Regular reports are excellent instruments for the 
Commission to identify problems with horizontal and vertical administrative capacities. 
However, the implementation of Phare, ISPA and SAPARD implies a process of learning 
by doing rather than a strategic view of administrative reform. This element was 
introduced with the twinning exercise which provided the effective means to address 
particular problems in the candidates' administrations. The Commission was particularly 
concerned about the absorption capacity of the candidate countries and their ability to 
implement sectoral policies. 
7 
The twinning of institutions in the accession 
process 
I Introduction 
So when does an idea's time come? The answer lies in the match between 
idea and moment. An idea's time arrives not simply because the idea is 
compelling on its own terms, but because opportune political 
circumstances favour it. 
Liebermann 2000, p. 709 
This chapter analyses the formulation of the twinning exercise. In order to test the 
plausible rival hypotheses set out for internal governance in Chapter 4, it is divided into 
two sections. The first section assesses the introduction of the twinning concept which 
was later used in implementation. It considers the original concept underlying twinning as 
well as the involvement of the Commission and the member states during its introduction. 
The second part identifies the sources of information which were utilised to formulate the 
twinning procedures. The chapter seeks to determine which factors'can account for the 
introduction of the twinning exercise, and the particular sources of information 
considered critical for its formulation. 
As outlined in Chapter 4, the decisions taken between insiders regarding the introduction 
of twinning can be best explained by one of the following alternative models: evidence- 
based policy-making, lesson-drawing, intergovernmental bargaining, and deliberative 
supranationalism. This chapter tests the hypotheses deriving from these different models 
on basis of the available empirical material. In order to conduct this test, it firstly 
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identifies the actors that were involved in the formulation of the twinning concept and its 
procedures. Second, it questions the motives and behaviour of these actors. Finally, it 
sheds light on the information used during the formulation of the twinning procedures. 
The dissemination of research interviews and in particular documents from the 
Commission's archives are the essential elements of this analysis. 
The first step locates the process in relation to the plausible rival hypotheses. The second 
step allows testing the hypothesis deriving from deliberative supranationalism against the 
remaining hypotheses. This is because it is the only statement that assumes a logic of 
appropriateness. This step also enables a direct comparison between the lesson-drawing 
model in which actors rationally make use of lessons drawn elsewhere (Rose 1991,1993) 
and institutional isomorphism. In this process by which actors adopt an institutional 
model because the discourse among policymakers views it as an appropriate or legitimate 
solution to the problems under consideration (Dimaggio and Powell 1991: 64-67; 
Radaelli 2000: 27-38). The third step enables the testing of the remaining models. In 
other words, the information used to establish twinning procedures is a useful indicator of 
the particular model employed during its formulation. 
2 The formulation of the twinning exercise 
The reform of the pre-accession strategy would have been incomplete without an 
instrument that could support the accession-driven programming of Phare, ISPA and 
SAPARD. In view of the fact that the Community would allocate C3.120 million annually 
to the three pre-accession instruments from 2000, the need to enhance the absorption 
capacity of the candidates in areas such as economic and social cohesion became a main 
priority. In addition, the 30 percent institution-building priority within Phare needed to be 
supported by an instniment that would make efficient use of money. In addition, a 
mechanism to create the necessary changes in the candidates' administrations, one that 
would enable them to implement Community legislation still had to be established. 
The Commission started to discuss the procedural aspects of the twinning exercise as it 
had announced in Agenda 2000 (CEC 1997a: 61; 1997b: 4). This process would be 
supported by the network of nominated NCPs from the member states and candidate 
countries (CEC 1998a: 10). The institution-building within Phare was discussed 
throughout the 1997 reforms with a focus on the vertical administrative capacities of the 
candidates. As Lamoureux stressed in the first NCP Meeting, 'notwithstanding the 
importance of general public administration modemisation, at this stage of the pre- 
accession phase it is essential to focus on building up capacity for the implementation of 
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the Community acquis' (CEC 1997g: 1)81. The question deriving from this approach is of 
course whether the building of vertical administrative capacities did not run the risk of 
being cancelled out by decisions regarding horizontal administrative reform (see also T. 
Verheijen 2002; Meyer-Sahling 2004; Goetz and Wollmann 200 1). 
2.1 Twinning as a delivery method In bilateral cooperation 
The 1997 Phare Interim Evaluation had already indicated that technical assistance on 
long-term basis and twinning arrangements were particularly suited to create the 
envisaged changes in the candidate countries (CEC 1997h: 64). However, the idea of 
using twinning arrangements to create administrative and judicial capacities did not 
originate from the interim evaluation. Commission and member states officials indicated 
overwhelmingly that the suggestion came from Frangois Lamoureux (Intw2,6,9,17,18, 
30,32,40 and 60, Commission and MS officials). As a German official stressed, 'it was 
Frangois Lamoureux's idea to introduce the twinning mechanism. He also used his 
seniority during the formulation of the procedures' (Intw2, German official, 13 March 
82 2002) . Indeed, this was generally seen as an important factor. Several interviewees 
stressed that his involvement and that of Catherine Day was essential for the process of 
introducing twinning procedures. Later, Frangois Lamoureux also stressed in the fifth 
meeting of NCPs that 'twinning was first mooted in 1989 at the European Council in 
Strasbourg' (CEC 1998j: 1). 
There was, however, also a high level of awareness concerning twinning as a delivery 
method among the officials involved in the 1997 reforms. This was firstly because many 
of them had been working with DG Development before moving to DGIA and the 
twinning of institutions was an established method in development cooperation. 
Secondly, the Commission itself made use of national experts seconded from the member 
states since the 1970s. In addition, the mechanism had also been used in the form of town 
twinnings between municipalities from different member states. Finally, twinnings were 
already used as components in Phare projects. However, these were largely arrangements 
whereby the contractors of the Commission recruited retired officials from the member 
states or individuals that had moved on into the private sector. 83 
81 Quoted according to the minutes of the meeting. 
82 Author's translation of the interview record. 
83 There are several other programmes in the Community framework that are similar to twinning, 
for example, INTERREG projects which bring together officials from regional authorities in 
bordering regions of two member states. 
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As an instrument of development cooperation, twinning has both its advocates (Jones and 
Blunt 1999; Askvik 1999; Proctor 2000) and its critics (Olowu 2002). It has been a 
widely-used mechanism for institution-building, in particular by the World Bank, CIDA84 
and USAID. The World Bank has implemented twinning programmes increasingly across 
an array of sectors from the early 1980s. A review of these an-angements resulted in a 
positive assessment of twinning as a delivery method: 
The twinning of institutions in developing countries with similar but more mature 
organizations in other parts of the world has proved to be a very effective way to 
transfer know-how, train staff, and build management capabilities. Professional 
relationships between operating entities offer advantages of complementarity and 
flexibility over time. The entity supplying technical assistance uses its own resources 
to offer services to its twin, as needed, in the functional areas in which they both work 
(L. Cooper 1984: iii). 
This assessment is shared by Jones and Blunt (1999: 381) who stress that twinning is a 
distinctive method that has 'potential advantages over other modes of development co- 
operation, ... it offers enhanced possibilities for organizational 
learning and sustainable 
capacity building'. The twinning of institutions was introduced in Nordic development 
agencies such as SIDA from the mid-1990s. It became an increasingly popular delivery 
method in institution-building programmes. 
A number of authors stress that twinning arrangements are likely to increase ownership 
during programme implementation. This is because most of these programmes include 
higher levels of decentralization than other delivery methods (Askvik 1999; L. Cooper 
1984). The twinning exercise therefore had the potential to become an optimal match to 
the themes of decentralization and deconcentration envisaged within Phare. However, 
both Jones and Blunt (1999: 399-400) and Cooper (1984: 30-34) also emphasize that the 
opportunities offered by twinning projects run the risk of being outweighed by 
operational problems. Lauren Cooper (1984: 1, emphasis in original) offers a 
comprehensive list of comparisons between the services provided under twinning 
arrangements and those offered by consultants: 
a. The supplier of TA8' has operating experience in similar functions. 
b. Twinning provides opportunities to integrate TA and training. 
C. There isflexibility to alter the workprogramme over time and the possibility of 
very long term cooperation. 
d. The TA supplier may lack world-wide experience. 
e. The supplier may lack experience in the consultingprofession. 
84 Canadian International Development Agency. 
85 TA - Technical Assistance. 
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The procedural aspects of the programme also proved to be the main obstacle during the 
introduction of the twinning exercise. One of those interviewed stressed, that this was the 
main reason why the Commission did not introduce it earlier, because 'every time we 
tried to get people from the member states involved, we ran into one or the other 
procedural problem' (Intwl7, CEC official, 11 September 2002). The Commission 
decided to start the implementation of the programme almost immediately and to 
introduce the procedures in parallel. 
Frangois Lamoureux discussed possible procedures with the officials involved in 
reforming Phare. There was a general conflict emerging between Deputy Director 
General and several of these officials. Although the group agreed that the long-term 
secondment of member states' officials would enable significant change in the candidate 
countries' institutions, there was considerable disagreement regarding the actual 
modalities. Lamoureux insisted that there should only be one long-term adviser and he 
should stay for a minimum period of two years in the respective applicant country. As 
one official stated, 'Lamoureux was strictly against any short-term arrangements in 
twinning projects. He did not want to finance administrative tourism. We on the other 
hand could see that short-term experts were necessary, because one person would not 
know every detail required by the applicants' (Intwl7, CEC official, II September 2002). 
There were also concerns among the group that this would be interpreted as arrogance by 
the candidate countries, simply because most of them tended to be more developed in 
their knowledge of EU legislation but they lacked particularly technical skills to 
implement it. 
2.2 The establishment of the twinning concept 
Although the Commission did not intend to base its model of twinning on any of the 
member states' programmes, it was crucial to know more about them in order to create 
feasible procedures for the exercise. Thus, parallel to drafting its own concept paper, the 
Commission distributed a questionnaire to the member states (CEC 1997i). Lamoureux 
and Day also agreed on the appointment of a task manager, Carolyn Leffler-Roth, who 
became a key figure during the first years of implementation. She was originally 
seconded to the Commission by the Swedish government and had been working on 
similar issues for some time. The questionnaire included the following questions: 
1. Bilateral arrangements 
Do you have bilateral agreements with the administrations of one or several 
candidate countries? If yes which ones? 
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What types of financial participation have you adopted? 100%, co-financing 
or other types of financing agreements? 
2. Long term secondinents 
" Do you provide long term secondments for your officials? If yes what is their 
status? 
" Do you sponsor or finance other types of organisations, institutions, e. g. 
professional organisations? 
" Does your mandate cover the possibility for private institutions, trade union 
organisations, local government/other municipalities and other professional 
associations to be involved in providing services for long-term secondment? 
3. Twinning Arrangements 
" Do you have any twinning arrangements? If yes, which ones? 
" Is the recipient state co-financing such arrangements? If no, who is? If yes 
which? 
4. Countries and sectors 
" In which sectors do you think your experience would be helpful? Through 
which types of institutions? 
" Would you envisage sending officials on long-term secondment? Under 
which conditions stipulated in your laws or regulations (status, financing)? 
" Have you encountered any major obstacles in the candidate countries? 
The answers to the questionnaire were then taken in a tour de table during the first NCP 
meeting on I December 1997.96 In addition, the Commission presented its own concept 
papers at the meeting. There were several of these documents: one concerning the future 
role of SIGMA; a paper on the modalities for long-term secondments; and an outline of 
institutional partnerships under the twinning exercise. The main problems the 
Commission had to solve was of procedural nature given the specific character of 
twinnings. 
A point in favour of the lesson-drawing model is that Lamoureux, from the very 
beginning, involved experts from outside the Commission. Thus, the second paper 
distributed in the meeting was drafted by Gilles le Chatelier, a French public 
administration expert. The paper identified a number of key problems regarding the long- 
term secondment of national experts. It suggested that the status of the advisers should be 
the same as those of detached national experts to the Commission. They would be eligible 
to the same type of daily allowances, removal costs, health care, and school fees (CEC 
1997c: 2-3). The paper made neither concrete proposals as to the channelling of funds to 
the host institutions of the advisers in the member states, nor specified the tendering 
96 See bibliography for a list of concept papers and other papers distributed at this meeting. 
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procedure for twinnings. It also explicitly avoided the issue of short-term experts (STEs). 
The lack of tender needed to be addressed fairly urgently because the involvement of the 
member states' public administrations meant that a completely different tendering 
procedure was required. 
The Commission therefore addressed this issue with the drafting of a framework 
agreement between itself and the member states. This document was mainly drafted by 
Carolyn Leffler-Roth in close cooperation with the Financial Unit from DGIA and the 
hierarchy. It intended the installation of a Technical Assistance Office (TAO), which was 
supposed to be placed in DGIA. It would have been, in principle, the equivalent of the 
twinning team in DG Enlargement to date. However, its mandate would have required 
much larger numbers of officials. The TAO was supposed to identify the needs for 
institution-building in cooperation with the candidate countries and forward fiches for 
respective programmes to the member states. It was planned that the terms of reference 
for these project fiches, would have been worked out between the TAO and the relevant 
ministries in the candidate countries. In response to the fiches, the member states would 
then be asked to submit CVs of experts to the TAO, which would conduct a screening and 
then forward them to the requesting country for approval. This was a very centralized 
approach to organising the exercise. 
2.3 Reactions of the member states 
The first meeting of NCPs was an opportunity for the Commission to test its ideas. It only 
invited the member states to this meeting in order to focus on the modalities of long-term 
secondments. There were mixed reactions to the concept paper and the framework 
agreement which were submitted as supplements to the invitation (see Table 17). Austria, 
Germany, France, Finland and Sweden were generally in favour of long-term 
secondments. However, the German official pointed out that the project costs including 
the replacement costs for seconded staff should be fully reimbursed. This was widely 
shared among the member states, but the French and Greek representatives also explicitly 
mentioned it as a requirement for their administrations to participate in the twinning 
exercise. The Greek NCP also declared a preference for projects in Bulgaria and 
Romania, and mentioned that there were already plans to cooperate in the transport sector 
with these countries. 
The response from Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Luxembourg, Ireland, the Netherlands, 
Portugal and the United Kingdom was muted. The Irish official, for example, stated that 
his government would be very interested in participating, but that the 'recent surge in the 
Irish economy put administrations under particular strain' (CEC 1997g: 6). Similarly, the 
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Italian and Portuguese representatives questioned whether their administrations would be 
able to send staff on secondment. The Southern European member states, including 
Spain, had no prior experience of institutional cooperation and therefore 'were stunned in 
silence' (Intw3O, Carolyn Leffler-Roth, 04 March 2003). It took some tirne for a number 
of member states to get used to the particular model of twinning advocated by the 
Commission. 
Long-term secondments Positive reactions 
Aý D, F, FIN. S 
GR, E (mentioned particular sectors) 
Reserved reactions 
B, DK, 1, LUX, NL, P, UK 
IRL (mentioned particular sectors, incl. language training) 
Preference for other types Involvement of consultants (GR, NL, P, UK) 
ofexchanges 
Preference for short-term assistance (DK, UK, S) 
Traineeships. virtual twinning (A. B, E, DK, S, UK) 
Preferences highlighted Brain drain (D. DK, UK) 
regarding the procedures Limited absorption capacity (D, UK) 
Strategy for general civil service reform (UK) 
Preference for simple management system (D, GR) 
Full reimbursement ofcosts and replacement costs (D, F, GR) 
Source: Author's compilation. 
Table 17: Reactions of the member states to the twinning concept87 
The British government was concerned about the emphasis on long-term secondnients 
and the focus on vertical administrative capacities. It was argued that the involvement of 
consultants should not be excluded from the outset, but that the procedures should remain 
flexible in this respect. It also voiced a preference for short-term twinnings rather than 
long-term arrangernents. This view was shared by the Swedish and Danish government 
representatives. There were also concerns regarding the brain drain in CEE 
administrations and the necessary reforms in their civil services which relate to this 
problem; a point that is constantly highlighted by evaluators of Phare. An ex-post 
evaluation, for example, stated that training activities were undermined by group 
members leaving the institutions before the seminars had finished, thereby 'causing a loss 
of institutional memory about Structural Fund programming' (Pls Ramboll Management 
and Eureval-Oe 2003): 144). Germany, Denmark and the United Kingdom therefore 
87 A= Austria, Bý Belgium, D= Germany, DK = Denmark, E= Spain. F= France, Fin = Finland, 
I= Italy, IRL = Ireland, NL = The Netherlands, S= Sweden, UK = United Kingdom, GR = 
Greece. LUX = Luxembourg, P= Portugal. 
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pointed out that the Commission should require CEE institutions to ensure the 
sustainability of the envisaged projects. Other suggestions included alternative types of 
exchanges such as traineeships in member states' administrations; study visits and virtual 
twinning via the internet (see Table 17 above). The French representative emphasised that 
such activities could be incorporated in long-term projects (see CEC 1997g: 4). 
The meeting with the member states was followed by a meeting with the NCPs of the 
candidate countries on 3 February 1998. This was used to clarify the progress of the 
candidates in drawing up the NPAAs and the institution-building plan which formed an 
integral part of this document. Frangois Lamoureux used the opportunity to once more 
stress that 'the main focus should be on long-term secondments from the member states 
to the candidate countries and that any other form of transfer of know-how would be 
subsidiary and in the framework of such twinning arrangements' (CEC 1998g: 7). The 
Commission also clarified that recourse to expertise would be based on competence 
regardless of employment status. Thus, member states would also be allowed to send 
experts from privatised bodies that are involved in implementing the acquis. Ahead of the 
meeting, the French expert Gilles Le Chatelier had already indicated that he had other 
commitments. 
In this context, another argument supporting the lesson-drawing model can be made, 
because Lamoureux responded to this by requesting the help of the SIGMA services to 
suggest other experts who would be able to elaborate on the design of the twinning 
exercise. Instead of turning to his team of in-house officials, he preferred to get someone 
from the outside involved. The OECD proposed Claude Cornuau, who had been working 
for various international aid agencies, including the World Bank, USAID88 and Adetef, 
the office responsible for institutional cooperation of the French Ministry of Economy 
and Finance. His record on institution-building incorporated the creation of a twinning 
initiatives in Vietnam and Cambodia for USAID, and various relevant positions in 
Eastern Europe. It is important to stress that he was not sent by the French government, 
but contracted by SIGMA and seconded to the Commission. After two weeks in Brussels, 
Cornuau submitted concrete proposals on the introduction of an effective implementation 
system. Lamoureux decided that his dossier made a valuable contribution and asked him 
to follow the implementation of twinning for two years. 
88 USAID is the government agency providing US economic and humanitarian assistance 
worldwide for more than 40 years. 
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As mentioned above, the concept of twinning between public administrations was in not a 
completely new idea. In 1991, Rice (1991: 21), a World Bank official, had already 
pointed out that 'twinning arrangements, whereby a public or private Eastern European 
institution is paired with a foreign analogue, have begun on a limited and ad-hoc basis'. 
Similar arrangements to those the Commission intended to introduce had already been 
operational between Eastern European securities regulators and US officials. In his 
assessment of such arrangements, Rice (1991: 21, emphasis in original) stressed that 
... they are used to facilitate many types of technical assistance, exchanges, and 
training, across a wide array of institutions. Some respondents believe that a major 
expansion of government institutional twinning would decentralize institutional 
development assistance and might help speed its implementation. 
The involvement of Claude Cornuau in the formulation of the twinning exercise served 
several purposes. Firstly, the Commission wanted to make use of his expertise in the area 
of institutional cooperation. Secondly, it recognized that other institutions had more 
experience with twinning. Finally, Lamoureux realized that the involvement of an expert 
from outside the Commission would help to challenge internal path dependencies. As one 
official noted, 'we knew very little about TRANSFORM or similar twinning programmes 
and therefore recruited outside expertise' (Intw28, CEC official, 24 September 2002). 
3 Explaining the design of implementation procedures 
The Commission started to prepare for the first joint meeting with the NCPs from the 
member states and the candidate countries. As part of the preparation, Corriuau was asked 
to draft a new concept paper on the twinning exercise. There was a clear shift in emphasis 
emanating from this paper. It introduced the concept ofguaranteed results. These were an 
expression of the goal to enable each candidate country to develop 'an efficient and 
operational organisational structure which will enable it to fulfil its Community 
obligations in all security' (CEC 1998e: 1). The idea was to 'build up a system which is 
based upon an effective commitment of the candidate countries' (Intw4l, Claude 
Comuau, 20 March 2003). This proposal was also in line with the findings of the interim 
evaluation, which had criticised the 'lack of commitment devices in Phare programmes 
themselves, through financial, political and other forms of conditionality' (CEC 1997h: 
64). 
3.1 Introducing the Implementation procedures 
The involvement of the consultant was also instrumental in convincing the hierarchy of 
the need to combine long-term secondments with short-term expertise. Comuau provided 
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Frangois Lamoureux with an example that changed his mind. There was no VAT system 
in Slovenia at the time. Thus, Cornuau argued that in order to introduce a functioning 
system in the candidate county, a lawyer would be needed for 3 months to draft the 
necessary legislation. However, once the law would have been written, his job would be 
done. The next step would be to draft accountancy rules which would apply to business 
accounts and invoicing. This then needed to be monitored by an appropriate organisation 
of the fiscal services and of the public treasury. However, the introduction of a VAT 
system also required the installation of new software systems and the training of 
personnel. Finally, these changes needed to be communicated to the public. The example 
simplified what the remaining officials probably said in more difficult words. It would be 
impossible for a single individual to give advice on the necessary changes to create the 
systems needed in the candidate countries. 
Afterwards, Lamoureux agreed to the inclusion of STEs in twinning operations and the 
VAT example found its way into a revised version of the concept paper (CEC 1998f, 2). 
It was harder for the external expert to convince the Deputy Director General to shorten 
the minimum period of twinnings. A compromise was therefore reached and the 
minimum recruitment time for PAAs89 was set at 12 months. This condition was 
introduced with the twinning manual, which the Commission began to develop parallel to 
the implementation process. However, the concept paper clarified that the individuals 
taking this position should be 'actual practitioners in their field, familiar both with its 
general principles as well as its practical problems, and capable ofabstractingfrom their 
own context in order to assist the CC to create its own system' (CEC 1998f: 4, emphasis 
added). 
The Commission's approach to twinning was therefore in line with the findings of 
Chapter 4. It intended to enable the combination of innovation and existing institutional 
models from the member states. It is therefore puzzling that Tulmets (2005b: 673, 
emphasis added), an excellent observer of the twinning exercise, concludes in her study 
on several twinning projects in Estonia that 
there is no 'pure and simple' transfer of institutional models: when these transfers 
were not simply rejected by officials, one may notice phenomena of muddling through 
and of institutional hybridisation, which can be explained best by individual as well as 
structural reasons. In this sense, twinning is not necessarily a success in the way the 
Commission understands it. 
Pre-Accession Advisors. 
- 
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In contrast, it can be argued that hybrids coupled with innovation were precisely what the 
Commission had in mind during the formulation of the twinning exercise. This can also 
be shown by an explanation of the remaining twinning procedures. 
3.2 The selection of twinning partners 
The Commission highlighted the importance of innovative solutions in many NCP 
meetings and the twinning manual (CEC 1998n: 4). In order to ensure that ownership of 
the projects would lie in the candidates' administrations, Leffler-Roth and Comuau 
decided that the selection of twinning partners would be made by the candidates 
themselves. The 1998 twinning manual, which became the rulebook for the exercise, 
stressed that candidates are free to 'forge ties with the Member State(s) whose systems 
best suit its own culture, organisation and national interest' (CEC 1998n: 25). It also 
expressed explicitly that candidate countries should adopt a varied approach in order to 
'prevent the blanket duplication of a Member State's system in an applicant country' 
(CEC 1998n: 25). 
The twinning exercise also actively supported the idea of competition for projects 
between the member states. Starting with the implementation of the exercise in 1998, the 
Commission asked the member states to present proposals in response to project riches 
drafted by the candidates with support of the Commission's delegations. These proposals 
and a presentation by the member states' experts in the respective partner institution built 
the basis for the selection of suitable partners. in the twinning manual, the Commission 
stressed that it would 'work with the CC to try to ensure that these fiches are as detailed 
as possible in order to assist the MS in properly defining their proposals' (CEC 1998n: 
21). It also noted that 'simple expressions of interest will not be considered eligible. The 
offers made by the MS are expected to show a certain degree of preparation' (CEC 
1998n: 21). 
The candidates were also allowed to choose experts from more than one member state. As 
a result, member states' administrations acted either as project leader when their PAA 
was selected during the presentation in the candidate countries or alternatively there was a 
chance for them to get involved as junior partners. The latter would usually send STEs. 
However, quite a large number of programmes were also implemented with more than 
one long-term adviser. The concept paper explicitly stated that 'the presence in the same 
team of specialists from several MSs can be a healthy stimulus in the searchfor original 
solutions tailored to the particular CC' (CEC 1998f. 9). This statement is another 
indication that the Commission wanted to enable the candidates to combine innovation 
with hybridisation of institutional models from the member states. 
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The next issue emerging from the discussions in DGIA was the fact that the secondment 
of PAAs and STEs would be more successful if higher level officials could get involved 
in the implementation of the projects. This issue was addressed by arrangements made 
through the framework agreement between each of the member states and the 
Commission. Claude Corriuau proposed that the twinning of administrations would be the 
best way to circumvent legal problems involved in bilateral cooperation. The partner 
institutions would be represented by the Head of the Administrations who would sign the 
twinning covenant, i. e. the document that laid out the commitments of the partners and 
the work plan for a particular project. The candidates and the member states would also 
each appoint a project leader. These higher level echelons would support the 
implementation of the project from their home countries and meet monthly in the project 
steering committee. The remaining signatories of the twinning covenant were the CFCU 
and the Commission's Delegation in the respective candidate country. 
The framework agreements complemented the twinning covenants by making the 
necessary modalities for the funding of twinning programmes. Although the financial 
responsibility of the projects rested with the CFCUs in the candidate countries, these legal 
documents were necessary to specify a number of conditions for the involvement of 
PAAs and STEs in twinning projects. In this context, Claude Cornuau stressed the 
following: 
The problem was that Lamoureux accepted to amend his original idea, but we had to 
obtain a lot of change in the way the Phare programme was working. It took us, at the 
first stage, one and half years to solve the most important problems. We knew that 
from the very first day, but time was pressing and therefore we had to improve the 
system while implementation went along. The political context demanded of us to do 
it that way (Intw 60, Claude Cornuau, 20 March 2003). 
There was considerable resistance against these proposals within the Commission. The 
majority of officials were still used to the making of commitments to means rather than 
results. Claude Cornuau's notion of guaranteed results was therefore not very well 
received, in particular by officials involved in the introduction of the SCR and AIDCO. 
The problem was largely a transfer of power from the Commission and its delegations to 
project implementation staff in the candidate countries. The objective of the proposals 
made by the consultant was that all partners involved in twinning would commit to the 
results of the project; outline a detailed work plan before implementation started; but they 
would also remain flexible in reallocating means within the budget to achieve the 
guaranteed results. The expert noted, 'people came to the Commission and asked "Please 
can we organise a workshop, please can we do this... ". I replied: Now, the problem is not 
to check the means, but to check the results. It was problematic for most officials' (Intw 
60, Claude Comuau, 20 March 2003). Since Frangois Lamoureux and Catherine Day 
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supported the consultant throughout the introduction of the procedures, it became 
possible to overcome such problems. 
There were also a lot of procedural questions that delayed the actual implementation of 
the programme. In order to resolve these problems, Claude Comuau travelled to the 
member states and the candidate countries (see Table 19 below). The staff of the British 
Know-How Fund, which was situated in DflD, for example, argued that the per them 
rates set by the Commission both for PAAs and STEs were too low. Their argument was 
that a good portion of the British administration had been outsourced and therefore 
salaries were higher than in continental Europe. Comuau responded to this issue by 
cMfying that twinnings would take place at the working level. In an interview, he 
stressed that 'they were asking for 61.500 a day. I told them that I do not need Mr. 
Schumacher to run a private taxi. They also proposed two former Secretaries of State'. 
(Intw4l, Claude Cornuau, 20 March 2003). This was an indication that the British 
government had a problem with the concept of twinning proposed by the DGIA. 
However, such problems led to a delay in implementing twinning projects until the mid of 
June 1999, when the first PAA left France to take up her new position in Poland. 
The Commission had already agreed to compensate the member states at a level of 106 
percent for the secondinent of PAAs. The 6 percent were an allowance that would be paid 
out for replacement costs. The advisers themselves were also reimbursed through an 
allowance that covered housing, health and accident insurance, school fees, travel and 
removal costs. In order to ensure the legal character of these agreements, the details of the 
financial arrangements were separately agreed with each of the member states in the 
framework agreements. The twinning manual also made an arrangement for the 
reimbursement for STEs and project leaders at three different rates. An actual allocation 
would be based on the days spent in the candidate countries: Class I expert - 6250 per 
day; Class 2 senior expert - 16350 per day; and class 3 special counsellor - C450 per day. 
In this context, another point in favour of the lesson-drawing model is that Claude 
Cornuau took about two years to introduce a procedure that would allow the Commission 
to reimburse the member states for project preparation costs. There was nobody else that 
was pushing for this particular procedure. As one official noted, 'Claude was completely 
alone with this, until the assessment report on twinning was published in 2000' (Intw6O, 
CEC official, 10 November 2003). 
The background of this procedure was twofold. Firstly, one of the main problems in the 
countries that were actually in favour of the twinning exercise was the lack of expertise in 
implementing administrative cooperation. Since twinning leads to the reallocation of 
budgetary envelopes within an administration, the member states needed bodies like 
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Adetef in France or GTZ in Germany that were able to contract within the framework of 
the projects. These structures needed some autonomy in law and had to be able to 'move 
budgetary allocations from something to something else' (Intw4l, Claude Cornuau, 20 
March 2003). Italy had to introduce two laws to initiate these institutions. The 
Commission, however, was also bound by its rules of Sound and Efficient Management. 
It therefore needed to ensure efficient monitoring and evaluation of the projects as well. 
Thus, the compensation for the preparation costs enabled the member states to invest in 
necessary resources. The consultant also indicated that he was 'familiar with these types 
of problems, because they usually occur in twinning arrangements' (Intw4l, Claude 
Cornuau, 20 March 2003). 
In order to enable the member states to engage in twinning projects in spite of these 
procedural issues, the Commission also asked the member states to develop a detailed 
work plan in cooperation with their counterparts in the candidate countries. This would 
become an integral part of the twinning covenant which would also include concrete 
benchmarks, timeframes as well as duration and risk analysis. These procedures would 
ensure the achievement of the guaranteed results which would have to be specified in 
each covenant in relation to the APs and the NPAAs. However, the preparation of these 
work plans would create costs for the member states which were not part of project 
implementation. Thus, Comuau decided that there should be some sort of reimbursement 
for the preparation of twinning proposals. He emphasized the following, 'it took me a lot 
of time to get the Commission to commit to a system of early reimbursement. The 
Commission said you cannot pay the administrations for preparing the covenant. 
EuropeAid did everything to block it' (Intw4 1, Claude Cornuau, 20 March 2003). 
In addition, DGIA agreed on a proposal by Cornuau which earmarked a flatrate 
compensation for any costs that were incurred outside the candidate countries during the 
implementation of the project. This included, for example, preparation or follow-up of 
member states' missions to the candidates' institutions. The flatrate was set at a level of 
150 percent of the actual per diems rates for work in the candidate countries. Its 
introduction was largely inspired by the intervention of the member states. Many member 
states had requested this change when Comuau visited them to discuss procedures that 
could simplify implementation. The member states were quite clear about this particular 
point in their communications with the Commission and made it a requirement for their 
participation. Germany had been pressing for a full compensation of all costs deriving 
from twinning projects. However, it was Comuau who came up with the concrete 
proposal to introduce a flatrate to compensate for these costs. The objective of this was to 
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'add further flexibility to the member states' operations during the implementation of 
twinning' (Intw4 1, Claude Cornuau, 20 March 2003). 
The financial proposals for twinning projects were then approved by the Commission's 
Steering Committee which usually met once a month in the candidate countries. This 
committee was chaired by DG Enlargement and included representatives from the 
relevant services such as the Commission's Delegation and line DGs. The decisions taken 
at the Steering Committee were based on a review of the respective twinning covenants 
and could take on several forms (CEC 2002c: 29): 
1. agree to finance the project as presented, either 
unconditional approval, or 
conditional approval; 
11. request that the twins undertake further amendments or clarifications, either by 
(iii) written procedure, or 
(iv) full debate; 
III. reject the proposal as it stands and request a full reworking. 
The Steering Committee enabled the Commission to exert considerable influence on the 
drafting of twinning covenants. It allowed the relevant services to become involved in 
project design. However, the power to terminate PAA secondments or the whole twinning 
project was only given to the project partners themselves (CEC 2002c: 63). This latter 
point indicates that cooperation was valued higher than enforcement of the conditions 
specified in the twinning covenants. 
As part of the drafting of the twinning manual, the Commission also started to provide 
templates for all steps in the implementation process: 
1. the framework agreement, 
2. the project fiches that were prepared by the candidate countries and the 
Commission services, 
3. the proposals by the member states, 
4. the twinning covenant, 
5. the quarterly reports by the PAAs, 
6. the final reports by the PAAs. 
These templates helped steering the implementation of twinning projects and the manual 
provided the rulebook as well as the necessary guidance on the instrument. In addition, 
the Commission made use of a number of other documents to guide the programming of 
twinning projects. The Phare Programming Guide, for example, gave detailed 
explanations of the logframe matrix approach that was also applied to twinning projects 
(see Annex 15, CEC 2001i). The Commission also annexed examples of completed 
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twinning covenants to the packs distributed at the subsequent NCP-meetings. In addition, 
Claude Comuau was given the opportunity to present his concept at three different 
meetings with the NCPs in 1998. He stressed at the meeting on 7 May 1998 that PAAs 
were 'providing services and are not involved in neo-colonialism' (CEC 1998k). In order 
to obtain an impression of the problems occurring during implementation, he continued to 
tour the capitals of CEE and the member states. 
Main steps In Twinning Main responsibilities In Tvirinning 
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03. Dispatch of oftni to berieficianes, x 
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05 Communication of selection to HQ x 
06. Commurwcabonofseiechontoms x 
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It. Implementation, reporting x 
12 Payments x 
13. Monitoring x For Info 
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guaranteed result 
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payment Subject 
to 15 
0 Work stmrod between Phare Unit and Twinning Team. 
Source: European Court of Auditors 2003, Annex I-p. 4. 
Table 18: Main steps and responsibilities In Twinning 
The implementation of twinning project would therefore involve a large number of actors 
within the Commission, its Delegations, the member states and the candidate countries 
(see Table 19 above). In order to programme twinning projects, the Commission involved 
four different internal units stretching over the Delegations in the candidate countries, 
relevant line DGs and two units within DGlA/DG Enlargement. In addition, it had to 
coordinate the drafting of project fiches with the candidates. In practice, programming 
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was therefore mainly conducted by the candidates with the support of the Delegations. In 
a second step, the Commission HQ conducted a quality check parallel in all three units 
involved. The candidates were asked to submit more fiches than would actually be 
implemented in a programming year. In case particular projects lacked quality, the 
Commission could therefore choose to finance alternative fiches. 
Following the selection procedure described by points 2-6 in Table 19, the drafting of the 
covenant had to be coordinated between the twinning partners, the administrations in the 
member states and the candidate countries that were twinned. There were significant 
delays in the drafting of the covenants, which led to many criticisms by external 
evaluators and member states alike (European Court of Auditors 2003b: 45; Birker el at 
2000: 5; EMS 2004b: 49; OMAS 2001a: 18). This is followed by the approval of the 
covenant which could lead to further delays. The Commission started to communicate 
exact deadlines for the submission of covenants and their approval by the Commission 
Steering Committee. The revised twinning manual concluded that 'projects can become 
operational within 6 months of selection notification' (CEC 2002c: 26). Due to the 
decisions taken from 1998 to 1999, the basic features of a twinning project therefore 
included the following: the minimum duration of 12 months, the PAAs, Project Leaders 
from the member states and candidate countries, a package of short-term missions and 
training, as well as a covenanting phase. In this phase, the joint objectives of the 
programmes were defined by the member states and the candidates' partner institutions. 
In addition, project implementation was accompanied by substantial monitoring and 
evaluation. The procedures agreed with respect to this aspect of the programme were 
fully in line with the reform of the Commission's external services (see Neill Nugent and 
Saurugger 2002; CEC 2001a: 14-16; 1999g: 25; 2000d). They gave substantial 
responsibilities to the Commission's Delegations in the candidate countries. 
3.3 Reformulating the twinning procedures 
The member states started to voice concerns regarding the overall direction which the 
design of the exercise had taken. At an NCP meeting in Brussels, the Danish NCP, for 
example, questioned the ve? y heavy twinning procedures, one aspect being the 
requirement for a long-term PAA (CEC 1999e: 1). In some respect, the Commission 
invited these criticisms. While it had used previous meetings to introduce the procedures 
worked out within DGIA, it addressed issues deriving from the first implementation 
rounds in the NCP meeting on 25 June 1999. It invited the member states to submit non- 
papers for this first reflection on twinning. This could be seen as an element of 
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deliberative supranationalism during the introduction of the twinning exercise. The 
meeting, however, also had to resolve a more serious problem. 
In 1999, the first PAAs started to take up their work in the candidate countries. However, 
the Commission had not approved the CFCUs in all of the beneficiary states. In addition, 
the budgetary authority had not approved enough paying credits and therefore the 
Commission had to ask the member states to pre-finance projects until the autumn of that 
year (CEC 2002c: 2). The member states, however, were pleased: as it was agreed to 
introduce the flatrate compensation for working days spent in their administrations. This 
significantly simplified the calculation of management costs. The Commission also 
presented statistics of the first implementation rounds in order to give an overview of the 
development of the selection procedure. It ensured the member states that a review of the 
twinning mechanism would be undertaken. The member states would become an 
important part of this assessment. However, the non-papers by the member states were 
not discussed in greater detail, partly because not all of them had arrived in time. 
The non-paper drafted by French NCP, Jacques Fanouillaire, expressed concern about the 
excessive rigidh)ýO of the implementation procedures. It presented a positive assessment 
of the twinning mechanism. However, it demanded more flexibility during its 
implementation, in particular concerning amendments to the twinning covenant. It also 
asked to speed up implementation through a simplification of the selection procedure and 
expressed concern regarding the provisions made for language support during 
implementation. The German non-paper highlighted the need to introduce more 
transparency in the selection process and to streamline projects through limiting the 
number of participants (see also Table 17 above). 
The latter was a suggestion that was shared by the Commission because there were now 
projects on the ground that built consortia consisting of five member states. A particularly 
good example of this problem was the twinning project PL981IB-OT-01 - Preparationfor 
Structural Funds in Poland (Phase I and 2) which involved the United Kingdom as the 
project leader as well as Germany, France, Ireland, Finland and Denmark as junior 
partners. It set the objective to 'enhance Poland's capacity to implement European 
Structural Fund programmes and the co-financing of large projects under the Cohesion 
Fund' (CEC 1998m: 1). The components of the project were fragmented into six parts 
which were to be implemented by each of the twinning partners. It became clear, 
however, that the objectives set in the twinning covenant were over-ambitious and 
go Author's translation. 
_ 
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therefore a modest approach was necessary. Frangois Lamoureux therefore decided that 
not more than twojunior partners should be involved in the implementation of twinning. 
The reactions voiced in the non-paper by Denmark were quite sharp. It stressed that it 
objected to the approach taken for the selection of twinning partners, 'institutions are 
treated as if they were commercial bidders and not government delegations offering their 
services. '91 This criticism was also made frequently by British civil servants during 
interviews. One official stated, 'I think competitive bidding for programmes is the 
completely wrong focus within an accession programme' (IntwlO, British official, 13 
May 2002). The Swedish government took a much more positive approach in its 
contribution to the debate. It expressed its full support for the implementation of 
twinning, highlighted positive developments and possible improvements. It also 
suggested abolishing the 12 months requirement that had been set for PAAs. The paper 
stressed that the provision of suitable experts in the future would be easier under a more 
flexible arrangement. 
In 2000, the Commission recruited four independent consultants in order to draft an 
assessment report on twinning. This report became instrumental in the introduction of 
shorter-term actions under the heading of Twinning Light. The report concluded that 
twinning is 'a highly valued mechanism to support CC progress towards meeting the 
requirements of the various acquis. (Birker et al. 2000: 3). It also recognized that the 
overly bureaucratic nature of the administrative procedures was addressed after the 1998 
round of twinning; 'flexibility has been enhanced and delegation of decision-making has 
been increased' (Birker et al. 2000: 4). However, it named three threats that could have 
impaired the implementation of the programme: the lack of absorption capacity in the 
candidate countries; the lack of progress made by the applicants on horizontal public 
administration reform; and lastly, the capacity of the member states to provide adequate, 
high-quality human resources. 
The assessment suggested that the 'absolute requirement for a full-time presence in the 
CC could be relaxed' (Birker et aL 2000: 4). This proposal was noted up by the officials 
who initiated a number of changes to the pre-accession strategy through the Phare 2000 
Review. The review referred directly to evaluation and concluded the following: 
Short-term institution building needs of up to two weeks are addressed by the TAIEX 
instrument. Longer-term needs of up to 24 months are addressed by twinning through 
inter alia the provision of civil servants on long term secondment from member state 
administrations to counterpart administrations in the applicant countries. However, to 
91 File retrieved from the twinning archive. The document carries no date or title. 
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address those Accession Partnership priorities that lie between these two extremes, 
projects providing medium term twinning (twinning "light") will be introduced in 
2001 Phare programmes. 
In the revised twinning manual, the Commission specified the procedures of Twinning 
Light and clarified that it would exclusively be utilised for subjects of limited scope. The 
Commission gave the creation of an Insurance Supervisory Authority or Roads 
Inspectorate as examples (CEC 2002c: Annex A, pg. 1). The main difference in the 
procedures was that the project fiches would be submitted directly to the Commission 
Delegations. In case the Delegation approved of a particular project, it would than contact 
the Country Unit within DG Enlargement with a copy to the twinning team for financial 
approval. The selection and preparation procedures were also considerably simplified. 
However, the bidding between the member states would still take place, but it would 
exclude the experts' presentation in the candidate countries. 
The Phare 2000 Review also introduced a new requirement for twinning projects. These 
needed to be included in the FMs from the year 200 1, whereas before that time, they were 
excluded from this document. However, in 2002, the Commission also relaxed the 12 
month requirement for PAAs considerably. In its 2002 Phare Programming Guide, it 
stated the following: 
As we approach finalisation of negotiations in some countries, the joint preparation of 
a work schedule in particular and all the other features of standard Twinning may still 
be necessary, but there may be exceptional cases where the presence of the PAA could 
be reduced; e. g. permanent presence of a PAA at the beginning, for a period of 
perhaps 4 to 6 months to kick-start the project, followed up by a monthly repeat visit 
of up to maybe a week by the same expert to ensure that the momentum is maintained 
(CEC 2002b: 3 1). 
The introduction of twinning light in 2001 and the relaxation of the 12 months 
requirement in 2002 were significant steps towards the recommendations of the member 
states, but also a response to the evaluators' findings of twinning. 
The changes introduced to the twinning procedures from 2000 to 2002 show that both the 
member states and evaluations had a significant impact on the elaboration of the 
implementation procedures. These changes, however, were not the result of a problem- 
oriented deliberation or the transfer of an existing model of implementation from the 
member states. As a result, both alternative explanation 3 and 4 appear to provide limited 
information on how the twinning procedures were introduced and how they changed over 
time. However, it has to be acknowledged that the changes were inspired by ongoing 
evaluations of the effectiveness of twinning during implementation. 
The type of information deriving from these evaluations appeared to tie in with the 
lessons drawn from Cornuau's experience in development cooperation and the demands 
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of the member states. In addition, neither the archive documents retrieved nor the 
interviews conducted suggested that the German government was heavily involved in 
formulating procedures or in fact suggested them. In contrast, the findings consistently 
pointed to a rather rational way of safeguarding the twinning concept established by the 
Commission. Thus, changes to the core components of this concept such as the long-term 
secondment of PAAs were only allowed towards the very end of the accession process. 
4 Conclusion 
The creation of procedures for the implementation of the twinning exercise was largely 
facilitated by lesson-drawing. This can be highlighted by a short summary of the findings 
presented in this chapter and a direct evaluation of the plausible rival hypothesis outlined 
in Chapter 4 (see Table 19 below). The formulation of the twinning exercise was mainly 
driven by the establishment of the twinning concept and its implementation procedures. 
In order to asses the plausible rival hypotheses specified for the internal governance stage 
of decision-making, this section explains each of the relevant steps taken during the 
reform process. It also highlights factors that played a significant role but lie outside the 
four models outlined in Chapter 4. 
Firstly, the focus of the Commission on vertical administrative capacities in the candidate 
countries can be largely explained by the political context of the reforms in these 
countries. There are no provisions in the acquis communautaire that allow the 
Commission to directly influence the setup of its members' administrations. Thus, the 
introduction of an instrument that targets horizontal administration reform would be seen 
as particularly controversial, unless it operates solely by the delivery of advice such as the 
SIGMA programme. In addition, the Commission could also see that it would be difficult 
to deliver on any promises made with respect to general administrative capacity or civil 
service reform, since these were largely driven by the internal politics of the candidate 
countries themselves. These were matters of the candidates' core sovereignty, which they 
would be entitled to sustain even after membership. It did therefore resort to demand that 
'the EU needs to develop with the Member States and other donors a stronger collective 
voice so that candidate countries' commitment to better public administration can be 
fostered and built on' (CEC 2000i: 10). 
The idea for twinning derived largely from the experience of Frangois Lamoureux, the 
Deputy Director General of DGIA. This chapter has highlighted that the involvement of 
the management level in DGIA was crucial during the introduction of twinning. The 
Commissioner was kept informed of the plans, but the internal process within DG IA was 
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largely driven by the reform concept that was formed between the group of officials 
working with Frangois Lamoureux and Catherine Day. Since twinning was an established 
delivery method in development cooperation and a strong functional case for its 
application in the accession process could be made, Lamoureux adopted the concept that 
had already been voiced at the Strasbourg European Council in 1989. This idea was also 
present throughout the implementation of Phare and in the Group of 24 since the early 
1990s. Phare Co-ordinators in the Commission and its Delegations constantly pressed 
consultants to recruit civil servants for institution-building projects, in particular 
following the 1994 Essen European Council. 
Twinning was also promoted as a successful delivery method by the Phare Interim 
Evaluation. However, when the actual formulation of the twinning exercise was 
envisaged, Lamoureux spent only a short time to establish a basic concept with his in- 
house team. He turned relatively quickly to outside expertise because he could see that 
the available information was insufficient. The knowledge about this type of bilateral 
cooperation accumulated in DGIA lacked precision and experience. The recruitment of 
Comuau made a connection to similar programmes implemented in the World Bank and 
USAID. He had been involved in operations of these institutions for almost all his career 
which terminated after his time at DGIA. In addition, this became a unique solution to 
the problem that the Commission faced during the introduction of the twinning 
procedures. These were mainly related to the culture that had developed during 
programme implementation in the 1990s. This point was also criticised in the Phare 
Interim Evaluation. 
The implementation of Phare was driven by concerns regarding the eligibility of the 
means rather than results. Commission staff was mainly involved in checking and 
controlling programme implementation by signing against the use of certain means. Phare 
programnies generally lacked concrete objectives specified by measurable indicators. As 
a result, a programme was deemed successful if the money was spent on time and on the 
right type of actions. The involvement of Cornuau led to a direct challenge of this culture. 
He faced the staff in the Commission's Headquarters as much as in the Delegations and 
introduced the category of guaranteed results. This was an expression of the commitment 
to results rather than means. His involvement was also necessary to convince Lamoureux 
of the fact that the long-term secondment of member states' officials to the candidate 
countries needed to be complemented with short-term expertise by relevant staff from one 
or more countries. Lamoureux had received similar feedback from the member states and 
his in-house team. However, the examples given by the consultant finally convinced him; 
they tipped the scales in favour of short-term measures within twinning. 
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Element of the reform Mode of governance 
Objectives 3. Focus on vertical administrative political context. evidence-based policy- 
capacit) making, 
4. Idea for twinning lesson-dravving 6& functional concerns 
Procedures I Long-term secondment of at least lesson-draiving, intergovernmental 
12 months bargaining 
2 Short-term experts lesson-drawing, intergovernmental 
bargaining 
3, Bidding process (proposals, lesson-drawing & innovation 
presentations and selection) 
4. Covenant ("Guaranteed Results", lesson-drawing & innovation, evidence- 
benchmarks, tinieframes, duration & based policy-making (path del)endence) 
risk analysis) 
5. Project Steering committee. lesson-drawing. 
Project leaders evidence-based policy-making 
6 Flatrate for proposal preparation lesson-drawing, 
intergovernmental bargaining 
7 Introduction of twinning light (as a evidence-based policy-making, 
result of the Phare 2000 Review) intergovernmental bargaining 
Source: Author's compilation. 
Table 19: The formulation of twinning procedures and modes of governance 
This opened up the opportunity not only to include STEs in the implernentation of 
twining, but also to send candidates' staff on internships to the member states or to 
arrange study visits within the framework of a twinning project. In addition, the positive 
effects of the involvernent of high-level officials during implementation were already 
highlighted in the Phare Interim Evaluation (CEC 1997h: 59). However, the systematic 
involvement of this type of officials derived from the concept paper that Claude Cornuau 
had drafted in close cooperation with the Commission's staff. These were to be included 
in the projects as Project Leaders in the twinned institutions of the member state and the 
candidate country in question. It has to be stressed that there was little time to coordinate 
on these types of procedural questions. It can be deduced from the tinlescales between the 
output of internal documents, and the NCP meetings where they were presented, that 
Cornuau must have discussed most issues directly with Leffler-Roth, Day and 
Lamoureux. There was often only a period of 4-6 weeks time between meetings to 
discuss the procedures. Most interviewees involved in the reform also clarified that it was 
a very small group of people that dealt with twinning (Intwl7,28,30 and 32, CEC 
officials). Other units within DGIA became involved particularly when tinancial issues 
were discussed. However, these did not dorninate the establishment of the overall concept 
of twinning that the Commission elaborated from January 1998. 
After consulting the member states in tile NCP-ineetings, the Commission commenced to 
shape the twinning procedures. While the first round of implementation was based on tile 
basic set of rules established at the first meeting, the second round, which was also 
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programmed in 1998, was already driven by the model introduced in the concept paper. 
This fact can be established by the archival documents retrieved in DG Enlargement. 
These confirm that the Commission was still involved in selecting twinning partners 
during the first round, but not anymore in the second implementation round. The main 
problems related to defining a tendering procedure that would suit the particularities of 
twinning. In this context, Claude Cornuau stressed that the commitment to results should 
be combined with a detailed workplan and a lot offlexibility during implementation. His 
concern was that member states would openly commit to a project without having thought 
through the necessary steps of implementation. 
This fear was based on Comuau's experience in Vietnam, where he implemented a 
twinning project as programme manager for USAID. Although the US aid agency 
promised him beforehand that they had the right twinning partners, they sent a single 
individual whose sole practical experience was based on teaching accountancy law at an 
American university., Comuau was adamant that this type of mistake would not be 
repeated in the EU's twinning programmes. As a result, the member states' proposals had 
to include the CVs of the experts that they wanted to send to the candidate countries. 
However, he was equally concerned about the tight controls of the Commission during 
implementation. It quickly became clear to Comuau that the arrangements made for 
implementation under Phare were counterproductive for the performance of the 
programme. Thus, he placed enormous emphasis on flexibility during implementation 
and in particular on the reallocation of financial means within pre-specified budget lines. 
In practice, this led, for example, to procedures whereby PAAs only had to notify the 
Delegation if they reallocated budgetary allocations from a study visit to a conference. It 
was within the discretion of the implementation staff to rearrange allocations where 
necessary. 
The next step in the selection procedure was the choice of the twinning partner(s). For 
this purpose, the proposals of the member states would then be evaluated by the 
candidates themselves. This point was relatively quickly agreed between Claude Cormiau 
and Leffler-Roth. There was considerable concern that the candidates would not support 
the implementation of twinning projects sufficiently. It was therefore necessary to leave 
the selection of partner to them and thereby create ownership of the programme in the 
candidate countries' administrations. The details of the selection procedure were 
formulated by Claude Cornuau, Leffler-Roth and the management level. At times, this 
also included Heads of Units or Directors as soon as plans became more concrete. The 
NCP meetings with the member states were used to introduce the new procedures. The 
important point to make is that Claude Cornuau travelled across Europe in order to 
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acquire further information regarding the problems during implementation. However, this 
was not solely an information gathering exercise. The consultant also started to take the 
member states side on a number of procedural questions, for example, the compensation 
for preparation costs and costs incurred outside the candidate countries. 
There was a general concern that the supply of adequate PAAs by the member states 
would break up after a few years. The Commission was therefore also willing to make 
concessions on a number of points. However, these changes were not guided by the 
objective to find appropriate or legitimate solutions, but rather member states made subtle 
threats that their administrations would not be able to send advisers without special 
arrangements. In addition, there was only real change where the management level 
supported Cornuau in the internal debates with AIDCO. Implementation procedures for 
Phare were subject to inter-service consultation. DGIA could not escape these 
discussions. It has to be stressed though that it was in an excellent position to generate 
change, since the publication of Agenda 2000 and the Opinions opened a unique window 
of opportunity. The enlargement of the EU had become one of the main priorities of the 
Community in 1998. At no time did the concessions made within the Commission or to 
the member states compromise the core twinning concept developed between the officials 
inDGIA. 
Evaluation of the alternative hypothesis 
This chapter has demonstrated that lesson-drawing is the only mode of governance that 
can explain all procedural aspects of the twinning exercise (see Table 19 above). 
Although, other factors were of considerable importance during the introduction of 
twinning, in particular interventions by the member states and evaluations of Phare, it was 
the involvement of an external expert that shaped the formulation of the procedures and 
the concept of twinning most. This chapter therefore concludes that the following 
alternative hypothesis describes the formulation of the twinning exercise best: 
Hlb: The Commission, due to its ability to draw lessonsfrom the experience of other aid 
donors, has been crucial in creating the twinning exercise by determining its objectives, 
procedures and content. 
The independent variables enshrined in the remaining hypotheses also played an 
important role during the introduction of twinning into Phare. However, none of them 
was present throughout this process (see Table 19 above). The Commission in particular 
started to utilise evidence-based policy-making after the contract of Claude Cornuau 
expired in 2000. This led to the introduction of shorter term twinning projects under the 
heading of Twinning Light. It also led to a relaxation of the 12 months requirement of 
PAAs. However, the latter change has to be seen in the context of the closing of accession 
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negotiations. It also has to be stressed that these changes were introduced after Frangois 
Lamoureux had moved on to DG Transport and Catherine Day to DG Environment. The 
evaluation of Phare therefore clearly gave impulses to the introduction of twinning and 
often the innovative elements of twinning benefited from both the experience of Cornuau 
in bilateral cooperation and the Commission's resources in policy assessment. 
It may therefore be appropriate to not see hypotheses HIa and HIb as exclusive answers 
to the questions posed regarding the internal governance stage of decision-making. In 
contrast, a synthesis of these models can account for the majority of procedural changes 
introduced to make the twinning exercise work. Although Cornuau acted as the main 
agent of transfer during the introduction of twinning, internal assessments and the 
Commission's staff had a significant impact on the procedures. This is in particular true 
for the management level in DGIA. However, the twinning concept, which is based on 
the long-term secondment of PAAs, short-term experts, guaranteed results and 
measurable benchmarks, derives largely from his experience with twinning operations of 
USAID and the World Bank. 
Hypothesis Hlc on intergovernmental bargaining can explain some of the concessions 
made to the member states during the formulation of the procedures. However, many of 
these changes would not have been introduced without the support of Claude Cornuau. 
This can also be highlighted on the basis of a small excursus on the introduction of 
twinning into the CARDS programme. The objective of the introduction of twinning into 
this aid programme was to enable the countries of the Western Balkans, who are partly 
applicant countries already, to develop the administrative capacities to implement 
Community legislation. However, since CARDS is implemented by DG EuropeAid, the 
flatrate for compensation of costs that occur outside the beneficiary countries was 
abolished for these operations. This rule applies only for twinning projects in the Western 
Balkans, but the member states were irritated about this particular decision. Nevertheless, 
the officials in EuropeAid proceeded with this procedural change. Later, when twinning 
was introduced into MEDA, the Community's aid programme for Mediterranean 
countries, AIDCO went along with its original decision. As a result, the joint manual on 
twinning drafted by DG Enlargement and DG Aidco had to refer to different procedures 
for the same delivery method. 
This shows that administrative culture within an institution is difficult to change from the 
outside. However, changes can be achieved from inside the institution, in particular)when 
the agents involved supported at the management level within the respective DG. Lesson- 
drawing provides as a form of prospective policy evaluation is a useful mechanism to 
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evaluate possible outcomes during implementation. Agents of transfer such as Claude 
Comuau can facilitate this process of projection during the creation of new instruments. 
They can become instrumental in gathering the right type of information because of their 
experience in implementation. The Commission voluntarily admitted to this type of 
influence during the introduction of twinning and made actively use of it. However, 
regarding the member states it took a more cautious approach. The contact with the 
member states was mostly formalised in form of the NCP meetings. Informal contacts 
were largely conducted by Claude Comuau and Leffler-Roth. These may have been 
instrumental for the member states in persuading Claude Comuau to support them. 
However, it can hardly be suggested that this points to a process of joint problem-solving 
as outlined by Hypothesis Hld on deliberative supranationalism. This is because the 
deliberation of alternatives may have had an impact on the formulation of particular 
procedures, but it did not affect the definition of the twinning concept. 
8 
The twinning exercise as an instrument of accession 
I Introduction 
It is by imitation, far more than by precept, that we learn everything; and 
what we learn thus, we acquire not only more efficiently, but more 
pleasantly. This forms our manners, our opinions, our lives. 
Edmund Burke, Irish orator, philosopher, & politician (1729 - 1797) 
This chapter examines the implementation of the twinning exercise with the aim of 
establishing what type of accession instrument it is and how it influences candidates to 
reform their public administrations. It tests the three alternative hypotheses outlined for 
the external governance stage of decision-making. These derive from the following 
theoretical models: governance by conditionality, persuasion and social learning, and 
new forms of governance. This test is performed by an analysis of the twinning 
procedures in light of the theoretical models outlined in Chapter 4; an identification of the 
role of actors involved in policy implementation; and an assessment of the dynamics 
deriving from the implementation of twinning projects. These research steps help to 
reflect on the interaction of the Commission, the member states and the candidates during 
the implementation of twinning projects. 
The chapter questions whether the implementation under the twinning exercise assumes a 
logic of appropriateness or a logic of anticipated consequences. In case when one of these 
behavioural patterns can be attributed clearly, the implementation of twinning can be 
explained by either the governance hy conditionality ar the persuasion and social 
214 
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leaming model. However, in cases when the implementation of twinning assumes both of 
these logics, it can be regarded as a newfOrm ofgovernance, which primarily makes use 
of peer pressure and enhanced cooperation (see also Steffens 2003; Tulmets 2005a, 
2005b). This is closely connected to the question of whether the twinning exercise made 
use of coercive forms of policy transfer as opposed to enhanced cooperation or persuasion 
during its implementation. The latter can be seen as more voluntary forms of obligated 
policy transfer (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000: 9; Stone 2004: 554). 
The chapter is closely related to previous considerations in this part of the thesis, as an 
informed assessment of the twinning exercise cannot be conducted without questioning 
its programming framework. The information provided in Chapter 6 on the Regular 
Reports, APs, NPAAs and FMs is therefore crucial for our understanding of the 
implementation of twinning. These documents provided the basis for the programming of 
the financial assistance for the candidate countries. 
2 External governance: twinning as an instrument of accession 
The introduction of the twinning exercise was an important element of the enhanced pre- 
accession strategy. It provided the EU with an instrument that was designed to blur the 
boundaries between the insiders and outsiders of integration (Friis and Murphy 1999; M. 
Smith 1996). The clarification of the accession criteria and AN allowed the Commission 
to specify the priorities for programme implementation. It is important to stress that the 
spectrum of its external governance was wider in the enlargement process than in other 
policy areas. This is largely a result of the fact that the accession instruments targeted 
changes across the whole of the acquis communautaire. 
2.1 Governance by conditionality 
This section tests the external incentives model which is the main basis for governance by 
conditionality as outlined in Chapter 4. The EU's conditionality either referred to directly 
or indirectly has become the main independent variable in explanations of its enlargement 
policy. The external incentives model applies the conditionality concept to the 
employment of accession instruments in the enlargement process, in particular those 
based on the allocation of financial assistance (Schimmelfennig 2000: 125-27; 
Schimmelfennig et al. 2003a: 496-97). It assumes that the ability of the EU to coerce 
applicant countries into reforms increases with the determinacy of conditions; the size 
and speed ofrewards; and the credibility of conditional threats andpromises. The model 
- 
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also predicts that the adoption of EU rules is more likely the lower the number of 
domestic veto players and adoption costs. 
The conditionality mechanisms deriving from the EU's accession instruments can affect 
the candidate countries in different ways. Firstly, the setting of EU rules as conditions for 
rewards gives the beneficiary an incentive to initiate reforms if the benefits outweigh the 
costs (intergovernmental bargaining). Secondly, the EU's conditionality may empower 
domestic actors and therefore upset the domestic equilibrium in particular ministries 
(differential empowerment of domestic actors). Such processes may lead to coercive 
policy transfer initiated by the Community and implemented by the member states' 
administrations during their involvement as twinning partners (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000: 
9; Stone 2004: 554). However, the question is also whether the EU's conditionality 
regime on administrative reform was limited to paternalism or whether it could become 
instrumental in initiating sustainable changes in the administrations of CEE (Lal 2001: 
253-56; cited in Stone 2004: 554). In other words, did the EU simply decide what issues 
were addressed by twinning projects or did it take an active approach by withholding 
rewards where projects did not produce the envisaged results? 
Determinacy of conditions 
The EU's ability to enforce its conditionality relies on the determinacy of conditions with 
regard to their legal status and their application across the Community. However, in the 
administrative terrain, there are very few strict rules to follow as has been stressed in 
previous chapters of this thesis. The Commission put every effort into establishing a 
stronger link between EU membership and public administration reform. It reflected on 
the administrative criteria in the Regular Reports and stressed the importance of 
administrative capacities on numerous occasions. Yet, the link remains 'an indirect one 
since there is no general body of European law in the public administration sphere' 
(OECD 1998: 13). The member states can therefore choose how to organise their 
administrations to implement EU legislation. This is a matter of sovereignty and therefore 
'all of them jealously guard their independence on this issue. That they should refuse to 
recognise an applicant's right to the same independence is unthinkable' (OECD 1998: 13). 
This lack of a legal foundation undermines the determinacy of conditions in the public 
administration sphere. The implementation procedures of the twinning exercise tried to 
compensate for this shortcoming by obliging participants to specify guaranteed results. 
These were to be agreed between the twinning partners and approved by the Commission 
before project implementation. The partners make a firm commitment to work towards 
achieving these results. In order to ensure the proper running of projects, candidates were 
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asked to provide the necessary workspace, equipment and assistants for the PAA. The 
member states on their part had to make sure that the right type of human resources 
would be committed to the project in form of PAAs and STEs. 
The twinning covenant of the project HTJOI-SO-01: Strengthening Autonomous Social 
Dialogue, for example, specified the objective to 'establish an institutional structure for 
autonomous social dialogue at sectoral level'. This was to be achieved by a number of 
measures such as a mapping study; training activities for the Hungarian operative 
committee and sector committees; the setting up of secretariats for sector committees; and 
a "train-the trainers" programme. However, the implementation of the project was slowed 
down by the fact that the project assistants who were to be paid by the CFCU did not 
receive their salaries for several months. This can be considered a lack of commitment of 
the Hungarian Ministry of Labour since it was obliged to provide assistants to any of its 
twinning projects. The EC Delegation only intervened upon several requests by the PAA, 
even though the problems were well known by the task manger. Such limited active 
monitoring of twinning projects by the EC Delegations immensely hindered the success 
of the exercise. This has also been stressed by the Court of Auditors (2003b: 29) who 
emphasised that 'the Delegations should monitor the achievement of project benchmarks 
more promptly, in order to allow timely action to be taken, such as reorientation of the 
project or even its termination'. 
The determinacy of conditions is also undermined by the uneven allocation of funding 
across the candidate countries. This signals to the candidate countries that the creation of 
administrative structures for the implementation of the acquis seems less important in 
countries that have lower Phare budgets at their disposal. In order to enhance its 
administrative conditionality, the Commission would have to introduce a more even 
approach to budgetary allocations. The creation of ad hoc schemes such as the Action 
Plans for Administrative Capacity may have reduced this problem. However, there was 
no sufficient compensation for smaller candidate countries that, although carrying almost 
the same burden regarding administrative reforms, received considerably lower amounts 
of funding. There was therefore a clear contradiction in the approach to administrative 
capacity building taken by the Commission services. The importance of these criteria was 
reiterated throughout the accession process. However, the national allocations of the 
Phare budgets were not adapted to the priorities of the accession-driven approach 
introduced in 1997. 
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The size and speed of rewards 
The average budget of twinning projects was EI million in 2000 (see Table 20 below). 
This can be considered a sizeable contribution to an individual ministry. The problem that 
occurred during the implementation of twinning projects was more about the speed of the 
reward. In particular in early twinning rounds, projects got delayed during the covenant 
drafting phase. There were significant start-up problems in the first 1998 twinning round 
which was 'bedeviled by long delays during the processes frorn design of the fiches to the 
arrival of the PAA' (Birker et al. 2000: 28). This also led to the termination of many 
projects due to the elapsing of the three year disbursement period in June 200 1. Although 
such problems appear to decrease with the guidance provided by the Commission and the 
member states' NCPs, the tiniely preparation of projects, needs assessment and risk 
analysis remains a major concern (see EMS 2004b: 6-8). 
Year Contracted 
amount (ME) 
Number of 
projects 
Average per 
project (ME) 
1998 76.8 103 0,75 
1999 118.7 122 0,97 
2000 145,8 146 1,00 
2001 133,5 133 1,00 
2002* 171,8 195 0,88 
2003* 128.5 152 0,85 
Total 775 851 5,45 
Subject to updates for the programming years 2002 and 2003. 
Source: DG Enlargement, Twinning coordination team, 4 December 2003. 
Table 20: Twinning budget for projects from 1998-2003 
Credibility of conditional threats and promises 
There are various references to corlditionalit, 'r in the programming docurnents of the 
enhanced pre-accession strategy and the implementation docurnents of the twinning 
exercise. Chapter 6 has already ernphasised that the conditionality clauses included in the 
AN and FMs were rarely employed to terminate particular projects. In contrast, the 
Commission typically decided to suspend funding for the complete Phare programme or 
all pre-accession financial instruments at once. In addition, the Commission mainly 
became involved in the early drafting of project tiches through its Delegations in the 
candidate countries. In the next step, it was involved through the approval of covenants in 
the steering committee. The Commission did therefore have considerable impact on the 
coherence of the projects with the objectives laid out in the APs. However, tile actual 
implementation of the twinning exercise was mainly dorninated by actors from the 
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member states and the candidate countries. In addition, considerable flexibility was given 
to these actors to change and adapt the work plan of the projects as long as the 
guaranteed results were not altered. 
The 2002 twinning manual specified that 'the starting point in designing a Twinning 
project is to define more precisely the guaranteed results targeted ... EUJunding will only 
he provided on the hasis ofthis result heing achieved. ' (CEC 2002c: 30, emphasis added). 
However, according to Article 3 of the twinning covenant, it was the twinning partners 
who could have cancelled projects under the provisions made in this contract. The 
Commission had a right to suspend funding since twinning projects were also listed in the 
FMs. However, this change was only introduced with the Phare 2000 Review and became 
operational in 2001. The task manager for the twinning exercise for the 1998 to 2002 
period stressed that more projects should have been cancelled. However, there was 'such 
a loss of face involved that nobody would go along with it' (Carolyn Leffler-Roth, CEC 
official, 04 March 2003). As a result, the Commission only intervened in a handful of 
cases. This hardly seems a credible approach to applying conditions during 
implementation, since 674 projects were implemented in the 1998-2002 period. It is 
unlikely that all of these achieved the guaranteed results. 
In fact, the Commission lists several twinning projects in an internal overview that 
achieved unsatisfacto? y results during implementation. A twinning project in Bulgaria, 
for example, BG-2000-FI-01: Strengthening the capacity of the Ministry of Economy, 
aimed at promoting competitiveness through transparent privatisation, market-based 
restructuring and a favourable business environment. However, the Commission's 
Delegation to Bulgaria came to the conclusion that the performance of the programme 
was unsatisfactory because in spite of the constructive working atmosphere no visible 
impact could be achieved at the end of the project (CEC 2003h: 3). The internal 
assessment stresses that there were legal restrictions preventing organisational change. 
The high-profile PAA repeatedly tried to overcome the deadlock during the project, but 
had no success despite oral assurances from his counterparts. 
In a special report on the twinning exercise, the Court of Auditors (2003b: 29) stressed 
that 'the term "guaranteed" is misleading as long as payments are not tied to the 
achievement of these targets and it is recommended that the use of the word "guaranteed" 
should be discontinued'. It is therefore necessary to evaluate the extent to which 
twinnings were really tied to the conditions specified in the covenants. The reality of 
implementation suggests that the specification of guaranteed results helped to focus 
assistance on applicants' needs. However, it depended largely on political circumstances 
_ 
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and relational factors as to whether projects were successful (Intw29, French official, 25 
September 2002). Thus, twinning projects relied firstly on the overall context of the 
reform process. In some cases, projects were moved into newly established ministries. 
Secondly, the interpersonal relations of the main actors within twinning projects, i. e. the 
PAA, the project leaders and the STEs, were crucial for the success or failure of projects. 
Thus, the achievement of project objectives depended on 'the PAAs' ability to foster 
good working relations with their immediate associates and with key officials within the 
ministerial hierarchy' (Papadimitriou and Phinnemore 2004: 636). The twinning partners 
did certainly not move the projects along because they felt that funding otherwise would 
be suspended. 
The real element of conditionality in twinning projects is therefore based on the approval 
of the covenants in the steering committee. This mechanism allows the Commission to 
require specific changes to the work plan agreed by the twinning partners. It gives the 
Commission the chance to intervene relatively early in the process and ensure the 
coherence of its accession conditionality. Since the steering committee assembled 
officials not only from the Delegations but also from the line DGs and DGIA/DG 
Enlargement, there was plenty of opportunity for individual units within the Commission 
to insert conditions regarding the design of particular projects. However, as Papadimitriou 
and Phinnemore (2004: 636) emphasise 'the EU has fallen well short of prescribing 
specific blueprints for reform in this field, despite the fact that the fluidity surrounding the 
post-communist administrations in central and eastern Europe offered fertile ground for 
the opposite'. The authors argue that the EU was not able to act decisively with regard to 
administrative capacity due to the resilience of national administrative traditions. It 
therefore developed relatively 'soft' EU conditionalities in the field of public 
administration reform. The following section tests the social learning model outlined in 
Chapter 4. 
2.2 Persuasion and social learning 
The social learning model outlined in Chapter 4 stipulates that the influence of the EU in 
the candidate countries increases with the legitimacy of rules andprocess; identity; and 
resonance (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005c: 18-20). The model assumes that a 
government adopts EU rules if it is persuaded of their appropriateness. It depicts 
influence as operating 'not only through bargaining but through persuasion or debate ... : 
efforts to align interests more closely through changing the definition of those interests' 
(Kahler 1992: 124). The model sees EU actors as engaging in an active policy dialogue 
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that may alter the interests of the candidates from within rather than giving them 
incentives to change their position as under the external incentives model. 
The likeliness of candidates to adopt EU rules is enhanced by the legitimacy of the rules 
to be transferred. It is more a transfer of norms rather than a transfer of administrative 
procedures that the model predicts. The adoption of a particular model of implementation, 
for example, is achieved by changing the opinion of key officials in the candidate 
countries. The likeliness of adoption also increases when officials within CEE 
administrations start to identify with ways of doing things within the EU. In the 
enlargement process this may be a result of the candidates wanting to join a Community 
who's collective identity, values, and norms they share (Checkel 2001a: 563; Johnston 
2001: 499). The candidates find it easier to identify with the objectives of a particular 
project if the perception of ownership by the domestic institutions can be increased 
(Killick 1996: 218-19; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005c: 19). The term resonance 
refers to the 'openness to accept and adopt new and external rules' (Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier 2005c: 20; see also Checkel 2001a: 562-63). The higher the legitimacy of 
rules andprocess; identity,, and resonance factor in the accession process, the more likely 
it is that EU actors are able to persuade their counterparts in the candidate countries to 
adopt particular EU rules. 
Legitimacy of rules and process 
The clarity and integrity of EU rules is generally given by their specification in the 
Regular Reports and the deflnition of objectives in the individual twinning covenants. 
However, the coherence of the rules is jeopardized because of different administrative 
practices across the member states. The establishment of long-term secondments and the 
decision to leave the choice of twinning partners to the candidate countries were 
important vehicles of the twinning exercise for the creation of ownership of particular 
projects in the candidates' administrations. 
The PAAs were based in the partner institutions for a maximum of 36 months, and a 
minimum of 12 months. In general, candidate countries valued the 'permanent presence 
of the PAA and the close link that is provided into the MS administration where real 
expertise and experience lies in implementation of the acquis' (Birker et aL 2000: 3). 
This was seen as an advantage in comparison to the private sector consultants which were 
contracted to deliver similar assistance before the 1997 reforms. However, the 
Commission seems to have underestimated the amount of time that would pass before the 
PAAs familiarized themselves with their new surroundings. The process of settling into 
the host institution was also largely impeded by the fact that the institutional environment 
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in which twinnings took place was often less than desirable. In some projects, the PAAs' 
counterparts in the host institutions changed up to three times during implementation. 
The twinning covenants made no provision on the CEE administration's input into an 
individual project. The amount of time spent on the project by the counterparts is not 
specified in the covenant and therefore leaves considerable room for interpretation on the 
candidates' side. As a result, 'many PAAs have become frustrated and demoralised by the 
trials and tribulations of being a PAA' (Birker et aL 2000). However, PAAs interviewed 
for this thesis were generally positive about the candidates' commitment to meet the 
results of the projects (Intw 42,43,49,51,54, Budapest, June 2003). 
The overall impression emerging from interviews with programme implementation staff 
is that a project was either on track or that the communication between the PAA and his 
counterparts had broken down due to political or relational reasons (Intw44,46,52,53, 
Budapest, June 2003). Although the procedures put a strong emphasis on long-term 
cooperation, this was not necessarily followed up during implementation. The PAA may 
therefore not have been able to present the legitimacy of the model he proposed. In 
addition, there may have been no opportunity to transfer norms in form of institutional 
isomorphism, since in practice the counterparts spent too little time with their twinning 
partners to redefine their interests along the lines of the member states' seconded officials. 
Identity 
The role of identity in this process is a rather ambiguous concept, in particular when it is 
applied to twinning projects. However, there were several activities such as study visits to 
the member states, and training events which may have ad an effect on candidates' belief 
systems. These actions within twinnings brought the candidates' staff together with 
significant amounts of STEs and medium-term experts (MTEs) from the member states. 
Such actions often involved social events before the actual training sessions and therefore 
fostered personal relationships between the staff of the respective twinning partners. 
Identity is also fostered by the definition of administrations as twinning partners. This 
may have had an impact on the candidates' perception of the legitimacy of their partners' 
proposals. Since candidates chose their twinnings partners freely and were even allowed 
to request member states' consortia during the selection procedure, much depended on 
whether their initial choice had an effect on the implementation of the project. In other 
words, following the logic of appropriateness, candidates were likely to select twinning 
partners that were compatible to their own administrative culture. The statistics on 
twinning as presented below suggest that candidates preferred particular member states 
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during the selection procedure. Romania selected French administrations in 30 percent of 
all cases for the 1998-2002 period. Sweden and Finland were much more active in the 
Baltic States, and the United Kingdom in the Czech Republic, whereas Germany spread 
its effort across all candidate countries (see Appendix 3). However, the Commission 
restricted the secondment of PAAs to two succeeding twinning projects in the same or 
different countries (CEC 2002c: Annex E, pg. 4). This put a limit on the time spent in 
particular administrations. 
Resonance 
The reaction of candidate countries' administrations to twinning projects is fairly mixed. 
PAAs found that counterparts ranged from being exceptionally supportive to extremely 
resistant partners during implementation (Intw42,43,47,49, MS officials, Budapest, 
June 2003). The circumstances found by project implementation staff are influenced by 
factors such as the sector under consideration, the support of the Project Leader in the 
host administration and individual agency. The latter is, for example, provided by 
translators and assistants to the PAA. However, Papadimitriou and Phinnemore (2004: 
630) in their study of twinning projects in Romania mention that for some local staff 'the 
very high salary received by the PAAs was a point of resentment'. In an article on 
twinning projects in Estonia, Tulmets (2005b: 671) even argues that 'the experts of the 
member states were sometimes considered as arrogant'. 
Interviewees in the Commission emphasised that there was considerable reluctance on 
part of the Czech Republic and Poland to support the implementation of twinning 
projects. Some of the candidates were clearly unwilling to admit to the repercussions of 
the 1997 reforms which took away the freedom they enjoyed under the demand-driven 
approach to Phare programming. The Commission communicated the twinning exercise 
as a cornerstone of the accession-driven programming of Phare. A Polish official 
expressed his concerns at the NCP meeting on 3 March 1998 by stating that up until 1989 
the Polish nation had been under the control of the Soviet Union and that his country was 
reluctant to replace this now with the manipulation of the EU. Lamoureux responded by 
reminding the representative that Poland had a choice, it did not need to become a 
member of the Community (Intw4l, Claude Cornuau, 20 March 2003). 
The Polish government engaged in only 8 projects during the 1998 programming round, 
while the Romanian government supported the implementation of 16 projects. However, 
the Polish goverrunent started to come around to the twinning instrument in 1999. Its 
record on implementing projects improved once the government recognized the potential 
benefits of working together with partner institutions from the member states. The 
- 
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candidates were particularly forthcoming in areas such as structural funding and 
agricultural policy, because they could see that their administrations' lack of absorption 
capacity had to be addressed in order to make use of EU funding after accession. An 
overall judgement on whether this was sufficient to establish good working relations 
between twinning partners is difficult to establish. We may say that some projects 
enabled intense exchanges of opinions and dialogue between the partners. However, on 
the whole it is unlikely that twinning projects led to a process of institutional 
isomorphism, whereby member states' officials altered the interests of the candidate 
countries significantly by persuading them of alternative models. The following section 
applies the newforms ofgovernance framework to the case study. 
2.3 New forms of governance 
The strength of the OMC, or new forms of governance, is that it incorporates actors that 
are involved in implementation during the formulation of the objectives of a policy or 
programme. It enables the sharing of experience among participants and avoids strict 
regulatory requirements. In this way, the OMC adapts to local circumstances and 
increases ownership of programmes among local staff involved in implementation. This 
focus on the actual running of projects during the setting of objectives undermines 
resistance from the outset and incorporates both elements of top-down and bottom-up 
perspectives to implementation (Eberlein and Grande 2003; Pressman and Wildavsky 
1973; Ham and Hill 1984; Trubek and Mosher 2001). The OMC is also regarded as an 
instrument of policy-making that is particularly suited to situations in which the 
sovereignty of states is at stake (1-16ritier 2003: 105). This section assesses to what extent 
the twinning exercise resembles the core features of the OMC and whether it became a 
vehicle of obligated policy transfer during the accession process. 
In Chapter 3, this thesis has referred to four essential elements of the OMC put forward 
by Mosher (2000: 6): 
1. fixed guidelines set for the Union, with short-, medium-, and long-term goals; 
2. quantitative and qualitative indicators and benchmarks; 
3. European guidelines translated into national and regional policies and targets; and 
4. periodic monitoring, evaluation and peer review, organized as a mutual learning 
process. 
These elements underline the importance of the definition of common objectives, 
indicators and benchmarks for the success of the OMC during implementation. 
Achievement of the desired outcome is more likely when the goals of a programme are 
clearly defined, and take place jointly with the definition of the objectives. However, 
- 
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desired outcomes also rely on the relevance of the guidelines set, the quality of 
coordination and on whether 'best practices' are identifiable and transferable. This is also 
related to the question to what extent twinning projects provided the candidates with 
institutional templates, thresholds and adjustments for the reform of public 
administrations in CEE (cf Jacoby 200 1 b, 2004). 
Elements of the OIVIC present in the Winning exercise 
The relevance of the objectives identified in the twinning covenants to the accession 
process was given by the Regular Reports and the AN (fixing of guidelines and thei 
relevance). Although evaluations of the exercise indicated that the guaranteed results of 
earlier projects were overambitious (Birker et al. 2000: 24; OMAS 2001a: 4; European 
Court of Auditors 2003b: 28; EMS 2004b: 51,64), none of these evaluations questions 
the relevance of the programme for the accession process. This is a result of the tight link 
between the projects and the accession criteria which has been enabled by the APs, FMs 
and the twinning covenant. The latter document is evaluated with regard to its relevance 
to the priorities specified in the APs. This process enabled the Commission as a multi- 
organization to engage in the setting of common objectives. 
The covenant drafting phase further resembled the establishment of short-term, medium- 
term and long-term goals from the OMC. It allowed the twinning partners both from the 
member states' and candidates' administrations to participate in the formulation of project 
objectives, activities and content. Although the candidates had limited influence on the 
objectives of the APs, they could take an active part in defining the objectives of 
individual twinning projects. This started with the process of submitting project fiches to 
the Commission. It continued with the selection of twinning partners and elaboration of 
the project objectives in the twinning covenant. Thus, twinning brought together the three 
parties during the fixing of guidelines (or common objectives): the Commission, the 
candidate countries, and the member states. This is in line with the approach taken during 
the application of the OMC in the EES. The fact that the setting of objectives is specified 
in terms of guaranteed results can be explained by the involvement of Claude Cornuau 
during the formulation of the implementation procedures. 
The formulation of indicators and benchmarks is partly incorporated in the AN and 
NPAAs which specified clear objectives for the candidates' administrations (quantitative 
and qualitative indicators and benchmarks). However, twinning covenants put even more 
emphasis on the specification of benchmarks and indicators. They also included needs 
assessment and risk analysis. In addition, the identification of national and regional 
policies in relation to the objectives set in the APs was provided for in the NPAAs 
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(European guidelines translated into national and regional policies and targets). These 
documents included an institution-building plan which formed an integral part of the 
programming exercise. The candidates could also make use of the NPAA to identify the 
budgetary needs of particular administrations. As a result, the specification of 
benchmarks and indicators as well as the translation of the objectives into national targets 
has been integrated in the enhanced pre-accession strategy. 
The periodic monitoring, evaluation and peer review, organized as a mutual learning 
process is a central element of all twinning projects. However, the programme differed to 
other areas where the OMC has been utilised because the opportunities for mutual 
leaming were extended over a minimum period of 12 months. The EES, for example, 
only provides for a couple of peer reviews per year in each of the participating countries. 
In contrast, the twinning exercise enabled mutual learning process on the basis of the 
long-term presence of PAAs, MTEs and STEs in the candidate countries. It provided 
opportunities for learning through training activities, study visits, software packages and 
training material. This extended the contact of candidates' personnel with member states' 
officials even beyond the staff involved in implementation. The activities were therefore 
significantly monitored by the PAA and the Delegations in the candidate countries. 
Identiflability and transferability of institutional models 
There are therefore a large number of factors which helped to sustain processes of mutual 
learning during twinning projects. The twinning procedures sought to respond to any 
problems which may occur during implementation. However, in order to benefit from 
processes of borrowing the candidates also needed to identify transferable models of 
implementation or components of such models. Did twinnings provide candidate 
countries with institutional templates, thresholds or adjustments that were of value to their 
efforts to establish effective implementation systems? There are several procedures that 
may have contributed immensely to the candidates' ability to transfer institutional models 
from the member states: the selection procedure; the option to choose member states 
consortia; the acceptance ofmandated bodies; and the content oftwinnings. 
The selection procedure allowed the candidates to choose their best match. This is 
equivalent to the selection of best practices or benchmarking under the OMC. However, 
the candidates were not pressured into adopting just one model of implementation as 
Tulmets (2005b: 673) implies in her article on twinning. In contrast, they were given the 
choice to mix components from several member states in order to establish the right type 
of system in their own country. This was achieved in particular by the provision of short- 
term experts from different member states, which led to the establishment of so-called 
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member states' consortia. It was also enhanced by the acceptance of experts from 
mandated bodies which are often outsourced parts of the member states' administrations. 
In Denmark, for example, the Ministry of Environment has far less staff than the Danish 
Agency for the Environment. Thus, it was more likely that the latter could provide 
adequate staff for twinning projects. 
In addition, the Commission and its partners learned from the early implementation 
rounds, and the objectives of twinning projects became much more modest in the 
subsequent years. This made the identification of transferable institutional models easier 
and enabled the candidates' learning processes significantly. The projects were also 
sufficiently sequenced by the Commission in order to ensure that one step was taken after 
the other. In a meeting with the line DGs on the 3 February 1998, Catherine Day 
responded to a representative of DG XVI Regional Policy that the structural funds were 
not represented as a priority in earlier twinning rounds because 'the choice of priority 
reflected concerns for basic prerequisites which affect regional policy as much as any 
other Community policy, e. g. Financial Control, etc. ' (CEC 1998h: 3). Therefore 
significant opportunities existed for the candidates to learn from their future peers. 
3 The main actors in a twinning project 
The previous chapter mapped the response of the member states to the introduction of the 
twinning exercise. A number of countries welcomed the concept deriving from the 
Commission's proposals, namely Austria, Germany, France, Finland and Sweden. In 
addition, Greece and Spain were generally willing to contribute to the programme, but 
mentioned particular sectors in which they were able to respond quickly to the needs of 
the candidates. The implementation of the twinning exercise naturally relied on the 
support of the member states. Interviewees emphasised that the most cooperative 
response came from the German and French government who actively engaged in the 
implementation of twinning projects. This is also reflected by the statistics which were 
assembled for this thesis. 
3.1 The role of the member states during implementation 
In response to the Commission's request for applications, the German government 
submitted 123 proposals in 1998. This was followed by French administrations which 
applied for 81 projects. The response of the Greek government lay with 51 proposals, 
close to the United Kingdom's contribution which amounted to 57 proposals. However, 
interviewees emphasised that the British government submitted proposals that contained 
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only one A4 page of writing. It was generally perceived that the programme was not 
supported by London, in particular during the first twinning round in 1998 (Intw3O, 32 
and 41, CEC officials). The approach of the government changed gradually when the 
NCP was moved from DfID to the FC092 , and 
in particular when after the election, the 
Labour government began to introduce changes to the Europe Department which was 
now responsible for institution-building issues in the candidate countries. The United 
Kingdom already participated more actively in the second round of twinnings which was 
also programmed in 1998. 
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Figure 11: Member states (as project leaders), 1998-2002 
In the 1998 to 2002 period, the German government contributed the PAA to 161 out of 
the 674 projects (see Figure II above). It also participated in 59 projects as a junior 
partner to another member state (see Appendix 3). This contribution can be largely seen 
as a result of its commitment to the enlargement process and the experience it had gained 
from the TRANSFORM programme. While the implementation of twinning projects 
required other countries to introduce new institutions or introduce new laws, the 
administrations of the Federal Republic were already prepared to participate in the 
twinning exercise. The adaptations that were necessary to implement the particular 
twinning concept outlined bv the Commission were easier to achieve in Germany than in 
92 DfID = Department for International De\ clopment, FCO Foreign and Commonwealth Office. 
93 A= Austria, D= Germany. DK = Denmark, E= Spain. F France, Fin = Finland, I= Italy, NL 
= The Netherlands, S= Sweden, UK = United Kingdom. GR Greece, Others = Belgium, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, Portugal. These are mN oN\n figures based on a list of proiects provided by DG 
Enlargement - t\% inning team. 
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the remaining countries. This was mainly because there were many semi-public bodies 
available such as the GTZ or the KfW94 that had gained similar experiences not only 
through TRANSFORM, but also during the unification process with East Germany. 
Interviewees also emphasised the role of the German NCP, Sigrid Selz, who is currently 
heading the Europe Department in the Ministry of Finance. 93 On her initiative, the 
German team started to organise buffets and similar events to raise awareness of the 
twinning exercise among national and regional ministries. As one official stressed, 
'Germany came up with proposals for almost every single project' (Carolyn Leffler-Roth, 
CEC official, 04 March 2003). It put in proposals for twinning projects across all 
candidate countries (see Appendix 3). The candidates spoke highly of German advisers 
and were particularly interested in East German counterparts. In many circumstances, 
they had already experienced some sort of cooperation with Gel-many before the 
introduction of twinning. The German NCP also benefited from participation of regional 
ministries and semi-public bodies in twinning projects. This significantly helped lift the 
burden of national administrations who were expected to respond to the high demand for 
German experts. Sachsen is the regional state which implemented the most twinnings 
with over 30 projects from 1998 to 2003. The majority of these projects were 
implemented in the environment sector (see Appendix 3, Section 2). 
In 1999, the government installed a twinning office run by GTZ in the Ministry of 
Finance in order to support the NCP during the coordination and drafting of proposals. 
This had an immense impact on the quality of proposals and led to a higher success rate 
during the selection procedures (see Appendix 3). These efforts to coordinate and steer 
through the twinning procedures were also complemented by the installation of similar 
arrangements in individual ministries. The Ministry of the Environment signed a contract 
with the consultancy blue! which supported the preparation and implementation of its 
projects in the candidate countries. 96 In the agricultural domain, the Federal Ministry of 
Consumer Protection, Food and Agriculture signed a similar deal with the consultancy 
GFA Terra Systems GmbH. The German government effectively invested in the twinning 
exercise without expecting to receive full reimbursement in return. It could reallocate 
funds from the TRANSFORM programme in order to finance extra activities. This hands- 
94 KfW = Kreditanstalt Or Wiederaufbau. 
95 The Europe Department moved into the Ministry of Finance from the Ministry of Economy after 
the Social Democrats won the election in 1998. 
96 See http: //v. rmv. the-blue. net/ for further information on the activities of the consultancy within 
the framework of twinning projects. 
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on approach to twinning also led to several supporting studies considering the 
programming of pre-accession projects in general, the Phare prograrnme, and twinning 
projects (see e. g. Riis Burisch& Partner Gmbh 2002b, 2001d, 2001a). 
The French government was similarly proactive in its approach to twinning although less 
experienced in this type of bilateral cooperation. It could build on the bilateral 
cooperation system of Adetef, the office responsible for institutional cooperation of the 
Ministry of Economy and Finance. There were several other public bodies that the French 
government could make use of during the implementation of twinning. However, it also 
had to adapt significantly in order to comply with the twinning procedures. This meant, 
for example, to make arrangements for the coordination of proposals by its ministries. 
This included not only the installation of an office for the NCP, but also the establishment 
of coordination units within the individual ministries (see Tulmets 2003c: 125-27). In 
contrast to Germany, the French government could make much less use of regional 
bodies for the supply of suitable PAAs and project implementation staff (Intw, Jacques 
Fanouillaire, 19 March 2003). 
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Figure 12: France (as project leader), 1998-2002 
The participation of French administrations was highly appreciated by Commission 
officials, who stressed that without the initial support by Germany and France it would 
have been difficult to get the programme of the ground (Intw3O & 32, CEC officials, 
March 20033). The distribution of French twinning projects across CEE suggests that in 
terms of actual amounts of projects, it almost implemented projects according to the 
Phare allocations of the individual candidate countries. French administrations were 
particularly present in Poland, where it led 29 percent of its projects from 1998 to 2002. 
Poland, 33,29% 
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In Romania, the French government engaged as project leader in 29 projects during the 
same period (see Figure 12 above). France was also involved as a junior partner in 49 
twinning projects, 20 of these projects were lead by German administrations (see 
Appendix 3). 
The remaining member states took a similar approach to twinning. The British 
government, following its change of heart regarding the implementation of twinning, 
focused largely on the Czech Republic and Poland, where 50 percent of its projects from 
1998 to 2002 period were placed (see Figure 13 below). In 2001, the FCO established a 
liaison office in Prague which was staffed with two foriner PAAs. This was to achieve 'a 
better synergy of the efforts made in twinning projects and bilateral assistance' (Intw9, 
British official, 15 April 2002). As a result, the participation of British officials in the 
exercise steadily increased since 2002. Interviewees from the NCP emphasised that the 
government would like to participate in projects across all candidate countries. However, 
the amount of projects in the Czech Republic seerns sizeable in view of the fact that this 
candidate country was allocated much less funds than Poland. In 53 projects, British 
officials also participated as junior partners to other member states during the 1998 to 
2002 period. 
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Figure 13: United Kingdom (as project leader), 1998-2002 
In 2000, Spain won almost three times more projects than in 1999 (see Figure II above). 
This was a result of a longer visit by Claude Cornuau who responded to a request of the 
Spanish NCP to help with the setting up of the institutional bodies to implement 
twinning. The Italian government made similar experiences during the start-up phase of 
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the programme. It was selected for only two projects in 1998, but quickly learned From 
the first twinning rounds and started to become more involved with 8 projects in 1999. Ill 
general, administrations from the smaller or Southern European member states started 
their involvement in twinning projects mainly as junior partners to other lead 
organisations. However, in later implementation rounds they put in a bid as project 
leader. There was therefore also a learning process involved for many of the member 
states and their administrations. 
The Swedish and Finnish government focused largely on projects in the Baltic States (see 
Figure 14 below). In this way, the implementation of twinning often reflected the bilateral 
dynamics underpinning the enlargement process. The main factor influencing the choice 
of partners and the submitting of proposals was the proximity of the partner countries. 
However, the similarity of administrative traditions and capitalist systems also factored 
strongly into the decisions taken by the candidates and the mernber states alike. The high 
involvement of the British government in the Czech Republic, for example, matched the 
candidate country's approach to economic reform. Its government had proclaimed the 
Anglo-Saxon model of capitalism and therefore planned to outsource large parts of 
administrations. British twinning projects in the Czech Republic were therefore often led 
by a so-called mandated body. Above all the competitive bidding for twinning projects 
was a part of the programme's success. This approach to programming enabled the free 
choice of twinning partners for the candidates and animated mernber states to participate 
in implementation. 
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3.2 The implementation at sectoral level 
The twinning exercise also facilitated the repeated delivery of assistance to key areas such 
as agriculture, structural funding and JHA. In the first years of implernentation, it focused 
on the establishment of institutions that would be needed to implement the EU's financial 
assistance programmes. The list of projects therefore included the following: "Develop 
regional and structural policy strategies", "Improving the efficiency of ISPA Task Force", 
and "Improving the efficiency of SAPARD Task Force". The administrative structures 
benefiting from the advice provided through these projects later became eligible for more 
focused support. This was delivered in the form of projects that targeted, for example, the 
"Establishment of Managing Authorities for Structural Funds". 
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Figure 15: Twinning projects per sector, 1998-2001 
In terms of sectoral support, projects concerning public finance accounted for 24 percent 
of the funds allocated in the 1998-2001 period; JHA for 20 and agriculture for 17 percent 
(see Figure 15 above). There was a general consensus emerging from the interviews that 
twinning projects were particularly suited to projects in JHA. Ill this sector, the 
instrument was used to strengthen the border control systems; introduce asylum and 
migration management systems; and many other examples. Later, projects were also 
implemented in areas such as Employment and Social Affairs. Many projects picked tip 
the thread left behind by previous twinning partnerships. In addition, the approach of the 
Commission seemed to be remarkably adaptable to the needs of the applicant countries. 
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3.3 Lessons from Implementation 
The implementation of the twinning exercise has also shown that there were several key 
factors contributing to the success or failure of a project: the quality of the PAA; 
commitment of the Project Leaders; the design of the project; and the flexibility of all 
involved parties to adapt to local circumstances. In case where these factors were 
positive, cooperation under the twinning project was more likely to achieve its 
guaranteed results. The member states commitment to the twinning exercise was largely 
driven by their bilateral relations with particular candidates countries. This can be shown 
by the statistics discussed above (see also Appendix 3). 
The preýaccession adviser 
In their latest report on the twinning exercise, the Commission's external evaluators 
concluded that 'although the results of twinning have been mixed, the tendency is for 
increasingly satisfactory performance of the instrument as experience of its use grows' 
(EMS 2004b: i). Since the performance of twinning projects rely on so many factors, it is 
almost impossible to predict the outcomes of a particular project. However, the 
commitment and qualification of the PAA has been named in many reports as one of the 
Most important factors in managing change. The 2000 assessment report specified a list 
of characteristics an optimal PAA should bring with her/him in order to manage the 
project successfully. Birker et a]. (2000: 14) noted that she/he should: 
a. be acknowledged as an expert in at least one of the specialisms covered by the 
covenant (although in some covenants the expertise required is too wide to be 
satisfied completely by the PAA); 
b. be a good project manager with the ability to coordinate and plan and respond to 
variations in the plan creatively; 
C. be flexible, adaptable and robust in the face of difficult and lonely circumstances. By 
definition most PAAs will not have worked in a CC state before and may not be used 
to the cultural and working practices in CC administrations; 
d. be proactive and outgoing with the ability to initiate action without usurping the 
authority of the counterpart; 
e. have good knowledge of the networks back in his/her MS administration; 
C be prepared to offer ad hoc advice on matters not necessarily covered by the covenant 
whilst ensuring that the overall aim of the Twinning is kept firmly in view; 
g. possess good diplomatic skills; 
h. be supported in his/her daily work by a competent language assistant. 
Such a list of characteristics of course should be read as an indication of the skills the 
PAAs should optimally bring with them. Even the evaluators acknowledged that 
individuals which fell well short of these qualities were successful in implementing 
projects. In general, PAAs were unlikely to be good project managers and excellent 
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experts at the same time. In some circumstances, projects therefore benefited from 
proactive assistants and Project Leaders in the member states that could take over part of 
the organisational tasks. 
The implementation of twinning projects often went along with the organisation of large- 
scale training exercises and study trips. This tested the PAAs organisation skill severely. 
However, evaluations also point to the fact that some twinnings were rather small in 
scale. Such projects were well-served with a PAA that brought with him the skills of an 
expert. The ability of the PAA to make contact with his counterparts was essential during 
the implementation of the projects. In view of the fact that the overwhelming amount of 
twinning projects would have to bridge language barriers, it is therefore important that 
adequate resources were devoted to translation and interpretation. This was generally the 
case. However, evaluations pointed to the shortage of these resources in several twinning 
projects (EMS 2004b: 48-51). There were also circumstances under which the 
counterparts of the PAA 'were selected more on the basis of their language abilities than 
on their technical expertise' (Birker et al. 2000: 12). In view of the evaluators, all 
twinning projects should therefore include a language assistant to the PAA- 
Project leaders 
The PAAs also relied heavily on the support of their host and home institutions. This was 
often linked to the question whether the Project Leaders appointed to the programme 
were committed to the guaranteed results. However, the project steering committees 
enabled the PAAs to make their problems known to both twinning partners. This forum 
also served as a commitment device for both administrations involved in implementation. 
Many PAAs used the quarterly reports of the project to highlight particular problems that 
hindered their project from achieving its full potential. However, since these reports had 
to be approved by the local Project Leader, real problems deriving from the host 
institution's attitude towards the project were not recorded. 
In Poland, the twinning project PL1998-IB-JH-02 set the objective to contribute to the 
programme of work required to bring the management of Poland's Eastern Border and 
hinterland to the standards required for EU membership. In his second quarterly report, 
the PAA of the project gave emphasis to the fact that twinning was still a new concept 
and therefore 'some teething problems were inevitable'. The report also highlighted that 
several months were needed to receive access to planning and other information activities 
in the host ministry. It also acknowledged that the Polish side was then fully supporting 
the implementation of the project. 
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Other key actors included the line DGs in Brussels, the Delegations of the Commission in 
the candidate countries and DG Enlargement. The main task of these actors was to 
acquaint themselves with the rules of the twinning exercise. This was in particular true for 
the Delegations which often interfered in the selection procedure during the early 
implementation of twinning (Intw4l, Claude Comuau, 20 March 2003). Since the 
twinning manual explicitly gives the right to select twinning partners to the candidate 
countries, it was even more detrimental to the start of projects if staff from the 
Delegations did not abide to this rule. There were several calls for a more coordinated 
approach to the programming of twinning projects, in particular in the Commission's 
Headquarters. This could have been achieved by the appointment of Twinning Liaison 
QJfIcers in each of the relevant line DGs (Birker et al. 2000: 9). 
The Commission could have also made information more easily available on a country- 
by-country basis. In some candidate countries, the Delegation organised weekly meetings 
and socials with PAAs to exchange information and to ease practical problems such as 
the accommodation of STEs and MTEs. Some NCPs have also suggested a website which 
would collect information on the implementation of projects and give further guidance on 
the drafting of the covenants by providing concrete examples (Intw2,55, German and 
British officials). The assessment report made the suggestion to provide 'a "welcome 
pack" for PAAs/STEs which as well as the more mundane aspects ... also provides some 
basic information about the CC administration and how its legislative and executive 
processes are managed' (Birker et aL 2000: 8). 
Design of the project 
The implementation of twinning projects is driven by their design. In general, the 
specification of objectives, activities and the content of a project can be separated into 
four stages: (i) the design of the project fiche by the CC administration; (ii) the writing of 
proposals by the MS; (iii) the selection of twinning partners by the CC; (iv) the 
covenanting between the CC and the selected MS. In order to achieve maximum results, 
these stages were to be based on needs and risk analysis. Adequate resources should have 
been allocated in the administrations that deal with these important stages. 
The design of the project fiche by the candidate country is the most significant step in the 
project life cycle. It enables an early definition of guaranteed results. However, the EMS 
consortium pointed out that "objectives" and "guaranteed results" are treated as the same 
in many project fiches, although the overall objectives should differ from the 
specification of the results (EMS 2004b: 18). This emphasised the need for more 
technical assistance on project design. The Delegations in these countries could have 
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played a key role under these circumstances. However, they were generally understaffed 
and did not have the manpower to perform such tasks (Birker et at 2000: 24). The 
remaining stages of project design suffered from similar problems. 
The evaluations have identified severe problems with the timely delivery of covenants, 
and there were also problems regarding the specification of project benchmarks and 
indicators. The EMS consortium noted that 'project design in general is considered still to 
be relatively poor ... especiafly with regard to lack of useable indicators of achievement, 
poorly formulated project purposes and log-frame matrices' (EMS 2004b: 18). This may 
have prevented projects from achieving their potential, because the identification of 
measurable indicators and benchmarks is an important factor during project 
implementation. It reinforces the commitment of the participants to processes of mutual 
leaming. 
4 Conclusion 
In the Commission's brochure Twinning in Action, Ganther Verheugen highlighted in a 
foreword that the twinning exercise 'provides a unique learning experience and exposure 
for both sides, which will greatly contribute to the successful completion of the 
enlargement process' (CEC 2001k: 1, emphasis added). This quote expresses the core of 
the Commission's twinning concept, which not only focussed on the achievement of 
common objectives but also on the establishment of mutual learning processes. The 
implementation of the programme was challenging because of the circumstances found in 
CEE administrations. The lack of resources and low level of salaries in these institutions 
naturally had a knock-on effect on the effectiveness of twinning projects, which were also 
often caught in problems deriving from horizontal administrative reforms. However, 
several twinning procedures helped to respond to the challenges of the ongoing transition 
processes in the candidates' institutions. Yet, experience on the ground shows that the 
transfer of institutional templates and models through twinning projects have sometimes 
faced strong policy resistance by domestic actors (see Bache and Taylor 2003; Dolowitz 
and Marsh 1996,2000). 
There is therefore a general concern as to what extent the instrument made efficient use of 
money, since any aid programme relies on the cooperation of the recipient countries. The 
main question for the Commission was whether the administrations in CEE could either 
be coerced or led into effective cooperation with their counterparts from Western Europe. 
Several procedures of the twinning exercise clearly resembled the OMC. The connection 
to the Al's enables the fixing of common guidelines based on the definition of short-term 
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and medium-term objectives. These guidelines were translated into national and regional 
plans through the NPAAs which contained an institution-building plan. The programming 
phase is started by the candidates with the drafting of the project fiches. This is followed 
by the selection procedure which was centred on the idea of benchmarking. The potential 
PAAs even had to present their proposals to project implementation staff in the candidate 
countries. After the selection of twinning partners, the covenant drafting phase allowed 
for common goal definition on the basis of the project fiches. It identified measurable 
benchmarks and indicators that were monitored and evaluated during the implementation 
of the project. This enhanced the quality of cooperation between the project partners. 
In spite of the fact that many circumstances may have impeded the possibility of 
enhanced cooperation during implementation; the opportunities for the definition of 
common goals are exhaustive during the preparation of twinning projects. The main 
difference to other policy areas where the ONIC was utilised is that the approval of the 
twinning covenants took place in the Commission Steering Committee. This shift gave 
the Commission considerable influence over the content of projects; a feature of the 
twinning exercise that may be better explained by the EUs conditionality. However, the 
basic features of twinning projects such as the minimum duration of 12 months, the 
PAAs, Project Leaders from the member states and candidate countries, a package of 
short-term missions and training, as well as a covenant drafting phase were ideally suited 
to the creation of long-term cooperation between the twinning partners. 
Element of the instrument Mode of governance 
Content and I. Connection to programming newjbrins t? 1'governance, 
implementation frarne%wrk (APs, NPAAs, FMs) governance by conditionality, 
2. Bidding process (proposals, newforins ofgovernance 
presentations and selection) 
3. Covenant ("Guaranteed Results", newforms ofgovernance, 
benchinarks. tiniefirames. duration & governance by conditionality 
risk analysis) 
4. Approval of the covenant in the newforms ofgovernance; 
Commission Steering Conunittee governance by conditionality 
5. Long-terrn seconchnent newforms ofgovernance, 
persuasion and social learning 
6. Short-terni experts neirfornis ofgovernance, 
persuasion and social learning 
7. Project Steering committee, newforins ofgovernance 
Project leaders 
Source: Author's compilation. 
Table 21: Elements of the twinning instrument and modes of governance 
There is therefore only one major difference between other instances where the OMC has 
been used and the implementation of the twinning exercise: the Commission gets 
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involved much later in the process of drafting common objectives and measurable 
benchmarks. It is legitimate to question whether this was actually an advantage, even 
though it could block the approval of covenants in the steering committee. In addition, the 
twinning exercise also enabled applicants to identify transferable institutional models 
based on detailed proposals and presentations in the Commission Steering Committee. 
After evaluating the performance of the member states, the procedures allowed the 
candidates to choose their twinning partners without restraint. This procedure seems to be 
particularly hard to explain with the other external governance models (see Table 21 
above). 
Evaluation of the alternative hypotheses 
This chapter has therefore demonstrated that new forms of governance as a theoretical 
framework are the only mode of governance that can explain what type of accession 
instrument the twinning exercise is and how it influences candidates to reform their 
public administrations (see Table 21 below). The chapter also highlighted that the two 
alternative explanations can be consulted for the explanation of particular procedures. 
However, the depiction of the twinning exercise as a form of enhanced cooperation that 
enables the candidates to learn from the member states' experience in implementing the 
acquis remains the most plausible answer. Thus, this chapter concludes that the following 
alternative hypothesis best describes the characteristics of the twinning exercise as an 
instrument: 
112c. - The twinning exercise seeks to provide candidates with opportunities for learning 
and transfer of administrative procedures. It is therefore designed as a new form of 
governance with aflexible andparticipatory approach to implementation. 
The remaining models also had useful insights into the working of twinning projects. 
However, the governance by conditionality hypothesis cannot be confirmed because the 
candidates cannot perceive of twinning projects as rewards, since the EU has been too 
reluctant to suspend funding for particular projects or indeed to canccl projects before 
their scheduled termination. The notion of 'soft' EU conditional ities introduced by 
Papadimitriou and Phinnemore (2004: 636) describes the situation relatively accurately. 
Indeed, there is 'a softer and more diffused form of monitoring conditionality' 
(Papadimitriou and Phinnemore 2004: 623). However, it is questionable how this differs 
from the evaluation and monitoring of common objectives intended by the OMC. 
Since the actual objectives of the twinning exercise are based on the AN and the joint 
drafting of the covenants, we may conclude that new forms of governance offer a better 
explanation for its characteristics. The main mechanisms at work during the 
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implementation of twinning projects are sustained cooperation over a minimum period of 
12 months and peer pressure on the basis of measurable benchmarks. 
This does not preclude that social learning takes place within the framework of the 
twinning exercise. However, the possibility of twinning partners to cooperate predicted 
by notions such as institutional isomorphism and social leaming was unlikely given the 
various factors that may have impeded individual projects. In contrast, twinnings were 
likely to achieve the establishment of administrative capacities based on institutional 
hybridization, emulation, synthesis and inspiration (Rose 1991: 21-22; see also Dolowitz 
and Marsh 2000: 13). These processes were likely to be sustained by significant 
innovation and indigenous designs for the implementation of EU policies. The levels of 
transfer as well as the objects of transfer in such processes are specific to each twinning 
project. It depends largely on the domestic circumstances to what extent even the 
implementation of institution-building projects may impact on the reform of public 
administrations. 
Conclusion 
The importance of policy transfer in the 
enlargement process 
I Introduction 
Imitation is the sincerest of flattery. 
Charles Caleb Colton, Lacon, volume 1, no. 183 
(1780 - 1832), emphasis added. 
By three methods we may learn wisdom: First, by 
reflection, which is noblest; second, by imitation, 
which is easiest; and third by experience, which is the 
bitterest. 
Confucius, Chinese philosopher & reformer 
(551 BC - 479 BC), emphasis added. 
This thesis shed light on the EU's administrative conditionality through an analysis of the 
formulation and implementation of the twinning exercise. It sought to explain the reforms 
in 1997, in particular the decisions that led to the continuous reshaping of the twinning 
instrument. However, it was also concerned with theory-building on the issue of 
enlargement and the EU's policy in relation to applicant states. The thesis in particular set 
out to answer the following two questions: 
3. Internal governance. What factors can account for the introduction of the 
twinning exercise and which sources of information were critical for its 
formulation? 
. 
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4. External governance. What type of accession instrument is the twinning exercise 
and how does it influence candidates to reform their institutions? 
2 The twinning exercise in theoretical perspective 
In order to facilitate a structured analysis of the empirical material, it introduced a 
methodological approach that is based on the triangulation of empirical findings deriving 
from elite interviewing, document analysis and quantitative data on the implementation of 
twinning. The dependent variables have been specified as the introduction of the twinning 
exercise and its character as an instrument of accession. The analysis of the empirical 
findings was separated into two stages concerning internal governance and external 
governance of the EU. This allowed for a clearer distinction between the explanations 
offered on these different parts of the process. 
The triangulation of research findings proved helpful in particular where gaps emerged in 
research process. However, it was also an important heuristic too] to combine the findings 
from the three sources of inquiry utilized in this thesis. This approach tied in with the 
specification of plausible rival hypothesis that were based on alternative explanations for 
internal governance on the one hand and external governance on the other. The testing of 
these hypotheses was ensured by separate chapters on internal governance (see Chapter 7) 
and external governance (see Chapter 8). In addition, chapters 5 and 6 allowed depicting 
the historical background of the case study and putting the alternative theoretical models 
to af irst test. 
2.1 Theoretical considerations 
The second step was to specify the theories that underpinned the models outlined in 
Chapter 4. This included a closer definition of the term internal governance, which was 
described as the process of formulating internally the policies towards outsiders (see also 
M. Smith 1996; His and Murphy 1999). The thesis also paid attention to the fact that the 
twinning exercise was introduced at the instrumental level of the Phare programme. As a 
result, it was not necessary for the reform group within DG IA to feed a formal proposal 
through the Council of Ministers. In contrast, it decided to formulate the procedures of 
the twinning exercise with the help of a network of NCPs. This process has been rcflected 
upon by a discussion of the EU's system of committees which governs over the 
implementation of Community programmes. The thesis identified two alternative 
explanations for these forums which are based on RCI and SC. 
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These forums are described as oversight mechanisms by rationalist scholars (Pollack 
2003b: 88,114; cf Tallberg 2002: ME), whereas constructivist scholars refer to them as 
forums of deliberation (Trondal 2002; Joerges and Neyer 1997a). The findings of scholars 
working on EU committee governance have been largely influenced by the new 
institutionalist literature. Several debates about these forums have generally centred on 
the issue whether there is a logic of anticipated consequences guiding the decisions taken 
within these committees or rather a logic of appropriateness. This thesis has identified 
four plausible rival hypotheses that derive from these discussions and initial observations 
during the research process. These alternative hypotheses for the internal governance 
stage of decision-making were based on the following theoretical models: evidence-based 
policy-making, lesson-drawing, intergovernmental bargaining, and deliberative supra- 
nationalism. Chapter 4 outlined the theoretical models underpinning these hypotheses in 
greater detail. It argued that a synthesis of the lesson-drawing approach as introduced by 
Rose (1993; 1991) and RCI enables an application of this concept to the role of the 
Commission in the policy-making process. The same applies to the evidcnce-based 
policy-making approach which seems to lack explanatory power without the heuristic 
tools provided for by RCL 
The external governance stage of decision-making was defined as the gradual process of 
extending the EU's authority to the candidate countries (see also M. Smith 1996; Nis 
and Murphy 1999). It was taken note of the fact that the enlargement process mainly had 
been described by the concept of conditionality. However, the thesis followed 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2004: 662) who argue that there is a 'need to 
distinguish analytically between the use of 'conditional ity' as a political strategy and its 
causal impact on domestic politics'. As a result, chapters 3 and 4 outlined how various 
instruments can result in different ways of influencing candidate countries. The thesis 
identified three alternative approaches that seemed plausible as explanations for the 
implementation of the twinning exercise: governance by conditionality, persuasion and 
social learning, and new forms of governance. 
2.2 The role of policy transfer In the policy process 
As central concepts running through all chapters, lesson-drawing and policy transfer 
factor high in the theoretical positions of this thesis. These approaches to policy-making 
and implementation have been introduced with regard to the EU's internal governance 
and its external governance. The thesis highlighted that each of the models specified in 
Chapter 4 can be associated with a particular form of policy transfer; the most classic 
example being the fact that the concept of institutional isomorphism can be seen as an 
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element of deliberative supranationalism. In other words, the search for common 
solutions as described by deliberative supranationalism can culminate into a process 
whereby policy-makers adopt a particular institution because the discourse among them 
views it as appropriate or legitimate. The relationship to the evidence-based policy- 
making model is also relatively clear. This model predicts the completely opposite 
approach to policy-making than lesson-drawing. However, in case lesson-drawing is 
utilised during the policy-making process, it usually combines with evidence taken from 
evaluations or internal assessments to form innovative solutions (Jacoby 2000; Westney 
1987). This has been emphasised in Chapter 4 where the alternative outcomes of policy 
transfer of transfer were defined as copying, emulation, hybridisation, synthesis and 
inspiration. Finally, individual member states may seek to transfer their domestic policies 
or systems to the EU in order to avoid distortions to competition or avoid adaptation costs 
(Knill 2001; B6rzeI 2001; Bomberg and Peterson 2000). Thus, policy transfer can also 
become an element of intergovernmental bargaining. 
The external governance models outlined in Chapter 4 can also be associated with the 
concepts of lesson-drawing and policy transfer. Since applicants are expected to introduce 
systems to implement the acquis and introduce EU legislation at the domestic level, 
governance by conditionality can result in coercive forms of policy transfer. This is 
because applicants were expected to perform the task of implementing Community 
legislation at a similar level than the current member states. In addition, in case 
persuasion and social learning were to be the chosen mode of governance during the 
implementation of the twinning exercise, the discourse between the project 
implementation staff and local officials would have resulted in institutional isomorphism. 
In contrast, the new forms of governance model links to the idea of obligated policy 
transfer. This is an expression of the fact that applicants have to meet the obligations of 
membership upon accession into the Community. The in-built mechanisms of 
benchmarking enable the candidates to identify suitable institutional models to implement 
the acquis, and the ongoing monitoring by their future peers reminds them of their 
obligation under the treaties. It is largely a result of the characteristics of a particular 
instrument whether it supports more coercive or voluntary forms of obligated policy 
transfer. 
The epigraphs above show that imitation may not only become an important part of 
policy-making, but is an undisputable part of everyday life. It is not an instinct that we 
have to learn in order to perform well in our occupations, but rather it is an essential 
element of our lives from a very early age. It is therefore not surprising that a number of 
scholars have revealed the important role lesson-drawing and similar methods of learning 
. 
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took in formulating policies. The contributions of scholars working on this phenomenon 
reach over a range of issues as diverse as economic policy (Lal 2001), environmental 
protection (Haverland 2003), modernization (Westney 1987), foreign policy (Levy 1994) 
and bureaucratic accountability (Bennett 1997). 
This thesis has shown that emulation was an important factor for reform in the 
enlargement process. It helped to formulate the implementation procedures of the 
twinning exercise and guided its subsequent implementation. The transfer of institutional 
models from Western Europe to the administrations of the CEE candidates has clearly 
been facilitated by twinning projects, while the introduction of the implementation 
procedures for the instrument itself, also considerably benefited from the involvement of 
Claude Comuau, an external expert with experience in similar operations. The latter 
finding, points to the Commission's readiness to address its lack of experience and 
resources on particular instruments. 
2.3 The findings of the thesis 
In spite of the problems that occurred during the implementation of the twinning exercise, 
it should not be forgotten that its introduction has been 'a landmark for the overall reform 
of the enlargement strategy' (Interview 16, CEC official, II September 2002). The main 
achievement of its formulation was to overcome the bureaucratic obstacles that prevented 
policy-makers in the early 1990s from introducing it. As a well-established delivery 
method in development cooperation, it had to offer a great deal of functionality to the 
accession process. Firstly, the secondment of member states' officials to the candidates' 
administrations enabled mutual learning processes that went beyond the scope of 
developing administrative capacities. The twinning of institutions in the accession process 
also led to active network-building between administrations in the Eastern and Western 
parts of Europe. It allowed the actors involved in implementation to experiment with 
institutional designs and to learn from the experience of their counterparts. 
Secondly, the particular twinning concept that was developed by the Commission with 
the support of the external expert Claude Comuau, gave impetus to a number of outreach 
activities. In other words, the twinning of institutions as a basic institutional partnership 
led to several types of exchanges between officials: internships, study visits, training 
activities, or, for example, the joint drafting of inspiration papers. These activities 
provided the CEE officials with valuable information on the systems of implementation 
that were used in Western Europe to comply with the acquis communautaire. The 
combination of long-term secondments with short-term measures facilitated the enhanced 
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cooperation of ministries across Europe. Since the introduction of twinning more than 
800 PAAs were sent to the candidate countries until the end of 2004. The Commission 
estimates that roughly six times the amount of STEs participated in twinning projects. In 
conclusion, we may therefore say that both the Commission and the member states 
allocated a fair amount of their resources to the implementation of this pre-accession 
instrument. This culminated into the largest effort of know-how transfer between 
administrations in the OECD to date (OECD 2002: 25). 
3 The hypotheses evaluated: the role of knowledge in the policy process 
This section provides an overall evaluation of the alternative hypotheses confirmed in 
chapters 7 and 8. It highlights the characteristics of the policy process regarding the 
formulation and implementation of the twinning exercise in light of the findings of the 
thesis. In order to re-establish the connection between the theoretical and empirical parts 
of the thesis, some of the earlier findings are reiterated. This section also clarifies the 
connection of this thesis to other literatures. 
3.1 Internal governance: the Introduction of the twinning exercise 
This thesis has shown that the formulation of instruments such as twinning in 1997 were 
not just the result of ad hoc entrepreneurship by the Commission. In contrast, the officials 
from DGIA that were involved in the reforms had been involved in the search for 
solutions for most of the 1990s. The first significant reforms of the Phare programme 
were conducted in 1993 at the Copenhagen Summit. Issues such as the possibility of 
infrastructure investment caused considerable controversy among officials from the 
member states, in particular in Britain, France, and Ireland. However, the extension of the 
infrastructure facility introduced into Phare in Copenhagen was agreed when the pre- 
accession strategy was created at the 1994 Essen European Council. There was a 
considerable amount of repercussions involved in these decisions. In particular, private 
consultants lost out on technical assistance contracts. 
The theme of investment support was carried all the way through to the 1997 reforms 
where it became clear that this type of support would account for 70 percent of Phare 
funding. Chapter 5 also highlighted that the EU's conditionality by no means was created 
with the introduction of the Copenhagen criteria in 1993. On the contrary, it evolved over 
time as a response to membership applications by several countries and as a political 
strategy through the G24 aid initiative. However, the repeated clarification of the 
accession criteria since the publication of Agenda 2000 gave momentum to the 
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enlargement process and became instrumental in the programming of the accession 
instruments. There was a shift in the approach to enlargement towards more active 
leverage regarding the candidates' political, economic, and administrative reforms 
(Vachudova, 200 1). 
The governance approach is a key concept in this thesis since it is instrumental in 
explaining the complex nature of the enlargements process and Community policies alike. 
Chapter 8 has already confirmed that the lesson-drawing model provides the most 
accurate picture of the introduction of twinning. However, it has to be stressed that the 
lesson-drawing approach alone is of little use. In order to explain the process more 
accurately, a synthesis between the models of lesson-drawing and evidence-based policy- 
making as outlined in Chapter 4 is necessary. The lesson-drawing component can explain 
the involvement and influence of the external expert Claude Cornuau and the evidence- 
based policy-making model may explain the factors that derived from internal assessment 
and evaluations. These models can both be embedded within the conceptual scope of the 
RCI approach. As a result, this thesis describes a picture whereby the Commission 
actively made use of knowledge to gain a maximum of influence over the formulation of 
the twinning procedures. In some circumstances it had to give in to the demands of the 
member states. However, the overall design of the projects as it had been developed by 
DGIA was never compromised during implementation. Even measures such as twinning 
light were designed to complete the tasks envisaged by the twinning exercise, not to 
replace it as an instrument. 
These forms of internal policy-making have complemented the Community method, the 
networking with relevant interest groups and national administrations (Peterson 1995b; 
Jachtenfuchs 2001), and the construction of epistemic communities (Haas 1992; Zito 
2001; Verdun 1999). While the latter are forms of coordinating Commission proposals 
with contacts that have been established over a long period of time, lesson-drawing can 
be used in a more ad hoc manner, allowing decision-makers to respond relatively quickly 
to the challenges they face. This dimension should not be underestimated in particular in 
the enlargement process. In addition, however, policy networks and epistemic 
communities can generate and sustain lesson-drawing over time. It is frequently used as a 
method of prospective policy evaluation (Rose 1993,199 1 ). 
In reality the long period in which twinning procedures were adjusted and made to fit the 
requirements of the actors involved in the process ultimately resulted into a moulding of 
various elements of policy-making. Lesson-drawing was the most important of these 
elements and this is well demonstrated by the involvement of Claude Comuau. He had 
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been working on similar programmes for USAID and the World Bank in Vietnam before. 
The procedures of twinning were essentially the outcome of his discussions with 
Commission staff in Brussels, neither the Delegations of the Commission to the 
applicants nor the member states were initially consulted. At the time these actors got 
involved through the NCP meetings, only minor adjustments were made to the concept 
developed by Comuau and the team in DGIA. Several intcrviewees confirmed that he 
was the main person involved in drafting the concept paper and the twinning manual on 
twinning. The management level in DGIA, Frangois Lamoureux and Catherine Day, 
helped to push through any obstacles that occurred during the formulation of 
implementation procedures. 
3.2 External governance: twinning as an Instrument of accession 
In relation to the external governance stage of decision-making, this thesis has shown that 
the introduction of the reinforced pre-accession strategy indeed led to more explicit 
conditionality terms in the enlargement process (Vachudova 2001,2004). However, 
instruments such as the APs and the NPAAs are to be seen as programming documents 
rather than elements of conditionalities that are enforced during the accession process. 
The latter seems truer of the accession negotiations which give more leverage to 
Community actors than the pre-accession financial instruments. As one official noted, 
'you don't buy yourself influence in the candidate countries with peanuts' (Intw 18, CEC 
official, II September 2002). This thesis therefore argues that the Commission utilised 
lesson-drawing in order to establish a new form of governance which would allow the 
candidate countries to transfer institutional models for the implementation of the acquis 
from their future peers. 
This finding is rather unique in the sense that it points to a more open approach to the 
implementation of the Phare programme than usually portrayed in the literature (Heil 
2000; de Chavagnac 1993; Deloche-Gaudez 1996; but see Steffens 2003; Tulmets 
2005a). There was such a variety of actors involved in the process of implementing 
twinning that it is logical to assume large variations at this stage of the decision-making 
process. The type of external governance that derives from the twinning exercise, 
however, generally falls under the heading of enhanced cooperation rather than 
reinforcement by reward. This contrast to the findings of well-established authors within 
the enlargement literature (Schimmelfennig 2004; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004; 
Schimmelfennig et aL 2005). It also contradicts the findings of most scholars that are 
working on the enlargement of the EU. These contributions generally emphasise the 
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important role of conditionality in the process (Van Westering 2000; Maresceau 2003; 
Pridham 2002; Reinholde 2004). 
3.3 The argument and overall findings of the thesis 
It is argued that the introduction of the -twinning exercise" was largely facilitated by 
lesson-drawing, whereas the programme itself constitutes a new. form of governance. it 
can generate obligated policy transfer and opportunities for learning depending on the 
actors involved in the implementation of the projects. In this context, the thesis stresses 
that the transfer of institutional models through twinning projects is driven by both the 
interdependence of actors during implementation and the possibility of resistance by 
domestic actors. 
Overall findings 
The thesis found that the involvement of an external consultant, Claude Cornuau, was 
necessary as an element of internal governance to face institutional path dependencies 
that were enshrined in the administrative culture of the Commission services (see Table 
22). The recruitment of this consultant became instrumental in unlocking the deadlock 
that existed regarding the culture of checking the means of assistance rather than the 
results of Phare operations. 
Agents of transfer Indigenous actors 
Internal governance International donors Commission officials 
Introduction of the twinning 
exercise Claude Cornuau EuropeAid Cooperation 
(international expert) Office 
Evaluation exercises 
External governance PAA CC pro. ject leader 
TNNinning as an instrument of 
accession MS proJect leader CC officials 
Short-term experts CC ministers 
Commission Delegation 
Commission HQ. - twinning 
team, geographical team, line 
DGs 
Source: Author's compilation. 
Table 22: The agents of transfer in internal and external governance 
It was also found that the engagement of the consultant led to the applications of lessons 
learned during the implementation of projects of other donor organizations. The 
consultant in particular made use of previous appointments as project manager of 
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twinning projects in Cambodia and Vietnam. The latter example provided negative 
lessons regarding the quality of long-term advisers and overall, his experience in the field 
was instrumental in convincing the management level within DGIA of the necessity of 
particular procedures (cf Rose 1991,1993). The thesis also highlighted that indigenous 
actors had significant influence on the internal governance stage of decision-making. 
These were in particular Commission officials working on the 1997 reforms; the 
Commission staff involved in introducing the joint external services; and internal 
assessments that were often presented in form of evaluation reports (see Table 22 below). 
Thus, lesson-drawing as a form of prospective policy evaluation became instrumental 
during the formulation of the twinning exercise and its procedures. 
The findings on the external governance stage of decision-making point to several actors 
in the process. It was found that the main actors during the implementation of twinnings 
are the PAA, the MS project leader, short-term experts and various services of the 
Commission. These actors become involved as agents of transfer during the 
implementation of twinnings in the applicant countries (cf Stone 2003,2004). They make 
use of their individual experience to influence domestic reforms in these administrative 
systems of these countries. As indigenous actors, the thesis has identified the CC project 
leader, CC officials and CC ministers as the key personnel that may affect the outcomes 
of particular projects. The thesis has also highlighted that the involvement of these actors 
and the utilization of the twinning exercise most likely results in hybridisation of 
institutional models coupled with significant amounts of innovation. 
Relevance to other literatures 
These findings have implications for a number of specific literatures. Firstly, the literature 
on external influences on democratization and reform in CEE has attracted a growing 
number of authors. This literature generally questions to what extent domestic reforms in 
these countries are driven by external influences (Beyme 1993; Andorka 1993; Derlien 
1991; K6nig 1993; Elster et aL 1998; Pridharn 2002). Scholars working on external 
influences may find that these do not only appear in form of bold political strategies such 
as the EU's conditionality, but also in shape of concrete instruments such as the twinning 
exercise. The thesis shows that such instruments do not necessarily adopt the same 
enforcement mechanisms as the overall strategy of the Community. In the case study 
under observation in this thesis, the instrument took on the form of enhanced cooperation 
based on a flexible approach to implementation. 
Secondly, it connects to the literature on conditionality. This literature is rather 
established with regards to the lending operations of international organisations on the 
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one hand (Williamson 1983a, 1983b; Stokke 1995; Feldstein 1998; Mikesell 1983) and 
membership conditionality on the other (Fierke and Wiener 1999; Schimmelfennig 
2003b; Jacoby 2004; Grabbe 2002; Hughes et aL 2004a). Scholars working on this aspect 
of policies may find that the membership conditionality can take on 'softer' forms than 
is the case for example in IMF agreements (see also Papadimitriou and Phinnemore 
2004). 
Thirdly, the findings of this thesis also provide insights for scholars interested in 
Europeanization and policy transfer (Knill 2001; Jacoby 2005; Grabbe 2003; B6rzel 
2001; Olsen 2002; Dolowitz and Marsh 2000). The thesis shows that lesson-drawing and 
policy transfer as approaches to the policy process can be embedded in the institutionalist 
literature to enhance the scope of their conceptual applicability. Scholars working on the 
Europeanization of public administrations in particular may find the emphasis given to 
the provision of institutional models particularly helpful. This aspect of administrative 
reform has hardly been highlighted in the literature. The findings show that the regular 
availability of institutional models in form of templates, thresholds and adjustments 
potentially have a significant impact on the candidate countries by offering opportunities 
for them to combine experience with innovation (see also Jacoby 2001 b, 2004). 
Fourthly, it can speak to scholars working on administrative reforms in the candidate 
countries. This literature has focused on EU enlargement as a driving force of executive 
reform in CEE (Lippert et al. 2001; Bossaert 2003; Nicolaides 2003; lankova and 
Katzenstein 2003; T. Verheijen 2002). While some of the contributors to this literature 
emphasise the inadequacy of the EU policies for horizontal public administration reform, 
this thesis shows that the enlargement strategy only touched on this issue in passing and 
in contrast focused on vertical administrative capacity building. The author of this thesis 
therefore disagrees with the assessment that the pre-accession policies provided 
inadequate instruments for civil service reforms. In contrast, the findings of this thesis 
show that the Commission never intended to touch on this matter of sovereignty. it 
therefore limited its activities to monitoring and advice when civil service reforms came 
under consideration. Instead, it used the twinning exercise as a mechanism to develop 
vertical administrative capacities. 
The twinning exercise beyond enlargement 
The Commission highlighted in its White Paper on Governance with regards to the 
performance of national administrations in implementing the acquis communautaire that 
'the Union can effectively draw on the experience acquired with the applicant countries, 
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such as the twinning arrangements' (CEC 2001d: 25). The twinning exercise also 
resurfaced as Article 111-185 in the Draft Constitutional Treaty 97 of the European 
Convention as a means of improving 'their administrative capacity to implement Union 
law' (European Convention 2003: 150). 98 Its operation is currently extended by a 
'transition facility', which has been included in the accession treaty of the candidates 
(Article 34). 
This clearly shows that the instrument is evaluated positively internally, while externally 
it has been criticised severely for its cumbersome procedures; problems during 
implementation; and its focus on the sectoral capacities of the administrations in CEE 
(see CEC, 2000; Cooper and Hohansen, 2003; European Court of Auditors, 2003a, 2003b; 
OMAS Consortium, 2001 a, 2001b; VerheiJen, T., 2002). However, the most likely uptake 
of twinning projects will derive from enlargement processes with the remaining and new 
applicant countries. 
In addition, the Commission has explicitly emphasised that the 'ENP99 will provide 
support including technical assistance and twinning for partners that wish to meet EU 
norms and standards' (CEC 2004i: 9, emphasis added). Although the ENP's introduction 
is delayed until 2007, when the new financial perspective comes into place, the 
Commission will set the trajectory of its implementation by introducing its elements in 
CARDS and MEDA. This shows that the EU also transfers instruments across related 
policy areas. 
4 Conclusion 
The rationale behind the reinforced pre-accession strategy was to enable candidate 
countries to meet the challenge of EU membership. As the implementation of the acquis 
lies in the member states' responsibility, it appears to be logical that civil servants from 
their administrations were chosen to become pre-accession advisers during the accession 
process. However, the secondment of civil servants to CEE administrations meant 
overcoming large bureaucratic hurdles and as a consequence was deemed impossible until 
the introduction of the twinning exercise in 1998. 
97 The body of laws and rules developed over time. 
9' My thanks go to David Phinnemore who has pointed me to this article in the convention draft. 
99 European Neighbourbood Policy. 
Conclusion: The importance of policy transfer in the enlargement process 253 
This thesis set out to explain how the twinning exercise has been introduced and 
implemented. There is substantial evidence that the hypothesis Hlb on internal 
governance stated in Chapter I can be confirmed. However, the Commission has by no 
means retained full control of the implementation process and the member states have 
also been able to introduce some of their own interests and preferences into the 
procedures of the instrument. Yet, the Commission could assert considerable control over 
the programming of the projects. There are many reasons why it has been so successful. 
We may conclude here that the main factor was the seemingly bureaucratic way in which 
the enlargement strategy had been designed in 1997. 
This needs further explanation. Although elements like the progress reports, AN and the 
covenants for the twinning exercise appear to be bureaucratic acts at first sight; in 
combination they have enabled the Commission to exert influence during the 
implementation of the pre-accession financial instruments. The progress reports aimed at 
influencing the political elites of the candidate countries such as governments, 
parliaments, opposition leaders, NGOs and also the public. This is because these 
apparently bureaucratic documents are discussed extensively in the candidates' media, 
they can therefore be considered highly political in nature. The Commission has been 
able to produce a kind of artificial competition between the candidate countries through 
the progress reports, which left them longing feverishly for their publication. After all, 
these documents spelled out what each country still needed to do in order to become a 
member of the EU. The AN have been useful documents to clarify the medium-term and 
long-term reform objectives that had to be met by the candidate countries. They were 
directed at the line ministries in CEECs, while spelling out in much more detail than the 
progress reports what needed to be done in order to render the accession process 
successfully. 
At the level of instruments, the accession negotiations are the Commission's most useful 
tool. The flexibility that was given to the negotiations by the method of provisionally 
closing chapters on behalf of the Union enabled the negotiators to put significant pressure 
on candidate countries even when chapters were already closed. As mentioned in Chapter 
7, the provisional closure of chapters did on several occasions incorporate demands to 
support and implement other instruments of the pre-accession strategy. In many cases, 
EU negotiators asked applicants to engage in twinning exercises where they did not 
comply with the acquis communautaire. Furthermore, the EU also introduced new forms 
of governance that are 'more accepting of diversity and encourage semi-voluntary forms 
of co-ordination' (Mosher and Trubek 2003: 63), since not all parts of the acquis are as 
explicit as those discussed at the negotiation tables. In addition, the Commission also 
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wanted to ensure to meet wider objectives, such as cooperation between neighbouring 
regions and the effective implementation of EU policies. These were not explicitly 
spelled out in the legal terms of the acquis, but would become more important during the 
post-accession period. 
It has to be mentioned of course that the twinning exercise has been only one among 
many instruments of the enlargement strategy and the reinforced pre-accession strategy in 
particular. Its unique features, however, enabled its application in the sensitive area of 
administrative reform. Cross-border cooperation programmes, participation in community 
programmes, the border regions programme, and technical assistance have also been 
important elements of the Phare programme. In addition, the implementation of the 
remaining pre-accession financial instruments also enabled the candidates to test their 
administrative structures before accession. 
